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Science, technology and agency in the development of droughtprone areas: a 
cognitive history of drought and scarcity. 
Abstract 
Drought and scarcity are two frameworks in common use to study the relationships 
between natural phenomena creating lack of water (drought) and the lack of access to 
water for human security and economic development (scarcity). This thesis studies how 
these frameworks have shaped public action in droughtprone and scarcity regions over 
time, in the agencies created for water development, and their cognitive and technical 
norms used in analysis of drought and scarcity and design of development programmes. 
These public agencies have relied on science and technology both to generate new 
understanding of drought mechanisms and social and environmental dynamics shaping 
scarcity, and also mobilise water sources to reduce vulnerabilities in droughtprone regions. 
It explores two hypotheses: that scientific, technological and political elites build their 
power - or struggle to remain prominent actors - through the cognitive and technical 
norms that they build; and that a cognitive framework linking drought and scarcity can 
transform options to assess, allocate and use water resources in droughtprone areas. The 
thesis presents case studies from three droughtprone regions, India, Yemen and 
Zimbabwe. These regions have different patterns of drought risk and intensity, which 
manifest themselves in different dependencies and risks on different water sources - soil 
moisture, groundwater and surface water - to support agricultural production. They are also 
very different types of state in terms of their commitment to public action for development. 
The countries show differing dependencies on techno-scientific networks, techno- 
economic networks and district and community level management in shaping livelihood 
security in the face of drought, and have had different performances in mitigating drought 
impacts and creating equitable institutions to mediate scarce water resources. Future public 
action will be better informed by the emergence of critical science with a stronger 
commitment to shared knowledge and participatory debate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I 
While drought is a meteorological phenomenon, scarcity represents its impact on the 
socioeconomic life of that region. Scarcity may include drought but drought need not 
necessarily result in scarcity conditions... Quite often, droughtprone areas are wrongly 
identified with economically backward regions. Government of Maharashtra, 1973, Vol 1, p. 37 
1.1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVES 
1.1. The scope of this thesis 
This thesis builds a cognitive history of drought and scarcity through a study of 
science, technology and agency used to analyse drought and transform water 
availability in droughtprone areas. It looks at why and how society has come to see 
drought and water scarcity as risks needing public action; and how, why, and to what 
extent, science and technology have primacy in defining public action in the 
droughtprone areas. It examines what has changed in understanding of development in 
drought- and scarcity-affected communities, and why these areas still generate direct 
action and contestation despite growing understanding of natural mechanisms and 
social relations mediating water use. 
As the opening quote shows, there have been two cognitive frameworks shaping 
knowledge for public action in droughtprone areas: drought and its associated risks, 
and scarcity and its mitigation. That of drought has looked at the dynamics of the water 
cycle as shaped by dry periods, focusing onto the different cycle elements - soil 
moisture, surface water and groundwater - as progressively mobilised for use 
in 
droughtprone areas, and the materialisation of manmade drought as water resources 
become over-developed. That of scarcity has moved from a focus on scarcity of 
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economic opportunity and precariousness of food supply shaped by limited and 
uncertain water supplies, to a framework of water scarcity involving problems of water 
access. This scarcity is shaped by social relations and water management that limit 
action to build new institutions to mediate this scarcity, as well as physical and 
economic forces. This thesis studies the development of these frameworks, and the 
shifts between them, in the evolution of development policies and programmes in 
droughtprone areas. 
A first hypothesis of this thesis is that scientific, technological and political elites 
build profiles, or struggle to remain prominent actors in release of water technology, 
through their cognitive and technical norms, and limit and contest new knowledge 
networks and new science. Also, how these cognitive networks and possible 
transformations evolve is hugely shaped by the developmental nature of the states they 
are part of, and state-locality relations within them. Within public agencies, the 
development and protection of scientific and technical norms is often justified in the 
name of good science and technology to advise or help the public good. However, 
pursuit of such norms for their own sake, and in the interests of self-preservation can 
often work against the real power of such evolved norms to have public acceptability 
and legitimacy, and be a real power to shape sustainable development. Dowding (1996) 
distinguished `power to' from `power over', where the former is about outcome power, 
to bring about or help bring changes in outcomes. The latter is about social power, or 
the ability of one actor to change the actions of another. Scientists and engineers have 
often assumed that their findings and norms create knowledge and rational decision- 
making for positive change in public welfare, and thus also reinforce their status in 
public decision-making. This study proposes that persistence with embedded norms for 
protection of agency profiles without their regular review for relevance and acceptance 
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in new problem contexts, can lead to losses of both sources of power in the public 
domain. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1999,1990) traced the evolution of `post-normal 
science' as an approach capable to investigate complex environmental problems with 
high degrees of uncertainty within them. Such science focuses on the quality of data 
and norms rather than just experimental design of hypothesis testing, and participation 
in decision-making along with others espousing different knowledge - in contrast to a 
narrow focus on incremental and experimentally-derived physical knowledge and 
belief in the superiority and primacy of quantitative analysis. Much of this thesis is 
about the failure of such post-normal science to find a place inside most specialty 
agencies - as well as the struggle of some scientists and professionals to preserve a 
serious debate about known knowledge of the biophysical world and technology in new 
struggles in water management. 
A second hypothesis is that these two cognitive frameworks have emerged and 
retreated over time in relation to the politics of their agencies rather than cognitive 
shifts, becoming discourses that compete rather than inform each other. However, 
better future integration can transform options to discuss water shortage problems, 
reshape knowledge systems and act for change. In such a new framework there are still 
important and interesting roles for science - but it demands recognition of the 
technological and social contexts shaping the demand for knowledge, and that wider 
public cognition can and should shape the scope of science and technology in societal 
futures. This study uses a conceptual framework built around cognition (see Chapter 2), 
and applies this to a study of science, technology and agency in three different 
countries - India, Yemen and Zimbabwe. It aims to show the struggles, inertia and 
transformations in key scientific fields of endeavour related to drought study, and in 
techno-scientific, bureaucratic and local agencies shaping water use. 
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1.1.2 The problem context 
The struggle of farmers against poverty and insecurity to live in droughtprone areas 
has been of prominent concern for their governing states and their publics. Climates 
with significant dry periods and irregular rainfall - drought - affect some 67% of the 
African continent, 65% of Asia and 20.5 million hectares (2%) of Latin America - 
shaping the lives, livelihoods and social relations of people living there, and the public 
action taken to reduce the social stresses that drought brings. Traditionally public 
action in these areas was concerned to combat famine and food insecurity triggered by 
failure of production and exchange mechanisms consequent to drought. Ilowcver, 
development policies for droughtprone areas also sought to release their economic 
potential if critical scarcities (including water) could be overcome. These older 
concerns have been made more urgent by the contestations emerging as `man-made' 
drought and scarcity conditions create competition for water through the combination 
of over-development and unequal access, brought about by the over-allocation and use 
of rivers and aquifers. Thus there is a new urgency to discuss more appropriate 
hydrology planning, technology choices and design approaches to water systems and 
their operation in droughtprone areas. 
There is now more than a century of public action recorded in the droughtprone 
regions (Government of Maharashtra, 1973), based heavily on new science and 
technology promoted to meet their needs. Much research has shown that these public 
interventions have massively reduced the risks of famine, and brought water supplies to 
more farmers (Sinha et al, 1987). Yet other research has shown that significant 
inequalities and vulnerabilities remain in livelihood security (Agarwal, 1991). Farmers 
have lost as well as gained water access under new irrigation development (Dubash, 
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2002; Knegt and Vincent, 2001), and the poorest must often still lobby, strategise and 
protest to preserve or gain access to food and water in a drought (Omvedt and Patankar, 
1991). Struggles around new water development programmes and laws show that the 
public deliberations underpinned by science and elite techno-scientific agencies are 
often seen to lack accountability, legitimacy or even reliability (Lemos, 2003: Waller, 
1994). Meanwhile, local people have diverse experiences and pluralistic views on the 
nature and causes of water scarcity that few public agencies and scientists interact with 
(Mehta, 1998). Clearly the knowledge generated on drought events, and the stresses on 
people struggling for water access in droughtprone areas, is still insufficient, 
inappropriate or contested in planning action. 
How and why such struggles continue, and implementation and intervention fall 
short of expectations and have unforeseen consequences despite reshaping of policies 
and programmes with conscious deployment of science and technology, is the focus of 
this thesis. It also hopes to show that there have been changes in knowledge and action 
for living with drought, through changing cognition. While many problems remain, by 
understanding these inconsistencies and struggles we can learn more for future action. 
Despite the growing concern over competition for water and vulnerability of 
societies to drought, there are still few comparative studies on cognition behind public 
action in droughtprone areas. Douglas (1985) emphasized the importance of 
recognising how and why societies highlight the risks they do, and choose to face them 
in particular ways. Allan (1993) asserts that, when we explore the social realities 
creating scarcity conditions, we can better negotiate their stresses and avoid war and 
violent conflict. Many authors recognise that policy development and implementation 
is greatly influenced by the scientific and technical information accepted (Sarewitz and 
Peilke, 1999, Thomas et al, 1998), and there are a few excellent studies showing the 
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interplay of water development, technology choices, elites and water politics (Waller, 
1994; Mollinga, 1998). However, studies that relate such political dynamics back into 
the heartland of scientific and engineering calculations and document their implications 
for water development and access, are rare even for one state or water sector (Lemos 
2003; van Halsema, 2002). This thesis attempts such a study in a range of states for a 
range of water sources over time. It aims to show changing cognition in policy 
formulation' and action by states and their public agencies, of the social processes in 
which science and technology are embedded, and the roles these processes continue to 
play in determining water resource dynamics and resource access in droughtprone 
areas. It also presents my own changing cognition in development-related research, 
with a hope to inform the possibilities for action by practitioners, communities and 
governments in the future. 
1.1.3 What is a droughtprone area? 
To many, a droughtprone area is a socionatural region with climates and societies 
affected by dry periods. A gradation of annual average rainfall criteria has been used as 
an indicator of worsening climatic challenges for agriculture. The first is an annual 
average rainfall of 800-1000 mm, where crop production is fairly assured but drought 
can bring crop failure of one year in 7-10 years. The second is an average annual 
rainfall of 500-800 mm, where crop options are more constrained and there are also 
higher risks of low rainfall and crop failure in one year in four or five. The problematic 
nature of risks in cropping has focused most international attention on this regime. The 
'Leftwich (2000) described policy formation as courses of action with means of implementation and 
outcomes. 
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last is the annual average rainfall of 300-500 mm, where crop failure can come one 
year in three or less, and agriculture is geared to much lower expectations of rainfall. 
(Cocheme and Franquin, 1967; ICRISAT, 1978(iii); Wallen, 1967) As climates 
become drier, so runoff is less, and dependencies on groundwater and special storage 
technologies become greater. The social mechanisms that regulate risks and control 
access to water vary not only with the drought risk context but also the society living 
under it. These social actions shape the nature of the 'scarcity' that materialises in 
relation to access to water. The actions of science, technology and agency in shaping 
the development of societies in these three droughtprone regimes with very different 
dependencies on different water sources - Zimbabwe, India and Yemen respectively -- 
are the focus of this thesis. 
Looking from the perspective of water supply, drought brings risks of food and 
water insecurity, and even famine - risks and hazards to be mitigated through our 
capacities to mobilise water and production for food, domestic needs and economic 
opportunity (Subramaniam, 1975). Looking from the economy of the region and life of 
its people, drought is significant in its creation of vulnerable livelihoods for producers, 
risky production for farm output and regional economic transformation, and thus 
impoverishment of people and stagnation of regions (Jodha, 1991). These are 
production conditions that science and technology have aimed to change through better 
water security and transformed farming systems, to find niche opportunities and new 
livelihoods, ensure basic needs, and build regenerative capacity and resilience to 
environmental fluctuations and shocks (Datye et al, 2000). 
However, looking from social relations that will evolve to control and mediate these 
actions around water and development - especially as mediated by power, knowledge 
and labour processes - droughtprone areas are not only natural habitats but also social 
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arenas. These involve actions around water control technologies and resource capture 
and exclusion, exploitative agrarian relations, coercive and authoritarian control, and 
control of personal and social destinies. Development arenas can also be studied as 
cognitive spaces, by examining political, social and technical performances around 
particular technological problems (Jorgensen and Sorensen, 1999). Such a study then 
brings a focus on key actors and locations of action, artefacts with associated science- 
technology relations and techno-economic networks, plural knowledge and visions, and 
transformations that stabilise or destabilise social and ecological relations around 
artefacts (Jorgensen and Sorensen, 1999). Studying droughtprone areas as cognitive 
spaces and not only ecological habitats, allows the bringing together of what otherwise 
might seem like a `patchwork of science and technology stories' to see conflicting 
interests and contentions - and sometimes possibilities for concerted action if conscious 
social learning and collective planning takes place. Public agencies arc actors in these 
spaces not only through the science and technology they deploy, but also how they 
allow for epistemological pluralism and social contestation. Arenas can be changed as 
new actors, actor-networks and ideas enter them to re-shape technology use and 
resource access, and the analysis of their risks and design challenges as well as 
potential benefits. It is this history that this thesis studies. 
1.1.4 Objectives and target audiences 
It is the cognition of the professional that shapes whether they define their work (as 
individual and group) in narrow performance terms around their own technoscicntißc 
concerns, or they truly recognise the complexity of the cognitive space and 
development arena they are part of. With this wider understanding, they can recognise 
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and critically evaluate their choices in the scientific routines and artefacts deployed, 
and strategic social networking. Thus the first objective of this thesis is to show what 
cognition has directed water planning and water-related development within 
droughtprone and scarcity regions, its weaknesses and biases, and how it has begun to 
change. Among some professionals and researchers, there is now an increased interest 
and commitment to greater inter-disciplinarity, recognition of different knowledge 
systems, and acknowledgement of the political action often necessary to shape redesign 
and implementation processes in development intervention and resource planning. The 
target groups here are hydrologists, engineers and development practitioners working 
in natural resource management. 
The second objective is more ambitious and difficult - to raise awareness about both 
how to plan participation and encourage negotiation, but also how to recognise the 
power struggles such actions are embedded within. As Dreze and Sen (1989 p. 259) 
argue ... "Public action is not ... just a question of public delivery and state 
initiative. It 
is also .... a matter of participation by the public in the process of social change". It 
is 
not just whether and how we allow this participation that is very important. Rather it is 
conscientisation in how to work with local people's expression of their wants, their 
experience of scarcity and the risks in their social action - which can come in violent 
forms as well as policy dialogues. In this respect, cognitive understanding can merge 
with and complement a wider political economy perspective to strategise and debate 
social action, beyond just recognition of plurality of knowledge systems and 
discourses. Policy-makers and planners, water activists, group action facilitators and 
`front-line' water workers and engineers are the target groups here. 
A third objective is to promote cognition that will enable resource use and social 
processes, and their mediation by technology, to be understood together with better 
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integrated understanding of mediations for drought and scarcity. Scientists, enginccrs, 
policy makers and governance representatives are the target audiences here. 
Such different target groups means that this thesis needs a 'users' guide, as some 
sections are quantitatively scientific and technical in nature, while others are more 
descriptive of policy, governance, regulation and participation dynamics. These are 
given in each chapter. Users themselves remain beyond the target of this study, but I 
hope they can ultimately benefit from more aware public agents to work with. 
To these ends the thesis uses case studies that both interpret the science and 
technology employed by different states and agencies - and describe my own cognitive 
frameworks and learning. The thesis uses case studies of `public water action' from 
Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh States in India, Zimbabwe and Yemen with reference 
particular eras of time. The focus of this study is on small watcr systems in rural areas. 
In the countries studied, these dispersed systems nevertheless help supply major 
quantities of water resources critical to smallholders, which arc also seen as 
increasingly `non-governable' by public water agencies. They thus discuss a social 
context of technological water control relevant to many states and local groups at this 
time. The thesis uses a conceptual framework focused on the interplay of nature- 
technology-society in the development of droughtprone areas, studied in relation to 
different water resources, technologies and states, outlined in Chapter 2. 
INTRODUCTION 
1.2 WHAT IS A 'COGNITIVE HISTORY' ANI) WHY IS IT RELEVANT? 
1.2.1 Some definitions of cognition 
11 
When Blackmore and Ison (1998) mentioned `cognitive history' they were talking of 
change in individual knowledge and experience. However, cognition exists in 
collectivities, such as states, techno-scientific agencies, and communities. It is shown 
in the knowledge they promote and use for action, whether for the power of elites or a 
more common good. Synthesizing various dictionary and encyclopaedia definitions2, I 
define cognition as.... the process involved in knowing or act of knowing, especially as 
it affects learning and behaviour, in which experience and intuition as well as learned 
information plays a role. For this study, I see it as involving all processes of 
consciousness by which understanding is built up. I see related within it not only the 
field of cognisance (judicially allowed knowledge, calculation, patterning, 
mathematical compression, and judgement) but also conscientization (Freire 1972)3, 
which shapes how people understand their relations with each other and the world, and 
linkages between them. Conscientisation is also critical in how knowledge is 
understood as power, and how concepts of process and strategy get built into ideas for 
concerted action. Nightingale (1998) stresses that knowledge is embedded in social 
practices and networks, such that collective innovation is about shared understandings, 
beyond an aggregate of individuals. 
Cognition has held a central place in research and conceptual development in 
science and technology studies, particularly in relation to organisational learning and 
innovation. However, in the application of cognitive approaches (that study knowledge 
2 Encyclopedia Britannica cdrom, Chambers Giant Paperback dictionary 
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and learning) to development agency, part of this field can also be studied through 
discourse analysis. Foucault (1969) includes as discourse the concepts and codes by 
which societies operate, which are also seen to evolve historically and socially rather 
than as pure evolutionary knowledge. Discourse analysis can show which concepts 
become used, and how and why they arc used, in the political functions of controlling 
people and developing power, rather than in developing understanding. Thus to some, 
discourse analysis can be a frame of study that subsumes cognition - indeed cognition 
can even become framed as a discourse, giving an acceptable language to a dialogue 
with organisations on how they must transform. I iowever, in this study, I am concerned 
about self-generated change in understanding, which can analyse as well as act against 
dominant controls. Thus I take recognition of discourse as part of cognition - indeed a 
critical one for agencies, groups and individual professionals concerned for 
transformation in knowledge and action. The understanding of how discourses become 
used in the contested access to natural resources, as well as how they shape accredited 
knowledge and agency, is an essential part of conscicntization, and recognition of 
process as critical to strategising change. A wider perspective of cognition helps critical 
assessment of data use and quality behind discourses, and helps more critical reflection 
on one's own findings and arguments. If we are to change discourses that have 
generated problematic transformation or exclusion, then to agree new ones, we need a 
cognitive framework that also includes political and scientific consciousness. 
' The term conscientisation refers to learning to perceive social. political and economic contradictions, 
and to take action against oppressive elements of reality (Freire 1972 p. 1 5). 
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1.2.2 Why `a history'? 
13 
Carr (1964) points out that when we answer what is history, our answer reflects our 
own position in time and is related to the view we have of the society we live in. 
History is not only the facts of the past, but analysis of the ideas, relations and 
ideologies that are understood in the particular fields of the past focused upon - and 
present in the writer themselves. The onslaught of science and technology on the 
environment has led some to say we are in an era after nature and at the end of history, 
left with only political ecology (Escobar, 1999). However, the answer is that we live in 
society as well as nature. Our facts need to keep us constantly aware of what structures 
our relations between them. Carr shows that to the dual function of history is both to 
help understand the society of the past, and to increase mastery over the society of the 
present - and the spaces people exist in. We learn from it in ways that enable us to 
explore not only why but whither. It allows us, and encourages us to declare our faith in 
the future. 
A cognitive history then, not only includes some study of knowledge related to 
public action. It is also the study of how these relate to the materialisation of change in 
society and resource dynamics: how one superstructure of knowledge agency interacts 
with another infrastructure of power agency (Cohen, 1976), often through the 
technology promoted. It also includes awareness of the way the student interacts with 
`their facts' and thinks about the present and future. This research thus focuses on two 
particular levels of development policy investigation (Potter and Subramaniam, 1998): 
the concepts underpinning development policy and their change, and the `capacities for 
change' in institutions involved in local management and intervention. In chapters 5 
and 6, this thesis also addresses the local level - the experiences of change by 
local 
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water users - but this is done to illustrate weaknesses arising from these policy and 
agency levels, rather than document local agrarian change processes in depth. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How have science and technology shaped public agencies and action in development 
of water in droughtprone areas, and public cognition on water availability and 
access? 
Subquestions: 
1. What changes are present in definitions of drought, droughtproneness and scarcity 
over time, and how and why are these different in agricultural, groundwater and 
surface water contexts? 
2. How have these framed the cognitive practices of agencies and institutionalised 
actors active in droughtprone areas, and to what extent have these changed the 
cognitive and technical norms of their working practices? 
3. What diversity is visible in public agency over water resources in droughtpronc 
areas, in different nation states, and why and how have these changed over time? 
4. How has cognition about technologies in use to mediate water supply in 
droughtprone areas shaped the science used in analysis and allocation of water 
resources and transformation of physical water systems? 
However, as explained, I want to show my own personal change while doing this study. 
I therefore write two shadow questions, which structured my rcscarch at different 
times. I will differentiate what was my starting condition - which I think was an 
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objective/instrumentalist approach to research (Blackmore and Ison 1999), and a later a 
cognitive/political economy approach (Nightingale, 1998; Mollinga, 1998). 
Shadow `objective/instrumentalist `question: How can the study of drought risk and 
water availability in drought prone areas contribute to water development 
interventions to transform droughtprone areas? 
Such a question, which assumes water is the essential factor shaping the conditions 
of society, not only makes researchers study too narrowly so they miss realities and real 
trends. It also brings great dangers through the way they miss political realities and 
misread the public mood for action - leading to conflict, or problems for assistants who 
might be accused of wrongdoing or penalised for their work relationships with research 
or intervention initiatives (as the Andhra Pradesh and Yemen cases discuss). Chapters 3 
and 4 are dedicated to showing the problems of cognition generated by such a question. 
Shadow `cognitive/political economy' question: How have public agencies in 
droughtprone areas used science and technology in interventions to assess risks and 
transform water availability in droughtprone areas, and shaped social processes and 
outcomes in water use, resource capture and evolution of water use systems? 
The second shadow question informed my later work. Such questions can yield rich 
understanding of designs, power struggles and intrigues around water. If research 
resists too glib an explanation and naive a faith in a technological future, it can also 
assist new interventions around technology. This question informs research in Chapters 
5-7 for India, Yemen and Zimbabwe. 
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1.4 SELECTION OF COUNTRIES FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY 
The selection of countries for this study (India, Yemen and Zimbabwe) was made with 
reference to both distinctive differences in states and drought contexts, but also to the 
nature of the development questions my research or project work was involved with. 
These included: 
" Existence of a significant area of territory with low and uncertain rainfall which 
also shaped seasonal fluctuations and availability of surface runoff and 
groundwater, where there had also been public action to develop technologies 
for agricultural and domestic water supply and regulate access to water, 
9 The relative importance of different elements of the water cycle in their 
economic and social development, to enable in-depth investigation of the 
scientific and technical norms to assess drought and scarcity conditions for 
rainfall, groundwater (wells and springs) and surface watcr sourccs; 
" To enable explicit recognition of different institutions in existence for planning, 
implementing, managing and advising on water development for rural 
transformation in different countries, which I hypothesised were related to the 
kind of state in existence. I was particularly concerned to compare states with a 
strong bureaucracy, but with a specific emphasis on social development and a 
democratic structure, with authoritarian states with bureaucracies enforcing 
economic development under more ideological models. In the latter there is 
little space to challenge development through the ballot box, direct action, or 
`deliberative democracy' with a shared dialogue between representatives. This 
helped in the identification of India as a failed developmental state and 
Zimbabwe as first an authoritarian and later an under-developed state. I also 
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looked for a state with a high dependency on local decision-making where 
traditional local elites were powerful and there could be multiple local 
allegiances shaping and constraining action -a weak state - for which Yemen 
was a good example. I considered these contexts to be significant in how actors 
in scientific and local elites, and agencies for planning, implementation and 
management play against each other as well as water users to direct rural 
transformations and water management in droughtprone areas. I considered that 
such agency would be shaped by the wider structures and level of concern for 
development processes emergent in these different kinds of states. I also 
considered these types of state to be present in a number of developing 
countries, such that the analyses given in this study had wider relevance. 
" They were countries where my own work has been involved with development 
questions and programmes in water management, but also in quantitative as 
well as qualitative analyses that examined and suggested reforms to scientific 
and technical norms being referred to for development planning and 
intervention in water management. I had always worked with a wider reference 
to international development policy and programmes, given a longterm concern 
and interest in the relationships between water and rural development. The 
development transformations of particular focus for me were reduction in 
vulnerability and increased livelihood security for small and marginal farmers 
(as defined locally) - through technologies that were also environmentally 
sound, and resources management systems and development processes that also 
built local public capabilities for reflective and participatory design and action. 
Beyond this problem-oriented approach of what to do, I was concerned to 
understand how and why the knowledge of engineers, scientists and 
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interdisciplinary thinking is significant in social change, and how such thinking 
and teaching needs to evolve. I built my research and networks through 
proposals, university collaboration and project work, trying always to link with 
agencies at work in that field. The wider focus and context of my research did 
change as development initiatives around vulnerability reduction and livelihood 
security themselves shifted through different emphases. These gave me 
different perspectives and possibilities for critical investigation of norms in 
science, technology and agency in these different contexts. Policy debates on 
rural transformation that shaped these wider contexts of my research included: 
agrarian reform and agricultural intensification, supporting basic needs, poverty 
alleviation, sustainable development, decentralised water management and the 
debate around efficiency and equity in water management (Vincent, 2003, 
2001; Hasnip et al, 2000; Groenfeldt et al, 2000). My concern was also for 
critical development of ideas and skills - for myself, students and research 
partners - that increased capabilities to understand the relationships between 
society-resources-technology in public action. 
" That the comparative research could also contribute to understanding about 
agency and knowledge, but enable critical reflection on science and technology 
and maintain critical support on them as a focus in public action. There have 
been changing views of science in its contribution to society. These are 
expressed well in the models of Funtowicz (2000), showing shifts from `expert 
demonstration' to `post-normal science', through the stages of the 'modern 
model', (where scientific facts, that were unproblematic, could and would 
determine correct policy); the 'precautionary model' (recognising that scientific 
facts were neither fully certain or conclusive), and the `abuse of science' model 
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(recognising social and political forces in science and its use). I had research 
and project studies from India, Yemen and Zimbabwe that allowed a study of 
the relationship of science, technology and agency in public action related to 
drought and scarcity. I wanted my research to support reflection on how I 
myself had moved through these models, but also how public agencies could 
transform (or not) given the changing debate around knowledge in and for 
public action. 
1.5 METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN 
The research questions are answered through a set of case studies demonstrating a 
variety of contexts, as a theoretical replication. The differences include: 
- different nation states with different state-agency-community relations that also 
have different interactions in water resources planning and engineering for 
development, and different local polities having jurisdiction over administrative, 
judicial, legislative and technical elements of water development and use; 
- different droughtprone locations and different water sources (rainfall, groundwater, 
springs, river flow) analysed by different methods; 
- different water extraction technologies (wells, cisterns, river diversions); 
- different conceptual perspectives behind research design (instrumentalist, political 
economy, cognitive). 
All the case studies were originally individual studies: superficially all involved 
similar study of the scope of the water resource base, and `appropriate' scientific and 
engineering analysis in development intervention to develop water systems, in regions 
experiencing periods without rainfall whose length and timing was also uncertain. 
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However, this is no literal replication. Each gradually starts to show the exploration of 
wider social and environmental forces mediating water scarcity, contact with wider sets 
of agencies and field realities, and changing understanding of agency-people and state- 
locality relations in technology development and water use. Thus, they illustrate my 
changing cognition of water-technology-society relations over time in how I 
progressively looked (or was forced) to understand these wider influences. 
Five of the case chapters derive from research studies, and previously written texts 
were revisited for the study in a form of hermeneutic examination, while one has 
retrospective reflection on a development intervention in which I worked (Yemen). 
One study was specifically set up for this thesis, to revisit the DPAs of Andhra Pradesh 
and Maharashtra in India twenty years or so after earlier studies (Chapter 5). 
The data sources and research methods used are detailed in Table I. I. The scale of 
study, data sources and analytical methods differ across the chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 
are really regional surveys, where `What and Ilow'-type questions (Potter and 
Subramaniam, 1998) were asked. They draw on archival data, statistical analyses, 
surveys, semi-structured interviews and basic modelling work. The more recent studies 
shift to `What and Why' questions, where case studies arc used, with field interviews, 
field measurements, statistical analyses and design experiments. Thus I describe this 
thesis as having a meta-framework in its use of methodological tools, in that it uses an 
interplay of quantitative, ethnographic and `dialogical' (Fals-Borda and Rahman, 1991) 
or group research methods. Their balance of use differs strongly across the chapters, 
showing how my own cognition changed - not only in how I recognised their value, but 
also in realising the importance (and difficulty) in triangulating between them for 
verifying information. Chapters 3,4, and 7 use statistics and records from the public 
domain. Chapters 5 and 6 involve my own field data alongside available public records. 
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1.6 CHAPTER PLAN 
Chapter 1 has introduced the research questions and methodological approach of the 
thesis. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework 
Chapters 3-5 focus on studies from India: an intermezzo chapter first carries brief 
details of the Indian planning system, and core agencies and programmes working in 
the drought prone areas. In this thesis I characterise India as primarily a failed 
`developmental state' with strong distributive (patronage) policies that nevertheless 
allowed a strong role to private capital and markets. This has tended to give free rein to 
technological policies and public agency in which science is accorded a critical role 
(but poorly performed), but which nevertheless generate real problems of access 
(worsened by corruption), and have little scope for coercive control to manage water 
even if laws are in place. 
Chapter 3 reviews both agency practices and alternative analyses for the study of 
meteorological and agricultural drought as applied in the droughtprone area of 
Maharashtra (DPAM). It involved analyses of meteorological data at 22 stations across 
the region for the period 1901-1975, to explore analytical methods that might support 
development planning in the DPAM. I was largely urban"bascd working with the 
records of key agencies, although I had meetings with regional agricultural research 
stations, NGOs and district development agencies, and made some field visits to water 
management projects. A critical finding was that, where statistical patterns in rainfall 
were visible, farmers had already started experimenting with new crop options to match 
them. Statistics validated what farmers were already doing, rather than helping to 
define spaces for new technology development - and many factors besides rainfall 
explained dynamics of rural transformation. I knew this by the end of the research - but 
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the study had no impact. This was because I did not link at all to real social questions. 
My findings validated other experts and had little power to threaten them. 
Chapter 4 documents research on groundwater development in the droughtprone 
Rayalaseema region of Andhra Pradesh state from 1984, in Kurnool district in 
particular. It studies both the practices of technoscientific agencies and their 
performance in the DPA. I located myself at the district level, and used secondary and 
grey literature from reports and files, and also field visits to villages `benefiting' from 
groundwater development programmes. This study required some detailed 
geohydrological analysis and comparisons of yield calculations. Major expansion of 
borewell technology was then just starting, but this expansion was first driven by 
agencies and subsidies rather than real technical advantages (after resultant falls in 
groundwater levels, this changed). Under-reporting of well development was rampant. I 
found myself looking at major corruption involving fictitious and partially developed 
wells. My research in this case had implications, and both I and my assistants had some 
unpleasant experiences as a result. 
Chapter 5 revisits Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh and the agencies earlier 
described, to see how they changed in the decade 1992-2002, and what new policies 
and assessment procedures came on line. By this time, the policies and agencies 
produced by the instrumentalist efforts to mediate drought were being publicly 
questioned, and new frameworks of scarcity were being used by other actors (notably 
NGOs and local government) to identify new support options. Political lobbying for 
drought relief and irrigation water allocations had proved to be as important as linearly- 
directed scientific and technology dissemination in the survival of many (Mathur and 
Jayal, 1993; Omvedt and Patankar, 1991). It also reports a study in three different 
groundwater zones across Kurnool district in 2002 that examined local experience and 
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change and indigenous understanding of drought and scarcity. Both collective 
experience and contact with new actors had greatly changed the resultant public 
reflection. Detailed knowledge about water resources and technology was only partly 
important: rather it was also strategic knowledge about which public agencies to lobby 
and interact with that also mediated access to water. This fieldwork was `dialogical' in 
the way it used interviews and rapid rural appraisal (RRA) methods. The Kurnool 
village RRA was undertaken in 2002, in villages also assisted under a Dutch-supported 
development programme in which other Wageningen students had been active. Aßcr 
initial contact with the project, I continued to work independently with a local assistant 
who had once worked for the project. 
A short `Intermezzo II' then follows, to describe the very different agency contexts 
for two subsequent case studies on Yemen and Zimbabwe, which also focus on 
different hydrological environments and forms of droughtproncncss. Thcsc chapters arc 
also written to bring perspectives from scarcity analysis and drought together, This 
gives a stronger social and political focus - in identifying who was excluded and how 
under physical and structural water scarcity - alongside discussion of parameters used 
for the physical description of drought and shortages, and potential changes in the 
framework for hydrological analysis. 
Chapter 6 presents a study from Raymah district of the then Yemen Arab Republic 
(YR), where I worked two and a half years (1985-87) in a drinking water project, This 
was an area of limited water resources already heavily developed for irrigation. I 
characterise YR as a weak state, where the central state was still hardly present locally 
in water governance - although it was reshaping the local government system, making 
this a crucial time in changing water control by local elites. This research can be 
described as exploratory action research, with extensive field contact with local 
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officials, villages and counterparts to examine a complex hydrology and even more 
complex system of customary water rights. The study focuses on groundwater-based 
spring development and small-scale water harvesting. The critical struggles were 
around social jurisdiction, challenged by the new water technologies and design and 
assessment techniques arriving in the region. Villagers used the project to test the 
changing authority and contest an older legal ruling on water resources they felt unfair. 
Technology became the battlefield where water rights were contested, and the battle 
ended the project. 
Chapter 7 presents a study from Zimbabwe, 1997-2000, focusing on the assessment 
and management of rivers subject to drought events and low periods, in the Lower Odzi 
watershed. I describe Zimbabwe first as an authoritarian and segregationalist (racist) 
state, that was directive but not particularly corrupt, later becoming an underdeveloped 
state experiencing corruption and elitism. The agencies under these authoritarian 
governments have been very different, employing legal agency (in a Water court) under 
quite a highly developed legal codification, as well as a scientifically elite Ministry for 
water planning and monitoring. The study used archival material on legal developments 
and rights, hydrological data sets, and some field data, including some feedback from 
PhD research studying smallholder irrigation systems in the same catchment. The study 
shows how assessment practices and access benefited the interests of commercial 
(white) farmers, with little analysis that showed the problems of smallholder water 
users. 
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of this thesis. The thesis shows that science has 
made considerable contribution to understanding of drought in its various forms, 
particularly through the ways it has enabled patterns to be identified. Yet it has not 
made the contribution to either sustainable technology development, or effective 
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agency for sustainable resource use and congruent technology choice and operations 
that many hoped for. The nature of the state does make a difference to the institutions 
and public agencies that evolve for monitoring, planning and implementing water 
development in droughtprone and scarcity regions. Commonly, within these agencies 
there has been failure to transform the norms in its own institutions and liaisc across 
different agencies, and lack of engagement by agencies with their publics over the 
complexity of technological problems and related development questions for 
droughtprone areas. In. failing to reform cognitive and institutional norms in the pursuit 
of daily institutional life, these public agencies have often lost some of both their power 
to contribute to resolution of complex water problems and their power over new 
policies, while their norms may lead to confusion and lack of clear application, 
allowing unequal and inequitable access to water resources. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
`Given the idiosyncrasies of science, it is practically impossible to make any science to order 
for technology. There is therefore no gain in coupling the two together... there are even 
disadvantages from doing so... New technology, in order to be achievable must use known, 
existing science and set itself, short-term, precise goals of achievement. There is very little 
evidence that the emergence of new technologies is critical to any process of redistributive 
justice in any direct fashion... At their worst they are easily turned into tools of exploitation 
because of this amorality implicit in them... The development of new technologies, regardless of 
how important to national hubris, is not critical to development ... Rath (1994). p. 2916-2919 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out the conceptual framework for this thesis, which builds first from 
the observation of Benton (1992, p. 67) that technology is a mediation between social 
relations and natural mechanisms. He argued that technology is a critical tool in this 
mastery of nature, but also emerges under particular preferences for, or imposition of, 
structures and processes of social control. The social relations and structures of special 
focus here are: the state as it affects the processes of development, public agencies as 
part of public action, and the knowledge systems and cognitive frameworks that evolve 
within these agencies and states, discussed in turn in sections 2.2-2.4 respectively. The 
natural mechanisms focused on in this thesis are the sub-cycles of the water cycle - 
precipitation, soil moisture, groundwater and surface water as shaped by natural 
drought - periods without rain - and human intervention through technology that has 
led to declining storage potential, more erratic behaviour and overexploitation of these 
water resources. In focus too are the scientific specialties developed for these water 
elements - agro-meteorology, hydrology, geohydrology and farming systems research 
These are reviewed in sections 2.5-2.8. The remainder of this section reviews concepts 
for technology and science used in this thesis. Figure 2.1 summarises this conceptual 
framework. 
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This differentiates the behavioural characteristics of natural phenomena of 
precipitation, soil moisture and vegetation, groundwater, and surface water as they 
materialise in drought, with different relational dimensions of scarcity - economic, 
physical and structural water scarcity. 
Focusing on technology as a mediation, something imposed between society and 
resources, enables a critical focus on agency to mobilise and manage the resources and 
build institutions to govern resource access, and the cognition used for this, including 
the framing discourses that shape emergent roles and practices, and the cognitive and 
technical norms developed. The option to look at emerging water deficits as scarcity, in 
which society develops coping strategies around the technologies giving water access, 
and not just as drought is a further cognitive transformation made easier by recognising 
this mediating role of technology. 
I use three other associated conceptions of technology to open ip this study. The 
first is to see technology as `the invention and employment of artifacts' (Feibleman 
1982), where artifacts are materials altered through human agency for human use 
(artifacts may be tools or language). The second is to see technology as `artificial 
function' (Nightingale, 1999). This definition allows study of the cognitive dimension 
of tacit knowledge - in how artifacts should and can functioß as opposed to just factual 
knowledge of intrinsic properties. This tacit knowledge exists within a technological 
tradition that co-evolves with a technology (which also may not involve much science), 
and a group's perspective on the relationship between nature and society, and 
appropriate technology (Dosi, 1982; Richards, 1985). This helps in understanding 
different views about how technologies can be changed, as will be discussed 
particularly in the Yemen case. A third is that cited by Peilke, 2003 p. 311 of ... 
`Winner's concept of `technology as legislation' ... as an 
interpretive tool for 
understanding of the meanings that drive people to favour certain choices of 
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technological systems over others... and a malleable base value in policy debate, and 
around which ideas, interests and institutions are created, marshalled, diffused and 
restricted'. These related conceptualisations allow study of the knowledge, institutional 
control and coping strategies involved in the development and operation of 
technologies for different water resources in a droughtpronc area. 
I also draw on several conceptualisations of science for this study. Fcibleman 
(1982) saw 'pure science' as a method to investigate nature by experimental methods, 
while applied science was the use of pure sconce for practical purposes. When 
'science' is used to address public policy needs (Ilcaly and Ascher, 1995), science is 
rather a body of empirically-derived routines, often seen as 'disciplines', allowed into 
policy debate because of their supposed scientific credentials and objective methods, 
free of the 'moral hazard' of subjective description. Nightingale (1998) defined science 
as the social practice of exploring and codifying patterns t in the behaviour of nature. 
Rath (1994) saw science as exploratory activity, less concerned for facts for 
'knowledge', and more a search for 'models' of the world and how it works, that was 
often just information gathering rather than science. Given the dependence on 
technology of contemporary scientific research, Latour (1983) introduced the term 
technoscience for the complex world of contemporary investigation and deployment of 
science in technology creation. 
A core focus in this thesis is on the use of statistics, which has become regarded by 
many as a quantitative science because of its evolution from application of mathematics 
and logic, such that it can describe the 'physics of society' (Funtowicz and Ravctz, 
1990). and thus produce facts for policy conclusions. Others are more pragmatic, 
1 These can be patterns: in the behaviour of natural phenomena; mental links between patterns and our 
sense experience; using mathematics as a shorthand for patterns that also compress information about 
behaviour. 
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recognising that statistics cannot provide facts but only forecasts, predictions and risk 
assessments (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990, p. 156), that have their own historical 
ontology (Hacking, 1990). It is the construction and application of statistics and data 
analysis in planning and decision-making, that much of this thesis is concerned. 
Yevyevich (1985) described risk as the exceedence or non-exceedance probability of 
a decision value of the critical random variable. However, we could choose to develop 
additional pictures of risk, for example economic risk, by looking at this probability 
and the consequences from that occurrence of risk. Risk is defined as related to 
quantifiable variables, in that their randomness is known and they can be measured. 
Later sections review how different researchers and agencies began to shape 
understanding of such risks in relation to water users for the different components of 
the hydrological cycle, relative to current use of technology and benefits from change. 
Uncertainty, has much less uniform definitions, but is often defined as related to non- 
quantifiable phenomena, described as such because of the complexity, non-randomness 
or unpredictability of their behaviour in space and time. Three forms of uncertainty 
identified are description uncertainty, parameter or measurement uncertainty, and 
natural uncertainty (including climatic, environmental and societal changes). Klemes 
(1985) voiced concern over preoccupation with `creation of curve-fitting tools' in 
stochastic hydrology, rather than attention to methods and contexts for application of 
tools to improve management decisions. Controversy around how complex phenomena 
are described to enable quantification, and whether they are then studied through 
appropriate statistics, has become a serious question in the validation of science and its 
wider social legitimacy. 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) went on to discuss several ways in which statistical 
analysis of data sets had critical differences from experimental research. Their 
significance can change depending on their temporal and spatial density. Evaluation of 
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the truth of information or procedure is done by review procedures (internal or 
external), rather than by scientific colleagues. In addition, behind the concern about 
how risks and uncertainties are treated, lies the question of quality of information to 
which statistical tools are applied, and how these come from experiments, as opposed 
to data collected in society for 'statecraft' and even personal judgements. In the latter 
case, the data collected could become shaped by the mission of the agency collecting it. 
As will be seen in Chapter 3, some Indian research agencies did try to keep the data 
used for statistical analysis based field data collection and experimentation. however, 
other agencies have amassed socially constituted criteria (for example, assessments of 
levels of crop failure), or data recorded from individuals (like census data). Thus 
behind the question of risk and uncertainty in availability of water, lies questions about 
the quality and uncertainty of the data used in its assessment, 
Brooks (1994) noted at least six ways in which science could contribute to 
technology, as: (1) new knowledge which serves as a direct source of ideas (once given 
most emphasis now often seen as least significant); (2) a source of tools and techniques 
for more efficient engineering design; (3) research instrumentation, laboratory 
techniques and analytical methods that find their way into design or operational 
practices; (4) the practice of research as a source of development of skills and 
capabilities useful for technology, (5) the creation of a knowledge base increasingly 
important in understanding the assessment of technology in terms of its wider social 
and environmental impact; (6) a knowledge base that enables more efficient strategies 
of applied research, development and refinement of new technologies. Brooks also 
showed that there were at least two ways that technology influenced science - and that 
this direction was at least as important in change. The first was in providing a fertile 
source of novel questions and thus helping to justify resources spent. The second was 
as a source of otherwise unavailable instrumentation and techniques needed to address 
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novel and more difficult scientific questions more efficiently. He also warned that some 
technologies- notably mechanical ones - did not need much science in their 
development. He also agreed that tacit knowledge was important, and was embedded in 
people rather than written down and codified. This typology is used to study the 
analytical routines used in agencies, and identify which actors have real knowledge 
about the behaviour of technology in relation to the resource base. While science and 
technology are seen by some as critical tools in social development, they are also 
critiqued, for being: non-neutral in their accessibility and impact (Knegt and Vincent, 
2001); blind to special characteristics of environment and society (Chambers, 1997) 
biased in its preferences for quantitative data (Lemos, 2003), and used to insulate 
policy makers from their public and support public objectives rather than determine 
them (Healy and Ascher, 1995) i. e. socially constructed rather than impartial (Rose 
and Rose, 1976). 
2.2 STATES AND DEVELOPMENT 
2.2.1 Development as an objective and process 
This thesis studies development as both an objective and a process, as outlined in Table 
2.1, and recognises the primacy of politics in both, after Leftwich (2000). He argues 
that, if we are to understand the different performance of societies (how people cope, 
what is achieved, what is possible in certain contexts) then we need to understand how 
their politics condense around their states, and the agencies and elites within them. This 
is the reason to compare several different states in this thesis. 
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Table 2.1 Definitions of development and politics 
Development as objective (Thomas et. al., 1998) 
Progress (material or ideals) through agencies and management for change, given conflicts in 
goals, values or interests. 
Development as process (Leftwich, 2000) 
While development can have various definitions, it always involves the organisation, 
mobilization, combination, use and distribution of resources in new ways.... and because 
resources are to be used in new ways there will inevitably be disputes among individuals and 
groups about how such resources are to be used as they calculate who will win and who will lose 
as a result of different configurations 
Politics (Leftwich, 2000) 
All the activities of conflict, cooperation and negotiation involved in the use, production and 
distribution of resources, whether material or ideal, whether at local, national or international 
levels, or whether in the private or public domain. 
To look within the state, I use a model by Davies and Ilossain (2002) that shoed 
relationships between public action, civil society and livelihood adaptation. 'T'hey 
posited overlapping fields of action between state, community and civil society, to 
enable identification of elites in each that in fact brokered or captured most of the 
spaces where state action programmes and people interact. However, there was a 
space where all did sometimes interact, which could be seen as spaces for 
participation and interaction that could enable negotiation and change. The process 
and style of exchange was, however, shaped by the wider history of state society 
relations. There were also multiple locales of action, including civil society action 
(formal and informal), beyond the arenas of state agencies. Formal civil society 
groups included cooperative societies, self-help groups, and social movements, 
which can have religious, spiritual and philosophical ideas and values at their core. 
Authors like Dubash (2002) and Steenbergcn (1997) argued that we should take a 
more realistic view of local agrarian institutions as they emerp in different cultural, 
political and ecological contexts, to understand whether local institutions would 
perform better than public agencies in mediating scarcity, especially in management 
of groundwater. 
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Development intervention is one stream within public action, in its pursuit of 
deliberate efforts at social change on the part of one or more public agencies, given 
public recognition through constitutional approval or legal registration. However, 
such agencies also intervene in social and political relations, and do not simply 
implement the plans and contracts issued under a policy or programme. How these 
agencies face conflicts of values, goals and interests both within themselves and 
with other agencies, to create effective actor-networks (or not), is of particular 
interest to this study, especially for the Indian case studies. This can be studied 
through the coherence (cognitive consistency), with wide acceptance of facts and 
routines generated and correspondence (good structural coupling). Another 
component in public action is direct action - actions driven by interest goups to 
confront issues or drive change considered not addressed by formal public or 
development action. It can have violent and coercive forms, as well as cajoling ones 
- including strikes, threats, roadblocks, protests, destruction of water systems and 
offices, and parliamentary and bureaucratic lobbying. Such action has become 
increasingly significant in droughtprone areas, as public agencies have fossilised and 
failed to enable full participation. Like Davies and Hossain (2002) I keep direct 
action distinct within public action It is the broader power of the state that often 
defines how such local direct action is associated with formal public action or not. 
For example, in Maharashtra, it was the protests and demonstrations of drought- 
affected farmers that often ensured that food aid rights to which they were 
constitutionally entitled actually arrived in their village Armvedt and Patankar, 
1991). 
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2.3.2 States of development 
In his review of states as they have been involved in development, Leftwich (2000) 
differentiated between their institutional structures, political purposes and development 
objectives. He built on the concept of the 'developmental state' started by Johnson 
(198 1), which were states with institutional structures and political purposes that were 
'developmentally' driven, while their developmental objectives were actually 
`politically' driven, in temps of fundamental political factors driving the urgency, nature 
and pace of development actions. They were also states that have concentrated 
sufficient power, autonomy, capacity and legitimacy at the centre to shape, pursue and 
encourage achievement of explicit objectives (Leftwich, 2000, p. 155), and new 
technologies and major technological projects night even have symbolic value for the 
nation state. He also confirmed what Johnson (1981) noted, that developmental states 
had a strong intimacy with the private sector and the market, and a further feature was 
the power, continuity and autonomy of its elite bureaucracy. Ilaving said this, none of 
the case studies discussed in this thesis now meet all the criteria of a developmental 
state. 
How agency develops under different politics with different objectives and 
purposes and different social relations within them is a core focus in this study. I look 
at how these political and social conditions shape the emergence of instrumentalist, 
infrastructure-focused water development - directed and controlled by public cxpcrt 
agencies, versus local, endogenous development and knowledge. Also, how these 
conditions shape the areas of mediation between society and resources that agencies arc 
directed into - in new scientific research, collecting data for resource assessment and 
planning, disseminating and managing the technology, and creating governance 
institutions that control water access. 
CONCEPTUALFRAMEWORK 37 
States of development: India, Yemen and Zimbabwe 
Herring (1999) regarded India as a failed developmental state, hamstrung by size and 
the pressure of interest groups into politics. Nevertheless, the case studies from India 
will show many of the structural institutions and imperatives taken up by 
`developmental states'. Myrdal (1970) regarded India as a `soft state', with a lack of 
social discipline at its core in which reluctance to abide by rules, corruption, and 
collusion of interest groups and elites allowed avoidance, blockage and subversion of 
development programmes. However, India most certainly is a democratic state2, which 
has helped maintain civil society and human rights action that counteracts some of this 
bureaucratic power. As chapters 3-5 show, these characteristics do materialise in the 
agencies for the droughtprone areas of India, but also often render them ineffective 
with little or even negative impact. For the states and time periods studied here, only 
India formally developed a Science and Technology Ministry, and developed agencies 
to disseminate particular artifacts (see chapter 4 and 5). 
I describe Zimbabwe as a past authoritarian state with segregationalist and racist 
policies, but actually not corrupt, that has now become an `underdeveloped state'. 
Authoritarian states can put specific and strong legal codes and agencies into the 
control of resource access, in contrast to developmental states which can often leave the 
market to broker resource use. An underdeveloped state is one characterised by 
inefficiency and instability, with wealth flowing from control of political power and 
hence control of the state and its organisations. Zimbabwe is also increasingly a 
patrimonial state, where a ruler attempts to dominate and control in his own interest and 
2Leßwich (2000) described the characteristics for their survival to include: legitimacy (geographical, 
constitutional and political); adherence to the 'rules of the game'; loyalty to the democratic process 
itself; 
policy restraint by the winning party; overcoming poverty or continuing to struggle against it; wealth or 
at least growth that moderates inequalities; and overcoming religious, ethnic and cultural cleavages or 
continuing to work against them. 
38 SCJEVCE, 7EQINYOLOGYANDAGENCYINTJ1EDEVELOPMIEWOFDROUGlfpROhEARBds 
that of his cronies. (Leftwich, 2000; Weiss, 1994). 1 charactcrisc the Ycmcn Arab 
Republic, at the time of the case study, as a weak state. Following Migdal, 1988 (p. 4) 
this has... `low capacity to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract 
resources and appropriate and use resources in determined ways... thus numerous social 
organisations exercise control, commanding allegiance of significant numbers of 
people, that may be enduring traditional institutions'. Section 1.4 has given detailed 
reasons for selection of these different types of state, and I hope that the case studies 
help show the stresses the stresses on hydrologists and engineers working in them. 
2.2.3 On agency In development arenas 
Agency is the capacity of an actor to realise at least past of the intended actions through 
(strategic) interactions in a network of social relationships (Long, 2001): the focus in 
this thesis on institutionalised actors - individual and collective - that shape goals, 
values and interests through their deployment of knowledge as institutionalised rules or 
science in the selection and development of technology in droughtprone areas. 
Collectivities become agents when they have discernible ways of formulating and 
carrying out decisions (Long, 2001). Knowledgability and capability arc critical in 
agency - but need b be translated culturally and politically. While there may be a 
habitu? in an agency in which its practices arc themselves conduits of interest, 
individual internal and external actors can also reshape these. 
Platt and Wilson (1999) have used the term 'technological capability' in terms of the 
ability to realise technological capacity through performance rather than just the 
potential of an organisation or enterprise to perform. Their work on micro-enterprises 
3 The system of acquired dispositions and habituated practices that act in perception and practical 
assessment and in organising principles of action (ßourdieu, 1977). 
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can also be related to public agencies and informal groups, although the greater power 
of institutionalised control in bureaucracy preventing change needs recognition. How 
groups are capable of organisational and technological learning will vary according to 
the socio-cultural context. Researchers lave focused on several frameworks to study 
how a learning cycle can be developed that can confront power struggles and transform 
practice within organisations. These include empirical learning, learning by emulation 
and learning by acquisition (Carbonara, 2004), and a participatory process that builds 
from what people know rather than confronting and criticising them (Platt and Wilson, 
1999). Shifts in these processes are visible across this thesis in some of the bilateral 
development programmes, scientific networks, politicians and individuals (including 
myself) studied. Interest in these shiftss also a key reason to bring in a cognitive 
approach to study the dynamics of agency behaviour. 
23. COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO STUDY AGENCY PERFORMANCE 
How public agencies form, perform and reform their scientific and cognitive norms to 
support social transformation in droughtprone areas, and how science and technology 
are part of this evolution in rationale and operating procedures - to stay in operation and 
sere their clients - is a core theme in this study. In their study of cognitive spaces, 
Jorgersen and Sorensen (1999) built together a number of concepts also used in this 
thesis. These included `institutionalised actors' - which in this study are often public 
agencies but may also be important local representatives, and `framing objects'. 
Framing objects include: relatively fixed visions of a technology and its role; or a 
discourse on roles of communication methods, or modernization aims; or a set of 
technological concepts created in the education of engineers and the standards 
operating in an area (Pijnenburg 2004). 
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Kuhn (1963) emphasised the cognitive consensus that can make up a speciality, 
which includes common substantive and methodological orientation (Weingatt, 1974). 
He later shifted his term again to that of `disciplinary matrix', which detailed the entire 
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques etc shared by a community. Whitely (1974 
p. 73) used the term cognitive institutionalisation, to describe the articulation of 
cognitive norms (legitimate problems) and technical norms (legitimate techniques) 
(Mulkay 1970) which come to define certain legitimate problems and techniques into a 
relatively coherent mode of understanding. This involves a set of interrelated and 
inter-dependent (though not necessarily logical) statements about the world and how to 
study it - and intervene in it. Cognitive institutionalisation also becomes a structuring 
element in social processes, if a group develops and organises themselves powerfully 
enough, and uses knowledge for control. This thesis applies these concepts of cognitive 
institutionalisation beyond scientific specialties, into the worlds of development 
agencies and institutionalised actors working in droughtpronc areas and the 'framing' 
discourses and approaches they use. Kuhn used the phrase 'normal science' to 
summarise these internal behavioural characteristics of scientists studying the physical 
world, in the ways knowledge was allowed and suppressed. Post-normal science was 
described as field of endeavour by Ravetz and Funtowicz (1999), that could not only 
recognise a range of new study areas emerging to deal with environmental complexity 
and uncertainty, but also allowed an extended peer community into creation and 
validation of knowledge used in public decision- making. 
To map the `cognitive institutionalisation' critical to development action around 
drought, I follow the idea of Ravctz (1971) to look to sec how groups define 'the 
purposes seen to be served' by intervention in society, and thus start to direct and fund 
cognition and action, and understand the relation between the two. This is visible in the 
research approaches, technology development, particular resource analyses, and 
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assisted development of products and systems these purposes are seen to require, and 
the scientific, technical and practical approaches taken up within them. I look into the 
programmes of research, technology development and institutional intervention these 
purposes have driver; to study what knowledge has actually been applied in research 
and implementation, or contested by users, and whether agencies change their cognition 
at all (or not). 
Roling (2002 p. 32) emphasises the structural coupling in cognition between the 
perceiving organism and the domain of existence - they are structurally coupled. Thus 
cognition includes an agent that can perceive, has context - beliefs or theories, 
emotions and criteria for judgement, relating to the environment or domain of existence 
the agert is structurally coupled to; and an ecosystem or space in which multiple 
agents interact. It is important that an agent keeps pace with the realities of their 
domain to have potential to act - it needs correspondence. The facts, routines and 
technologies produced and used have to stay significant and remain accepted for an 
agent to be seen to remain capable and reliable in its domain - it needs to keep 
cognitive consistency with other agencies and knowledge groups. Thus to transform as 
a learning organisation needs two fundamental drivers for the cognitive process: 
coherence (cognitive consistency) and correspondence (structural coupling) 
(Gigerenzer et at 1999). The failure to recognise and adopt these drivers is particularly 
significant in the fate of the Indian groundwater agencies discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Roling (2002) also distinguished collective, distributed and multiple cognition, to 
emphasise the different social relations in which agents have to interact for concerted 
action This is relevart in explaining the fate of participatory technology development 
initiatives discussed for India and Yemen in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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To explain my own learning, I look beyond the disputed arguments of bchaviourists 
on how the brain works'. I draw on the ideas of the French philosopher Bernard- Iienry 
Levy who relates understanding with how we move and travel - in conscientisation and 
not just space. We never have a blank mind, and have pre-formed views or at least a 
mass of views: however, Earning from heterogeneity and otherness changes us, and 
thus changes how we act to maintain freedom for ourselves and for our collectivities. 
This is where `accountable participation' becomes important - otherwise the use of 
facilitation tools for their own sake is not only a tyranny (Cooke and Kothari, 2001), 
but a danger. 
Other `frames' and discourses on the relationships between society and natural 
resources that have shaped water development include seeing drought as: 
-a causal control on social development. This breeds instrumentalist approaches, in 
which construction of supply systems for extraction and control of water arc dominant 
concerns; 
-a factor in socioeconomic activity. This brings modelling and rationalist approaches to 
design of technologies and institutions aiming at profit as much as sustainability; 
-a reactive phenomena from society's use of the environment, in which 'resource 
dilemma' assessments and social learning processes arc core tools for transformations. 
My own cognitive history is greatly bound up in my own movement through these 
cognitive perspectives on the relationship between society and nature, and within this 
on drought and development. However, at the end I stay with the view of Denton 
(1992), that public action in a droughtpronc and scarcity area can only work for a 
greater good if it is constantly aware of the struggle in mediation around the design, 
4 ic. whether our minds are virgin spaces that develop tendencies in relation to the teachings of our 
culture, or whether there are brains with a predilection to think in certain ways and thus get drawn to 
certain work, disciplines and ways of thinking. 
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operation and access to use of technology. This means awareness of these discourses 
and their concerns about technological and resource risk and uncertainty, and reflection 
and action about the data and analytical routines used within them. 
2.4 DROUGHT, DROUGHTPRONENESS AND SCARCITY 
Drought is a period without rain, specified as of human interest in how this dryspell 
affects agricultural production, and as societies have transformed on the activities of 
society in the affected region. Wallen (1967) distinguished between permanent drought 
(of the driest climates), seasonal drought in climates having well-defined wet and dry 
seasons; and contingent drought resulting from irregular and variable rainfall. Dry 
periods bring impacts to regions and not only to individual fields, and the term 
`droughtprone regions' has been in existence since the nineteenth century in India. 
`Droughtproofing' emerged as a term to describe actions and measures that could make 
societies better able to survive drought. Drought and scarcity have come to occupy 
public debate in ways that other criteria like dryness and aridity never have, perhaps 
because of the way they link into public interests and possibilities to reduce calamity 
and vulnerability, rather than the struggle to build new adaptive capacity in resource 
management. Yevjevich et al (1983) developed a matrix to study `dryness' 
differentiating nature-produced and human-produced conditions. Drought and aridity 
were nature-produced, the terms representing temporary versus permanent shortages: 
water shortages and desertification were humaproduced. The case study areas show 
different degrees of dryness and aridity, interacting with seasonal and contingent 
drought, and give more chance to study cognition in agency around these ideas. 
The meteorological phenomenon of drought brings perturbations into the soil 
moisture availability, rivers and groundwater in the hydrological cycles of a region. 
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Hladny and Buchtele (1989) differentiated agricultural drought - linked with soil 
moisture content and slowed growth or even death of plants - from hydrological 
drought - where the diminution of water flow and storage is critical as in surface, sub- 
surface and ground water. 
Bandyopadhyay (1987, p. 2159) noted that `drought has generally been associated 
exclusively with deviations in rainfall. In actual fact the current water scarcity is a 
result of our failure to ensure the stability of the water cycle in the course of 
implementing development programmes'. Bandhopadhyay differentiated between soil 
moisture drought, surface water drought, groundwater drought, and mar- made drought, 
wanting to widen the debate to incorporate the technobgy being disseminated in 
development programmes. He pointed out that this caused 'man-made drought' to 
occur even in years of normal rainfall, referring to water ovcrcxtraction and thus 
drying up of older water sources. Ile launched a call '... to look into the reasons for 
other forms of drought that actually represent water scarcity, instead of putting all the 
blame on the failure of rainfall in an unscientific manner ... '(p. 2180). Ile called 
for a 
shift to frameworks that focused on the overall water cycle to resolve scarcity and 
promote environmental recovery, away from the normal focus on water inputs into 
particular crop and human use systems. 
Mehta (1998) showed how concepts of scarcity enable a focus on relational aspects 
of the use of water. She distinguished between the constructed aspects of scarcity - in 
what discourses were permitted-and the physical realities of declining access and use, 
noting how the former obscured the diverse strategies and different knowledge that 
local people used in the face of limited sources and restricted access. While the 
underlying power and social relations shaping discourses remain unchallenged, water 
use and access will remain unequal and policies be flawed. Mchta's work is important 
in this identification of this construction, but leaves the risk of destroying the value of 
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scarcity as a focus in public action and a loss of understanding of the historical 
dimension critical to this public action. The portrayal of shortage also has preferred if 
not sanctioned discourses, which have been used particularly in tools for scenario 
planning. However, these also have weaknesses in their portrayal of local people's 
access and strategies and options to change them. Indices of per capita water 
consumption (Falkenmark, 1990) and water scarcity and productivity (Seckler, 1996), 
and concepts of transformations to `closed basins' where all water is allocated and 
used (Keller et al., 1997), are all abstracted from the everyday reality of people's access 
water unless they also address the policies of the states they operate within. 
Historically, the drought-affected areas of India were known as scarcity regions, 
because of their lack of options and investments shaped by the uncertain and limited 
amounts of rainfall (Government of Maharashtra, 1973). Even before Mehta, there 
were calls for a wider perspective on how human agency was involved in or affected by 
drought and scarcity. Sexton (1992,1990) distinguished `economic scarcity' as scarcity 
related to economic development choices that generated institutions that first help but 
eventually often -constrain access to water, as opposed to absolute scarcity which he 
thought technology-limited. These institutions relate to wider economic decision 
making which often can get captured by water institutions set up. Homer-Dixon (1995) 
described `structural scarcity', that evolved from the process of `resource capture' by 
powerful groups, that will be seen in the Zimbabwe case study. Turton and Warner 
(1999) differentiated orders of water scarcity, with first order scarcity measured in 
resource availability, and second order scarcity was scarcity of social means - adaptive 
capacity and social resources to act resolve emergent competition and conflict. I keep 
this concept related with economic scarcity. I study these realities for India in Chapter 
5, Yemen in Chapter 6 and Zimbabwe in Chapter 7. 
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Ohlsson and Turton (1999) portrayed a historic spiral in water management 
approaches, where action started with engineering efforts to liberate supplies but 
transformed into different agency needs to manage demand and access transformed by 
this liberation - in which it became more and more difficult to separate natural droughts 
from socially conditioned scarcities because of the technological dimension. Eventually 
natural resource reconstruction was necessary demanding social adaptive capacity 
which could be both endogenous and externally supported by projects and capacity 
building. A problem with this spiral concept is its looseness in articulating the struggle 
in transformation of institutions and the initiatives that might build this social adaptive 
capacity. Sexton (1990, p. 24-25, citing Galnoor, 1980) also criticised 'supply-side 
approaches' that evolved for a historically specific task of opening tp water supply. 
However, he noted that while this produced clearly visible water institutions, it actually 
left de-facto water-policy decision-making in the agricultural sector. This meant that 
both old and new institutions assumed best able to meet a task would have difficulties 
achieving adaptive capacity on any-prefigured norms unless they also had real 
understanding of agrarian and economic dimensions and processes of the agricultural 
sector. Sexton, together with writers like Allan (1993) looked for demand-side 
conceptual approaches to assist understanding of scarcity and policies for its 
management, focusing onto allocation. Allan emphasised allocativc rather than 
technical efficiency in resolving scarcity, particularly developing the 'virtual water' 
concept that estimates the water value of imported products against locally produced 
goods. Allan (1993) also emphasised that such concepts should be used alongside 
effective political discussion about food sufficiency and livelihood security in 
economic planning and not be reduced to a dc-politicised toot However, concepts that 
bring this debate to the local reality of agrarian conditions and agricultural sectors arc 
rare. Adaptive capacity, without a sound base in understanding of local agrarian politics 
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and natural resources, can become another target for generic models and pre- figured 
tools of intervention and capacity building. Much of this thesis is written in the hope of 
emphasising the importance of understanding the interplay of state, locality and rural 
transformation in resolution of scarcities and reduction in vulnerability to drought. 
From within research on users of water, some authors have attempted to 
conceptualise water scarcity for use in irrigation (re)design and operations. Wade 
(1988) opened up initial understanding of the role of local agrarian institutions in 
mediating water scarcity as also shaped by technology and resource contexts. Uphoff et 
al (1990) differentiated relative and absolute water scarcity in system allocation and 
delivery. In the former overall supply left room to manoeuvre, such that actions by one 
farmer or a group could also reduce the problems of another, giving a role to local 
irrigation management institutions. With absolute water scarcity, water delivery could 
only be enforced and mediated by strong authority. Mollinga 0998) and Oorthuizen 
(2003) opened up these concepts further by exploring the interplay of water technology, 
water delivery and key actors. Mollinga (1998) explored now scarcity was also actual a 
design choice under supply-side policies, constituting its own evolving array of 
political and technical actors in water delivery - who also could also constrain reforms 
to deal with changing demands and agrarian conditions. Oorthuizen (2003) explored 
local scarcity constrained by policies of allocation as well as technology design 
choices, in irrigation systems with areas given core and peripheral status in security of 
supply. There, frontline workers and politicians operated alongside recognised but 
largely powerless local water associations to capture water in particular sites and broker 
water delivery in highly informal but locally-understood ways. Van Halsema (2002) 
introduced the idea of the `irrigation concept', where design choices about technology 
and institutions need consideration together with a recognition of local agrarian and 
agricultural realities and their transformation. This can be used to understand problems 
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water access domains built in at local level, and the real cfcacy of new modernisation 
efforts built around specific technological or institutional transformations. The work of 
Mollinga (1998) and Oorthuizen (2003) shoved the working of political economy 
between state, technology and resource access needed to use further the concept of 
`economic scarcity' as understood by Sexton (1990) and the Maharashtra government 
(1973), and the structural scarcity of Homer-Dixon(1995). 
These concepts inform the framework shown in Fig 2.1. I look at the domains of 
drought that have received successively more attention as technology has been 
developed to create more security in water use. I keep contexts of drought related to use 
- agricultural, groundwater and surface water drought - and investigate how both 
natural and human factors shape these cycles, as dimensions of scarcity. My own view 
is that there is a groundswell now to bring together frameworks to study drought and 
scarcity (see Chapter 5 and 7), and that can be the next cognitive step in relating 
science, technology and agency in droughtpronc areas. IIowcvcr, the case studies will 
also show the struggles and dilemmas in creating such new public action when older 
public agencies have evolved with other frameworks. As Ohlsson and Turton (1999) 
suggest, specialty scientific areas have grown to define the behaviour of different parts 
of the water cycle and risks from drought, and been linked with agencies developed to 
manage these water resources and disseminate technologies to use them in 
droughtprone areas. However, these initiatives create new pressures of scarcity that are 
rarely addressed through existing specialties and agencies, leaving problems of 
coherence and consistency. The remaining sections of this chapter now review core 
knowledge research developments in each drought context, in relation to both the 
nature and impacts of drought and scarcity. 
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2.5 AGRICULTURAL DROUGHT 
2.5.1. How do producers survive in a droughtprone region? 
49 
Morris (1974) used the question `What is famine' to draw out the aspects of the 
production cycle vthich enabled people to live in an area with a recognisable risk of 
rainfall failure. Famine is associated with drought, but is not a direct consequences. The 
effects of inadequate rainfall in any one year have to be seen against what is `normal' 
for such an area. One important concern was the impact of sequences of bad years, in 
addition to a high frequency of individual bad years, which lay at the root of a 
constellation of problems of underinvestment, risks and losses, and general low yields 
from poor soils and low-level moisture- fertility responses. Runs of dry years were seen to 
have particular impact, in how farmers could lose productive assets and savings, and 
face severe problems in restarting after drought (Binswanger et al, 1979; Jodha, 1991) 
Recognising traditional coping mechanisms, but also finding new ones, became a 
concern of some for research in the droughtprone areas (Dandekar, 1976; Jodha, 1991). 
However, by the mid 1970s, after serious droughts in India, others pointed how older 
coping mechanisms were breaking down. Agarwal (1991), Borkar and Nadkarni (1975), 
Moser (1994) and others studied how households coped with different vulnerabilities6 
related to seasonality and actual calamity, aid how they drew on income, social 
relationships, collective resources, migration and sale of productive and non-productive 
s Famine, which has attracted a huge literature, could be created by war, a range of disasters or even 
simple hoarding that changed people's access and 'exchange entitlements' (Sen, 1992). 6 Blaikie et al (1994) defined vulnerability as 'a combination of characteristics or group expressed in 
relation to hazard exposure, which derives from the social and economic condition of the individual, 
family or community concerned. ' (p. 60). Both Blaikie et al (1994) and Moser (1998) emphasised how 
vulnerability is different from poverty, and that there were policy reasons for keeping them separate: 
anti-poverty programmes were designed to raise incomes or consumption, while anti-vulnerability 
programmes aimed to reduce the chances of the hazard having a negative effect. 
50 SQENCF, TEQIIVOLOGYAJDAGE1VC'TIN771EDEFTLOPULWOFDROUGIfMRaVEARW 
assets to survive. Binswanger et al (1979) showed the increasingly precarious position of 
a farmer as successive droughts hit, in relation to his/her equipment and financial 
resources. Research showed the slow reinvestment after drought in both productive 
(livestock, equipment) and non-productive (jewellery, artefacts) assets, and the persistence 
of indebtedness, with assets rarely being replaced within two years. Not only was the 
farming system weakened in a drought year, but a real disaster occurred if two or more 
drought years occurred in succession. Farming systems research became concerned not 
only to design new production systems that could use new i IYV seeds and water sources. 
They also tried to find strategies related to the risks and options available to small farmers 
in dry areas: including: 
i) risk reducing measures. These operated before harvest failure, and included crop 
diversification, intra-seasonal adjustment of sowing times, and soil and water 
management; 
ii) loss management. These dealt with the consequences of crop failure, and included 
inter-year storage build-up and resale of assets, salvage operations, borrowing. and 
insurance; 
iii) off-farm strategies included migration and involvement in drought relief work. 
While research under the hazard and calamity frameworks destroyed any romantic 
notions of easy coping (Blaikie et al, 1994), Morris's (1974) arguments against seeing 
drought as a special `hazard' still has value. In a calamity framework, it becomes 
possible to treat drought events as a one-off occurrence in time, and not part of natural 
fluctuations. It can encourage people to sec the potential resource base as somewhat 
better than it is, to focus on `average conditions' against which a drought is a hazard. It 
can reduce attention to the general environmental base and technological paradigms 
and collective organizations relevant to this, in favour of an overemphasis on 
individual strategies and loose situational mechanisms of coping. 
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2.5.2. Studying agricultural drought risks 
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Framing of the `problem' of droughtprone areas shapes the emergence of data 
collection to support public action. Only India among the case studies has a historic 
public interest in agency 6r drought and scarcity management. Under the colonial 
administration, drought was interpreted in production terms, by their impact on crop yields 
and thus on taxes and food supply: thus rainfall and annewari declarations (tax relief 
allowed relative to yield reduction under calamities) were regularly recorded. 
However, globally emerging science networks - under the European empires, the 
Commonwealth, the UN and CGIAR system post World War 11 (WWII), and growth 
of new universities and international assistance programmes - soon helped the 
expansion of two scientific specialties in particular - agricultural meteorology and 
agricultural/farming systems research. 
Although agro-climatology had its roots in the 19th century, it boomed in the 1950s 
with advances in weather reconnaissance, understanding of plant photosynthesis and 
respiration, and plant genetics. Also in the 1950's, Penman and Thornthwaite published 
their respective formulae for calculating evapotranspiration. These formulae gave 
scientists their frst sense of 'universal' formulae, which could be used for international 
comparative work. 
As the knowledge base grew, both about weather but also about possible new cropping 
technologies, so too did attention to both risks of unwanted weather conditions, and the 
reliability of occurrence of weather conditions relative to the needs of new varieties or 
intensification of cropping. Three particular streams of work emerged that will also been 
seen in this thesis. However, these also developed rather differently in different regional 
networks of agricultural research in the indicators selected to help determine public action 
52 SCIENC& 7ECMVOLOGY. lNDAGFNCYRV77LEDEVELOPMENTOFDROUGIlTPRO, %TARElS 
Also, the probability levels for which risks were assessed often differed slightly, partly as 
a result of existing social norms, and related sets of scientific activity. 
One stream of research followed emphasis on the quantity of rainfall occurring in a 
period of time. For agricultural research and public assistance concerned with failure of 
crops, a specific total of rainfall was typically used as an indicator. The amounts used 
were selected either from actual experimental knowledge of crop water requirements, 
or from general experience of administrators about the relationship between rainfall 
amounts and regions with lower yields and limited crop options. Older studies (pre- 
1970) also occurred at time when there was less knowledge on crop growth and water 
requirements, another reason to use annual rainfall totals. For researchers linking more 
with questions about economic development and investment, levels of tolerable risk of 
crop failure became one guide in the search for rainfall totals and rainfall patterns that 
could adversely affect returns to investment or bring destitution. 
In colonial Africa, a model of agrarian transition was already in place that 
hypothesised a shift between subsistence, transitional and commercial farmers, which 
also shaped a very influential paper that reached into the Royal Society. Manning 
(1956) made probability analyses of annual rainfall using the normal probability 
distribution to study the chance that farmers failed to get the seasonal rainfall required for 
certain crops. He considered that larger farmers would have assets which could We them 
across bad years, which small subsistence farmers would not. The levels of risk adaptation 
he identified for different farmers, to rainfall received 95%, 90% and 75% of the time, for 
subsistence, `emergent' (moving into commodity farming) and commercial large farmers 
respectively - still influence many statistical studies of rainfall. As will be seen, the 10% 
risk has also become a common risk assessment level in water resources planning (sec 
Chapter 7). 
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A second stream was to look at the length of a `growing season' at different levels of 
risk and reliability, as a tool to help the general design of new farming systems. In West 
Africa, Cocheme and Franquin (1967) began identifying the growing season and the 
concept of 'moisture availability periods' (MAI) by comparing evapotranspiration with 
average rainfall, although it could also be compared with probabilities rainfall such as 
manning (1946 discussed). In India, such work also began in the 1960's (Georg and 
Krishnan, 1969) but, took on different conventions, as will be seen in Chapter 3. The 
IMD developed a variant of the MAI that was very much their own creation. Biswas 
and Sarkar (1978) took the concept developed by Cocheme and Franquin (1967) to 
compare the ratio of precipitation to potential evapotranspiration, then adopted some of 
the ideas of Hargreaves (1967), who used a rainfall probability of 75% probability to 
calculate the time period and rainfall amount when this ratio was above 0.3 (when the 
soil conditions were considered to make plants wilt and die). However, -they also 
performed the calculations on weekly periods, and also calculated periods when the 
ratio was above 0.7 when there should be no stress on crops (and when higher demands 
from growing crops could be met). They published a range of rainfall probabilities 
from 10%.... 90% (from the gamma function) so that planners could choose their risk 
levels. For climatic mapping, for their own mapping purposes, `assured rainfall' was 
that received 50% of the time, but they also used 30% and 70% levels. 
A third stream was the analysis of typical and aberrant weather conditions within a 
season: this helped in both forecasting, and in design of crop strategies. These emerged 
rapidly from regional and international contact from the late 1950s, as both climatological 
and agronomic knowledge grew (Glover and Robinson, 1953: Lineham, 1972; Raman, 
1974) It is also no surprise that such studies emerged more commonly where there was 
good interaction between meteorological and agricultural research organisations (as in 
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India, and in several colonial African states). Nevertheless, these techniques said little 
about the vagaries of actual production year-to-year for the small farmer. 
The question of how to study risk in physical water availability remains an area of 
debate. On the one hand, the older work of Manning (1956) has been superseded by 
debates that argue that even small farmers can make cropping choices that face higher 
levels of risk if they have relevant support and social networks (or can grab the %%ater), 
and that it is runs of years that create more difficult problems. IIowcvcr, Manning's 95% 
criteria still has some value. It indicates a core element of reliability of water, in quantity 
and timing, as well as risk in other periods. This is information and understanding that 
subsistence farmers may still work with for their general farming strategy, even if they 
take risks in growing additional crops. In areas without great food security or water 
security, where farmers must still rely on own production due to low purchasing power or 
lack of food for sale, this knowledge of more secure production periods and related crops 
remains important. This will be seen in section 7.6. 
Jodha (1991) argued that, for agricultural drought, it was important to distinguish 
research and development related to farmers' strategies, separate and additional to 
research and development on the 'production environment', also to recognize that there 
were also very different kinds of farmers suffering drought and living in droughtprone 
areas. However, while economists and farming systems analysts urged study of factors 
and environmental risks that restricted new investments in agriculture, and helped 
understanding of farmer decision. making, few meteorological scientists had taken up this 
challenge by the time of the study reported in Chapter 3. 
Beyond data collection and analysis, the other responses of science and technology 
were to develop practical artefacts and organise responses to combat drought. These were: 
- droughtproofing measures - to hold water or mobilise water - typically in wells, dams 
and diversions for irrigation and watershed management strategies; 
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- drought mitigation strategies - water allocation and access strategies designed to 
lessen the impact on people, and changes in farming practices; 
- emergency drought relief 
However it was irrigation that became targeted as the best panacea' and best 
`droughtproofing tool' - seen as vital to stabilise production, support niche crops 
appropriate to these regions, reduce inter-regional economic contrasts, and distribute 
new benefits to poor farmers. Tools for planning water development for irrigation are 
the main focus of chapters 4-7. 
2.6 GROUNDWATER DROUGHT 
Groundwater drought, shaped by lack of rainfall that reduces recharge, manifests itself 
through reduction in the yield of an aquifer overall and in individual wells - through 
the early falling of water levels and yield, that limit the period available for pumping 
and number of crop seasons, and reduced crop area within a season Growing 
dependencies on groundwater to provide water during a drought period drive further 
over-extraction. Olsen (1987) wrote unequivocally that it was `man-made drought' that 
had emerged in Andhra Pradesh through the huge expansion in well numbers and 
volumes extracted. 
The development of speciality knowledge and specialty agencies to mobilise 
groundwater in a droughtprone area has had a very different dynamic from that for 
agriculture. Much of the basic physics of groundwater movement and flows to wells 
were known by the early part of he twentieth century, and the basic importance of 
geology for mineral wealth as well as water made geology another early scientific 
specialty of empire. However, it was the rapid emergence of new drilling technologies 
and pumps in the 1950's, and the identification of well development as part of 
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development strategies in many areas, that shaped agencies for groundwater 
development. 
Generic frameworks for groundwater behaviour have been exchanged across the 
world, both for water movement in geological formations, and also the design of access 
technologies like open wells, tubewclls, springs and seepage points. Actual data on 
water levels and water yields have become standard items of monitoring. i lowcvcr, 
other intrinsic behaviour - groundwater movement, well behaviour and water balance 
and safe yield of aquifers - have all largely relied on modelling with this data. 
Development programmes have often worked with model schemes for costs and returns 
and risks to farmers, which have rarely been tested in reality (Vishwanathan, 1983; 
ARDC, 1980). 
Agencies emerged for technology dissemination at the same time or even before 
agencies or departmental units were in place to plan the use of groundwater - creating 
problems of consistency and congruency in actor networks that have never gone away. 
While groundwater development programmes were often assisted by foreign funding, 
these projects did not at first bring the scientific tools and ideas for regional planning of 
groundwater. These instead had to be `homegrown', for use in local agencies often 
without funding for research except where externally funded. Studies on potential for 
groundwater development in a droughtpronc region have thus first and foremost been 
related to changes in levels and to numbers of extraction devices, that can be equated 
with `safe yield' under normal and drought conditions. While the early efforts to 
develop models were respected because they nevertheless tried to assist urgent 
programme needs (ARDC, 1978a and b, 1980), the lack of real change in recent models 
has left them subject to extensive criticism (Mocnch, 1992). These routines 
underpinning the `science' of groundwater drought arc analysed further in Chapters 4 
and 5. 
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For studying the changes and misfits around agency and cognition, I draw on 
several writers who have tried to open up the social dimensions behind increasing 
groundwater drought and the nature of scarcity. Burke and Moench (2000) have charted 
the stages of evolution of groundwater, from (i) popularisation of technologies, (ii) rise 
of new groundwater-based agrarian economies (iii) early signs of groundwater 
overdraft (iv) decline of groundwater availability to levels where it has effects on the 
economy and quality of life. Each stage has different characteristics locally and policy 
requirements regionally a, 
In the 1980s, as drilling technology was expanding, Dhawan (1982) highlighted the 
need to understand the economics of tubewells, because of the unique dualism starting 
up between traditional and modem methods of groundwater irrigation in India. There 
were important questions about how the state could regulate groundwater to prevent its 
exploitation that were still unanswered as its expansion began. He also noted that 
tubewells were largely an assembly task, where there were a variety of methods and 
materials that could be studied in relation to the development of tubewell/borewell 
proper, the pumpset, the water distribution and power source. These shaped their costs 
and also their dissemination, and the assemblage dimension meant that little real 
science might be needed in their installation and use. 
Chandrakanth et Arun (1997) wrote about the changing levels and scope of analysis 
that could be used to separate problems of drought impact and scarcity for 
groundwater. Early studies tended to focus on the degree and type of well interference 
and groundwater exploitation, often with particular focus on the dry and drought-prone 
regions. Later studies could study investments (physical and institutional) in coping 
strategies, as a reflection of the economic scarcity understood by farmers. In this 
respect, Chandrakanth and Arun (1997) found that additional costs like drip were rarely 
taken up by farmers unless economic scarcity was really severe. They also tried to look 
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inside clations between numbers of wells working in a village and the volume of 
groundwater available in the aquifer, as a means to understand real interactions 
between wells (and other water bodies locally) and thus what diffcrcnt technical and 
social options might really be of relevance. This approach is followed in Chapter 5. 
Such `scarcity-related' study required much local interaction and knowledge which 
most techno-scientific agencies would or could not undertake, leaving most `scientific' 
studies of groundwater scarcity stuck in the first level analysis of well density and 
interference, or more abstract modelling. 
Shah (1990) argued that as over-exploitation continues, groundwater management 
regimes might go two ways: in the first, the groundwater balance i; disrupted and the 
farming system falls to a new (lower) equilibrium level of production and income. 
Alternatively some rules may be accepted, and that some organisational forms could be 
better in helping these `self-correcting mechanisms" to emerge. Changing legislation to 
allow flexible and often multipurpose organisations for managing borcwclls or 
borewell clusters, and support for such organisations has been a focus of public action 
in the 1990s. 
Kolavalli and Atheeq (1995) tried to define generic behaviour of wells that indicated 
water scarcity, with particular reference to hardrock aquifers. These included: water 
quality problems; declining groundwater levels, both as lower levels occurring earlier 
in a season, and falling to qualitatively lower lewls; open dug wells drying up; 
borewell depths increasing; borewell yields decreasing; and borcwclls falling dry. As 
chapters 4 and 5 show, these could all be monitored locally in villages, but responsible 
agencies have hardly changed their analytical procedures to develop this new 
understanding. 
Dubash (2002) highlighted how the private market has proved much more influential 
and successful than public agencies in dissemination of well and pump technology, and 
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that markets - or at least locally shaped exchange groundwater mechanisms - may be 
eventually more influential in groundwater management than any public initiative to 
register and legislate well development and control groundwater access. Moench 
(1991) and Knegt and Vincent (2001) highlighted the relevance of studying the social 
interaction that could be promoted around the different technologies involved in 
mobilising groundwater, where electricity may give more options for collective action 
than water exchange. 
2.7 SURFACE WATER DROUGHT 
Surface water drought is visible as the effects of low or intermittent flows, dry rivers 
and reduced water storage. Models of throughflow and runoff have been debated since 
the 1930s, but basic scientific routines and statistical analysis to study patterns in river 
flow have been around since the early 1900s. Given the importance of water for 
domestic use and irrigation, and simpler technology historically and locally available, 
many countries have had longstanding ordinances and laws defining surface water 
rights (unlike groundwater), often with clear courts of legal redress. However, the 
critical importance of irrigation to development has often put responsibilities in 
monitoring and planning inside agencies for irrigation or agriculture. This often stifled 
research on hydrological processes, except as they related to quantitative availability of 
water, and indeed made research a poor relation to the development of norms that 
helped construction and operational needs. The transforming point in which a water 
agency or river agency can assert itself over other state departments is often a critical 
one in the cognitive frameworks for water management in droughtprone areas and 
scarcity conditions, and this is a focus of interest in Chapter 7. 
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Monitoring of surface water drought perhaps has even more problems than 
groundwater and rainfall, because of the costs in developing measurement points and 
difficulties in designing hydrometric networks to study and monitor runoff and its 
relations with meteorological conditions. Despite the basic importance of surface water 
in many areas, debates about structural scarcity - how definition of rights and design 
agencies lead to social exclusion of some groups - and physical scarcity where water is 
overallocated and extraction improperly controlled -arc relatively recent (Waller, 1994; 
Bolding, 1999). 
Risk questions are also critical to these water resource planners and designers. Rees 
(2002) argues they must be treated as social as well as scientific concepts. She 
emphasised that while risk assessment needed to be based in good physical science and 
technology, the wider social forces shaping water management also need 
understanding. Economic, political and ecological sources of uncertainty can have 
major implications for water allocation and people's access, beyond hydrological 
uncertainty. The analysis of river flows to make plans for abstraction is more complex 
and challenging because of the variability of flow in space and time, and the impact of 
offtakes in one point on another. The costs and difficulties of monitoring rivers in many 
developing countries, and complexity to synthesise and analysis relationships across 
river networks, meant that many countries developed proxy indicators of runoff, 
typically relating runoff to rainfall. The use of such formulae is discussed in Chapter ?. 
As more data is available, flow frequency and flow duration curves enable comparison 
of yield with and without storage of different levels of cost. Typically, levels of water 
allocation are allowed to increase in relation to probabilities of surface water 
availability, as more water is stored: however the analysis can shift between actual 
flows and total annual water received. As Chapter 7 discusses, allocation of flows 
received 10% of the time has been used as a planning norm in Rhodesia/Zimbabwc: it 
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has been applied to flows when there is no storage and the annual water yields where 
there is reasonable levels of storage. Higher levels of allocation can come with greater 
storage and over-year storage. 
The planning for use of river water involves understanding of the behaviour of flows 
in themselves, but also the economic impacts of failure of flows and social impacts of 
conflict between users over water along a river system. However, the scope of impact 
and nature of risks investigated have changed over time. While risks of low flows were 
first assessed against irrigation and domestic security, they have now expanded into 
requirements for more ecological security, to give minimum flows for aquatic life and 
against pollution (Falkenmark, 2003). Currently, the concern for economic productivity 
from water has meant new debates about how to maximise the efficiency of water use 
against equity of water access that minimises conflict (Rees, 2002). 
To study these points, I draw on the work of HIadny and Buchtele (1989), who 
emphasised two critical areas in hydrological analysis to support information to plan 
and act against surface water drought. 
- design values for protective facilities and measures - not only physical measures like 
construction of dams, but plans and legislative steps for water management in a 
drought: this is the main field addressed in the latter part of Chapter 7; 
warning and forecasting tools. 
I also use a rather standard framework for the work of a hydrologist, in order to later 
criticise it in Chapter 7. Kohler, (1957, p. 1) noted that.... 'In the broadest sense' 
hydrology treats the occurrence of water on the earth, the description of the earth with 
respect to water and the relation of water to life on the earth'... He proposed that the 
problems confronting the hydrologist could be segregated into two categories: those 
pertaining to `planning and design', and those dealing with 'operation'. Kohler's 
conceptualisation is shown in Table 2.2 
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Looking at this framework 45 years later, we still see such tasks dominating, but I 
argue that tasks must widen. The issue of the relationship of water to 'life on earth' 
should highlight the question of 'which social groups' and with 'what social and 
economic development concerns' in mind is data collection designed? Equally. the 
tools in use for planning and operation also have to consider the options of debate and 
enforcement of institutions for managing surface water, both in the planning and 
operation dimensions. This issue is taken up further in Chapter 7. 
Table 2.2. Problems confronting the hydrologist (after Kohler, 1957) 
Planning and design problems 
" Spillway capacity 
(for reservoirs, stock ponds etc) 
" Levee design and channel improvement 
" Storm drainage 
" Power potential estimates 
" Available water supply 
(with or without storage) 
" Safe yield of groundwater, 
well-spacing etc 
" Flood damage frequencies 
and determination of flood risk 
" Estimates of consumptive use 
and reservoir evaporation 
Operational problcms 
Short range forecasts 
" Operation of dams 
" Flood forecasting, also for 
evacuation and withdrawal of 
movable property 
" Low-flow navigation planning 
" Scheduling diversion 
and distribution of irrigation water 
" Scheduling power production 
" Planning construction in or 
near stream 
Seasonal and annual forecasts 
" Basis of long-range flood control 
operations and flood containment 
" Agricultural planning in inigatcd 
areas 
" Basis of power operation schedules 
" Planning for municipal supply 
" Long-range navigation planning 
I would also highlight the concern for water allocation and monitoring of water 
access, missing in the above, but now central to many water planning dilemmas. I also 
believe that understanding of operational problcms must (rc)shape planning and design 
activities: indeed many failures in irrigation systems arc a consequence of their 
designers giving insufficient thought to the practical operation of systems. 
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Waller (1994) used a political analysis to study how expertise and elite groups held 
control over water allocation and management. He explained how it took the crisis of a 
six year drought in California to expose the control over policy agendas and control 
over policy reforms by an elite set of interests and 'expert systems. Only after new 
claims from urban legislators and new lobbying groups, and the mass media attacked 
poor water management, were reforms pushed through. Only then could a strong 
technical image and power alliance between water agencies and powerful farmers be 
confronted to get new water conservation progranunes. This framework also informs 
the study of surface water drought in Chapter 7. 
There are calls from different researchers to develop a more holistic view, for 
capabilities to study the dynamics of drought and scarcity together - to understand 
`water cycle drought' (Bandhopadyay, 1987) and for the reconstruction of water 
resource management systems that have institutions and agencies capable to manage 
water in a sustainable, equitable and compassionate ecological framework. Several 
frameworks for water management - integrated water resources management, river 
basin organisations - have been actively debated (Abu-Zeid and Biswas, 1996; 
Hufschmidt and Tejwani, 1993; Wessel et al., 1999). I think this is also an admirable 
objective - but I also recognise that in the context of many states of development, these 
idealised new frameworks are difficult to render feasible nor always desirable (see also 
Wester et al, 2003). Rather I hope that the findings in this thesis show the importance to 
understand the interacting politics of knowledge and agency related to drought and 
scarcity, in thinking how to bring new and more inclusive water management. 
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2.8 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has built a conceptual framework to study the cognitive history of drought 
and scarcity, as shown through public agency in droughtprone areas. Choices in the 
framing of problems, and nethods of data collection and analysis, and their use in 
technological design, have powerful effects on how allocation, negotiation and 
transformation of water management can take place. Wicked social dilemmas are 
embedded in the planning and monitoring of water resources. Science and technology 
are socially constructed (Rose and Rose, 1976) and transformation in the scope for 
analysis will need change in analytical frameworks and tools to meet the needs of 
different groups. The studies that follow trace what happens if, in the name of 
economic development, scientists, engineers and instrumental actors fail to make 
resource evaluations or choose technologies consistent with the environment and public 
they are supposed to serve. 
INTERMEZZO 1 
INTERMEZZO 1 
PUBLIC AGENCY IN TBE DROUGHTPRONE AREAS OF INDIA 
65 
The purpose of this intermezzo is to outline both the orientation and form of public 
agencies and programmes that developed in India, and shaped water availability in the 
droughtprone areas of India, as described in the next three chapters. A second intermezzo 
precedes Chapters 7 and 8 on Yemen and Zimbabwe, which highlights key differences of 
these states in their public agencies working in droughtprone and scarcity-affected areas. 
Rural devebpment in India has been pursued through a series of Five Year Plans 
(FYP). The 1st FYP began in 1951/2: the 10th FYP (2002-2007) was underway as this 
study was written During these plans, a number of special programmes have been 
launched by Central Government and locally implemented by State governments. Central 
programmes are not legally binding on the states, but operate through financial influence, 
as state governments have limited prospects to raise their own funds. These programmes 
have not only influenced water resource development. The third FYP was generally 
considertd the start of policy formation on natural resource development, to be developed 
on `scientific lines'. Disastrous food shortages, combined with extensive American 
influence promoting programmes and agencies for technology dissemination (with both 
subsidies and credit packages), also helped to spearhead many irrigation development 
initiatives that were at their zenith during the 4-6th FYP. The year 1971, and the period 
1969-1975 (fourth FYP) was something of a watershed for the creation of a number of 
special water monitoring units newly set up, or carved out of older bureaucracies, who are 
prominent in this study. These helped monitor resources and plan water extraction in 
relation to the new development programmes. 
Apart from changing content, fie scope of water programmes was also shaped by 
administrative discourses. They include shifts in attitudes between elected or appointed 
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officers in programme administration (in villages or specialist agencies), towards crcdit- 
based rather than pure welfare assistance, and promotion of individual rather than 
communal assets. The emphasis on 'Community Development' or 'Panchayat' 
organisations emphasised by early plans (influenced by the personal philosophy of Nehru) 
shifted towards specific organisations for rural development during the Third FYP 
(1961/66) - creating the District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) - separate from 
local government. However, since the 7`h FYP there has been a re-emphasis back on using 
community organisations, but with elected representatives. Liberalisation and financial 
reforms from the 1990s, and development discourses promoting local institutions, have 
also focused attention on local water user and livelihood associations and district-based 
monitoring of resources (see Chapter 6). 
A number of thematic policy concerns, or framing discourses, arc central in the next 
three chapters. These include major debate on, and programmes for: 
a) rural development and poverty alleviation. Crucial to droughtprone India generally, 
and the next three case study chapters, is the Drought Prone Area Programme 
(DPAP), launched during the 4th FYP and still in existence in 2000, which 
emphasised creation of community assets that helped create resilience against drought. 
The DPAP has had an extremely important influence on the mobilisation of surface 
water and groundwater for irrigation. Critical cognitive elements for this programme 
were: the areas considered relevant for programme assistance, the availability of water 
resources that could be mobilised under the programme, and the water sources and 
technologies to focus on, examined in Chapters 3 and 4. Its funds were released for 
small irrigation systems in areas without widespread availability of large irrigation 
systems. Under this programme, normal criteria of hydrological suitability' were often 
I Irrigation dams funded under this programme arc permitted to be constructed at 50% dependability rather 
than 75% (i. e. they fail to fill 50% time). Equally borcwclls arc allowed funding that have lower yields. 
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suspended, so that small water supplies could nevertheless be developed for poor and 
marginal farmers in difficult areas. The Integrated Rural Development Programme 
was launched in the 6th FYP for employment generation and household asset creation. 
It essentially assisted individual farmers through subsidies and loans, and did support 
programmes giving small farmers access to pump technology. 
b) Special programmes for scheduled castes and tribes (SCSTC), which have been 
used to fund irrigation development to these socially excluded groups. SCSTC 
schemes often had to mobilize projects in areas of very poor water resources. In 
later programmes, greater emphasis was given to employment generation, in which 
the construction and provision of irrigation works declined. These programmes 
operated from District-level Societies that also worked closely with the DRDA; 
c) Drought Relief Funds released by Central and State funds at times of 'scarcity'. 
While these often involved employment generation (sometimes constructing irrigation 
works), they were also used to cover emergency water supply needs. New community 
wells and borewells could get dug when existing sources failed, or small dams be 
constructed or renovated. Drought relief work was usually under special sanction of 
government officials, and could be outside norms present in other programmies. 
India also has a long tradition of public agencies involved in water monitoring and 
development. Some had colonial origins, and echoed developments in the United 
Kingdom. For this study, several of these older institutions are particularly important. The 
oldest was the Geological Survey of India, set up in 1851. However, although this 
undertook some survey work on groundwater from the 1960's, a specific Central 
Groundwater Board (CGWB) was only carved out from the GSI in 1971. 
Percolation tanks to support aquifer recharge and associated well development are also common. For many 
years, the DPAP also hosted special work on 'Watershed Management', following on from earlier soil 
conservation programmes. 
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The Government of India proposed a Groundwater (Control and Regulation) Bill in 1970, 
as the scale of groundwater development under tubewells began to become apparent. State 
Groundwater Departments also date from this time, although they often took time to 
become established. With the Agricultural Refinance and Development Corporation 
(ARDC), the CGWB set up the Central Groundwater Estimation Committee in 1985, with 
guidelines for the estimation of groundwater draft, and State Estimation Committees 
followed. As Chapters 5 and 6 will show, the experience of the state groundwater 
departments has been a troublesome one. Their build-up of identity and respected 
scientific performance has been poorer than other agencies with older and more 
independent scientific credentials. I describe these state agencies as specialty agencies 
with quite low cognitive and social institutionalisation, which has often made them 
uncertain partners in development initiatives, while also very dependent on external 
programmes for funds and scientific identity. 
A second was the India Meteorological Department (IMD) established in 1875. This 
was variously located at Calcutta, Simla and Poona before being finally located in New 
Delhi. It developed an Agricultural Meteorology Division (AMD) in 1971, based at 
Poona, which was my base for the study documented in Chapter 3. I characterise the IMD 
as a specialty agency with both strong cognitive and social institutionalisation, with a 
well-established bureaucracy which allowed it to run its own operational tasks as well as 
its research areas. The Agricultural Meteorology Division, still relatively young at the 
time of that study, could be thought of as one of IMD's Research Areas at that time, but 
one still quite well-structured into the strong cognitive and social institutionalisation of the 
overall agency. Well-established and accepted observation and calculation methods of 
IMD simply spread into the new divisions and programmes of AMD. 
A third institution with colonial origins stems from the Imperial Council for 
Agricultural Research, renamed the Indian Council for Agricultural Research after 
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Independence. A focus on the problems of dryland farming began as early as 1923, and in 
the period 1933-43 five research stations became operational to develop dryland farming 
practices for their area. Of particular relevance to this study is the station at Sholapur. 
However, in 1966 ICAR launched the `All India Coordinated research project on Dryland 
research based on 27 stations, to be located in `typical' agro-climatic zones. I would also 
characterise this programme as a `research area', but one strongly linked with the norms 
of the Specialty agency it belonged with, and also showing strong cognitive and social 
institutionalisation. 
The final institutions with colonial roots were certain Universities and Agricultural 
Colleges. The (Bombay) State Department of Agriculture emerged in 1877, and a College 
of Science was created at Poona in 1879, after a noted Indian agriculturist lobbied the 
British government. This was renamed the College of Agriculture in 1907 and became one 
of the five first Universities to give an Agricultural degree. This college was later 
absorbed into the Maharashtra Agricultural University network in 1968. At the time of 
study discussed in Chapter 3, Poona was still the site of the Vice Chancellors office, 
although the main campus was identified as Rahuri in Ahmednagar. As will be shown in 
the next chapter, there have been direct funding relationships at times between ICAR, the 
Agricultural Meteorology Division, and the Poona campus. These allowed good links and 
contacts to be formed, backing up key preferences to combine practical observational data 
linking statistical and crop biological phenomena - but excluded other data. 
However, both the Central and State governments developed agencies as necessary to 
suit the wider needs of planning and development. In fact, India's policies on science and 
technology development, under a Ministry, were also quite distinctive. This Ministry 
looked quite systematically at which technologies it has wanted to promote and thought 
about agency structures for their dissemination and uptake: well technology is a particular 
focus for Chapter 4. However, credit sources for technology uptake have also been a 
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special concern, given historical dependencies on non-institutional loans (money lenders 
and traders) and persistence of indebtedness. 
Village co-operative societies began as early as 1904, but in 1961 formal institutional 
credit still provided only 1% of actual requirements. State land development banks, which 
federated Primary Agricultural Credit Societies for short term loans, emerged 1920-1940 
in some states. However, these credit sources did not emerge in the areas studied until 
after the new states were created. In 1969, nationalisation of banks meant that commercial 
banks could also become involved in giving loans. Finally some special regional banks 
developed from a combination of central state and commercial bank funds. However, a 
serious problem throughout has been big farmer bias and the lack of lending to small and 
marginal farmers. 
Given the Central government's insistence in a credit component in many of its 
promoted plans (alongside a subsidy element for small farmers), a special corporation was 
set up in the mid 1960s - the Agricultural Refinance and Development Corporation 
(ARDC) with funds from the World bank and bilateral donors to `refinance' these local 
loans and related agencies. This was replaced by the National Bank for Agricultural and 
Rural development (NABARD) in 1981, which gained responsibility for policy towards 
central financial support for agriculture. Minor irrigation became a specific and important 
part of their work Both ARDC and NABARD had important powers for the scrutiny of 
accounts and investigation of procedures of banks and other corporations set up with 
public and private capital to spearhead technology dissemination. Both became heavily 
involved in setting technical norms for clearance of borewell and pump developments for 
bank funding, not otherwise available from other research, monitoring and technical 
agencies emerging at this time. I also describe ARDC and NABARD as having strong 
social institutionalisation. However, its technical staff often faced problems in building 
links into other scientific and technological agencies, precisely because they were not seen 
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to come from a more specific scientific and engineering specialty background, and powers 
of financial scrutiny and technical scrutiny did not always favour good personal relations. 
The structure of a corporation also emerged to deal with these special technology 
dissemination needs - capable to receive public and private funds, develop new technical 
norms, liase with banks over funding, and act speedily among the numerous departments 
and groups operating at local level. One corporation important to this study is the Andhra 
Pradesh State Irrigation Development Corporation (APSIDC), set up for implementing 
surface and groundwater `lift' schemes, in 1974 (although branches only emerged in the 
droughtprone area in 1981). Other corporations of this kind included the Andhra Pradesh 
State Agro-Industries Corporation (APSAIC), which had a special division dealing with 
agricultural pumpsets. A third was the Andhra Pradesh State Cooperative Rural Irrigation 
Corporation (APSCRIC), who became involved in installing `dug cum-borewells' -a 
technology for deepening open wells. These corporations were specialty agencies - or 
ventures really - set up by public and private funds and very shaped by political forces. As 
will be seen, tlieir operating environment actually gave them little . time for research, and 
relations with more research-based and science-based agencies were problematic for these 
'implementation-biased' agencies. Their technical norms in use often emerged in a rather 
ad hoc and pragmatic way, and they were influenced as much by banks and 
ARDC/NABARD as the Groundwater Department. While often led at first by charismatic 
directors, later financial problems and technological underperformance limited their 
cognitive transformation, even when linked to external development assistance, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
Beyond these `specialty' agencies in scientific and technical performance, lay the 
general rural development agencies and district committees involved in implementing 
state plans and applying, coordinating and disbursing subsidies, and local government 
authority overseeing them. The most significant of these for this study was the District 
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Rural Development Agency, created from 1985. Essentially a planning agency disbursing 
funds to other implementing agencies, they nevertheless had some technical staff from 
various ministries and departments attached to them. Mainly, however, they were 
administrative and financial staff. Here the study will show other special problems, as 
accepted technical norms and research interests sometimes got subverted by 
administrative and financial interests. Another significant agency was the Scheduled Caste 
Finance Corporation that allocated funds to a range of implementing agencies (including 
APSIDC, and the Irrigation Department). At district level resources were managed 
through District Service Cooperative Societies for Scheduled Castes, Backward Classes 
and scheduled Tribes (SCSTC). They a)uld contribute additional subsidies as `margin 
money' -a kind of hypothetical long-term loan. These subsidies provided important 'top- 
up' funding for special community programmes. Coordinating these agencies and running 
regular meetings on planning and action was the District Collector responsible for law and 
order. 
Beyond this complex mix of agencies acting in the public domain, lie also many NGOs 
active in the civil/informal sphere, whose work will be discussed more in Chapters S. 
However, one last scientific influence and interest to mention is international research, and 
also development agencies. ICRISAT, the International Centre for Research in the Semi- 
Arid Tropics based at Hyderabad, had a special interest in drought-prone areas and its 
Agricultural Meteorology and Farming Systems divisions sought special links with IMD 
and ICAR. International agencies like the World Bank and The Ford Foundation, and also 
some bilateral programmes, sometimes funded special staff in to assist new agencies 
Alongside this complex web of formal public agency for programme implementation 
and resource management typical of a developmental and democratic state, was an equally 
complex structure of legal institutions for water management. However, a system of rights 
with disputes handled in civil court has not been able to spawn new state- level regulations 
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for groundwater use (although many Model bills exist, see Knegt and Vincent, 2001). 
Some aithors see this as another domain that India is `leaving to the market', although 
Dubash (2002) argues that locally-shaped exchange practices can yet emerge to combat 
the growing control of a rural elite over groundwater resources. This lack of established 
regulation and institutions across all areas of water is one distinctive difference between 
India and the other case studies discussed in Intermezzo 2, although all countries do show 
common struggles to access water that are often shaped and brokered by new 
interventions. 
The scope of the states to follow through on central plan guidelines has been shaped by 
their creation as well as political configuration. The state of Andhra Pradesh was 
recognised in 1956: the state of Maharashtra was recognised in 1960, when the old 
Bombay state was split up into Maharashtra and Gujarat. Maharashtra state used the 
annual isohyet of 750mm, together with an incidence of irrigated area under 15% to 
demarcate its DPA. The Andhra Pradesh (AP) government used an annual isohyet of 
less than 750mm and a criteria of less than 20% of local administrative units were 
irrigated, and an annual isohyet in the range of 750-1125mm if a block had less than 
15% of the area irrigated. The AP conditions were thus more favourable to areas 
actually being declared droughtprone. After a review in 1982 of the DPAP by a Central 
Taskforce, AP was forced to axe 15 blocks from its DPA because of actual area 
irrigated. The Taskforce also insisted that new blocks could only be added if the 
irrigated area was less than 20% or 15% - but this still left Andhra Pradesh disbursing 
money into areas with more irrigation than in other states. 
There are historical differences in the political dynamics and priorities between 
Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra states, which have shaped the evolution of 
institutions and continuity and breadth of data sets. These differences were underscored 
by radically different political histories during the 1990s: different grass root politics, 
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different styles of the Chief Minister and very different options for international donor 
assistance. Maharashtra, with its longer history of cooperative movements, welfare 
altruism, and political activism remained a hotbed of NGO and other civil society 
activism underneath more fundamentalist Hindu politics, who continued to drive many 
new paradigms for building resilience in the droughtprone areas. 
Andhra Pradesh meanwhile reinvented itself in the 1990s with both populist and nco- 
liberal rhetoric on `good governance' that attracted a lot of donor attention - although on 
the ground it had many fewer civil society organisations and radical programmes than 
Maharashtra. In Andhra Pradesh, water was given a unique profile by the Chief Minister 
himself, Chandrababu Naidu. He put a special focus onto water conservation with his 
`Neeru Meeru' programme, which became pushed through newspaper supplements, 
television coverage and video-conferencing with local officials, some of which was even 
reported on public television. 
What I hope to show in the next three chapters is that while drought has been of critical 
concern in India, the actual contribution to critical cognitive and technical norms to help 
sustainable development in DPAs has been rather limited, and scientific networking in 
particular has been very poor. Where specialty agencies had strong cognitive and social 
institutionalisation, they tended rather to stay within themselves and coexist with other 
agencies in an easy but rather detached way. Thus elite scientists coexisted with the 
representatives of informal civil society quite well, but rarely absorbed from them any 
radically new cognitive frameworks or technical ideas on drought and drought 
impact/mitigation. This is visible in the chapters looking at studies in agricultural drought 
and agricultural meteorology. When agencies were neither strongly developed as 
specialties nor strongly institutionalised - as will be seen in groundwater development - 
there was a much more complex interaction and influence between agencies, in what were 
technoeconomic rather than technoscientific networks. They also Gund difficulties in 
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stopping inappropriate and corrupt activities, that often emerged because of the pressires 
and opportunities in these networks. The main users of the information generated were 
usually other agencies involved in development assistance or technology dissemination. 
Fanners interacted with agencies to take up their financial assistance, but often were not 
finding them that useful for their operational decisions. Recognising this political 
economy of public agency and how they broker, control and achieve programme tasks - 
and how it utilises or brings relevant science and technology or not - has been one 
learning curve in my own cognitive history in understanding development options in 
droughtprone areas. 
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CHAPTER 3 
AGRICULTURAL DROUGHT AND AGROMETEOROLOGICAL 
RESEARCH IN NIAIJARASHTRA STATE 
If there is one single natural factor that can undo the progress of agriculture, it is weather. 
Farmers have always been weatherwise, but it was the Royal Commission on Agriculture 
(1928) which was responsible for introducing meteorological thinking in the science of 
agriculture in India. The Royal Commission had ... stated that there were two directions in 
which scientists interested in agriculture should undertake investigations of meteorological 
nature. The first was statistical and the second biological... Progress in the field of agricultural 
meteorology in the country has been mostly in setting up of observatories in agricultural farms. 
Meteorological research in close association with agriculture has been limited. Ministry of 
Agriculture 1971 Preface 
A scientific study of the problem of Growth and Instability in Indian Agriculture is possible 
only if comparable agricultural and meteorological data are available for a sufficiently long 
period. Sen 1969, p. 827 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the application of the science of agrometeorology into studying 
agricultural drought risks for development planning in the droughtprone area of 
Maharashtra (DPAM) state in 1979 - the end of the Fifth FYP period - and the agencies 
involved in this scientific enterprise to chart an area. Thus this chapter demonstrates at 
least two of the relationships of science supposedly contributing to technology outlined 
by Brooks (1994). These include being a source of tools and techniques for more 
efficient engineering design (in this case for farming systems), and widening a 
knowledge based that enables more efficient strategies of applied research, 
development and refinements of technologies. The objective of this chapter is not only 
to show the critical cognitive and technical norms put in place, but also the gaps that 
remained in the generation of tools and ideas useful for the development agencies and 
farmers struggling in the DPAM. Contributing to, and being part of, development 
agency in the wider sense was left outside the work of these scientific ventures. By 
detailed reporting of my own and others' work, I hope to show the minutiae and levels 
of abstraction that can also absorb and overtake the unwary scientist. 
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For understanding the cognitive and technical norms used in recognising 
agricultural drought in these earlier times of development planning in droughtprone 
areas, this chapter looks critically at the work of the Indian Meteorological Department 
(IMD) and the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR). It looks at both the 
models they used and knowledge partnerships they worked in, at the time when the 
DPAP programme had been running for 8-9 years. A serious drought in Maharashtra, 
which ran for almost 3 years 1970-1973 had also brought strong state government 
attention into the predicament of farmers in the DPAM, building on earlier `Scarcity 
Commissions' (Government of Maharashtra 1973,1960). This chapter also documents 
studies I undertook on drought working alongside IMD staff, both to extend 
understanding and also find simple models and criteria for various needs in local 
development programmes of that time. The chapter thus shows the first changes in my 
own cognitive understanding, in becoming aware of my own instrumentalist training 
and orientation. 
The sections of the chapter are laid out in relation to the instrumentalist view I- and 
others - had at this time. After a review of the institutions under study, there Sllows 
two quantitative sections that study climatic data in different ways, based both on 
characteristics that scientists thought might be influential on production, but also as 
shaped by the nature of data available. Each section looks at what agencies werc doing, 
and the additional studies I tried to undertake. Section 3.3 documents the studies of 
precipitation considered relevant to crop potential (and thus a focus of action for 
droughtproofing). The studies developed by IMD and ICAR focused around rainfall 
and `aberrant rainfall' conditions for crop planning, while the analyses I developed 
tried to bring in more of a livelihood focus, particularly through dryspell analysis and 
study of runs of poor years. These sections show that, whilst IMD and ICAR could 
have worked more together on ideal crop planning needs, they did not at that time 
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relate to wider agricultural economics and farming systems research. The focus then 
also was still overwhelmingly on `kharif weather in the monsoon with less attention to 
post-monsoon `rabi' conditions. Section 3.4 examines water balance studies around 
rainfall-evapotranspiration-soil moisture models to show critical stress periods on crops 
(that could be used in planning and support for and with small farmers). The studies 
developed by IMD and ICAR only to some extent related weather crop 
evapotranspiration and crop yields, and did this through statistical analyses, while my 
analyses focused on crop-weather matrices and runs of good and bad years, and crop- 
weather models. Section 3.6 gives the conclusions, that really few criteria and models 
were available to assist many practical development needs. My work, while of personal 
interest to some, never got taken up or even reviewed in India. This was partly because 
of the social dynamics around the research, but also because I failed to understand 
about the networking necessary to bring changes in cognition and action. 
This study was my first major overseas research grant, funded by the then Ministry 
of Overseas Development. Its objectives involved statistical analyses of rainfall and 
evapotranspiration patterns to understand more about critical dry spells for crop 
production in Maharashtra, and the wider links of dryspells to the monsoon circulation. 
I was drawn to the subject both by the growing literature on agricultural meteorology 
for agricultural planning, a specific interest in the linkages of drought, food and rural 
development, and also an interest in monsoon climatology. Like many at the time, I 
was interested to see if there were generic models that could be applied to the study of 
rainfall almost regardless of time and space. I was drawn to Maharashtra because it was 
the base for research in agricultural meteorology in India, it had excellent rainfall 
records (visible via the UK Meteorological Office), and the apparent lack of published 
studies from the state. I also knew it had a dryland production zone with an historic 
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core food scarcity zone, formally defined as a Drought Prone Area (DPA) in the Fourth 
FYP. Only once in the state did I start to learn and reflect on the wider social 
dimensions to planning for drought responses and structuring of drought research, 
primarily through field visits with NGOs, local agricultural research stations and 
colleges, and discussions with local Collectors at District level. My research permit and 
base was developed with the India Meteorological Department (IMD) at Poona, jointly 
with the Agricultural University of Maharashtra (then also still with its main offices in 
Poona). These links were facilitated by the academic networks that existed between 
British Universities and Vice Chancellors with active tropical research interests also 
concerned to get `more young Brits interested and knowledgeable about India' (notably 
Reading University, which also was very active in agricultural meteorology at this 
time). Of the year's funding available, I spent an initial period reading on the monsoon, 
then four months in Maharashtra for consultations and data collection, returning to UK 
for the analysis and writing up of data collected. For this I developed my own computer 
programmes, either writing them myself or with help from a programming specialist. I 
had an extraordinary amount of support and cooperation from Indian scientific agencies 
at this time - even to the point of giving me the rainfall record of 22 selected stations 
on disk- a level of access to basic data I have never experienced since. 
When I arrived in India, I of course found that a great deal of work had been done 
by IMD - but that this was published in their internal publications series (which was 
nevertheless critically reviewed), as befits a specialty with high cognitive and social 
institutionalisation. My plans then changed both to sec where scientifically I might 
undertake new analysis and test hypotheses hitherto not done by IMD. Ilowever, 
almost at the same time, I became aware of the range of development planning needs in 
relation to drought response, which it seemed to me were not being researched. Thus, I 
also became interested in defining criteria and concepts and associative ideas for these 
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development concerns: later I also became interested to understand why these were not 
being investigated further in the plethora of agencies present. This chapter draws on the 
study published as Vincent (1981; 1980). 
As the opening quote shows, cognition in agricultural meteorology in India has been 
`encouraged' to develop in relation to very specific techniques of scientific analysis of 
weather - statistical models and biological data. Within IMD - as this study will also 
show - there was a commitment/intent also to rely only on their own observed data 
whose standards they monitored, or on the data of closely allied/trusted partners. This 
had streamlined their work very much into the analysis of rainfall only, or into the 
combined statistical analysis of rainfall, evapotranspiration and certain crop data. 
Statistical studies were only really seen as reliable if there were adequate data - at least 
30 years, and IMD's determination to work with `reliable' data also makes their 
commitment to sustained observation understandable. Also distinctive in the opening 
quote was the reference to agriculture, rather than development per se. Finally, rarely 
is the word drought mentioned - rather it is scarcity or aberrant weather that is used in 
the scientific language. The framing cognitive discourses of these agencies did not 
address the wider development problems for the small farmer. 
This section ends with a summary of the development needs where I felt 
agrometeorology should be trying to evolve contributions for development planning. 
As part of this study, I concluded that research into droughtproneness could respond to 
at least six administrative concerns: 
i) environmental (especially meteorological) factors which influence the possibility to 
grow cash crops, in what were previously subsistence crop or pastoral areas; 
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ii) distinction of droughtprone (also called scarcit)-affected areas) from non- or less- 
affected areas, on which development plans or agricultural programmes could be 
concentrated; 
iii) signal criteria which alert authorities to impending or existing food scarcity 
conditions; 
iv) spatial differentiation within the general dryland farming areas, so that appropriate 
research methods and improved farming strategies may be designed; 
v) environmental and social factors which control the local traditional farming system, 
which should be considered in the design of improved farming strategies. 
vi) appropriate short-term relief measures. 
I return to these administrative needs in the conclusions, to see what was supported 
by norms generated, to discuss what new insights were generated from my own 
analyses and to reflect why these cognitive gaps were present. 
3.2 DROUGHT, PRODUCTION AND SCIENTIFIC AGENCY IN THE DPAM 
3.2.1 Recognising instability and vulnerability 
Maharashtra State came into existence in 1960, the same year as a scarcity study for the 
old Bombay state was published (Government of Maharashtra, 1960). At that time over 
90% of the state was under dryland agriculture, and only 8% irrigated. Despite the 
recommendations of this 1969 scarcity study to expand irrigation (through large 
systems and well development) and practice soil and conservation works for bcttcr 
water retention, Maharashtra went on to face a further period of serious instability in 
food production. The level of production of 1960 - 7.7 million tonnes - actually never 
crossed 7 million tonnes again until 1974, and there was not a single year in that period 
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when either rabi or kharif crops were not adversely affected by the weather. Crop yields 
in the state regularly registered as lowest among all Indian states. The drought of 1965- 
68, followed rapidly by another serious drought 1970-1973, led to a further public 
enquiry on drought and scarcity (Government of Maharashtra, 1973), which called for 
more meteorological and agronomic research among other recommendations. The 
general emphasis was not just to identify drought risk, but to understand when and how 
to act in relation to the wider uncertainty and instability in food production. At this 
time, 25% of landholdings were less than one hectare (almost 45% under two hectares), 
while agricultural labourers largely without land were almost 30% of the agricultural 
labour Jbrce. Thus the problems of dryland farming output were also compounded by 
the difficulties for small and marginal farmers and agricultural labourers to survive 
across a drought period. At this time some two thirds of the state was under kharif 
crops (grown during the southwest monsoon) and only one-third under rabi crops. It 
was against these problems that the special assistance programmes of the 3d and 4th 
FYP swung into being. Many development programmes were aimed at redesigning the 
cropping system, and to bring technologies that made it less vulnerable or diversified 
livelihood options. Drought relief - that ensured basic food supply and gave 
employment despite crop failure - also remained a critical and strategic political tool. 
3.2.2 The involvement of scientific agency 
Changes in science and technology raised new hopes for the droughtprone area and 
their dryland farming systems. The first of these changes was the evolution of High 
Yielding Varieties of crops, together with greater fertiliser production, and their 
integration with better water control for optimum yield. These new varieties were 
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usually also of shorter duration, thus changing options for catch- or sequence-cropping 
- especially if new dry seeding techniques were also tried. During the 1960s and 
especially the 1970s, there was a great leap in understanding about crop growth and 
equipment was developed for the monitoring of soil water movement, crop growth 
conditions and solar radiation. Computers arrived, making more sophisticated statistical 
analyses and models possible than before. Many aspirations and studies developed 
around these new technologies and analytical tools, including much use of replicated 
trials to study specific soils and crops. The ICAR Dryland Farming project began. 
While this did start comparisons of the cropping methods of local farmers with new 
`integrated techniques' being evolved at research centres, early work still tended to 
comment that farmers for various reasons were not growing those crops most optimal 
to location. A set of interests was borne that has never gone away. Yield improvement, 
crop substitution, intercropping, sequence cropping, methods and dates of sowing, 
weed control, fertiliser use emerged as the first round of interests. By 1970, interests in 
water harvesting for supplemental irrigation and emergency measures for aberrant 
weather conditions were added - especially for delayed onset of the monsoon, long dry 
spells during the monsoon and early end of the monsoon (ICAR, 1979; Spratt; and 
Chowdury, 1978). 
However, these studies overlooked or ignored research results emerging from 
agricultural economists, geographers and field agronomists, that pleaded for more field- 
based micro-level studies of actual cropping practices (as opposed to cultivation 
methods). For example, it was known that farmers rarely grew any monocrop stands of 
any dryland crop, and that farmers traditionally intereropped as a means of risk 
spreading. These scientists argued along different lines - that it was important to 
understand crop association patterns of regional groups in the pursuit of better support 
measures and new crop combinations. By 1973, geographers had mapped the core 
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scarcity area of Maharashtra (Dikshit, 1973), to show typical associations of 1-5 crops 
grown by farmers. These crop regions had some contradictions with the crop regions 
that new agricultural research stations were seen to represent. (These new centres had 
been located in agro-ecological zones mapped from simple criteria using the ratio of 
average annual rainfall and evapotranspiratioß as did Cocheme and Franquin (1967), 
which showed cropping periods for which new crops might be developed and 
recommended). Figure 3.1 shows my study of key crop associations and regions, 
indicating a crop zone of rabi cropping in the lee of hill areas hardly considered in crop 
research at the time. 
The agricultural meteorology division (AMD) of IMD (henceforth AMD-IMD) was 
initiated in 1932, but was first largely involved in setting up observatories on 
agricultural farms focused on study of key agricultural crops (millet, sorghum, wheat, 
cotton and sugarcane). In 1945 an agricultural weather forecast service began on a 
regional basis. The AMD at IMD-Poona collated and analysed data from across India at 
that time, and did not run a special service for Maharashtra. However, Maharashtra 
certainly was one of the states for which AMD-IMD staff became interested to 
establish generic techniques that might be useful for mapping general water conditions 
for agriculture and aberrant rainfall conditions. In 1975, the Ministry of Agriculture 
recommended that all Agricultural Universities should have weather stations where a 
basic data set for rainfall and evapotranspiration could be recorded. In 1977 the IMD 
also installed its first lysimeters in which crops were grown (Sarker et at 1976), so that 
water use and percolation across a growth cycle in relation to rainfall could be 
monitored. The links between IMD, and the scientists at both agricultural research 
stations of ICAR, and of regional colleges of the Agricultural University were thus 
quite close. 
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Fig 3.1 Crop regions of the DPAM in 1978 (compiled from District Agricultural Census 
data) 
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However, new technology did push new boundaries in scientific research. During 
the 1960's, dryland areas gained attention for their strategic importance in national food 
production - particularly for crops like pulses and groundnuts - and their potential to 
lessen food deficits (and thus food movement needs) with the production technology of 
the Green Revolution. At this time, a demand grew for techniques that could map 
potential constraints to crop options and yields. Thus scientists began to exchange ideas 
on agrometeorological mapping techniques, between regions and even continents, to 
search for more generic analytical tools. (At the same time also the search for new 
germplasm moved across countries, and weather mapping helped indicated specie 
niches and what might be exchanged. ) Two lines of work relevant to this study were: 
- spatial mapping of the boundaries of certain dryland farming areas by 
meteorological parameters (Biswas and Khambete, 1978; Mallick and 
Govindaswamy, 1963; Subrahmanyam and Subramaniam, 1965); 
- onset of rains, water availability period etc, with a view to preparing statements on 
crop scheduling and crop conditions (George and Krishnan, 1969; Chowdury et al, 
1978; Raman 1974; Ratnam, 1975). 
Another group of scientists active regionally were those at CGIAR Centre of 
ICRISAT: although based in Hyderabad, the ICRISAT Agricultural Meteorology 
Division (ICRISAT-AMD) had taken up six rainfall sites across Maharashtra for their 
research into general analytical methodologies for rainfall in the semi-arid Tropics. 
However, it was the work of the farming system and agricultural economics group 
(ICRISAT-FS), under NS Jodha and Hans Binswanger that became more significant in 
portraying the riskiness of farming in the scarcity zone, and the problems created by 
runs of dry years. The ICRISAT-FS group were very active at this time, building links 
with scientists interested to work with them in this emergent research area of risk and 
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uncertainty in the semi-arid Tropics. At the time, some ICAR scientists linked quite 
actively into their meetings (see ICRISAT 1979 Workshop. However, the relationships 
between ICRISAT-AMD and AMD-IMD remained pleasant but rather disengaged 
(attendance of ICRISAT 1978i workshop). 
Despite the work of agricultural economists that had begun to show the real 
problems behind vulnerability in scarcity areas, meteorological research never really 
linked up with these agroeconomic studies, even inside the CGIAR institutes with 
divisions under one roof. Table 3.1 compares the different variables cited as 
appropriate for use in different fields of study, and column 1 is most significant for this 
chapter. 
It is very common for agrometeorologists to lament the lack of soil and crop data 
available for their studies, so it is not surprising to see these in an optimal data set. 
However, section D- other useful research tools - focuses only on options to replicate 
tests: there is no idea to make comparisons with different kinds of farmers and their 
responses to drought. Thus application of agrometeorology was largely linked with the 
causes of agricultural drought - and remained hrgely divorced from study to see its 
potential consequences. Despite the wealth of information that could be monitored to 
understand drought and droughtproneness, most actual attention remained with rainfall, 
basic meteorological measurements for the assessment of evapotranspiration, crop 
yields at research stations, and crop returns reported from village authorities for the 
annual agricultural census. It is this gap on consequences that is studied further in 
Section 3.4. 
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3.23 State programmes and NGOs 
Outside the scientific research agencies lay NGOs and state development agencies 
interested in water management for rural transformation. At this time NGO's were 
already active in construction of small dams and percolation tanks, and in local 
integrated watershed management for improved availability of water also managed 
locally for equitable water access. The best known model, called Pani Panchayat, 
developed special rights of access to water across a community, giving access to 
laborers as well as landholders and with rights based on family size and need rather 
than landownership (Pangare and Lokur, 1996). 
At this time, the administration of state development programmes under the FYP lay 
with a District committee under the District Collector made up from relevant 
Ministries. The main drought recognition criteria remained related to crop yields - the 
annewari criteria' - when these were low, taxes were withdrawn and special relief 
programmes could be organised (see section 2.5.2) It was the 1960 Pardesani 
Committee that first defined the 'Scarcity Zone' on which Maharastran Ministries and 
programmes would act - on the basis of frequency of annewari declarations. This failed 
to include any talukas in the districts of Nasik, Jalgaon and Dhule. While the Commission 
recognised parts of Dhule and Nasik had low rainfall, they did not suffer frequently from 
declarations of scarcity conditions (Government of Maharashtra, 1960). 
When the Central Government introduced the DPAP, it used three quantitative criteria 
to define the areas for special Central assistance: annual rainfall; frequency of annewari 
(scarcity) declarations; availability of irrigation. However, the Maharashtra government, 
'The 'Famine Relief Code' of 1885 set up the annewart scale by which crops yields were compared to an 
official average for the local area. The annewaii scale defined 'scarcity' conditions when relief or suspension 
of land taxes was granted if crop yields were poor, with relief and public works scheduled accordingly This 
is why raingauges are often sited at Revenue Circle offices. Annewari declarations are still made annually 
for revenue purposes. 
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conducting its own analysis for a state DPAP in 1973, Lcused primarily on rainfall and 
questioned the suitability of ainewari criteria for its `moral hazard' (as data open to 
abuse). They defined the 'scarcity' zone to include all unirrigated areas (less than 15% 
under irrigation) receiving less than 750 mm annual rainfall (or 800 mm in shallow soil 
areas). This later 'scarcity zone' did include talukas in Nasik, Dhule and Jalgaon districts. 
In 1960, much of Dhule at least was seen as remote and underdeveloped with tribal 
settlements, with little regular cultivation on which land taxes could be levied or assessed. 
Use of only rainfall criteria brought into the DPAM an area which did have drought risks, 
but which were different from those of the long known scarcity districts. 
Ironically, as the economic and political need for a broad development programme 
for the DPA became accepted, so the arguments proceeded for rigorous assessment 
criteria, `free of moral hazard' to assess these areas. Despite the objectives of the DPAP 
being couched in the broadest economic and ecological terms2, no changes were made 
in monitoring or assessment criteria. Nor did the research attention shift much beyond 
the yields and planting options in agriculture. The definition of regions for state action 
adopted technical criteria consistent with ideas from scientific agencies available, 
focused on rainfall available, and not to wider cognition of the production problems of 
the DPAM. Critical analysis of the value of this annual rainfall criteria became the first 
of my own studies, to analyse the relevance of boundaries subsequently mapped for 
agricultural development, and what tools might bring better representation of actual 
realities. 
Figure 3.2 shows the general boundary of the DPAM in relation to the state as a 
whole and the network of agricultural research centres and regional colleges of the 
Agricultural University. The state research centres were focused on specific crops 
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rather than having a general focus on local production. It also shows the 500 mm and 
700mm isohyets for averaW annual rainfall. Fig, 3.3 shows the boundary of the DPAM 
in more detail, together with the sites of the rainfall stations used in the studies 
discussed in this chapter. 
The DPAM shows the association of the area with this lower rainfall that occurs 
particularly in the lee of the Western Ghat mountains: shallow soils and certain kinds of 
dryspell risk shape the risks of crop failure and vulnerability to drought of areas outside 
this isohyet. Irrigation development explains the areas within the 700mm isohyet that 
are not demarcated as droughtprone 3. 
The complexity of the resulting landuse created by this interaction of dryland and 
irrigated areas, and funding from different programmes, has shaped the politics of 
drought and water access virtually since the state came into existence. 
3.2.4 Monsoon dynamics and rainfall across the DPAM 
The rainfall received across Maharashtra is related to the establishment, location and 
shift of the low pressure area known as the monsoon trough aligned generally north of 
the Bay of Bengal - south of Lahore. It is the speed of synoptic change in June and July 
that gives the distinctive onset and burst of the `southwest monsoon' rains over India. 
The rainfall during onset and across the monsoon season results partly from continental 
2 (i) to reduce the severity of impact of drought; (ii) to stabilise the incomes of people, particularly 
weaker sections of society; (iii) restoration of ecological balance. 
3 These include lift systems and gravity systems along the Tapi river in the northern boundary, and 
irrigation systems developed in the upper tributaries of Eastern flowing rivers, including along the 
Godavari river flowing through Nasik and north ofAhmcdnagar (the Mula irrigation system) and various 
tributaries of the Krishna river flowing across southern Maharashtra supporting irrigation in Pune District 
(the Nira irrigation system) and Sholapur (including lift and gravity systems supplied by the Bhima and 
upper Krishna rivers). 
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relief effects but also from disturbances and depressions in the moisture-laden airflow. 
This trough moves southwards in September, in erratic and unpredictable shifts. It also 
steers the tracks of depressions that eventually merge with the trough to give wide areas 
of heavy rainfall. Most commonly depressions form at the easterly end, which in 
September can bring rain to Maharashtra. Sometimes however depressions come in 
from the Arabian Sea, bringing heavy rain to western parts of the DPAM and giving 
much trans-Ghat rainfall. Periods of heavy rainfall are known as active monsoon days, 
and many now recognise a pulsation in rain suggesting a 59 day cycle. Dry spells 
between these rainy periods are common. Most serious, however, is the condition of the 
`break monsoon', which can bring dryspells of 3-4 weeks or more in July or August 
(see Hamilton, 1977). These breaks have a variety of causes, although the most 
common is when the monsoon trough shifts north of the Himalayas. 
Crop production in Maharashtra is fundamentally controlled by this onset, passage 
and retreat of the `south-west monsoon' circulation, between June and October. 
However, relief features - particularly the Ghat mountain chain with its spurs and 
outliers - also have a major influence on rainfall distribution and soils. The timing of 
the rainfall peak June-October, the duration of the rainy season, and soil moisture 
characteristics determine whether `kharif or `rabi' crops arc grown. Kharif crops arc 
sown in June/July with the onset of the monsoon rains. The principal kharif crops of the 
DPAM were: millet (bajra), kharif sorghum (jowar), groundnut, scsamum, pulses and 
cotton (although cotton was not raised in the core DPAM), and usually shorter duration 
pulse varieties. Rabi crops were sown in areas experiencing peak rains (or a second 
peak) from September and where soils offered good soil moisture storage potential 
beyond the cessation of the rains. Principal rabi crops were sorghum, gram and 
safflower, with some wheat grown in the cooler northern areas if irrigation was also 
available. A cropping calendar is given in Appendix 1. Apart from cotton and 
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groundnut, all other crops were intercropped, a traditional farming practice. Fig 3.1 
shows the main cropping regions, together with relief features. 
Most of the northern, western and eastern state has a single rainfall peak in July, and 
has always grown kharif crops. In areas with a short rainy season and shallow soils, 
millet and short duration pulses were the only crop options. Central and southern 
Maharashtra, and the DPAM, had a bimodal rainfall regime with a distinct August 
minimum. This 'break' in the monsoon circulation gtve farmers a low expectation of 
four consecutive months of rainfall, and farmers opted for either a short duration crop 
raised June-September or waited for the September rains. Opportunities for double 
cropping were limited, except where catch cropping was done with short duration 
pulses in the kharif season. Locations with a high expectation of 5 months of adequate 
moisture and good soils went under kharif sorghum or cotton. 
I thus differentiated 7 types of drought risk from the southwest monsoon - all with 
different implications in agriculture: 
1. complete failure of the monsoon circulation to establish itself; 
2. late onset of the monsoon, after the middle of July; 
3. dryspells in July and August (in kharif), from `break' conditions, or dry spells 
between disturbances; 
4. dryspells between disturbances in September and October; 
5. inadequate rainfall in showers to replenish soils; 
6. early withdrawal of the monsoon circulation before October; 
7. spells of bad years. 
By this time IMD and ICAR were already performing analyses of Moisture 
Availability Indices (see section 2.5.2 and 3.4.2) to assist planning of new production - 
particularly for onset conditions, and probability analyses that showed different levels of 
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reliable rainfall across the season - the rainfall that was received at 30,50, and 70% 
levels. However, while all these drought contexts were acknowledged as constraining 
production, there were no real analyses of drought events or sequences of adequate Q 
insufficient rainfall across a season, that shaped risks to farmers. These gaps shaped my 
focus onto dryspell analysis. The cognitive focus in IMD and ICAR - that water 
availability was the key factor shaping development, and that only scientific analyses were 
reliable, based on their own collected data - focused them into studies using precipitation 
alone, or into comparing precipitation and evapotranspiration. The next two sections 
summarise the main analyses undertaken by IMD and ICAR with these different data sets, 
and also my studies of dryspells to understand relative risks of different problems and the 
vulnerability in the farming system, 
3.3 PRECIPITATION ANALYSES TO STUDY DROUGHT AND PRODUCTION 
PROBLEMS IN THE DPAM 
At the start of my 1978 study, a range of precipitation criteria were in use to indicate 
dry conditions for different time units. These are summarised in Table 3.2., which 
indicates several generic criteria already established to define meteorological drought. 
My interest, however, was to understand criteria to help map vulnerability and assist 
regional development planning in the DPAP. 
3.3.1 Boundary criteria and spatial variation 
The simplest drought risk criteria were the annual totals of rainfall: these gave overall 
indications of drought, but did not separate out effects for kharif and rabi crops, nor did 
they show timing of critical drought periods. 
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Table 3.2 Rainfall criteria used to classify drought prone areas and drought periods 
I. Criteria based on the amount of rain. 
(a) Annual amounts 
Drought areas 
(i) 400-1000mm4 
(n) less than 750mm, or less than 800mm in shallow soil areas3 
Drought years 
("') 'drought years' receive less than 500mm4 
(iv) 'serious scarcity years' receive less than 385mm2 
ý Drought periods ý')) 4 or more consecutive 'dry' weeks (weeks with less than 18mm)' 
(n) an 'absolute drought' begins when at least 15 consecutive days have occurred with less 
than 0.01 inch on all days3 
(iii) 'partial drought' occurs if there are at least 29 days, over which the mean daily rainfall is 
less than 0.01 inches' 
(iv) 'dry spell' is al period of at least 15 consecutive days, none of which has received (104 
inches or more 
II. Criteria based or statistical variability 
(a) Annual rainfall 
Drought areas 
(i) a'drought prone area' is one where the probability of a 'drought year' (see iii) is over 20%2 
(ii) a 'chronic drought prone area' is one where the probability of 'drought year' is over 40%2 
Drought years 
(iii) a 'drought year' occurs when less than 75% of the 'normal' rainfall is received 
(iv) a 'severe' drought year occurs when less than 50% of the 'normal' rainfall is received 
(b) Drought periods 
(') "the seasonal rainfall is more than two standard deviations below normal 90 
(n) "crop failures are general when more than the 22 monsoon weeks have less than half the 
'normal'; rainfall of those weeks"' 
(c) Drought weeks 
M an is 'scarce when below the 50 per cent probability given by the gamma function 
(i) a drought week is one which receives less than half its 'normal' rainfall, where the 
'normal' is at least 5mm' 
Sources: 1. India Meteorological Department, 2. British Meteorological Office. 3. Government 
of Maharashtra (1973), 4. Verena. (1976) 
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Mapping with annual rainfall criteria 
Across semiarid areas, the figure of 700-800 mm was in widespread use as an average 
rainfal total indicative of restricted cropping options, and indeed had been used by the 
state government in its work (see also Fig. 3.2). I also performed analyses with the 
750mm annual isohyet for the selected rainfall stations (1901-1976). 1 found that for 
basic mapping this criterion did provide a fairly representative boundary for the 
DPAM, as it is linked to the reliability of water requirement for a range of dryland 
crops. As such this boundary did indicate the area of most limited production 
possibilities - although less useful on the eastern side because such a parameter could 
not distinguish kharif and rabi risks. Fortuitous or not, it appeared that that this annual 
isohyet correlated very well with areas that frequently suffer long dry spells in August- 
September. - but it was this, rather than low rainfall per se, that oflcn restricted 
production possibilities. 
Two other annual rainfall criteria had also been used quite successfully to indicate 
further production stress. Mallik and Govindaswamy (1963) used parameters of 500mm 
annual rainfall for a drought year, and 385mm for a serious drought year, as mapping 
criteria across India. I also used these parameters in a very simple first study of 
probability of dry years, and runs of bad years, as these precipitation totals arc linked to 
minimal water requirements for crops like sorghum and millet to survive, with results 
as shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4,. The DPAM stations of Malegaon, Ahmcdnagar, 
Sholapur and Aurangabad showed the highest probabilities risks of these low rainfall 
totals and runs of dry years, and were thus selected as key sites for later detailed risk 
studies. 
Ars- - 
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Table 33 % of years 1901-1976 when annual rainfall was less than the following 
500 mm 385 mm 
Malageon (DPA) 38.1 18.4 
Ahmednagar (DPA) 30.2 13.1 
Sholapur (DPA) 19.7 7.9 
Aurangabad (DPA) 11.8 6.5 
Poona 17.1 3.9 
Jalgaon 5.2 - 
Akola 2.6 - 
Table 3Ä Frequency of spells of years where annual rainfall was less than 500 mm 
(1901-1976) 
Length in years 12345 >5 
Malegaon (DPA) 
Ahmednagar (DPA) 
Sholapur (DPA) 
Aurangabad (DPA) 
Poona 
Jalgaon 
Akola 
9511-1 
11 6 
93 
71 
10 -3 
4- 
31 
Mapping precipitation frequencies and probabilities within the monsoon season 
By 1978, Biswas and Khambhete had used the gamma function to analyse weekly rainfall 
probabilities across Maharashtra, publishing probabilities for the 70%, 50% and 30% 
levels. These provided a good picture of spatial contrasts across the state in a given 
meteorological week4, and of numbers of weeks with a higher probability of receiving 
rainfall, but the data was not related to time of onset of the monsoon. I did no further 
probability studies of this type, as I thought simpler criteria were sufficient for basic 
mapping of water insufficiency. 
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3.3.2 The differential incidence of drought through the monsoon in the DPAM 
Studies had been done to identify criteria to signify late onset of the monsoon and 
examine frequency of dry spells - but these were done to find general criteria, and no 
studies had been focused on the DPAM. I reviewed the criteria around planting dates, 
but decided to study ftse with a fuller set of agrometeoro logical data, as reported in 
section 3.5.3. However, I did work further to study dry spells in rainfall. 
Onset conditions and sowing rains 
Criteria to identify onset conditions of the monsoon had been identified by Raman 
(1975) for Maharashtra generally, and Virmani (1975)3 for Hyderabad, Andhra 
Pradesh. A comparison of these criteria for Maharashtra study suggested that onset 
criteria are locally specific. Use of the Hyderabad criteria in the DPAM tended to pick 
out the heavy pre-monsoon showers in advance of the real onset of rains, common in 
Maharashtra in the months of May and June. 
Raman (1975) put forward the idea of the `sowing rains' of the first heavy rain that 
would saturate a soil in preparation for seeding. He looked for a criterion which would 
identify both the substantial rain which typified transition into the monsoon, and a 
sustained wet period where moisture could percolate to sufficient depth to moisten the 
soils and allow land preparation for crops. His criteria for the commencement of 
sowing rains (CSR) was a seven day period when at least 25mm fell, with I mm or 
more on any 5 of these days. Research at Sholapur confirmed that shallow soils 
4 All weeks of the year were numbered: the first week of January was Met week 1. 5 The criteria used by Virmani (1975) was to identify the specific 'meteorological week'5 where at least 
20 mm of rain is received over two consecutive days in a week. However, this week must also be one 
with a 'dependable precipitation probability' of receiving 10mm of rainfall. This gives the media sowing 
date for Hyderabad as 25 June -I July (met week 26), which is similar to the DPAM. 
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required about 25mm rain to be moist enough for tillage. Heavier soils required up to 
50mm before tillage can take place. 
Raman's study of the sowing rains across Maharashtra showed that the DPAM was 
characterised by a median onset date of 24 June-1 st July, with the most delayed onset 
in isolated pockets of northeast Ahmednagar and west Sholapur - with variability 
around this median date of up to 26 days. The date of onset was strongly influenced by 
relief. The Dryland Research Station had a simple classification that `late sowing 
conditions' occurred when the rains started later than 15 July Met week 28). If CSR 
occurred after this, then crops like bajra, green gram and groundnut were highly likely 
to fail. `Mid-season' correction crops like setaria, sunflower or castor might be more 
successful. 
Planting dates in the first fortnight of September (Met. Weeks 36 and 37) were 
considered ideal for rabi jowar and safflower. Rains after 1 October were regarded as 
late. If sowing was delayed after 20 October (after Met. Week 42) then very poor yields 
were expected. With late rabi sowing dates, the cooler December weather could 
encourage unwanted tillering which decreased yields from a sorghum crop. The cooler 
weather was more marked in northern Maharashtra, so that if a rabi crop was grown it 
was usually wheat (not planted until November, to encourage tillering). My own study 
(see 3.4.3) suggested that late rabi planting conditions occurred more frequently than 
the very long dry spells that can threaten kharif crops. Also, late rabi rain was less of a 
risk than general depressed yields resulting from restricted soil moisture availability. 
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Dry spells and their links with the August 'break' and rabl rains 
Dry spells were one of the major risks in kharif crop production, and several general 
studies of dryspells in the monsoon had taken place for Maharashtra before nine. The 
first difference in debate had been over what constitutes a 'dry day' and how a dryspell 
is known to have ended. The IMD classified days with at least 2.5mm as 'rainy days'. 
Raman (1974) suggested that at least 6.3 mm was required for effective moistening of 
the soils in the Indian climate. Raman also considered termination of a dry spell in his 
study. He studied the duration of dry spells between the first sowing rains, and the next 
seven day period when 2.5 nun or more was received, and then estimated the 
probability that the spell would be 20 days or more. His 30% probability contour 
picked out the DPAM almost exactly, with two core areas - Nasik-Ahmednagar and 
Western Sholapur district - having a probability of 60% of such dryspells. 
Chowdury et al. (1976) made a study of dry spells at 26 district stations across 
Maharashtra for the period July-October. Their maps showed the DPAM to be 
characterised by longer breaks between showers, whereas districts further cast had 
more reliable rainy periods broken by spells of only 1-5 days. In particular, their map of 
the frequencies of dry spells of 15 days or more (with 6.3mm as a wet day criteria) 
gave a close approximation to the core 'scarcity zones' defined by the Pardcsani 
Committee (1960) and the OMAI criteria of Biswas and Sarkar (1978) (sec section 
3.5). However, I felt that more differentiation could be gained by studying detailed 
dryspell patterns within different months, for more stations within the DPAM. This was 
done partly to ascertain which dryspell criteria gave the clearest picture of risk 
variability, However, it was also done to understand how, when a dryspcll established 
itself, it tended to persist. 
A variety of mathematical series were available to model the frequencies and 
probabilities of spells of 1,2,3.... t days (Lawrence, 1957; IIuishand, 1977). Ilowever, 
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beyond a mathematical question of what mathematical series might represent actual 
probabilities, there is the question of what kind of knowledge is wanted. Information on 
persistence of dry spells is very relevant to climatic forecasting once a spell has started. 
However, such studies ae less useful to understand the frequencies and risks of 
dryspells of certain lengths around which cropping could be planned by farmers. In 
conventional statistical analysis of runs of dry days of 1,2.3... t days, the higher general 
frequencies of very short runs in a month can easily hide understanding of the 
recurrence of what longer lengths of spells in a month over a period of years. After 
review of the assumptions and uses of different statistical approaches and mathematical 
series, and returns relative to higher levels of computation demand (see Appendix 2), 1 
calculated two parameters from the compilation of actual frequencies of spells 1,2,3.. t 
days for the period 1901-1976. Following the convention of Lawrence (1957), spells 
that ran across months were allocated to the month that received the greater part of the 
spell. Following IMD practice, the criterion for a dry day was a day receiving less than 
2.5mm of rain The two parameters were calculated were: 
(i) the average 1ngth of spell t occurring an average frequency of 50% in a month 
Number of dryspells of at least.... t days in month = 0.5 
Number of years (n) 
This spell was labelled (S50)6 
(ii) the persistence probability (Pt) that if day 1 is dry, then days 2,3,4..... t days will 
remain consecutively dry, where Pt = p2p3p4... pt 
pt = number of spells lasting at least t days 
number of spells lasting at least (t- 1) days 
e. g ps = number of spells lasting at least 5days 
number of spells lasting at least 4 days 
6 The probability of a dry spell of x days in a month can also be derived from calculation of the return 
period, by ranking (1... m) the maximum dryspell lengths per month over N years, where P =mx/(N+1) 
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The frequency tables and probability values given above were calculated for each 
month at the 22 stations shown in Fig 3.3. Tables presenting the frequencies of spells 
of at least 5,10,15,20,25 and 30 days are given in Appendix Z which also gives 
further discussion of the methods selected and also more detail on the most useful 
criteria found for each month. Some results are presented here as maps and graphs, as 
these provide better synthesis of data. The maps presented focus on the EPAM, to 
present data on the largest possible scale, but results from three non-DPA locations of 
Akola, Nagpur and Chandrapur are listed for contrast in the lower right-hand comer. 
Further study of the persistence probabilities gave information about the duration 
patterns for spells of 2,3,4.... t days were plotted for July and August, for six 
representative stations - Malegaon, Sholapur Sangarmer and Jath in the core drought area 
identified by the above maps, and Akola and Aurangabad outside this core area. Two 
aspects of this persistence were important: 
i) the actual value: a high value, for example over 0.8, indicated that a high proportion 
(80%) of spells extend for at least one more day; 
ii) the trend of a series of persistence probabilities, which could be positive (upward), 
negative (downward) or stay fairly constant (see Lawrence, 1957). A positive or constant 
trend suggested a dominance of synoptic features which tended to promote spells of this 
length. A downward trend reflected a rapid falloff in the frequencies, and indicated the 
rare occurrence of atmospheric phenomena responsible for dry spells of this length 
In the maps for August, contrasts between DPAM and non-DPAM stations were very 
marked: Malegaon, Sangamner and Jath all showed stable or positive persistence 
probabilities to P20 and beyond, all probabilities being over 0.8. At all these stations there 
was thus a high chance that a spell, once started, would persist into this length range. 
These three stations then showed a period of negative persistence before showing a second 
period of positive persistence towards the length of maximum spell. The variation in the 
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Fig. 35 Sso Length of dryspell occurring in 50% years in August (Isolines indicate spell 
length of at least t days) (1901-1976) 
AGRICULTURAL DROUGHTAND AGROMETEOROLOGICAL RESEARCH INMAHARASHTRA STATE 107 
DHL 
MAG 
0 
. AUR 
2. 
"KAR 
0 
SHFi 
I vt# 
2000 teeter 
Other sites 
Boundary of DPAm Akoia 5.9 
o 10 ioc 150 20. D :,;., =orwfr s Nagpur 3.6 
o so loo 150 Zoo Mies Chandrapur 2.5 
ý. a 
Fig 3.6 Probability P10 in July expressed as a percentage, the probability that a dry day 
persists as a dry spell of at least 10 days (from rainfall records 1901-1976) 
108 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND AGENCY IN TILE DEVELOPMENT OF UROUGIITI'RONE AREAS 
Fig 3.7 Probability Pet in August expressed as a percentage, the probability a dry day 
persists as a dryspell of at least 25 days (from rainfall records 1901-1976) 
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longer duration of spell was influenced by the presence of only few spells. Nevertheless 
there was a suggestion of two modes in dryspell length which might well reflect the 
`typical' length of break monsoons in August i. e. frequently up to three weeks, less 
frequently three-six weeks, and then again six-eight weeks. At all other stations, the first 
positive persistence period was much shorter, with a change in gradient around Py 0-P1s. 
Neither Aurangabad or Akola showed this tendency to experience the second, long type of 
break that sometimes occurs at the core DPAM stations. This supported my idea that it 
could be a quiescent period following the decay of an Arabian Sea disturbance, 
particularly when it merged with more general `break monsoon' conditions, that caused 
such severe dry spells in the western DPAM. The graph for Sholapur had less specific 
trends. There was a period of general persistence up to about P22, but there were breaks in 
this trend Plo-Pis. The suggestion was that Sholapur behaved like the other core stations in 
some years when it did experience long dry spells. In other years, however, Sholapur 
experienced weather much more akin to Aurangabad, and might miss some of the more 
disastrous spells of the more Western stations. This again helped justify consideration of 
rabi cropping options. 
These dry spell analyses not only provided a great deal of information on useful 
mapping criteria, and the nature of risks at certain sites. They also emphasised the need 
for improved crop strategies to be evolved and tested relative to these longer dry spells 
- with moisture stress the yield advantages of hybrids will not materialise. Moreover, 
they provided a great deal of information relative to weather forecasting zones in the 
DPAM. This suggested that six weather zones existed in the DPAM, as shown in figure 
3.1, a much finer breakdown than was being used by IMD at that time (see Appendix 1) 
and developed in the OMAl study of Biswas and Sarkcr (178) discussed in the next 
section. 
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Other studies 
Even in the 1970s, there was concern whether climatic change was occurring and rainfall 
becoming more precarious. Mann (1955), Jagannathan and Parthasarathy (1973) and 
Verma and Robertson (1973) all searched for trends and periodicities in Indian rainfall: 
while none have found trends, all found periodicities and `persistence' effects in rainfall 
patterns between years. I also looked for periodicities in rainfall using 5-year moving 
averages. This certainly suggested that periodicity and persistence were present in the 
evidence of bad years, although their incidence was irregular. While trends were not 
apparent in most of the DPAM stations, results suggested that Sholapur had been 
receiving better July and August rainfall in recent years, which was relevant for the kharif 
cropping strategy being promoted by the ICAR Sholapur research station 
3.4 WATER BALANCE ANALYSES FOR DROUGHT RESEARCH 
Whilst rainfall studies can provide simple criteria by which to assess drought, most 
workers agree that analysis ofrainfall in relation to crop water demands provides a much 
more rational approach in agricultural drought analysis. In their simplest form, water 
balance models are a book-keeping procedure between rainfall, evapotranspiration and 
soil moisture. Most models use potential evapotranspiration data, ether from instruments 
or formulae. Actual evapotranspiration from specific crops may be estimated by 
lysimeters, or soil moisture or neutron probes, or from formulae developed by workers 
such as Penman or Thomthwaite. A good summary of models can be found in Doorenbos 
and Pruitt (1975). 
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3.4.1 P: PET ratios versus crop weather models 
By 1978, potential evapotranspiration (PET) data (Penman formula, albcdo 035) had 
already been derived from 18 'agromet' stations across Maharashtra: zmnthly averages 
were published for all these stations, and weekly averages were also available for 11 
stations. The IMD had started maintaining lysimeters to study sorghum growth at Akola 
and Sholapur, from which actual evapotranspiration was estimated, but data were still 
limited. -Thus water balance models were restricted to those that could be built around 
average PET estimates. 
Crop weather models which related soil moisture stress at crop growth stages and crop 
yield were another focus of international scientific interest, also as particularly relevant for 
monitoring yield stress on crops raised on stored soil moisture. Crop weather models have 
two components: building a realistic model of soil moisture behaviour, and relating this to 
known phenological crop growth stages and research on yields. More sophisticated crop 
yield models could be built if daily measurements of leaf, root and plant data were 
available (see Shaw, 1978; Maas and Arkin, 1978), but most scientists were struggling to 
find models that worked with less data. Doorcnbos et al (1979) provided a simplified 
model for estimating crop yields under moisture stress, using evapotranspiration and soil 
water data only, for a variety of crops including sorghum, groundnut and cotton. Another 
model in wide debate was the Australian CSIRO model `WATDAL' (Kcig and McAlpine, 
1974). In the WATBAL model, water available is indicated in the soil profile at a 
specified depth (which can be related to rooting depth), and is released at a rate which 
depends on soil saturation status, which then modifies the transpiration rate of the plant. 
In turn, as the plant removes water from the soil, a 'soil factor' reflecting the moisture 
status of the soil can be derived. 
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The main problem for even a simple crop weather model in India was the shortage of 
information on the behaviour of soils and crops. ICRISAT successfully adapted the 
WATBAL approach to derive probabilities of soil/crop moisture stress. They built in other 
local measurements to provide information on plant stress, of which stomatal resistance 
and leaf water potentials proved to be good indicators of soil moisture stress - by now also 
equipment was available for their measurement. However, instruments to measure such 
parameters were not available at meteorological stations nor at many of the national or 
University research stations. ICRISAT staff developed a set of field experiments to model 
hybrid sorghum production in collaboration with various universities (but not in 
Maharashtra). However, all experiments were on hybrid varieties produced under fairly 
optimum conditions. There was no monitoring of actual production on a farmer's field in 
a drought area. No studies existed then on the drying behaviour of Maharashtran soils, so I 
constructed a simple crop weather model, drawing on `generic' equations for the 
modelling e. g. Shaw (1978) suggested generalised rates of provision of water under high, 
medium and low evaporation rates. The IMD had never attempted to experiment with 
such models. It stayed simply with the data that it collected from its own stations. All its 
work in relating weather and crop growth was done through regression equations : no 
simulated crop modelling had ever been undertaken 
Thus, in my study, I did pursue more detailed work with both simple water availability 
criteria equating rainfall and evapotranspiration, and also experimented with building a 
crop weather model for sorghum using data from Sholapur. For this I enlisted the help of a 
programmer. I tried to monitor the number of weeks in each crop development stage 
where soil moisture was likely to cause decreased yields. The results I obtained were 
puzzling in the extreme, suggesting no real difference between soils of considerable 
different depths. Later a colleague testing the model warned me that one sub-routine was 
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not looping correctly, and that the programming was faulty. This cxpericnce taught me 
that it is better to use only tools you construct yourself, and to be cautious with models 
that combine generic or surrogate data from different general sources. Thus I came to 
respect the attitudes of IMD and ICAR to only use their own data, only use field 
measurements without simulation, and use data compiled over consistent periods at the 
same location. I also came to recognize the warning of Funtowicz and Ravctz (1990) 
about the problems possible from uncritical use of computer models and programmes. 
3.4.2 P: PET ratios and crop options 
The simplest crop water balance model is a ratio of potential evaporation (PET) to rainfall 
(P) to define growing periods (Cocheme and Franquin, 1967): 
Period P: PET ratio 
humid > 1.0 
moist 0.5-1.0 
moderately dry 0.25-0.49 
dry <0.25 
Humid and moist periods (i. e. ratio P: PET of 0.5 or more) are considered suitable 
for plant growth. Raman and Srinivasamurthy (no date) defined average growth 
periods for 21 stations in Maharashtra, comparing average monthly rainfall with 
average monthly PET. The moist and humid period lasts on average 130-150 days over 
much of the Drought Prone Area (long enough for a sorghum crop). However, at 
several stations it is 90 days or less, and parts of Poona and Ahmednagar have almost 
no humid period - suggesting conditions always likely to give depressed yields. This 
simple comparison was also used by Gadre and Umrani (1972) to map detailed 
contrasts for crop planning across Sholapur district. Srinivasa Murthy (1976) also used 
this approach to study risks for crop production at six Maharashtra stations, mapping 
actual weekly rainfall data year by year against awragc potential evapotranspiration for 
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a 50 year period, to understand more about the growth periods of bajra, kharif jowar 
and rabi jowar. This work was one of the first by AMD-IMD staff to distinguish the 
relative risks to kharif and rabi crops rather than map only the monsoon season as a 
whole. His work showed the less favourable kharif cropping opportunities at 
Ahmednagar and Sangli, where general production opportunities were also at their 
lowest. His work also confirmed the more favourable conditions for cotton production 
at stations like Jalgaon, Aurangabad and Akola. 
More recently workers had begun to use the 'moisture availability index' (MAI) of 
Hargreaves (1967) on a weekly basis to study agricultural planning. As already noted in 
section 2.5.3, Hargreave's ratio was the ratio of 'dependable precipitation'? (defined by 
him as the rainfall amount received at 75 per cent probability) to PET. The probability 
that this ratio is at least 0.7 had been used by several workers to define crop opportunities 
(Virmani, 1975; Reddy et at 1977). This criteria was also been used very successfully by 
Biswas and Sarker (1978) to map the DPAM. They defined the 'Optimal Moisture 
Availability Index' (OMAI) using the rainfall received 50 per cent of the time (calculated 
by the gamma function). They then calculated the number of weeks where the OMAI 
exceeded 0.3 and 0.7 for all Maharashtran stations, and developed the following spatial 
classification: 
Zone Number of weeks with OMAI of at least 
0.3 0.7 
D <10 <1 
E 10 1 
F 11 4 
G 14 7 
In the map produced, the boundary of Zone F coincided almost exactly with the 
administrative boundary of the Drought Prone Area, with only slight boundary differences 
7 Hargreaves worked on agroclimatogy in Latin America. This shows how ideas moved between 
continents within one scientific specialty (see Hargreaves, 1967). 
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(see Fig 3.7). Clearly the OMAI could be a very useful and simple technique for mapping 
cropping seasons and thus production options,, although it was still more useful for rainy 
season (kharif) crops. In fact the OMAI method became a standard for IMD, and was later 
applied in other states. However it still gave fewer divisions for forecasting than the map 
developed in my study (see Fig 3.1), based on my own studies of dry spells crop 
associations and P: PET study outlined below. 
3.43 My own study of probabilities for a `growing season' 
The work of Srinivas Murthy (1976) was thus one of the only pieces of 
agrometeorological work in IMD which actually expanded into reasons for the 
vulnerability of dryland crops. I therefore decided to expand this kind of work in my 
study, to show what information could be generated by using these simpler techniques. 
The seven stations of Malegaon, Aurangabad, Ahmednagar, Sholapur, Jalgaon, Poona 
and Akola were chosen as stations for which both rainfall and monthly PET averages 
were available (1901-1976). Of these, the first four were DPA stations, Malcgaon and 
Aurangabad being in the northern DPA. Poona station, while close to the boundary, is 
not strictly in the DPAM. A programme was written to calculate the ratio of actual 
monthly rainfall to average monthly PET for all months 1901-1976. Humid and moist 
months (ratio >0.5) were distinguished from moderately dry and dry months (ratio 
<0.5). A number of criteria were then developed to monitor different kinds of kharif 
and rabi risks, and thus to establish the overall level of drought risks and spells of 
drought years (see Appendix 3). It was not possible to report all the results of that study 
in this chapter. However, several tables arc reproduced now to show the usefulness of the 
technique for demonstrating constraints on production. These showed, firstly, how 
expectations of consecutive months of `humid' and `moist' months influenced the choice 
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of crops. Secondly, the technique could be used to compile types of risk, into a composite 
picture of risks of crop failure. Thirdly tables show how both can be combined into a crop 
decision matrix for farmers (see next section). 
Table 3.5a summarises the production alternatives by looking at the incidence of 
consecutive growing months (months in the humid or moist categories). The chance of at 
least three months consecutive growing period brought out the extremely risky nature of 
kharif cropping at Malegaon and Ahmednagar, with 'good years' on average only 1 in 3 
years at Malegaon, and even less at Ahmednagar. 
Table 3.5 Growth months (moist or humid) across the monsoon period 
(a) % of years with at least 3,4, or 5 consecutive growing months (for kharif crop or double 
cropping). 
At least 
345 months 
Malegaon 36.8 21.0 2.6 
Ahmednagar 28.9 22.3 9.2 
Sholapur 52.6 36.8 14.5 
Aurangabad 68.4 48.7 15.8 
Poona 64.4 39.5 22.3 
Jalgaon 80.3 48.7 13.1 
Akola 78.9 44.7 13.1 
(b) % of years with two consecutive growth months in September and October for a fair rabi crop. 
Malegaon 27.3 
Ahmednagar 35.5 
Sholapur 34.2 
Aurangabad 25.0 
Poona 38.1 
Jalgaon 18.4 
Akola 22.4 
Yet farmers with shallow soils in these areas had no alternative but to grow kharif 
crops. Conversely, the chance of at least three months growing period was higher at other 
stations, particularly the non-Drought Prone Area stations of Jalgaon and Akola. The 
chance was also unexpectedly high (just over 50 per cent) at Sholapur, and thus good for 
catchcropping a short duration kharif crop before rabi. 
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The chance of at least four consecutive months represented the chance to grow longer 
duration kharif crops such as kharif sorghum or cotton. Such a chance only matcrialiscd 
on average 1 year in 5 at Malegaon and Ahmednagar. Chances were substantially greater 
at Aurangabad, Jalgaon and Akola, which were important cotton or kharif sorghum 
producers. Cotton and sorghum of course brought substantially greater profits than the 
millets and pulse crops feasible with only three consecutive months. 
It was the percentage frequency of at least five months which showed the real potential 
of double cropping. This was not particularly high at any site, although it reached over 15 
per cent at Aurangabad and Poona. The problems and costs of double cropping at this 
level of risk were quite high, and farmers might have preferred the income or subsistence 
value of a more reliable 4-month kharif crop like cotton or sorghum. Many farmers might 
also be 'catch cropping' a second crop at this level of frequency, without formal guidance. 
To demonstrate this decision problem of kharif versus rabi cropping further, Table 3. Sb 
also shows the chance of getting a reasonable rabi crop. It was highest, as expected, at 
Ahmednagar, Sholapur and Poona, where farmers with deeper soils could obtain fair 
yields. At other sites, however, the chances were less than 30 per cent, and substantially 
lower than the chance of at least four kharif months. This again confinmd that at these 
sites farmers could be more disposed towards a single kharif crop. Indeed, as they crop 
across the period July-October, they may not distinguish kharif and rabi options that 
specifically. Looking again at Table 3.4 in terms of consecutive cropping months, all sites, 
except for Ahmednagar, were more reliable for a three-month short duration kharif crop 
than a rabi crop. Even Sholapur, a traditional rabi district, had 52 per cent of years with at 
least three months in kharif, as against only 34 per cent of years with good rabi rains. 
Sholapur and Poona had about the same chance for at least four consecutive kharif 
months, as a good rabi crop, but several other features might be responsible for the actual 
rabi preference. It will be shown in Table 3.6 that there was a stronger risk of a sequence 
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of poor kharif years than of poor rabi years, especially for farmers on deeper soils. Also 
there remained resistance to working the deep black soils il the wet kharif period, and a 
dietary preference for the grain produced by rabi sorghum varieties. Thus at Sholapur, 
Poona, Ahmednagar, and also the deeper black soils of Aurangabad soils, one could 
expect a preference for rabi crops, regardless of the 'average frequency' of rabi drought. 
All these sites, except Ahmednagar, however, could have reaped benefits from more 
concerted efforts to 'catch crop' a short duration crop in kharif. 
At all other sites, and on shallow soils at all sites, the preference might be for kharif 
crops, and there was limited potential for catching a second crop. On shallow soils, and 
less favourable sites like Malegaon, only 3 month kharif crops could have a reasonable 
chance of success: there appeared almost no scope for double cropping. At the other sites, 
Jalgaon, Akola and Aurangabad, the chance of double cropping also materialised as 
limited, but the chance of 4 kharif months was good. The cash return of a cotton crop, or 
subsistence value of sorghum, could make it more sensible to concentrate on a single 
kharif crop, than to chance a lower value double crop of millet and pulses. 
3.4.4 My own studies of P: PET ratios and specific drought risks 
I also undertook a detailed analysis into how P: PET ratios could be used to study specific 
drought risks. Full details of criteria are given in Appendix 3, but briefly these are: 
1. Late onset was indicated if the first ratio of 0.5 or more did not occur until August or 
later, 
2. Dry spells were studied through the incidence and consecutive occurrence of months 
with a ratio of less than 0.5; 
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3. The risks for rabi crops were studied through the indicator value in Septcmbcr and 
October. A ratio of less than 0.5 delayed planting. A ratio of 0.5 or more in only one 
of these months was likely to cause depressed yields on all but the deepest soils: 
failure to receive a ratio value of 0.5 or above in either month would result in rabi 
failure on all soils. 
General frequencies of drought risks to production 
The combined results are shown in Table 3.6 below, which shows the risks of total failure 
and depressed yields as modelled from monthly data series 1901-1976. In kharif, total 
failure was considered to result from: failure of onset; late onset in August or after, or if 
there are two or more months with a ratio less than 0.5 in succession. General depressed 
yields would result if there was one dry or moderately dry month (ratio less than 0.5). In 
rabi, total failure was considered to result if there is no ratio above 0,5 in September or 
October. General depressed yields were likely if only one month with a ratio of 0.5 or 
above was received. The risks from a dry September were not included in the analysis, 
because they are influenced by other features like temperature. The kharif risks given in 
earlier Table 3.4 also showed these 'core' Drought Prone Area stations of Malegaon, 
Ahmednagar and Sholapur. 
Planting after mid-September meant that the cold weather of December was more 
likely to promote unwanted tillering of sorghum. The study showed a risk of a dry or 
moderately dry September at around 10% in Malegaon, Ahmcdnagar and Sholapur, rising 
to 31.1% in Poona. This risk was not that substantial, although for deep soils it was equal 
to that of failure of the rains. More research was still to be done in 1978 on the effects of 
low temperature on sorghum yields, however, before its importance relative to soil 
moisture stress could be evaluated. 
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Table 3.6 Summary of kharif and rabi risks, % years 
Total kharif failure General depressed yields Total kharif risks 
Malegaon 22.4 43.4 65.8 
Ahmednagar 22.4 50.0 72.4 
Sholapur 21.0 23.7 44.7 
Aurangabad 2.6 21.0 23.7 
Poona 6.5 18.4 29.9 
Jalgaon 1.3 13.1 14.4 
Akola 2.6 13.1 15.7 
Total rabi failure General 
depressed yields 
Total rabi risks 
Malegaon 19.5 59.7 79.2 
Ahmednagar 7.8 54.5 62.3 
Sholapur 7.8 53.2 61.0 
Aurangabad 11.7 62.3 72.7 
Poona 11.7 40.3 51.9 
Jalgaon 25.0 59.7 84.4 
Akola 17.1 55.8 72.7 
All these stations shared a probable risk of total crop failure of 20 per cent over the 
long-term, and at Ahmednagar and Sholapur the risk of depressed yields was a further 40- 
50 per cent. The kharif risks of depressed yields at Sholapur were less high, confirming 
my idea that when kharif rains did establish themselves over Sholapur, they could be 
good, so there was some scope for increased kharif cropping in Sholapur district. If one 
looked at total kharif risks, however, at these three stations, they appeared far more risky 
and 'droughtprone' than the remaining stations. The position of Aurangabad was 
interesting - it had a very low risk of total kharif failure, lower indeed than Poona (not in 
the Drought Prone Area), but its risks of general depressed yields is over 20 per cent and 
similar to that of Sholapur. Aurangabad also had less favourable rabi cropping 
opportunities than Poona. The other two stations, Jalgaon and Akola, could have general 
kharif risks at the rather low level of 15 per cent; that was still over one year in ten, but 
clearly lower than Drought Prone Area stations. 
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Rabi risks were extremely interesting, the risks of absolute failure appearing quite 
different from those of depressed yields. In this analytical approach, at Sholapur and 
Ahmednagar these risks of total failure fell as low as 8%. The risks at Malcgaon, Jalgaon 
and Akola were substantially greater, again confirming that tlrsc would be kharif crop 
sites. However risks of depressed yields appeared alarmingly high at all sites. As 
discussed earlier, sites such as Aurangabad, Jalgoan and Akola had good kharif options, as 
medium soils could be put under cotton, kharif sorghum or shorter duration kharif crops. 
Total failure in rabi appeared less than the risk of total failure in kharif only at 
Ahmednagar and Sholapur, where indeed it was substantially lower. The risks of general 
depressed yields, however, were higher than kharif crops at all sites. In total rabi risks, 
only at Ahmednagar did rabi cropping have a clear advantage over kharif cropping. It 
seemed that most soils at Sholapur could take up kharif cropping with some advantages, in 
the ways already discussed by the research station. At Ahmcdnagar, however, the risks to 
such soils were about the same in rabi as with kharif crops, and for subsistence heeds 
farmers night opt for rabi sorghum. Thus the drought risk structure at Ahmcdnagar, 
substantial for kharif and rabi, night have little potential to change under any of the 
cropping strategies then being promoted. 
Sequences ofgood and bad years 
The vulnerability of a farmer to drought, and his individual 'drought. proneness, depends 
on his ability in the face of three dynamics. Two of these, the general frequency of low 
yields and the frequency of good years, have already been discussed. The third factor is 
the incidence of sequences of bad years. Using the data from previous tables, the length of 
sequences of years of depressed yields and scarcity (i. e. all risks) arc shown in Table 3.7. 
For kharif yields, Malegaon, Ahmcdnagar and Sholapur had all cxpcricnccd about 
ten sequences of at least two years of depressed yields in the pcriod 1900-1976. 
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Table 3.7 Number of sequences of at least 1... 14 years of: 
(a) depressed yields kharif crop 
Runsofyears/ 
Rainfall station 
1 2 3 456789 10 11 12 13 14 >14 
Malegaon 19 11 8 642 
Ahmednagar 19 10 7 421111111111 
Sholapur 17 11 4 1111 
Aurangabad 14 3 1 1 
Pune 16 7 
Jalgaon 17 4 
Akola 11 31 
(b) depressed yields: rabi crop 
Rainfall station/ Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 >14 
Malegaon 19 11 8 7 5 3 2 1 1 1 1 1111 
Ahmednagar 19 11 8 7 5 3 2 1 1 1 1 111 
Sholapur 19 9 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Aurangabad 14 8 6 6 4 4 4 3 3 2 1 11 
Pune 12 7 5 4 3 2 2 1 
Jalgaon 12 11 9 6 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 
Ako1a 14 10 8 7 6 2 
(c) Total failure rabi crop 
Rainfall station/ Years 123456789 10 11 12 13 14 >14 
Malegaon 13 2 
Ahmednagar 7 
Sholapur 6 
Aurangabad 92 
Pune 81 
JaIgaon 13 4 
Akola 71 
(using rainfall records 1901-1976) 
For Malegaon and Ahmednagar around five of these sequences stretched for four 
consecutive years. Sholapur shows a lower risk of these very long sequences. This is one 
reason why, of course, subsistence farmers on deeper soils at Sholapur and Ahmednagar 
might opt for rabi crops. Farmers on shallow soils, and virtually all farmers at Malegaon, 
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had no way of avoiding these sequences, with their highly debilitating cfTccts on the local 
economy. For other stations in kharif, while they did ha%c these occurrences of bad years, 
they only rarely persisted for a second year. 
Clearly the kharif farmers at Malcgaon, Ahmednagar and Sholapur inhabited a 
highly risky production environment. However, the position for depressed yields with 
rabi crops was almost as bad at the three 'core' stations of Malcgaon, Ahmcdnagar and 
Sholapur. Malegaon and Ahmednagar again showed five occasions when a sequence 
of depressed yields of at least five years occurred and again Sholapur showed a slightly 
lower risk of these prolonged spells. 
Risks of long sequences were also high at the othcr stations for rabi crops, again 
suggesting that at the stations with more favourable kharif opportunities, kharif crops 
would predominate. For total failure of rabi crops, however, consecutive years were 
much less frequent. At Ahmednagar and Sholapur, there were no cases of two 
consecutive years with low ratios in both September and October. 
P: PET ratios and crop decision matrices 
It then became possible to set up a crop decision matrix for a farmer at a site, depending 
on whether they occupied shallow, medium or deep soils. From this one could also assess 
current vulnerability to drought risk, and the real scope for a reduction in drought 
proneness by new farming practices being promoted by research stations. Individual 
examples are given in Tables 3.8i-iii. for Sholapur, Ahmcdnagar and Malcgaon. The 
actual cropping patterns found in these districts confirmed the crops suggested by these 
decision matrices. This indicated that farmers were managing their own monitoring and 
adapting to new options and conditions. Statistical analysis did not identify much that they 
were not aware of - rather it confirmed their responsiveness. 
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If one looked at these matrices in relation to current development strategies then being 
promoted, the opportunities to reduce drought proneness were not very encouraging. One 
extremely important point was that vulnerable northern Drought Prone Area sites, of 
which Malegaon in Nasik district was a prime example, was not represented by any 
current research station. Akola, while it also had a kharif maximum, had a good chance of 
a four month kharif cropping period (sorghum or cotton) and so quite a different risk 
structure. Secondly, at Malegaon generally, and on shallow soils at Ahmednagar and 
Sholapur, there were few strategies which could really reduce the risks posed by dry 
spells. Thus more attention should have been given to shallow soils than had been given 
to date by any research station in 1978. Even ICRISAT had done little work on alfisols of 
less than 50cm depth at that time. 
These models also suggested that there might be some new kharif farming 
opportunities to examine at Sholapur. Table 3.4 showed that Sholapur had a 53 per cent 
and 37 per cent chance respectively of either three or four months of rain in kharif. The 
'four month' kharif chance could have made it worth investigating the kharif sorghum/tur 
strategy being promoted by ICRISAT. Also, if very short duration pulses were raised, 
farmers would still have the opportunity to sow rabi crops. The options for change at 
Ahmednagar were much less favourable, having only a 29 per cent chance of three 
consecutive kharif months. This was a high level of risk for the adoption of kharif crops, 
so farmers seemed likely to remain with a very strong rabi emphasis, only 'catch cropping' 
a short duration pulse crop in favourable years before the rabi crop. Because of the high 
risk of failure or such a kharif crop (three years in four) farmers probably needed special 
encouragement to adopt the strategy. These results for Ahmednagar probably represented 
a broad zone extending from Ahmednagar district into eastern Poona and western 
Sholapur. 
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Table 3.81 Crop decision matrix: Sholapur 
Sholapur 
Shallow 
Soils 
Medium Deep 
General drought risks lower in kharif than rabi? K 
II 
Yes No 
Chance of a good three month kharif crop greater A Yes No 
than a fair rabi crop? R 
I 
Chance of a good four month kharif crop greater F Almost the same 
than a fair rabi crop? 
0 
Chance of a sequence of at least two years of N 
depressed yields lower in kharif than rabi? L Almost No 
Y the same 
Conclusions: Farmers on shallow soils will cultivate short duration kharif crops (general risk level 
45 per cent). Farmers on medium soils probably cultivate rabi sorghum for subsistence (dietary 
preference, difficulties in working soil in kharif, sequences of bad years the same) (general drought 
risk 61 per cent). Other farmers cultivate rabi crops. 
Actual current cropping pattern - 72 per cent under rabi crops, no kharif sorghum, reflects this 
choice. 
Crop options to reduce drought proneness - Very few on shallow soils. Scope to transfer to short 
and medium duration kharif crops on medium soils provided economic and subsistence results 
compare with current rabi crops, and problems in working soils can be met. Otherwise, apparent 
drought risk may be lessened (from 61 % to 45%) but food problems unchanged. 
Table 3. Sii Crop decision matrix: Ahmcdnagar 
Ahmednagar 
Shallow 
Soils 
Medium Deep 
General drought risks are lower in kharif than K No No 
rabi? II 
A No No 
Chance of a good three month rabi crop greater R 
than a fair rabi crop? I 
F No No 
Chance of a good four month kharif crop greater 
than a fair rabi crop? O 
N 
L 
Chance of a sequence of at least two years of Y Same No 
depressed yields lower in kharif than rabi? 
Conclusions : Farmers on shallow soils will cultivate short duration kharif crops (gcncral drought 
risk 72 per cent). All other farmers will cultivate rabi crops (general drought risk for medium soils 
62.2 per cent of years, only 7.8 per cent of deep soils). 
Actual current cropping pattern - 69 per cent rabi crops, 24 per cent kharif crops, but no kharif 
sorghum, reflects this position. 
Crop options to reduce drought mneness - Very few for shallow soils. Promote catch cropping of 
kharif pulses on other soils, although double cropping only successful one year in ten, so 
contribution to profits limited. Still better to concentrate on rabi production. 
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Table 3.8 iii Crop decision matrix : Malegaon 
Malegaon 
Shallow 
Soils 
Medium Deep 
General drought risks lower in kharif than rabi? K Yes No 
H 
Chance of a good three month kharif crop greater A Yes Yes 
than a fair rabi crop? R 
I 
Chance of a good four month kharif crop greater F No No 
than a fair rabi crop? 
0 
N 
Chance of a sequence of at least two years of L Same No 
depressed yields lower in kharif than rabi? Y 
Conclusions: Farmers on shallow soils grow short duration kharif crops (general drought risk 66 
per cent). Farmers on medium deep soils also grow short duration kharif crops, as overall 
economic risks are less. Other farmers may grow rabi crops (general drought risks 20 per cent). 
Actual current cropping patt ern - kharif crops 76 per cent (millet 50 per cent, kharif sorghum 6 per 
cent) reflects this choice. 
Crop options to reduce drought proneness - very few indeed, economic position made worse by 
dependence on low value kharif crop. 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter began with a list of six development needs for which information could have 
been generated by agencies with a mission in meteorology and agriculture. By 1978, 
criteria had been generated that mapped the DPA in ways comparative to scarcity models 
already used by the state, but made little detailed differentiation of local conditions to help 
design development programmes. The weather patterns causing difficulties in one 
monsoon season were quite well understood, and some more detailed spatial 
differentiation across the DPAM had started with criteria using dryspell analysis and 
P: PET ratios. However, no modelling was done on the build-up of inter-year runs of bad 
seasons for farmers. Generally speaking, there was little advantage of more complex 
modelling over simple procedures, and field-based observations of locally specific criteria 
gave the best - and only really reliable - information. This called into question the 
idea of 
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seeking generically appropriate criteria and models for analysing the problems of 
agricultural drought. In general little progress had been made for 
- signal criteria on which to alert authorities on impending food scarcity conditions 
- social rather than environmental factors relevant to change or stagnation in local 
farming practices 
- appropriate short term relief measures. 
Despite the wealth of information that could have been monitored to understand 
drought and droughtproneness, most actual attention remained with rainfall, basic 
meteorological measurements for evapotranspiration calculations, crop yields at 
research stations, and crop returns reported from village authorities for the agricultural 
census of each year. Perhaps, however, this old annewarl assessment tool, which had 
real political embeddedness around which a variety of local governance actors could 
lobby, respond and broker action, was still a more relevant tool for action than detailed 
meteorological criteria from research that may not have been that valued or understood 
by local development agencies. 
Both cognitive and social institutionalisation can help explain these weaknesses. This 
study suggests that both IMD and ICAR had high cognitive and social 
institutionalisation, in that they followed agreed methodologies and targets, and 
produced new information relevant to their own norms and objectives rather than 
external ones. Both tended to focus on research related to agricultural planning and 
aberrant weather conditions, rather than on criteria to assist wider development needs in 
assessing droughtproneness. The reliability of own data and tested statistical methods 
remained their framing objects. At best, they had looked at scarcity on an areal 
perspective - and did not relate their work to the 'droughtproncncss' of individual 
farmers. Neither had admitted wider agroeconomic or sociological data into their 
analysis at that time, not even to look at the classic known problem of spells of bad 
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years. ICRISAT did try to push new research into which it tried to invite IMD and 
ICAR, and certainly ICRISAT in the late 1970's benefited from some of their data. But 
no major new scientific findings or cognition in meteorology emerged at a level that 
could become embedded and used in the public agencies for development. Once the 
energetic staff of that time moved on, the coalition platform on drought and 
vulnerability fell away. 
The relative isolation of meteorological research is another answer, where there had 
been relatively little inter-disciplinary contact with socio-economic research. While 
scientists in specialty agencies also frequently took up new models and criteria generated 
by other scientists to test on local conditions, they rarely set out to look at highly localised 
problems. The complexity of agriculture practised by the small farmer was another reason, 
as it was less amenable to easy statistical analysis and demanded regular contact with 
farmers in order to build up data sets. The greatest reason, however, I thought, was that 
research workers faced problems in seeing value in production systems that most of them 
were taught to see as inferior and were working to eliminate. Greater attention to 
modelling the problems of he small farmers could come only with recognition that that 
farming sector would not only survive, but also contribute to the food production of the 
country. 
The search to replace socio-economic criteria for boundary and mapping needs, by 
generic `scientific' methods to identify potential crop production periods was however 
relatively successful in terms of IMDs norms and `guidelines'- and the OMAI index 
moved into the repertoire of India-wide techniques used by IMD. The OMAI index did 
become used more widely in some (re)mapping of boundary areas of droughtprone areas, 
and did become an influence on the localised weather forecasting zones that emerged 
more in the 1980's. BCBiswas later became Director of IMD-Poona, as appropriate to his 
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scientific successes and very genuine meteorological enthusiasm. Ilowevcr my dryspell 
studies and suggestions for six crop-weather zones with different crop associations stayed 
as maps in a report. 
Both my own work, and that of other agro- meteorologists then, ovcrwhclming 
fulfilled the assertion that a scientific approach was a search for patterns (Nightingale, 
1999). Computers gave us endless opportunities to model and statistically analyse data. 
We still worked with the belief that good statistics could almost represent scientific 
facts, and this science could be a source of tools and techniques to help design, or set 
up more efficient strategies of applied research and development in the DPAM (after 
Brooks, 1994). The main perspectives I worked to add alongside work being done by 
others was to look at frequencies and not only average lengths of dry spells, but also 
runs of bad years assessed through P: PET ratios, thinking these were critically 
important for small farmers. What I learned once I collected production data was that 
farmers had already spotted these patterns and were relating options to them I learned 
that farmers never wait from recommendations or the 'approval' of statistics, but will 
be experimenting immediately from their own cognitive assessments. My faith in 
models and modelling was also shattered as I earned just how easily bad programming 
happened and how unrepresentative and unreliable model cobbled up from surrogate 
and generalised figures could be. My own interests in interdisciplinary studies and 
syntheses increased - but only as they could be based in good field data. While I 
communicated my reports back to IMD, none of my insights got taken up in subsequent 
work. However, I also have to acknowledge that I did not stay in these same networks 
of scientists to try and disseminate or `institutionalise' my own findings. Thus I also 
had a first lesson in the limited power of experts if they do not integrate with their own 
network of practitioners. In this case, my network became tlrnse mobile in 
development-oriented research, not those institutionalised into specialty organisations. 
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The agro-meteorology of the droughtprone area of 1978 was still really the 
meteorology of important cash crops often discussed on a regional basis. The key 
emphasis in research reflected theoretical production potential, and the constraints 
weather gave to this, without reference to the real vulnerability that typified dryland 
farming systems or drought-prone locations at that time. Thus the `useful' contribution 
of agrometeorology was really only benefiting the farmers with substantial resources 
who might be able to withstand drought periods. A real focus of droughtproneness, and 
the vulnerability this caused for small farmers remained lacking, or at least just left 
with the older annewari approach of crop yields used since the turn of the century. In 
1982, a Taskforce reviewed the achievements and areal coverage of the DPAP and was 
sharply critical of the agro-meteorological data made available by states. They 
commented (Government of India, 1982, p. 5) 
... 
"In most cases the data received are too general to permit any worthwhile 
analysis. The paucity of microlevel data indicates that, over the years, a basis for crop 
planning in areas deficient in water has still not been evolved, and the use of 
meteorological information for scientific agriculture is still minimal". 
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CHAPTER 4 
GROUNDWATER DEVELOPMENT IN RAYALASEEMA: FIRST 
STEPS IN EXACERBATING GROUNDWATER DROUGHT 
... In view ofpast experience, the proposal to pump... crores 
for works in the rural areas evokes the 
grave anxiety that if the quality of a large number of works is as bad as it has been, and the 
leakage of funds, due to corruption, is as bad as it has been, there may be neither a substantial 
addition to productive capacity nor a significant income transfer to show for this enormous outlay. 
Instead of reduciig the poverty and idleness of the poorest, it may further enrich the rural oligarch 
and bureaucracy, and increase inequity and tension in the countryside. " Krishna, 1974 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores dugwell and borewell expansion in the droughtprone Rayalaseema 
region of Andhra Pradesh, as it was occurring in 1984, in the `fast phase' of groundwater 
development - popularisation of technology (Burke and Moench 2000). It studies the 
agencies emerging to support technology dissemination and their cognitive and technical 
norms, contributing to research sub-questions 1,2, and 4 for groundwater drought. It 
shows that operational rather than `scientific' criteria evolved around the easily 
measurable criteria like water levels and pumping yields, and that virtually no norms 
showed any special consideration of drought - either in how lower rainfall affected 
recharge or on falling water levels that could restrict intensity of cropping. 
In common with the Indian planning approach (see Intermezzo 1), agencies were again 
created both as a source of techniques for more `efficient' design and to provide a 
knowledge base for more efficient development strategies for technologies. However, this 
chapter introduces some different kinds of agencies and institutionalised actors into the 
development arena of a droughtprone area - newly formed `scientific' resource 
assessment agencies (the groundwater departments) and specialised technology 
dissemination agencies for borewell development (irrigation development corporations). 
Both show very different problems and struggles to reach the confident institutionalisation 
visible with the IMD and ICAR in the last chapter. The chapter shows how much of the 
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scale and spatial diversity in groundwater development, and over-extraction of 
groundwater, was driven by technocconomic networks - associations of banks, 
credit/subsidy institutions and technology installation agencies rather than any well- 
established technosciendfic specialty agencies. Thus looking into droughtprone areas 
through groundwater mechanisms, rather than rainfall, configures different actors and 
norms in this development arena, and the actors and framing objects shaping the cognitive 
space of a droughtprone area. 
My own work became directed into a critical evaluation of these early cognitive and 
technical norms in these agencies involved in groundwater development. In this chapter, 
as in Chapter 3, I both critique and try to expand these generic norms and models created, 
again to show better the risks to small farmers of groundwater development otherwise 
invisible in the standardised approaches of many of the general assessment criteria. I also 
review the biased choices and corruption that spread into groundwater development by 
wells, feasible because of he kind of techno-economic networks present. In this respect, 
the study shows how little science really contributed to conscientious public action in this 
complex technological context. Technology was driving what science evolved in the 
groundwater field, both as it yielded more information, but also in how it structured 
analytical frameworks on potential well numbers, and eventually triggered questions about 
its social and environmental impact. 
I came to this research programme to work more in irrigation development realities in a 
DPA, after this frustration with the separateness of agro-meteorology from farmer 
realities. I also came with the invitation of the state irrigation development corporation 
(APSIDC), all set to work with these important tcchnoscicntific agencies (with many 
people who also gave me a lot of support). No one prepared me, however, for the scale of 
financial irregularities on the ground. This ultimately drove a more critical investigation of 
the techno-economic networks actually at work. 
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After an overview of hydrogeology in section 4.2, section 4.3 examines key scientific 
and technical norms used in groundwater development, with particular reference to 
selection of dug-or borewell technology, and the risk environment of small farmers taking 
up new credit programmes. Very simple additional calculations could have indicated 
serious potential risks in operations and profitability for small farmers. Failure to perform 
these is attributed to the pressure to disburse funds under development programmes. 
Section 4.4 reviews the agencies involved in these programmes and techno-economic 
networks, which allowed these simplistic planning methods to steamroller ahead. Sections 
4.5 and 4.6 look at the outcomes of agency action in borewell and dug-wells respectively, 
especially the corruption that emerged - and whether science made any real difference in 
local action; given incentives and pressures to disburse subsidies and credit. Initial 
sections discuss the Rayalaseema region: later sections focus into Kurnool district and 
Dhone taluk'. The corruption uncovered in Dhone made work very difficult. Moving 
between different districts helped me to see what procedures should be in place and what 
questions to ask. 
4.2 AGROECOLOGY, HYDROGEOLOGY AND GROUNDWATER MOBILISATION 
4.2.1 The Rayalaseema region 
The Rayalaseema region consists of four districts (Kurnool Anantapur, Cuddapah and 
Chittoor) that form the core droughtprone region of Andhra Pradesh. The region has an 
average annual rainfall of less than 900mm, and Kurnool and Anantapur have less than 
700mm. This 700mm isohyet was used to define the 'Drought Prone Area Programme' in 
1A taluk or block is the first administrative subdivision ofa district. In Andhra Pradesh, these were later 
subdivided into mandals, which have around 5 villages in them. 
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Andhra Pradesh State, alongside low levels of irrigation (see India Meteorological 
Department, 1972; Revenue Department, 1981). A more detailed picture of crop risk was 
developed through mapping 'agrociimatic zones' defined by the number of consecutive 
weeks of moisture availability - the OMAI described in the previous chapter - shown in 
Figure 4.1 (Mandal et al, 1983). Lower rainfall also limited the recharge available for 
groundwater. Droughtproneness was further exacerbated by the soil type prescnt2.7he 
two important river systems for the region arc the Tungabadhra river, a tributary of the 
Krishna system, and the Pennar river these support several large surface irrigation and 
small lift irrigation systems. (Groundwater Department, 1976, and 1976/1995) 
The geology of Rayalaseema divides into three systems :a map is given in Appendix 4. 
The oldest series is the crystalline 'Archean' rocks composed of granites, gncisscs and 
schists, where groundwater availability is linked to the existence of joints and fractures in 
the rocks, to contact planes with dykes, or to the weathered zone, usually up to 30 metres 
deep. The second series is the sedimentary Cuddapah-Kumool formation, including 
sandstones, limestones and shales. The third and most recent are alluvial sands, clays and 
gravels found in river valley areas. The first two of these systems are together classified 
as 'hard rocks' for development purposes. Groundwater resources arc generally poor in 
these hard rocks, with slow rates of water movement, typically 1-10m3/day/nI. The 
degree of fracturing and depth of the weathered zone varies greatly across the area, as 
does the level of recharge and depth to the water table, making localised groundwater 
potential groundwater very variable. Proximity to major irrigation schemes as in 
2 'Red' soils are shallow (less than 50mm), sandy and gravelly soils developed over the granite rocks: they 
are low in nutrients, but with good management can support a wide variety of 'irrigated dry' crops, and the 
high value tree crops like citrus and mulberry. Very poor skeletal hill soils are best be developed under 
forestry. The black soils are clay loams often over 1.5 metres deep and have better nutrient availability and 
moisture holding capacity, but may become waterlogged when wet and crack when dry. (source: Interview 
with GWSG Branch office, Kurnool district, July, 1983; Groundwater Department, 1976). 
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northwest Kurnool district) also influences recharge levels. (Hanamantha. Rao, 1982; 
Groundwater Department, 1976 and 1976/1991) 
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Fig 4.1 Moisture availability zones and district boundaries, Rayalaseema region 
(Compiled from India Meteorological Department, 1973; Khambete et. al., 1983) 
Zones are defined according to the Moisture Availability Index 
Zone D defines the least favourable production zone, with survival conditions operating for 
less than 10 weeks in 50% of years. Anantapur district largely falls under this zone. 
Zone E, where survival conditions are a little more secure, covers western and southern 
Kurnool district. 
Zone F, covering eastern Kurnool district, western Cuddapah and a small part of Chittoor, has 
both a more substantial survival period and several weeks of good rainfall within this, 
in 50% 
of years. 
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Table 4.1 shows groundwater and well behaviour characteristics for these rock types. Dug 
wells (open wells) were the traditional technology of the region, with a water-lifting 
device operated by oxen (a mhot). They were large, typically 10-15 metres in diameter 
and up to 10-12 metres deep, providing reservoir storage against slow permeability and 
recharge rate. 
Table 4.2 shows the state of groundwater development in 1982, when only 9% 
of the groundwater resources of Kurnool district were registered as developed -a 
startlingly low figure given concerns about rapid development elsewhere. Explanations 
for this included higher levels of canal irrigation and problem geology and soils, and 
lack of programmes for borewell technology at this time. Higher well numbers in other 
districts reflected older traditions of well use, and special development programmes in 
districts like Anantapur. (Interviews, Groundwater Department Branch Officers, 
Kurnool and Anantapur districts, July and August 1983. ) 
Table 4.2 Groundwater potential in RnvnIaspp. na districts 1982 
Rayalaseema Status of Number of new % Gross % Gross irrigable 
District groundwater pumpsets irrigable area area under 
potential feasible under tubewells 
development dugwells 
M 
Kurnool 931 61404 58.2 - 
Ananta ur 32.8 24637 78.5 0.04 
Cuddapah 58.1 14206 81.2 1.9 
Chittoor 30.4 21979 75.7 1.1 
source: tianumanina tcao, (i iooz). 
4.2.2 The real costs of dugwells 
Excavating a dugwell involved several elements which came to have standardised 
costings in their development programmes(Hanamantha Rao, 1982; n. d. ) 
- digging of 'trial pit' to ensure water is available 
- excavation work 
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- costs of explosives and drills for breaking rocks 
- availability of pump for dewatering 
- lining (lining) of a well to prevent its collapse 
- installation of pump and pumphouse 
- subsequent development of canals for distributing water. 
The two elements that crucially influenced the cost of a dug well were depth, and 
whether blasting was necessary - this could raise prices prohibitively3. Even in rocks 
relatively easy to excavate, a 10 metre depth cost about 10,000 rupees without lining - but 
in such unconsolidated rocks, lining was necessary against siltation and collapse of a well. 
However, lining the full well depth almost doubled the cost. Only with a well of 8 metres 
depth or less, was it possible to excavate and line a well at less than 10-11,000 rupees at 
this time. In 1983 there were references of 'up to 50,000 rupees' as the cost of a deep 
hand-dug well. The costs were complicated by difficulties in obtaining explosives, and 
organising the labour involved. Typically it could take 15 adults five-six months to 
excavate a well, with work often spread over 18 months so that fluctuations in water table 
could be monitored. 
It was against this high cost that in-well-bore technology arosc, available through 
both the State agency APSCRIC, and private contractors. An in-well-bore cost only 
about 75-150 rupees per metre in 1983 (the sanctioned agency figure was noted as 140 
rupees in APSCRIC, 1981). It was a measure of the burgeoning possibilities of this 
technology at this time, that Anantapur district had around 100 contractors for 
undertaking in-well-bore work, compared with around 12 contractors for tubcwcll work 
(Interview, Groundwater Department, Branch Officer Kurnool District, July 1983). 
With this technology, water was pumped via an in-well bore (drilled at first only to 
3 Blasting could increase cost per volume up to six times, and brought work supervision problems. For 
examples of standard costings see Appendix 4. 
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25m) into the well, and thence to the surrounding area. Except in weathered zones 
prone to collapse, in-well-bore technology was very feasible - but its expansion could 
mine the groundwater table. 
4.2.3 Borewells 
In the hard rocks, the borewells first developed were typically 50m in depth and cased 
only in the weathered zone i. e. about the top six metres. Full casing was too expensive, 
with a cost of around 220,000 rupees. General costings of borewell elements at 1983 
prices were (derived from APSIDC, 1980,1983): 
borewell 20-25000 rupees 
distribution works 17-20000 rupees 
mechanical and electrical works 20-23000 rupees 
general investigation, transport and other charges 15000 rupees 
working estimate for total 75-80000 rupees 
Borewells were not without problems for farmers. Faulty installation of the pumps at 
inaccurate depths could mean that wells yielded less water than envisaged, and problems 
of pump maintenance were greater. Thus maintenance could also be a factor in technology 
choice (Interview, Executive Engineer, APSIDC Kurnool District, July 1983). However, 
to farmers, the attractions of borewells over dug wells greatly outweighed the 
disadvantages, except where dug wells experienced virtually a total subsidy. They were 
faster to develop, without the need to organise labour. However, it was the payment 
system which proved a major key. Finance on group wells assisted through the State 
Irrigation Development Corporation (APSIDC) was repaid as a water rate: while high at 
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fast, this was reduced to the standard for other minor irrigation systcros4. Also this cess 
was often not paid: during the 1980s APSIDC collected these charges, and arrears were 
extensive. This eventually brought financial problems into APSIDC, who in the early 
1990's tried but failed to transfer the rate collection to the Revenue department 
(Interviews with: Chef Engineer APSIDC, 2000; NABARD officers at the NABARD 
workshop, Hyderabad, September 1995 and Iiyderabad offices, November 2002). 
4.2.4 Pumps and Power 
At this time, the 5 hp motor was sanction for assistance under in development 
programmes, being one of the artefacts also manufactured by the state company Ago 
Pumps and Instruments Ltd (APIL). (From 1978, subsidy was also allowed on 7. S hp 
engines). Given the slow spread of electricity, diesel pumps still formed some 40% of the 
pumpsets in Rayahseema districts in 1983. However, the advantages of electricity as a 
source of power greatly outweighed those of dieset which was subject to unreliable 
supply and was more expensive - to the extent of jcopardis ing returns on all but lucrative 
crops. The cheap tariff for electricity - then 50 rupees per hp per year - did not deter rapid 
expansion of illegal connections. 
These, then, were the costs and issues confronting the development programmes for 
wells, to be compared with returns from irrigation, and bank loans and programme 
subsidies available. Costs seemed about the same order of magnitude for dugwclls and 
borewells - but there were different dynamics in accessing and repaying credit and 
4 Previously, this water rate was calculated on the basis of capital, interest, maintenance and depreciation 
charges up to a maximum limit of 400 Rs. per acre per crop for a site of ten acres or less, or 250 Rs. per acre 
per crop on a site of more than this. After an outcry over the differences between this rate and those levied 
on surface tanks, it was fixed as 50 Rs. per acre per crop, with an addition of an electricity charge of 50 Its. 
per hp per year. The difference was subsidised by the Government, with the subsidy supposed to taper off 
after 6 or 7 years. The comparative advantage over repayment terms for a loan for a dug well arc obvious. s The number allowed was supposed not to exceed 25% of all pumps up to 10 hp financed. See circular 
9647/IDA-37-78-9, September 1978. in See Ministry of Agriculture, 1979, Government of India. 
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subsidies. However, well behaviour and reliability in supplying water, across the year, was 
also of major concern. Table 4.3 shows how these played into different technology 
choices across Kurnool district 1975-1983, based on loans released though 
ARDC/NABARD. 
Table 4.3. Refinance through ARDC/NABARD, 1975-1983, Kurnool district 
Taluk 
Dug wells 
NUMBERS 
Well Deepening Pumpsets 
EXPENDITURE 
Lakhs Rs 
Banaganapalli 161 171 94 15.52 
Kurnool 306 46 136 17.42 
Nandyal 465 211 425 53.55 
Allagadda 92 71 84 10.33 
Dhone 774 140 279 45.82 
Pattikonda 49 50 37 4.63 
Nandikothur 886 407 948 104.02 
Adoni 806 259 566 60.91 
Alur 352 113 178 20.47 
Koilkuntla 390 181 224 31.76 
Total 4281 1649 2971 364.43 
Source: NABARD records, Kurnool District 
Differences correlated partly with groundwater availability (poor for shallow 
groundwater in Alur, Koilkuntla, Banaganapalli and Nandyal taluks although borewells 
would later give better yields in the last two); relative interest in dug wells or in-well 
bores given older traditions of using wells (like Nandikothur and Adoni); and the 
interest of new special assistance programmes to move into blocks with a low level of 
canal irrigation which were also underdeveloped in their infrastructure and marketing 
(Dhone, Pattikonda, Alur, Koilkuntla). Blocks like Allagadda had low loans due to 
bank overdues and restrictions on credit. Thus dug wells, including with in-well bores, 
were being heavily promoted in certain blocks, just as borewell technology was coming 
into the region In fact dug wells continued to be developed through the 1980's under 
certain programmes despite the growing interests and new agency development for 
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borewells. How this happened, and the problems resulting, is a critical theme in the rest 
of this chapter and the next. 
43 AGENCIES FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE DROUGHTPRONE AREAS 
By the mid-1980s, the promotion of groundwater use through 1RDP and DPAP brought a 
raft of new organisations into existence and interaction with each other, including for 
1) data collection on water resources - the state groundwater department; 
2) technology dissemination and technical intervention- the new state corporations; 
3) disbursing credit and subsidies; the banks, the DRDA and the SCSTC; 
4) regulating agencies at central level - ARDC/NABARD and the CGWB. 
This section reviews the struggle of each agency to survive and develop particular 
operating norms, and shows how they linked together as a tcchnocconomic network 
4.3.1 Data collection on water resources- the Groundwater Department 
A regional office of the State Groundwater Department (SGWD) was set up for the 
Rayalaseema region in 1972 (located in Cuddapah) and branch offices were designated in 
1975. In fact the office for Kurnool only began in 1983: it was awarded a cohort of seven 
geologists (but two were seconded to Anantapur) and two geophysicists. Central to the 
slow emergence of local offices was funding. In 1983 the state government awarded its 
GWD only 35 lakh rupees (about 195000 pounds) to be spent on exploration in their DPA. 
Thus the Kurnool office opened partly as a result of this special state allocation to the 
DPA, but also funding from the Central DPAP (5 lakh rupees or 25000 pounds) which 
allowed it to buy its one rig and jeep. (Interviews with Branch Officers of Groundwater 
Department in Kurnool and Anantapur districts, July 1983). This manpower and 
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equipment level was simply not enough to keep pace with the groundwater development 
scheduled within the DPAP and IRDP programmes as well as its general duties6, and no 
specific attention was made to any dimension ofdrought. 
While considerable progress emerged with the mapping of groundwater levels and 
general geology, much of the drilling information to help estimate groundwater flow and 
recharge came from APSIDC. The SGWD at first was more like a data collection wing for 
the corporations (and the banks), serving their loan screening needs. 
4.3.2 Technology dissemination - the new state corporations 
The Kurnool office of the Andhra Pradesh State Irrigation Development Corporation 
(APSIDC) opened in 1978 and the Anantapur branch in 1981: by 1983 its engineers 
estimated they did about half the surveys for their own borewells (Interviews with 
District-level Executive Engineer, Kurnool District, July 1983). The Andhra Pradesh 
Corporation State Cooperative Rural Irrigation Corporation (APSCRIC) was also set up in 
1981 to drill dug-cum-borewells (APSCRIC, 1981; interview with Chief Engineer, 
APSRIC, July 1983). The state corporations were an amalgam of state, central and private 
funds, organised into operating budgets and reserves which could continue to generate 
interest: they were also supposed to gain income from water rates charged on borewells 
installed. Central funds came in through special assistance programmes, and it was this 
funding that brought them under the scrutiny of ARDC/NABARD (which together with 
state funding sources were their real regulators). APSIDC ran a 'normal' scheme for all 
farmers, as well as supporting special assistance programmes with the DRDA office. 
6These were (i) to make survey investigations and drawing up hydrogeological maps; (ii)to give groundwater 
clearance for schemes given credit by banks (iii) to make investigations for percolation tanks (iv) to make 
investigations for the corporations drilling borewells and dug-cumborewells. 
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Their operating position was thus very different to a state dcpartmcnt dependent on an 
annual budget 
There was no specific agency to manage dug wells. Funding programmes were 
handled by the DRDA and the SCSTC through their local officers. The pressures on these 
officers to disperse funds over large - and relative ly distant - areas were massive, leaving 
opportunities for financial mismanagement and corruption. In 1983 the Anantapur DRDA 
proposed a Central Authority to coordinate well dcvelopmcnt7. The request was turned 
down, not because of opposition from other agencies, even though such an agency might 
be in competition with APSIDC. It was turned down because it involved a grant of 
money, without any loan component that would be paid (interviews, SCSTC and DRDA 
staff, Kurnool and Anantapur districts, September 1983). 
4.3.3. Disbursing credit and subsidies; the banks, the DRDA and the SCSTC 
The DRDA, responsible for coordinating programme funds such as the IRDP and DPAP 
also had serious manpower shortages: the DRDA staff in Kurnool consisted of a Project 
Director with just three technical assistants (typically animal husbandry, agriculture and 
sericulture), a credit officer and an accounts officer. The DRDA had no research funds, 
and was dependent on the knowledge of science and technology within the state agencies 
it worked with, or who seconded staff to the office. No-one could be seconded for 
groundwater, as there was no Ministry to provide this. The pressure to disburse funds 
pushed project development ahead of real knowledge about the resou-cc basc and fanning 
systems of the locality concerned. The special corporations for scheduled castes, 
7 It was argued that such an entity would greatly simplify procedures and cut costs for farmers by 
coordinating all involved activities, and estimated to cost only 650 rupees per new well - easily 
comparable with the costs from hiring in of contractors and equipment, and related delays (field 
interviews with SCST district staff, Kurnool and Anantapur, September, 1983) 
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scheduled tribes and backward classes also faced even worse manpower pressures and 
lack of resources for evaluation or research. 
The IRDP, with its aim to generate additional employment and raise incomes for 
poor families, set the poverty line at an annual net income of 700 rupees or less. This was 
different from the conventional landholding criteria for categories for small and marginal 
farmers based on land ownership 8 used by the DRDA, which also shaped bank lending 
policies. There were insufficient staff to collect or check this diverse information (even if 
it was collectable). 
IRDP focused on weaker sections of the community - not only small and marginal 
farmers, but 50% of `beneficiaries' were to be from scheduled castes and tribes. The 
programme included a range of activities of which irrigation was a supporting part for 
secure water supply - including sericulture, animal husbandry, horticulture, social forestry 
and fisheries. (APCCADB, 1983,1980; DRDA office files, Kurnool district). The 
packages involved a loan repayable by the `beneficiary', but also gave subsidies if actual 
development was very expensive or loans proved difficult to organise - as was typical for 
high cost wells, or loans to very poor farmers or special caste groups. 
Successful expansion of wells under IRDP involved the cooperation of the banks in 
lending to small farmers, which was not very forthcoming at this time. (Khan, 1980; 
APCCADB, 1980). Most banks would only loan for minor irrigation if a farmer had four 
acres or more, and many banks used a criteria of 10 acres. Apart from insisting on land as 
collateral, for irrigation assistance, they used the value of land under dryland cultivation in 
loan assessment, which was typically only 1,000-3,000 rupees per acre value. All the 
banks assisting in the IRDP programme had a minimum landholding requirement to assist 
individual wells - usually 2%-3 acres for a well only, and 5-6 acres for a dug well and 
8 An agricultural labourer/ marginal farmer was defined to have 1 acre of less, a small farmer 4 acres or 
less. 
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pumpset. (Agricultural labourers were only eligible for loans to a maximum of 3,100 
rupees. ) (sources: APCCADB, 1980; DRDA records, Kurnool district, and government 
circulars on financial assistance) Thus reaching small farmers involved increasing 
amounts of subsidy alongside the loan component a bank would extend. However, 
despite huge subsidies that made loans very small in practice, there was still limited help. 
Certain banks (e. g. the Syndicate Bank) assisted community irrigation wells if they 
covered at least 1.5 acres and had at least three beneficiaries. It is hard to know whether 
`community irrigation schemes' came about because they were genuinely wanted 
collective developments, or were simply designs that gave access b central funds and 
bank loans. 
Another problem was the repayment terms relative to likely income from wells. In 
1983, general rates of interest were 10%, with repayment terms of 9 years for large 
farmers and 12 years for small farmers. However, the repayment term for farmers 
receiving subsidies was reduced (because of a smaller loan): to only 5 years, and I saw 
one repayment schedule agreed of three years. Typically one could see a loan, after 
subsidy, of around 8,000 rupees for a well and pumpset, to be paid back at 10% interest 
over 5 years. 
DPAP funds bought in twice the level of subsidies to a block as IRDP. Subsidies under 
the DPAP programme were first disbursed to a district per area of the programme: after 
1979 they were issued in relation to blocks. DPAP funds were for 'droughtproofing' and 
restoration of ecological balance, and focused primarily on provision of communal 
resources, for which community dug wells and borewclls were eligible. The DPAP could 
also give funding to the GWD for data collection. 
9 Many of these are collected in Ministry of Agriculture (1979). 
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Thus the different technologies assisted under the different programmes were as 
follows: 
Groundwater development under IRDP Groundwater development under DPAP 
Individual and communal hand-dug wells Community borewell 
Pumpsets Community dugwells and in-well bores 
Individual in-well bores 
The limited numbers of banks, their overdue levels, and unwillingness to assist 
small farmers visibly hampered programme work. This in turn put pressure on the DRDA 
to coordinate its work as much as possible with other programmes and agencies providing 
subsidies - margin money from the caste corporations, and also the irrigation corporations 
refinanced through ARDC. As will be shown, this often drove well development 
programmes into some of the weakest communities on the poorest land, sometimes 
bringing further risks into production in these area and communities if wells failed. Even 
by 1982, the Central DPAP taskforce lamented that the DRDA was coming to see its 
programmes just as `budgetary custom', such that there was no real design of any 
programme (Government of India, 1982, p. iv). Thus they drew up a new 21 point plan 
that put strong emphasis into irrigation potential and watershed harvesting, as well as 
spatial data synthesis for local planning: whether this worked is a subject for later sections. 
4.3.4 Regulatory agencies 
All emerging processes left considerable power with the banks, yet they also had very 
poor levels of control, as they had no technical staff of their own. In fact it was 
hydrologists with ARDC who ended up drafting simple procedures for banks to follow - 
to estimate yields, irrigable areas and possible incomes, and appropriate pump sizes, as a 
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means to stop local banks from overextending loans to against inappropriately sized well 
commands, or wrongly sized pumps10. They also took a fumcr control over bank 
overdues, restricting flows of funds to banks with high outstanding repayment levels ý. 
ARDCINABARD also oversaw the financial probity of the Irrigation Corporations, to 
audit expenditure of central funds and repayments ofwatcr charges that were supposed to 
replace capital expenditure. 
4A THE 'NON-SCIENCE'OF GROUNDWATER PLANNING FOR SMALL FARMERS 
As the previous section has shown, the pressure to develop groundwater led to creation 
of multiple agencies for resource assessment, technology dissemination and planning. 
However, these new state agencies had neither a historic sense of identity nor scientific 
credentials as seen in the agencies described in Chapter 3. While the Central 
Groundwater Board certainly did have a sense of scientific mission and purpose, this 
was hard to replicate meaningfully at first in the state groundwater agencies created, 
who inevitably just followed the models created by the central agency. What was 
emerging in the 1980's was a loose and uneasy coalition of agencies bound together by 
the funding patterns and programme directives emerging via state and central 
development policies. While all developed operational norms to help technology 
dissemination, none of these took any real cognisance of any dimension of drought - 
neither to limit development to lower recharge levels nor reflect of problems of low 
profitability if production options declined in a year when water levels fell early. 
10 Guidelines for scrutiny of groundwater utilisation schemes projected under the normal lending 
programmes of the land development banks. These were seen as temporary until Groundwater 
Departments were better established and could develop improved norms. (Circulated with letter 1(W1 
Agri-Credit Board, 29.6.1972. See also Ministry of Agriculture, 1979) 
See Circulars on the Issue of loans by State Land Development Banks - Regulation of Advance 
(NoLDB, 1036/11 and 46-78/9 (January 1979)and Revised Norms ß1o ACD. DB. 11994/11,46.78/9, 
January 1979), See Ministry of Agriculture. Government of India, (1979) 
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The `science' for development had to be created from existing data sets, which 
became linked together as best as possible between basic sciertific principles, empirical 
norms and pragmatic associations. This section summarises findings related to two 
critical quasi-scientific models used in the implementation of well development targets: 
- technical appraisal routines to select and approve well dimensions and pump 
selection 
- estimation of groundwater yield, potential well numbers and well development 
options. 
These explain also some of the problems in subsequent well development, the 
corruption related with this, and the negative impacts on some farmers outlined later in 
chapter 5. Critical evaluation of these models could have stopped some of these 
excesses, but did not. 
In 1983, both these sets of estimation procedures in use had been created by 
ARDC/NABARD, rather than the technical or central scientific agencies just discussed. 
ARDC set up these simple models, in the hope that `more scientific procedures' would 
follow later. There was a third area of science that later became important in 
dissemination of well technology. This was geophysical monitoring for presence of 
groundwater at a site, undertaken through resistivity measurements. This technology 
was only coming generally into use at this time. In my study area, the critical first stage 
in any site survey was still the digging of a trial pit to test drilling to see if water was 
present - both were also within the control of implementing agencies. Resistivity 
techniques are therefore not reviewed in this study. 
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4.4.1 Appraisal routines to select and approve well dimensions and pump selection 
These technical appraisal procedures evolved in stages. First, calculation procedures 
were standardised, to assist in selection of appropriate pumps and groundwater works 
consistent with aquifer parameters and designed pump discharge. They were developed 
in principle to ensure costs were payable by small farmers, and to avoid problems of 
over capitalisation (pump size too larg) and over- or under-financing. Second, 
standardised procedures were set up to equate estimated yields with irrigable area of 
borewells, and the profitability of irrigated production supported by the well (from 
which loans could be repaid (ARDC, 1980 (i) and (ii), NAI3ARD, 1992). 
Groundwater development in Ralayascema meant development in hardrock area where 
aquifers were known to have low and unpredictable yields and problematic fluctuations in 
water levels across seasons. Pressures to assist small farmers meant that agencies went 
ahead with well development with low yields, despite their high costs. For credit and 
special assistance much discussion centred on what yield should be available before a 
borewell was `allowed' to be fully developed and declared successful. The limit used for 
a `failed well' was only 2500 gllons per hour (gph) (3.2 Us) for individual wells and 
1200 gph (1.6 Its) where a cluster of borewells has been developed. In fact the government 
agreed to the use of 1000 gph or less where scheduled castes or tribes benefited. 
(Interviews, APSIDC staff, August 1983) For in-well bores, the criterion for a failed well 
was 500 gph (0.6 Us; APSCRIC, 198 1). The 'rule of thumb' was that 1000 gph irrigated 3 
acres of 'irrigated dry' crops in the kharif season and 2 acres of rabi'2. 
At this time however, there was very little information on local aquifer 
characteristics. The CGWB continued some exploratory drilling: the SGWD only did 
12 the older levels of 4 acres and 3 acres respectively were considered too high by APSIDC field staff 
interviewed in July 1983. 
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exploratory drilling if it could fund this through special external assistance 
programmes. Thus the SGWD could do little more than extrapolate generalised 
estimates of yields in relation to geology and known performance under wells in other 
regions. Borewell drilling incorporated at best exploratory measurements done within 
them: geology was recorded, together with increases in flow recorded at different strata 
that were hit. However, no specific controlled pumping tests were done, from which 
storativity or transmissivity could be estimated. Bores were also typically lift capped 
and undeveloped for 6-24 months between drilling and commissioning, given all the 
procedures needed to get funds and clearance for the screening and energising of the 
borewell. Kurien and Dholappa (1995) reviewed the gap between drilling yield aid 
eventual operation yields across Rayalaseema. In wells left uncommissioned for up to 
24 months, they found the reduction in yields to be 33-75% in the granitic gneisses, and 
23-34% in the Deccan trap basalts. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.4(a) show estimates calculated from data used by the SGWD and 
from APSIDC files in 1983, for likely irrigable areas under borewells in different 
formations. The crystalline hardrocks had low yields, typically irrigating less than a 
hectare, consequent to low sustainable pumping levels. Yields were only really adequate 
for wells irrigating larger areas under some cavernous limestone formations. Shales and 
quartzites also had low yields under dug wells 13. To a large extent, low yields also 
characterised dug wells in the other main geological formation - the Cuddapal--Kumool 
system, except where this contained limestone strata - specifically the N4 limestones 
14 
_ 
and some weathered quartzite zones in central and eastern zones of Kurnool. Alluvial 
13 Subsequently borewell yields were improved for these formations consequent to both better exploratory 
methods and also drilling and development methods that opened up fractured/weathered areas in these rocks 
(interviews with APWELL project staff, Kurnool district, October 2002). 
14 The Nadi limestones had a well-developed cavern system for transmitting water. The Koilkuntla and 
Vampalle limestones had poorly developed solution and weathered zones and yield very little water, 
although the Koilkuntla limestones yield more in the most eastern parts of Kurnool district - either 
through the increased influence of faulting or recharge from the K. -C. canal irrigation scheme. 
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sands and gravels usually gave good yields of water but these were rare in Kurnool and 
Anantapur except in zones close to or within large-scale irrigated areas. Deep black soil 
areas also faced problems in well development - wells needed full lining to prevent the 
collapse of the well, making them very expensive to develop, and might also have water 
quality problems 15. 
Borewells or dugwells? 
Tables 4.2 and 4.4(b) show that the low yields of some borcwclls in crystalline formations 
would barely irrigate 1 hectare - similar to that of a dug well (unless they were in a high 
recharge zone, say close to a tank). Thus borewells generally had little yield advantage 
over dug wells in the crystalline rocks, as both were simply tapping the water table of a 
weathered zone. The difference in advantage had to be weighed in relation to cost, 
employment generation, speed of results, management - and availability of subsidy. The 
prospects from borewell development were also not very encouraging. Where tubewells 
tapped across the various strata of the Kurnool system, they could be productive, and 
support irrigable areas of up to 15 hectares. However, there were also sites where an 
individual borewell might not support more than 2-3 hectares of 'irrigated dry' crops. The 
limitations of existing drilling technology (percussion drilling) meant borcwclls were then 
rarely drilled beyond 50 metres. 
Table 4.4b shows that, in Kurnool district, over 40% of borcwclls drilled under special 
assistance programmes could irrigate less than 4 acres -a figure probably bwcr after 
borewells were finally commissioned These low yields reflect the siting of wells for 
15 Water quality problems in the black soils have different causes. In black soils developed over limcstoncs 
and shales, salts present in water are a result of mineralisation and solution of the parent rocks. Reasonable 
sub-surface drainage means that salinity problems in black soils over limestone arc rare. In the black soils 
developed over granites, the source of salts is the plant material from which soils developed, but poor sub- 
surface drainage and limited rainfall for flushing means high salinities and sodicity may be present. The 
blocks with the greatest problems arc Alur, in eastern Kurnool district, and parts of northern Anantapur 
district. (SGWD, 1976: interviews with SGWD staff) 
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special target groups in more marginal lands with poorer aquifer potential. Yet often 
investments of up to 80000 rupees might have to be repaid from income from this area 
(unless costs could be reduced by shortcuts in construction or massive subsidies). 
However, the programmes never stopped - their mandate was to develop wells. In 
Kurnot only 28 % of 'normal' borewells irrigated less than 4 acres in rabi, but 42 % of 
borewells developed under special assistance programmes fell in this range. Overall, 36 
% of tubewells only supported 2-4 acres in the rabi season and overlap with the yield 
range of a dug well. These low yields came to haunt well programmes, especially ones 
promoting `group wells' to serve such small areas. As water levels began to drop the risks 
of loss and bankruptcy occurred (see Chapter 5). 
Summarising technology options across the geology - over the Narji limestone and 
quartzites, prospects for dug well development were good, but tubewells tapping 
additional strata at depth would give even better yields and assist more irrigators. On the 
shales, both dug wells and borewells had limited prospects, although borewells might 
strike water-bearing strata at depth with good exploratory techniques. In granite rocks, 
there was little yield difference between borewells and dug wells. In favourable fissured 
zones, borewells picked up higher yields as they tapped a greater depth but could face a 
collapse problem. Elsewhere there might be advantages to a dug well, with an in-well 
bore, as a farmer had a better reservoir of water to pump. 
Thus for yield, the advantages of borewells was only clear for favourable sites in the 
Cuddapah-Kurnool system, or deep fissure zones in granites and schists without 
collapsing strata. However, funding programmes and politics helped drive actual 
technologies disseminated, and not always evaluation of best options. 
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Drawdown, specific capacity and irrigable area under dug wells 
The models first developed usually took a model farm of 3 acres, which had emerged as 
the minimum holding banks would loan against. In fact, this was probably the minimum 
area against which unsubsidised development would make any profit. In the models, these 
farmers also produced in three cropping seasons throughout the year - even into summer - 
which rarely occurred in practice after the 1980s as water levels fell. The unit costs given 
for wells even in 1988 were only 16000 rupees, or 24000 rupees with a pumpset. Even 
then the repayment norms were 40% of the net income from crops identified as feasible to 
be grown. (ARDC, 1980 (i)and(ii); Kurnool District DRDA records, August 1983). 
The model then estimated what diameter of dug well would provide the Squired 
water, for a given drawdown of water-levels. The norm set up was for operating 4 hours a 
day, with a maximal drawdown of 2-3 metres, with water levels ideally recovering 
overnight. Calculations with the lower yields from wells in hardrock areas indicated that 
pumps of only 2 or 3 hp were necessary for lifts which were then shallower. However, the 
influence of APIL meant that 5hp pumps were most common in energised wells. If 
operated for four hours a day this pump would lift between 250-400m3 of water, about the 
same as a 2-4 metre drop in wells of the 10 metre diameter discussed (such a drop is 
considered maximal in good design practice). Thus the control on the area irrigable was 
the rate of replenishment of the well. 
Thus a criterion very important in Indian well design - specific capacity (or litre per 
minute released per metre drawdown in water level) became embedded in equations of the 
model If the aquifer did not recharge within 24 hours, then the well needed to act as a 
reservoir to provide the volume for pumping within the given drawdown range. In such 
cases, the well diameter was accordingly increased, based on simplified and standardised 
calculation procedures derived from scientific formulae for estimating these dimensions 
(modified Thiem and Sligter's formulae). These were used to estimate well dimensions 
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and recharge time, sufficient to fill the well to support periods of pumping: results from 
use of these equations for dug wells are also shown in Table 4.4a. Clearly many 
crystalline rock formations had a specific capacity whcrc wells did not recharge within 24 
hour to sustain a reasonable period of pumping, and needed large diameters. These 
principles were already known locally, as large diameter wells were a known feature of 
parts of Rayalascema. However, these larger well sizes affcctcd cost estimates for new 
excavation, and could not support intensive production 
Table 4.5 shows my calculations of the typical area under different crops irrigablc with 
a 2-3 metre drawdown of water every day (a four hour pumping period would lift enough 
water to irrigate one third-one half hectarc every day, with blocks of land boing irrigated 
in rotation). 
Typically, wells of the diameter mentioned would support an area of around four 
hectares of 'irrigated dry' crops, if some water was available for irrigation cvcry day. 
However, wells with sites of slower recharge, for example those recharging every five 
days, would only irrigate 0.5-1 hectare. These were hardly an economic proposition, given 
their costs, unless there was extensive subsidy. Such wells were implemented, however. 
Profit margins in production 
Given the scale of loans in well assistance programmes, the economic returns on crops 
produced were obviously of central importance. In Kurnool at this time, rice was found 
on 25% wells, groundnut on 22%, chilies on 11% and onions and vegetables on 14%, 
with some 16% having `other crops' (Seasonal and Crop Report, 1980-1981). This 
greater proportion under groundnuts, chilies and vegetables probably reflected 
availability of interstate road and rail infrastructure, or relative proximity to I lyderabad 
offering reasonable prospects for vegetable production. Rice remained the main wet 
crop, with little expansion into sugarcane at this time. 
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Table 4.5. Areas irrigable from a dug well pumping at 20 litres per second1for four 
hours 
Crop Discharge factor2 
Litres per second per hectare 
Areas irrigable (hectares) 
Recharge within: 
24hrs3 Sdays4 12days5 
'Wet' crops 
sugar cane 5.25 3.8 0.7 0.3 
paddy 7.5 2.6 0.5 0.2 
'Irrigated dry' crops 
wheat 2.91 6.8 1.3 0.5 
cotton 3.35 5.9 1.1 0.4 
maize 2.91 6.8 1.3 0.5 
tobacco 3.4 5.8 1.1 0.4 
chilies 4.37 4.6 0.9 0.3 
jowar 4.37 4.6 0.9 0.3 
onions 3.88 5.1 1.0 0.4 
bananas 4.37 4.6 0.9 0.3 
vegetables 2.33 8.5 1.7 0.7 
fodder 4.2 4.7 0.9 0.3 
(compiled from own calculations) 
1. A5 hp pump operating at 50 per cent efficiency lifting water through a head of 10 metres would 
pump 19 Us: at a head of 8 metres the rate would be 24 Us. In the field, few dugwells had pumps 
actually delivering this amount. 
2. Information for Andhra Pradesh, linking depth of irrigation water required with the rotation 
interval (see ARDC, unpublished data 1). 
3. The rate of 201/s divided by the discharge factor. 
4. The area irrigable at 24 hour recharge divided by 5. 
5. The area irrigable at 24 hour recharge divided by 12. 
Because of the low yields or low reliability of water supplies available, the emphasis 
under special programmes after the 1980's was on 'irrigated dry' crops, promoting: 
" mulberry for sericulture in areas where infrastructure exists; 
" citrus and mango production in areas with good transport infrastructure; 
" more systematic production of fodder to support livestock and dairying; 
" vegetables to improve nutrition; 
9 fuel and timber crops, especially in more remote areas. 
Table 4.6 shows envisaged returns for these crops for this period. Clearly, the returns for 
certain irrigated crops were high, but these depended on fairly high input expenditure. 
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Thus, at their most favourable, the net returns on groundnut could be 3,900 rupees16 pCt 
acre, but only 500 rupees per acre if thcrc was low use of inputs. Returns on grape, citrus 
and mulberry were very high, but only feasible with high levels of inputs, reliable water 
and a good extension service for cultivation advice. These crops also had long gestation 
periods. The banks made special loans available for citrus and grapc development to 
allow for this longer period to full production. Ilowcvcr, by the carly 1980s few small 
farmers were involved in this production. 
Table 4.6 Returns ner acre of crops envisaged under minor Irrination (1982 costs) 
Crop Gross Returns 
Product Fodder Total Cultivation Costs 
Net Returns 
(Rs) 
Existing irrigated 
production 
Groundnut 800 200 1000 Soo 540 
Sorghum 240 200 440 200 240 
Millet 240 60 300 150 150 
Ragi 240 200 640 400 240 
Improved irrigated 
production 
Groundnut 
Sorghum 4800 300 5100 1200 3000 
(hybrid) 3000 500 3500 1000 2500 
Ragi 
Vegetables 1800 300 2100 600 1500 
Fodder - 4500 4500 1500 3000 
Grapes 5000 - 5000 1000 4000 
Citrus 36000 - 36000 16000 20000 
Mulberry 15000 - 15000 5000 10000 
10000 - 10000 2000 8000 
Source: Kurnool Distract, UKUA office, 1983 
4.4.2 The estimation of groundwater yield and well development options 
Estimation of groundwater rcchargc and safc yicld for dcvclopmcnt was undertaken 
primarily to estimate the development potential of a block, its state of dcvclopmcnt, and 
161n 1983 £1=15 rupccs 
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thus potential new numbers of wells. ARDC set up the first highly empirical guidelines 
for assessing potential groundwater. '7 The model in use at the time of this study was 
initiated by a Groundwater Overexploitation Committee, also set up by ARDC, in 
1977. The model began with compiling evidence of sources of recharge. In 1982 
another committee was constituted with members drawn from the Central Groundwater 
Board, SGWD and other scientists to create the methodology known as the 
Groundwater Estimation Committee Method 1984 (GEC Method, see NABARD, 
1986). However, this methodology did not get used in Andhra Pradesh until 1993 (and 
in fact did not make major changes from the original approach). The 1977 method 
involved mapping of changes in water level before, during and after the kharif 
monsoon period, at key observation wells. By interpolating flownets (from 
groundwater level contours), zones could be mapped of specific ranges of change in 
water level. By relating this with the specific yield (storativity) of the aquifer, seasonal 
fluctuations could be converted to volumes of water. Increased exploratory drilling did 
come to improve these estimates. The GEC method used a recharge criteria based on 
10% of the average monsoon rainfall - 70% of this was regarded as usable annual 
recharge. Thus drought and abnormal rainfall hardly figured. In addition, recharge from 
post monsoon rainfall (P) was estimated by an empirical formula, and other general 
formulae were in use to estimate recharge from canal seepage (C) and irrigation (I). 
Draft or actual use was estimated from either: 
- generalised consumption requirements for irrigated crops and population estimates; 
- numbers of wells, for which standard unit consumption norms were in place derived 
from pump discharges and estimated hours of operation given below. 
17 Guidelines for scrutiny of groundwater utilisation schemes projected under the normal lending 
programmes of the land development banks. Circulated with letter 10-571 Agri-Credit Board, 29.6.1972. 
See Ministry of Agriculture, 1979, Government of India: Credit for minor irrigation: A compendium of 
circulars (1979). 
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Working norms in use in 1980's 
Annual draft Ha. m 
Kharif(monsoon) Post kharif (monsoon) Unit draft Net 
draft 
Hard rocks: 
Dug well 0.15 0.35 0.5 0.35 
Dugwell with 0.4 0.84 1.2 0.84 
Pumpset 
Working norms later applied in APSGWB from 1993 (*relcvant to this study) 
Mhot well 0.35* 
Dugwell with pumpset 0.65* 
Borewell 1.30* 
Shallow tubewell 2.05 
Tubewell 4.1 
Deep tubewell 5.25 
The figure of 1.2 ha. m is equivalent to using a Shp pump for four hours daily (the 
standard model) for 180 days. 
Groundwater-based irrigation was allowed to use up to 85% of net utilisable 
recharge, with the balance allowed for domestic use. Initially, growth rates in borewell 
numbers were extrapolated at 1% a year. ARDC knew the approach was a simple one 
see footnote 19), and looked for some rapid development of science by others - instead 
their norms became embedded. 
Other criticisms of the time included that observation wells were sparse, and taken 
to represent wide areas. They were also often sited in towns: thus they also often did 
not reflect the real changes of water levels in agricultural areas where groundwater was 
being developed. Criticism also came on the infrequent measurements of water levels, 
at this time only once a year before the monsoon. However, the real concern was 
whether the increasing number of wells and borewells being drilled were actually 
recorded, and whether the estimated draft was correct or not. Where electricity and 
water was available, the use of 1.2 ha. m of water per year seemed a likely if not 
conservative level of use, but it remained a figure applied to borewells until 1993. After 
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1993 the working norm for draft under a dug well was actually decreased. By 1983 
then, some cognitive problems were already clear. While the methods for groundwater 
estimation could count numbers of wells and types of wells, local agencies did not 
include detailed information on pumping regimes, nor on real groundwater conditions 
as they changed between seasons. 
4.5 WHAT HAPPENED UNDER BOREWELL PROGRAMMES 
As this discussion has highlighted, yields alone did not determine the development of well 
technology: finance was also critical, with cost advantages to farmers who could put 
pressure on authorities for a borewell. Borewells became a recognised element of funding 
in the DPAP, drought relief and special programmes for scheduled castes and tribes. 
Against a unit cost of 80,000 Rs, group borewells attracted a 50 per cent subsidy under the 
DPAP, with the remainder contributed by APSIDC (refinanced through NABARD), to be 
repaid as a water cess. As difficulties were faced in executing dug wells, especially with 
the unwilling involvement of banks, so the attractiveness of borewell programmes 
increased. During 1980-1983 a very high proportion of APSIDC work was with special 
programmes, while the backlog of applications for tubewells under normal schemes grew 
because of lack of staff (Interviews with Executive Engineer Kurnool district, July and 
August, 1983). They made no real recognition of the risks of groundwater drought either 
from low rainfall affecting recharge, or any detailed local studies of water table decline 
across the years or between years. 
164 SCIENCE. TEGINOLOGYANDAGENCYINTlWDDYELOPMFMOFDROUGIRPRONWAR AS 
4.5.1 Problems in borewell development 
As already noted, borewell development by agencies was still in its early stages in 
Kurnool at the time of this study. APSIDC was under great pressure to expand its 
schemes, and in 1983 was permitted to subcontract work out to private contractors. In 
Kurnool district, the targets set in Autumn 1983 were 25 borcwells a month - 10 drilled by 
APSIDC rigs and 15 by contractors. While initially three contractors were hired, this was 
reduced to only one, selected after tender by APSIDC, to ensure 'continuous work' for the 
contractor. These contractors had a three-year agreement with APSIDC. 
Contractors were actually paid a lower rate per metre (220 Rs) than that allowed for the 
State rigs (285 Rs), on the basis that contractors carried no establishment charges. 
Contractors also had a freer choice of rig and spares, and newer equipment, than those in 
use by APSIDC. One private contractor in Kurnool (interviewed in the field in September 
1983) reckoned that private rigs could drill up to five times as many bores as State rigs in 
a given period because of higher efficiencies. APSIDC provided costs for diesel for 
drilling and the casing for a standard depth of 6 metres, and paid a transport rate between 
drilling sites. Another contractor interviewed in the same period reckoned that he broke 
even on 15-20 bores a month, and that in every 100000 rupees worth of work (about 10 
bores) he made around 25000 rupees of profit. A contractor was permitted to take on 
additional private work in an area if he had met the APSIDC target and APSIDC had no 
additional work in the area. While the potential profits for some contractors appeared 
considerable, many established contracting firms disliked working for the Government 
because of their slow payment. One contractor quoted money still pending for work 
undertaken 3 years ago. 
APSIDC had an assistant present with the drill rig. Information and samples were 
recorded every 2 metres depth from where water was hit, with the drilling discharge 
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measured by a Vnotch weir. However, this still left quite a few problems in drilling 
management. One contractor interviewed had no previous drilling experience, he was a 
relative of the Hyderabad company who had won the contract, and until two months 
previously had been running a hotel. He did, however, have a drill operator who did have 
7 years experience in Hyderabad and Anantapur. Of the 7 wells this contractor had drilled 
so far, 2 had collapsed because the 6 metre casing did not extend deep enough to screen 
off weathered material. He admitted that he might not drill to the anticipated 50 metres if 
there was `adequate water', though drilling to a shallow depth would reduce discharge. 
There were also problems in the way the discharge of the well was measured. Drilling 
discharge is not an adequate representation of potential discharge for regular pumping. 
This is one reason why group borewells frequently came to irrigate an area smaller than 
envisaged (the other reason was faulty pump installation). 
Despite demand on APSIDC, its development work was slowed by several 
problems. The first was inadequacy of electricity supply: then typically schemes waited 
two years to be energised. Often programme demands required APSIDC to ground their 
schemes in areas without electricity - and then develop them in clusters in order to get 
the State Electricity Board (SEB) to extend lines to them. (Interviews with APSIDC 
Executive Engineer Kurnool district, July-August, 1983). The SEB would fund lines if 
costs worked out at less than 90 rupees per hp of the pump but otherwise APSIDC had 
to subsidise the work. In sites where a cluster of borewells was developed, a local 
supervisor was available, but elsewhere a maintenance supervisor was scheduled to visit 
every 15-30 days. 
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Some of the greatest maintenance and breakdown problems stemmed from fluctuations in 
voltage in electricity. The total pump life was envisaged as around 9 years, with 2-3 years 
maintenance free (without voltage fluctuations). However, such fluctuations could ruin a 
pump within six months, with a 3-4000 rupee replacement cost. Damaged pumps were 
sometimes replaced with a pump of lower capacity. (Interviews with local APSIDC 
assistant engineers and operators, September-November, 1983). At one borewell site 
visited in Anantapur (1983), a supervisor claimed that over 10 per cent of pumps installed 
in the last 3 months had been lost because of voltage fluctuations. There were also 
problems of failed wells as well as low yields. Table 4.7 shows the pattern of borewell 
development under the different programmes, with borewell numbers, spread 
differentially across the taluks with better groundwater resources. However, it also shows 
a 28% failure overall: 17% in the `normal programme' but 34% of borewells drilled under 
special assistance programmes. 
4.5.2 Who got the borewells 
Table 4.8 shows the number of beneficiaries and average area per APSIDC borewell in 
Kurnool district: this gives some indication of the types of beneficiary in the command 
area of the tubewell, as well as the number amongst whom management of water had to 
be organised. 
If the average plot size under by the borewell was more than 2 hectares, then larger 
farmers were certainly present, possibly indicating infringement of land ceiling legislation 
(the limit on land holdings under tubewell irrigation was between 7 and 10 hectares 
depending on crops grown. 
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Table 4.8. " Average size of holding and number of beneficiaries per group 
borewell, Kurnool district (Figures show the number of wells) 
Average per beneficiary 
(hectares) 
Number of beneficiaries 
12 3-10 11.20 Over 20 
dial assistance schemes 
0- 1 
1.1-2 3 35 61 
2.1-5 6 27 1 
5.1-10 1 2 3 
10.1-25 
Normal Schemes 
0-1 3 8 52 
1.1-2 1 15 21 
2.1-5 2 
5.1-10 I 2 
10.1-25 1 
Over 25 
(source: AFS1)C: records, Kurnool district, provided July-September 1983) 
Amongst special assistance schemes it secmcd there were borcwclls serving a range 
of farmer classes, raising concern over the effect of the presence of one larger farmer 
amongst several smaller ones in terms of control. While 3-10 beneficiaries was the typical 
range of members per borewcll, some special assistance borcwclls had only two 
beneficiaries. Conversely, however, there were borcwells with very high numbers of 
potential beneficiaries within the potential ayacut area. I could only spcculaic in 1983 
whether such high collective numbers on small areas really existed beyond paper 
registration 
The possibility that some schemes developed under the 'normal' programme were 
not reported (possibly due to infringing land ceiling legislation) was indicated by the 
low borewell numbers reported in the Agricultural Census. For the 1982/83 Census, 
only 7 tubewells were reported in Kurnool district, all in Nandyal block, but at least 16 
wells had been commissioned by APSIDC by that date, apart from private 
IS There arc possible errors here, as often records showed only hypothetical areas irrigable from the 
drilling discharge of non-cncrgiscd wells, and the number of beneficiaries in the vicinity. When a cluster 
of wells was developed, it was not clear if a beneficiary had land under more than one well. 
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developments. Thus even as early as 1983, there was real uncertainty about the real 
state of borewell development. 
4.6 WHAT HAPPENED TO DUG WELLS: OVER EXPANSION AND UNDER- 
REPORTING 
Dug wells continued to be promoted well into the 1990s, even though they became 
vulnerable to drying up as borewell numbers expanded (see next chapter). Within 
Rayalaseema three types of schemes emerged to assist dug well development: 
i) general bank loans to assist individual fanners without subsidies; 
ii) individual wells assisted partly by bank loans and partly by a subsidy under IRDP; 
iii) community irrigation (CI) wells. These had a chequered history in Rayalaseema: by 
1982, they were only being actively developed in Kurnool district. These were funded by 
DPAP, drought relief and SCSTC funds. 
Dug wells were uncertain in their development costs, depending on excavation and 
blasting needs. The main IRDP assistance to individual farmers was on tin basis of unit 
cost of 10,000 rupees for a dug well and 5,000 rupees for a pump. However, at 1983/84 
prices, 10,000 rupees barely covered the cost of excavating a well not requiring blasting19, 
and certainly did not cover the cost of lining. On the more marginal lands, more likely to 
be occupied by weaker sections, the problems of costs and low yields led to the idea of 
community wells, which might have to irrigate land of really very low quality. In this 
context, a programme emerged for 'social forestry' community wells, specifically 
designed to produce tree crops like subabul and eucalyptus. Community wells were given 
It was only half the cost of excavation alone for a well requiring blasting. It would just cover the cost of 
excavating 4 metres and inserting an in-well bore, (but in practice separate loan arrangements would 
have to be made for the two components! ). The figure of 15,000 rupees for a community well would 
cover excavation costs of a deep hardrock well at 1980 prices, but was already inadequate for this by 
1983/84. 
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a unit cost of 15,000 rupees, a higher cost that was a way to increase the actual subsidy to 
assist weaker sections. (Kurnool District, DRDA Office Records, August 1983). 
Appendix 5 gives details of three 'community wells' , where lining, depth and baling20 
charges are all adjusted to keep to exactly this subsidy of 15000 rupees. Well lining 
was the main component dropped to reduce costs, although in theory banks would not 
release funds for a pump unless lining was completed. liowcwr, the biggest 
administrative headache was ensuring that claims matched the work done, both for 
material excavated and the rates of pay to labourers: this spawned the corruption 
documented later in this section. 
4.6.1 Individual well development under normal loans and special schemes 
A study of the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Central Agricultural Development Bank 
(APCCADB) showed that between 1976-1982, (once the special assistance 
programmes were launched) most well developments were funded through special 
programmes targeted not just at small farmers but also excluded groups. In Kurnool 
district, the APCCADB recorded only 168 dug wells financed under normal loans, 
compared to 2754 wells under `special programmes' (in Anantapur the ratio was 
5: 6601 showing even greater emphasis on small farmers). Larger farmers may have 
been already opting for borewells, or going to other funding sources. however, 
assistance to larger farmers was also hidden by the criteria used by the bank to classify 
a small farmer 21. Thanks to this criterion, APCCADB did achieve its target at first to 
give more than 50% of well-related loans to small farmers in most blocks of Kurnool, 
20 Banks would not disburse funds for pumps before wells were completed, so pumps for baling were 
hired! 
21 APCCADB used the criteria of a holding of ten acres as a definition for a small farmer, compared with 
four acres in use by the IRDP. 
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district except in Pattikonda, Koilkuntla and Allagadda where loans became restricted 
by bank overdues. Table 4.9 shows the relatively low numbers of wells funded under 
IRDP by 1983, most occurring in areas with a tradition of dug well use. 
Table 49 Cases of assistance under IRDP un to December 1983. Kurnool district. 
Taluk Wells Deepening of wells Pumpsets 
Kumool 13 62 33 
Dhone 4 1 1 
Nandikothur 111 25 25 
Atmakur 79 7 7 
Nandyal no data no data nd 
Banaganapalli 6 - - 
Koilkuntla - 1 1 
Alur 13 - - 
Pattikonda 6 - - 
Adoni 49 - - 
Allagadda 26 - - 
Source: Kumool District DRDA records, 1983. 
Given these problems, to extend its minor irrigation programme in Kurnool district, the 
DRDA had to turn to other irrigation developments - community irrigation wells. 
4.6.2 Community irrigation wells in Kurnool district 
Community irrigation (CI) wells have represented one of the more problematic 
components in minor irrigation developments under groundwater, in their implementation, 
management and maintenance. They persisted in Kurnool partly because the slow 
progress of well development left them an ongoing part of the development programme. 
They also persisted because they remained the only developments possible ßr subsidies 
allocated for communal programmes, given the combination of high costs and unwilling 
bank participation CI well development could utilise several sets of funds: 
- special assistance funds for scheduled castes and tribes, often spent in conjunction 
with DRDA funds because of limited manpower in the administration of these groups; 
- drought relief 
funds; 
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- funds from the DPAP; 
- funds from IRDP. 
Another reason why Cl wells were such a strong component of the minor irrigation 
programme in Kurnool was the difficulties the DRDA office had in allocating funds for 
minor irrigation. Drought relief funds had to be spent in the drought. stricken block, and 
DPAP funds did need to be spent across the region they arc allocated for. Unlike 
Anantapur, Kurnool did not have extensive terrain suited to tanks, nor a large number of 
abandoned tanks for conversion to percolation tanks, on which money could otherwise be 
spent. Also, the recent arrival of APSIDC activity in Kurnool district meant that funds 
could not yet be massively allocated for tubewcll development. Cl wells proved an 
expensive component of drought relief. However, the combination of above funds meant 
that the full expense of community wells could be met, and that available funds were 
actually utilised. Community irrigation wells were possibly also the only developments 
the Kurnool administration could mobilise immediately to benefit some weaker sections 
during a drought event. 
In 1982, Kurnool had three main programmes of CI wells operating: 
(i) wells commenced under the 'Food for Work Programme' (FFWP) launched in 1979; 
(ii) wells commenced under the 'Scheduled Caste Action Plan and Drought Relief 
launched in assigned and surplus land22 begun in 1982. This programme included the 
'Social Forestry wells' operating in land of marginal quality; 
(iii) a new plan for CI wells was being organised to utilise a special 3.5 lakh Central 
Assistance Fund awarded in 1983. 
(sources: Kurnool Office DRDA records: interview with District Officer for Kurnool 
District, November, 1983) 
22 assigned land is land not registered as private holdings and is typically marginal hill land or tank bcd land. 
Surplus lands are those reallocated after land ceiling enforcement. 
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The combination of subsidy and loans for (ii) and (iii) developed out of some difficult 
experiences under the earlier 'Food For Work' Programme (FFWP) from 1977, which 
aimed to utilise available food grains for generating employment and creating durable 
community assets to strengthen rural infrastructure. Problems included the actual 
availability of foodgrains (acquisition and delivery), poor control over development 
costs of wells within the programme, malpractice between contractors and local 
representatives, and that wells benefited only 1-2 farmers23 and thus were not true 
community assets. Later programmes reduced the food supply element in favour of 
grant or subsidy. My 1983 study traced some of these problems, to try and disentangle 
the problems of good technical assessment from the pressures of financial disbursement 
and corrupt practice. 
CI wells were supposed to serve at least three acres and be communal assets: they 
were also supposed to be launched in `assigned' or `surplus land' - land not registered 
as private land (e. & land assigned for scheduled castes and tribes, or surplus land taken 
up from land ceiling legislation). The former was often marginal quality land - often in 
hilly areas - with poor water potential, where water was unlikely to remain sufficient to 
irrigated 3 acres across a year. Table 4.10 shows the numbers of beneficiaries per 
FFWP Cl well. Over two-thirds of the wells developed for Scheduled Castes had only 2 
users. 
While special programmes could subsidise virtually all components of well 
development, often loans were still needed to acquire a pump. Yet most banks would 
only consider loans to individuals or groups holding land in their own name - which 
also pushed the programme towards groups on `private' land. Looking at the FFWP, 
23 Only small and marginal farmers, or farmers below the poverty line were supposed to benefit from Cl 
wells. The programme allowed for 'local technical institutions' to assist in planning projects, but was 
specific that contractors should not be used in work or food distribution. The food component was 
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Table 4.11 shows that most development was on private holdings - and also that the 
numbers of CI wells developed was substantial. The assistance for the FFWP wells was 
based on a unit cost of only 16,000 rupees; 10,000 rupccs for cxcavation and 6,000 rupees 
Table 4.10. Beneficiaries per CI well under the FFWP sanctioned for Scheduled Castes 
Block Number of wclls with Number of beneficiaries 
12 3-6 7 or mors 
Kurnool 2 25 
Kodumur 24 
Dhone 16 25 13 7 
Nandikothur 39 8 2 
Atrnakur 33 19 
Nandyal 18 23 
Allagadda 23 13 
Koilkuntla 1 I 
Banaganapalli 6 2 
Adoni 2 16 6 
Alur 5 4 1 
Pattikonda 26 7 1 
Yemmiganur 22 15 
Total 25 262 109 10 
Source: Kurnool Utlice, DRDA records. 1983). 
for lining and pumpsets. This was quitc adcquatc in the carly statics of the projcct, when 
the excavation cost was to be covered through food grain allocation, and the lining costs 
through DPAP funds (at this time IRDP was not in existence). With the subscqucnt lack 
of foodgrains, 'margin money' of 2,000 R was brought in from SCSTC assistance against 
part of the excavation cost, leaving an oil engine costcd for a loan of 4,000 It to be sought 
after the well was completed. 
allocated through Panchayat organisations, the wells developed were to be maintained by the Panchayat 
and water rates to be paid by beneficiaries were fixed by the Revenue authorities. 
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Table 4.11. % wells taken un in various tunes of landholding under the FFWP 
Block Total number of 
Wells scheduled 
% developed in 
assigned surplus 
land 
patta 
Atmakur 228 3.1 1.7 95.2 
Dhone 158 19.0 - 81.0 
Kodumur 91 - 3.2 96.7 
Kurnool 91 12.0 3.2 84.6 
Nandikothur 146 30.1 1.4 68.5 
Allagadda 242 9.9 - 94.2 
Banaganapalli 18 - - 100.0 
Koilkuntla 3 - - 100.0 
Dyal 134 12.7 13.4 73.9 
Adoni 42 16.6 14.2 69.0 
Alur 33 6.0 9.0 84.8 
Pattikonda 104 13.5 - 86.5 
Yemmiganur 148 10.1 4.0 85.8 
Total 1438 11.2 3.1 85.7 
Source: Kurnool District DRDA records, 1983. 
4.63 Technical clearance, disbursement pressure and scope for corruption 
In late 1978/early 1979 the Collector instructed Block Development Officers (BDO's) to 
investigate trial pits for possible CI wells to be executed under FFWP. In fact there was no 
systematic groundwater survey by any qualified agencies for these programmes, but 
BDO's were supposed to ensure the presence of water before well excavation commenced. 
Disbursement records were kept at village level, but without detailed map references. I 
had insufficient time to really map any of these wells before the corruption started to 
become clear from the files and preliminary field visits. 
The first round of requests from BDO's for wells under FFWP in 1979 is indicated in 
Table 4.12, which shows the scale of worked first claimed against work actually 
confirmed on the ground in 1983. Most BDO's claimed that work had commenced 
immediately, and by March 1979 had sent in claims for subsidies for ongoing wells, 
especially for those nearing completion. In March subsidies of around 3,000 rupees per 
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well were released as a first instalment for all wells listed as 'near completion'. Concern at 
the advance demand of funds led to a subsequent survey of the actual number of wells 
grounded in August 1979, shown in Table 4.13. Discrepancies between initial well 
numbers claimed and those confirmed in the survey were very serious in Dhonc, Alur, 
Nandikothur and Pattikonda. However, since subsidies had been released only in relation 
to wells claimed as nearing completion, the blocks with remaining substantial 
discrepancies were Dhone, Alur and Nandyal. This confirmed list was the basis of a 
revised programme of 1,200 community wells in 1981. 
Given the time needed to develop a dug well, it was not surprising that only a 
proportion of the agreed wells were completed by the cessation of the FFWP programme 
in 1980. The progress of the wells was worsened by the slow and intermittent flow of 
foodgrains. But this was not the real problem. It was hard not to sec advances still 
outstanding by 1982 as an indicator of financial mismanagement by BDO's. 
I took up study of these events in Dhone block, as a block with a large number of 
wells registered that could be studied, that was also easier to visit than the other more 
distant blocks. I used DRDA and Panchayat Samiti files (and lists of beneficiaries 
given for 1978/79) to see what programmes had assisted which well dc' clopment 
component, then tried to visit these wells in the field to learn more about of their 
development and performance. In fact the extent of malpractice present made this 
work almost impossible. I was able to visit some wells: however, in some villages 
where headmen had been coordinators of work, I was not even sure I was taken to the 
correct well. In another incident, my camera was stolen and the office officials 
`casually' started naming the son of my key informant as the possible thief. Quite 
quickly, my work, and the support of those trying to help me, became untenable. I soon 
ceased further study on these wells (November, 1983). 
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Nevertheless, correspondence in the files enabled the following picture to be built 
up. The following paragraphs draw on correspondence 1979-83 bctwccn; 
- the State Government, Panchayat Raj department on what could on CI programmes 
and what could constitute a Cl well and issues of food for work (letters 
29843/DPAPI1/17; 497/FFWPIIl79.1; 4/FFWP/78-34; 
- between the DRDA Kurnool of icc and IIDOs in 1982 and 1983; 
- Office notes on problems and cost estimates (619/79); 
- Kurnool District DPAP Master Plan, 1978-83; 
- Kurnool Project Reports 1980-1985 for the DPAP; 
- tabulated records on conditions of individual 'bcncficiar)i wells at the Panchayat 
level within Dhone block. 
In Dhone block, an application for 250 Cl wclls was submittcd in April 1979, of 
which 208 were claimed to be at the lining stage. Subsidies of about 3,000 rupees for 
each of the 208 wells were released in the same month (a total of 6.25 lakh rupees). 
After a survey confirming only 158 wells in Dhonc block, the DRDA notified an 
adjustment of accounts. For 158 wells, the total remaining subsidy would be 9.48 
lakhs. Given the existing allocation of 6.25 lakhs, a balance of 3.23 lakhs was paid. 
Between September-December 1979, the DDO requested 20624 oil engines, for 105 
completed wells and 101 nearing completion. Release of 5.16 lakhs for the 50 per cent 
subsidy on these pumps was made in March 1980. In 1980, the UDO submitted that 
107 wells were completed. By 1982 there was both a revised programme for FFW and a 
new BDO in Dhone block: the previous BDO had been transferred as a result of questions 
over financial management. At this stage only 57 wells were registered as completed. 
24 In August 1979 a review of wells eligible for new IRDP assistance meant the target for Dhonc was 
increased to 201. After the introduction of IRDP, some community wells were transferred to the IRDP 
programme, although in theory the subsidy on lining was already paid. IRDP helped to bring in funds 
where it was proving impossible to get the original 1: 1 ratio of funds: foodgrains 
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The new BDO requested a further release of 3.5 lakhs, but only 0.5 were released, because 
of extent of advances against work was still pending - in January 1982, this was 235508 
rupees (almost 17000 pounds in 1982). 
In November 1983, only 60 wells were recorded as completed. Table 4.13 shows 
the depths of excavation recorded in November 1983 of these wells. First it is 
important to note the number of wells for which no information exists. Then, nest of 
the wells were not excavated to the expected depth25, and so should not have cost the 
anticipated 10,000 rupees. There were also a number of well sites with no water level 
recorded, presumed dry. Among these dry wells and wells with no data, there were 38 
sites where advances for lining of over 1,000 R were recorded, some with advances of 
the full 6,000 rupees. 
Table 4.13. Range of excavation depths on FFW Community Wells, Dhone block, 
1983 (Source: BDO records) 
Depth excavated in wells where 
water has been located (m) 
IRDP assisted 
% 
DPAP assisted 
% 
0-2 - 5.9 2.1-4 20 15.4 
4.1-6 30.8 14.7 
6.1-8 29.2 16.9 
8.1 - 10 7.6 5.9 
> 10 6.1 2.2 
No water level recorded 
Excavated depth (m) 
5 or less 6.7 24.2 
over 5 19.9 
no data 7.3 
Actual well numbers 65 136 
Panchayat sanuti and 13DO records on CI wells: Dhone block, 1983. 
23 Many had apparently struck water within this allowed depth. It may well be that farmers would not 
e)ravate further unless water levels fell seriously: however, interruptions in the supply of foodgrains 
could have been a further disincentive to excavation. 
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On trying to analyse the accounts, the 6.49 lakhs the DDO hypothetically utilised 
tallied almost exactly with the subsidy for the 107 wells initially listed as completed. 
However, around 1.7 lakhs (11400 pounds in 1983) were missing even if all awards for 
lining were made, and there was still a difference between advances made to farmers 
and work executed of an additional 0.9 lakhs. It was impossible to follow the actual 
funding of oil engines, but the files on them still recorded 0.42 lakh Rupees was 
recorded as 'not returned by the BDO'. Awareness of opportunities for fraud had 
replaced any cognition on groundwater development. Indeed, the individual got away 
with it not just because of disbursement pressure, but because of lack of real interest 
and understanding about the processes and possibilities for well development. Missing 
funds were not the only problem. In general the release of foodgrains also was in 
excess of work done, although there were also sites in deficit, and sites where the value 
of allocation seems small for the work done. In total the work done was valued at 6.21 
lakhs, against 7.42 lakhs of foodgrain disbursed. 
Under FFWP and NREP work was to be executed by the `beneficiary': contractors 
were forbidden to be involved in work or shifting grains. In some blocks, some 
cooperative organisations had executed works However, there was circumstantial 
evidence of village headmen organising 'cooperative work' with a group of local 
labourers, with possibly less than the correct wage or food quota being paid. Field visits 
showed one site where villagers said wells had been developed by contractors under the 
coordination of the village headman, and that the contractor had paid for the work in grain, 
though these wells were not under FFWP. In one site, farmers said development of their 
wells took place under FFWP, when records said otherwise. Offen farmers cited different 
parts of their wells as developed under different programmes of DPAP, FFWP, or IRDP, 
and it was virtually impossible to check developments retrospectively in the field. 
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Where did this leave the community wells? The more recent CI well programmes still 
under DRDA and SCSTC learnt lessons from FFWP. With the exception of 'social 
forestry' 26 wells, all work was later done with either cash subsidy or loans 27. Amazingly, 
rather than stopping the programme, by 1983 there was a policy that a CI well could be 
developed for only two people, and indeed only one if this person owned more than two 
acres of land! This allowed wells also to go to scheduled caste families owning this level 
of land in an assigned area - see next chapter - and their land ownership gave the basis for 
a bank loan. The unit cost to excavate a well remained 15000 rupees until 1988, 
subsidised almost entirely by DRDA, SCSTC and drought relief funds. On paper the bank 
gave credit for part of a land development package, in fact this loan worked out as 
equivalent to cover the pumpset only. 
Requirements and practices to obtain groundwater clearance did tighten after 
recognition of the high number of recorded well failures28. Both the banks and the DRDA 
started to ask 1r a groundwater clearance note in advance, although it was still up to the 
BDO to enforce this. However, the DRDA was forced to use universities and contractors 
besides the SGWD because of shortage of personnel (interviews with SGWD Branch 
Officer for Kurnool, 1983). 
26 Social forestry' wells included a food for work component, and some wells from both the old FFWP 
and the Scheduled Castes Action Plan were transferred to this programme. Excavation and lining costs 
were covered to one-third of the cost by foodgrains, with remaining work and provision of saplings 
provided from DPAP funds. For the pumpset, 33% was provided by a loan, the rest through DPAP funds 
and margin money. 
21 In late 1979, BDO's were asked to revise down their requests for lining to 3,750 R (possibly to help 
finance the cost of oil engines in combination with the margin money from SCBC assistance). Thus, 
amongst the wells with completed lining, a cost of 6,000 R is only rarely recorded. 28 The DRDA office had operated a 'failed well, allowance of 1000 rupees towards the cost of a failed 
well, which was to compensate for the cost of excavating a trial pit 5 metres in diameter and 2 metres 
deep. 
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Actual well development 
The previous subsections all suggest unreliability of data on well development. To 
demonstrate this, Table 5.14 compiles together information from finance agencies and 
the Agricultural Census, 1975-1983. There is very little comparison between data. 
Numbers of well sanctioned are greater than the Census records in all blocks except 
Kurnool and Pattikonda. One could conclude in 1983 that administrators simply did 
not know the real state of groundwater development in Kurnool district - and knew 
least about actual developments in the blocks traditionally held to have some of the 
lowest well developments, and the poorest people, and where the efforts of planned 
interventions were ideally supposed to be concentrated. 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has shown how the expansion of groundwater in the droughtpronc area of 
Andhra Pradesh was driven by techno-cconomic networks shaped by credit and subsidy 
biases, rather than real scientific design. The programmes developed for the assessment 
of groundwater and development of borewclls also used empiricist formulae and 
reductionist models in groundwater planning and development, that gave little 
recognition of any drought dimension. This happened precisely because of a lack of 
tradition or funding for observation in new agencies, and a `teleological' approach to 
water resources analysis (where it is studied in relation to its use by the well technology 
being promoted). These agencies could not at first develop a reliable network of 
monitoring sites under their own controls, as IMD and ICAR did. 
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What was present was really `non-scientific' cognitive activity, developed to suit the 
ideological frames present for groundwater development and the agencies to promote 
it. The techniques of groundwater estimation put together had neither any historically 
developed methodological legitimacy, nor were they that accepted by other scientists. 
Although focused in a DPA, estimation procedures as used barely acknowledged the 
drought dimension - its only influence was in using the criteria of 10% of average 
monsoon rainfall (of which 70% was considered utilizable recharge). Technical norms 
kept a focus on finding (and permitting) new water for wells to development, rather 
than acquiring knowledge for sustainable development of aquifers and control of well 
development in a DPA. 
Interventions around groundwater were for better livelihood security, rather than to 
ensure good water management: but the science of both became overwhelmed by the 
administrative need to disburse funds. The programmes launched to develop wells 
increasingly involved subsidies as a way to bring remaining costs to a level where a 
bank would consider a loan. Clear warning signs - in the gap between the costs of well 
development and bw profitability under low yields - were never really addressed. If 
either well yields or profitability proved less than expected, farmers faced problems 
with loan repayments - and this was a risk even before large-scale development drove a 
decline in water levels that left many open wells dry. 
Dug wells and borewells were initially of similar utility as both tapped similar water 
yields - but choices developed, not just around costs and water yields, but also around case 
of finance for both implementers and farmers. Yield advantages from borcwclls only 
really occurred in the limestones and quartzites of the Cuddapah-Kurnool formations. 
Loans for dug wells remained under a more disadvantagous finance regime than 
borewells: indeed under special agency programmes the banks were not required to hnd at 
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all for borewells. Borewells came to dominate, despite the problems electricity shortages: 
rather the popularity of borewells pushed up theft of electricity and created pressure to 
keep electricity tariffs low. 
The two technologies were developed by different networks of organisations, and 
only one - borewells -had a specific form of corporation to develop it. There was a 
lack of coherent development of integrated authorities to ensure more sustainable water 
development. Divisions of responsibility between, and inadequacies of activity by, the 
Groundwater Department, APSIDC, APSCRIC and the SEB, all caused delays in 
development. Their weaknesses - together with wider funding Imitations - devolved 
much of what could have been publicly managed development to private contractors. 
The Central GWB continued to push forward its models for groundwater estimation 
and its own exploratory programmes. This minimised any special investigations by 
local groundwater staff unless funded by bilaterals or multilateral donors assisting 
special programmes. Public funding for data collection paid for salaries rather than 
special investigations. Groundwater information came through operational techniques 
like geophysical logging and drilling, rather than scientific pimping tests. Rather 
agencies like ARDC, NABARD and APSIDC themselves looked to see how this data 
could be combined pragmatically into equations and norms: these simply soon became 
`given'. Resources for data collection and analysis came only from the DPAP. The new 
IRDP programme made no additional allocation for data collection, and saw 75 per 
cent of site selection of new wells being done by professional geologists and 
organisations outside the Groundwater Department. 
There was thus no agency even to integrate data collection on groundwater 
availability and/or works executed. The agencies with the greatest impact on 
groundwater development viere the DRDA office and the Collector, and it was their 
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strength in informal integration of different agencies that determined how 
developments took place. They managed the meetings to discuss water conditions 
across the year, and to them fell the appreciation of how to mesh available sources of 
finance, and limit corruption. 
It was failure of policy to consider these problems that lay at the heart of the initial 
slow increase of groundwater-based irrigation in Riyalasccma, and the later extent of 
`groundwater drought", rather than environmental difficulties in themselves. Failure to 
think about how groundwater drought could be manifested in a drought area inevitably 
created the groundwater drought that had natural and manmade dimensions. In 
Rayalaseema, the districts with the highest groundwater development success rates - 
Anantapur and Chittoor - were not the districts with the least environmental problems. 
They were the districts where a strong historic emphasis on minor irrigation had 
promoted a more united effort, given lack of options for large-scale irrigation 
development. They were also districts with a generally higher level of infrastructural 
development and political awareness. In Kurnool and Cuddapah, however, there was 
much more limited progress in minor irrigation development, precisely because of the lack 
of a united front among agencies still troubled by limited manpower, by lack of 
infrastructure, and difficulties of organising programmes against entrenched local 
interests. With the strong influence of large irrigation projects in these districts, interest in 
minor irrigation development emerged only as the release of funds pushed agencies into 
creating more local activity. 
In 1983 there were certainly inadequate statistics by which to judge the actual extent 
of groundwater irrigation development in the Rayalasccma region, but the problems 
behind it were visible. Despite all the apparent emphasis on sustainable resource 
development and livelihoods in the FYPs, there was really little historical scientific 
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framework - or ethical framework - for the expansion of groundwater use. No coherent 
and realistic technical or cognitive norms evolved, and the simpler early norms became 
embedded in agencies as these struggled to survive. The following chapter reviews 
how, if at all, this knowledge and action changed with recognition of widespread 
groundwater drought. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FACING DROUGHT AND SCARCITY - AGENCIES AND 
FARMERS IN THE DPA OF INDIA 1992-2002 
Water has become scarce because every cubic yard forced to run into a pipe is a guarantee that 
at the end of the pipe, the demand for water will grow endlessly. Pipes call for more pipes in a 
never ending spiral. This is why water, less limited than ever before, has never been so scarce. 
Roberts, 1993 p. 4 (also cited in Mehta, 1998) 
Public action is not... just a question ofpublic delivery and state initiative. It is also ... a matter 
of participation by the public in the process of social change. Dreze and Sen, 1989, p. 259 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
By the year 2002, there had been 30 years of specific central and state planning 
initiatives in India for droughtprone areas. India not only experienced many more 
meteorological droughts, but the growing dependencies on irrigation from groundwater 
in droughtprone areas brought new recognition of groundwater drought in many areas. 
Farmers had to cope with seasonal variability always present in their groundwater 
supplies, which worsened in years of meteorological drought, but also was becoming 
generally less perennial as groundwater sources became heavily developed. Farmers 
sinking new borewells faced more and more uncertainty in striking economically viable 
groundwater resources. Thus a new debate of water scarcity emerged, now a result of 
overdevelopment of (borewell) technologies rather than a lack of accessible water 
(Ohlsen, 1987). This debate also highlighted whether public action was addressing the 
right processes of change, as agencies still strove to deliver old programmes and 
seemed unable to address the processes of environmental insecurity and social 
exclusion from water emerging in the DPA (Government of India, 1982; Mathur and 
Jayal, 1993). 
To illustrate these debates and struggles, this chapter revisits the two droughtprone 
areas of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, to review their reconfigurations as both 
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development arenas for accessing water, and cognitive spaces on action around 
drought. Section 5.2. summarises how broader debate and activism had changed ideas 
about best programmes for droughtproofing, as a succession of drought events brought 
a reappraisal of intervention frameworks supposed to combat vulnerability to 
agricultural drought. Section 5.3 examines the structural and cognitive changes in 
agencies met in Chapters 3 and 4 compared with ideas encouraged by NGOs and 
international donors. What is best described as 'scientific inertia' appcarcd present, as 
existing norms and routines had been refined, but few real shifts made into wider 
studies of the' drought mechanisms' that act between resources and society. Technology 
dissemination programmes for borewells had largely run their course, and these 
agencies withered away under a range of problems. Section 5.4 focuses on farmers and 
their experiences of drought and scarcity in areas that had become dependent on 
groundwater. It goes behind the rhetoric of 'groundwater drought' and its physical and 
man-made forms, to see which wells and borcwclls stayed working from the 
programmes introduced in Chapter 4. It portrays local irrigation realities in three 
villages in the droughtprone area of Kurnool district, with different geologies. This 
section shows the capacities of ordinary people to act and build their own solutions, 
with their knowledge becoming socialised and embedded more through trial, error and 
observation rather than any scientific education. 
By this time, my own preferences to work with more-farmer focused mience and 
engineering design, and with participatory approaches, were much more dcvclopcd as 
well as tempered by the experience of Yemen. I had moved from an instrumentalist into 
something akin to a 'deliberative practitioner'. My variable experiences in working 
with other scientists and instrumental actors had brought home to me the often political 
and conflictive problems in building collective cognition and joint action - but also the 
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importance of trying for this. The information presented here' is built up from informal 
interviews with policy makers, agency staff, grey material during a series of visits and 
consultancy activities in the period 1990-2002, and a longer stay in Andhra Pradesh 
October-December 2002, during which I undertook some rapid rural appraisals (RRA) 
in villages also under a Dutch-funded groundwater development project (APWELL). 
5.2 CHANGING PUBLIC ACTION ON DROUGHT AND SCARCITY 
5.2.1 Facing droughts: from scientific planning to dependencies on drought relief 
The India-wide drought of 1987 drove the first re-evaluation of academic and planning 
frameworks around vulnerability under drought. Most drought-affected areas survived 
without famine, which brought a first rush of self-congratulation that the policies of the 
1970's had worked. However, further research showed that it was foodgrain reserve 
management and drought relief that had prevented hunger, rather than much of the 
infrastructural work. By the 1990's, there were widespread assertions that adhoc 
programmes of drought relief were becoming prominent as a policy framework on 
drought2, and attempts for systematic plans of droughtproofing were nonexistent. 
Writers lamented that, as activists and politicians got more involved with drought 
issues, the growing political struggle and enmity fractured possibilities to build a united 
front on drought action. This left power with the very bureaucrats that many political 
writers criticised. (Ahluwalia, 1991; Mathur and Jayal, 1993; Torry, 1986). Meanwhile 
farmers and labourers were also participating in direct action agitating themselves for 
I made a series of visits across this decade: two as a consultant on feasibility studies (one on drinking 
water supply in northern Maharashtra, and another with a Groundwater Training project that visited 
several states); and two as an observer/ researcher revisiting areas of Andhra Pradesh and Pune 
in 
Maharashtra. 
2 Also that these relief measures themselves were often inadequate, shaped by political pressures and 
connections than actual needs, and that only a fraction of relief reached target groups. 
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relief and water programmes where possible (Omvcdt and Pantankar, 1991). By 1988 
the slogan `secure water for eight months' was on the lips of many -a demand for 
water that would at least supply a kharif and rabi crop. As section 5.4 shows, borcwcIl 
irrigators in Kurnool felt they 'broke even' on costs if they obtained a kharif and a rabi 
crop. 
These criticisms and actions re-focused interest in the mechanisms that linked 
drought and social impact, rather than just the mapping of drought characteristics. 
Academics and activists revisited the risk frameworks described in section 2.4.2, with 
writers noting that many of the older coping mechanisms of drought had disappeared, 
confirming that drought relief was becoming ever more important. This section now 
reviews the new thinking that developed in some NGO and donor-driven programmes, 
and examines the (limited) responses of scientific and technical agencies to transform 
their cognitive and technical norms as a result. Table 5.1 summarises the prominent 
'framing discourses' in development programmes across the period. 
Table 5.1 Changing frameworks in development practice 1 
" participatory approaches, and where possible 'process projects', that emphasised 
involvement of people in planning of assistance and more open access to information 
(APWELI-, 1997) 
" demonstration as public action to claim perceived rights and right apathy and corruption 
in agencies (Omvedt and Patankar, 1991) 
" more local governance in assistance projects, bringing more non-govcmment and 
informal local organisation into public action (AKRSP, 2002) 
" criticism of 'green revolution' technologies, and highlighting of older and local 
technologies especially watershed management and rainwater harvesting (Pangare and 
Lokur, 1996) 
" livelihood' and 'natural resource management' perspectives rather than a pure agricultural 
development focus, as problems in resource allocation and access were becoming clearer. 
These also increased emphasis on local organisation (Batchelor et al, 2003) 
" embedding new local knowledge as core norms in a farmer-movement or even devotional 
practice, rather than as a scientific or expert skill (Shah, 1997) 
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5.2.2 Reforming development programmes, subsidies and access to technology 
This consistent critique of central and state planning programmes, by special 
taskforces, agency audits, and academics did drive some changes into rural 
development programmes. 
Government programmes at district level 
By the mid-1990s the IRDP and some other district- level programmes had been 
replaced by the Swarnajayanthi Gram Swarozgari Yojana (SGSY). By this time, the 
central government had noted how earlier programmes were pursued as separate 
programmes resulting in `a lack of proper social intermediation, absence of linkages 
and focus on programme targets rather than substantive issues of sustainable income 
generatiion' (Government of India, 1982, p. iv). The SGSY focused on micro- 
enterprise generation in which a group approach was emphasised, with targets on 
numbers of families to be brought above the poverty line in the next five years. The 
activities could still include minor irrigation but general project limits were tighter3. 
Borewell development did not stop, but became much more difficult, partly through 
lack of subsidies but especially because of electricity restrictions. Public funding of 
wells was largely restricted to scheduled castes and tribes, for which the approval of 
Collector became more prominent. By the 1990s, the AP government also extended 
subsidies for drip irrigation systems to help spread scarce water in the DPA. However, 
DPAP programmes kept going, and the norms by which an area was registered stayed 
largely in tact (although the Central Taslcforce for the DPAP forced AP to take a lower 
3 For individual assistance, subsidies could be 30-50% for disadvantaged groups, to a limit of 10000 
rupees. Group projects had no limit on subsidies for minor irrigation, but encouraged to find multiple 
credit courses. 
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level of irrigated area in its registration). (Interviews at Kurnool Collcctoratc, and with 
Special Commissioner for Rural Development, Hyderabad, November 2002). 
Electricity supply 
By 2002, shortages in electricity supply were recognised as both a curse and a blessing. 
At that time, supplying irrigation pumps took over 30% of electricity generated, and 
erratic supplies and breakdowns slowed down well development and brought 
uncertainty in production. By 2002, electricity supply was also under privatised 
companies - APTransco was the company supplying Kurnool district (there were 3 
others in the state). These companies accepted greater state control over permits for 
new electricity connections: only 50000 were being alloy cd in 2002 for the whole of 
the state. They were developing plans to reduce illegal connections and increase 
`healthy lines' by increasing capacitor banks at substations to compensate for defective 
components, and encouraging agricultural users to use good quality pumpscts 4. They 
also hoped to introduce smaller transformers that would supply smaller groups of 
borewells, decreasing line length, and allowing for metering and monitoring of 
electricity use that could also become tools in water management (Interview with Chief 
Engineer, APTransco, Kurnool Office, November 2002; sec also Mocnch, 1992; Knegt 
and Vincent, 2001). 
4 These were 'monoblock' pumpscts with a standard PVC footvalve (makes frictionless). and fixing 
capacitors. This was difficult as farmers often felt they were the cause of a motor not running properly. 
s They had submitted a plan to the state for a new accelerated power development scheme to bring in 
these 25kW transformers. I lowever, they saw this taking at least another 2-3 years to get passed, and find 
the 3000 crore rupees necessary for 13600 transformers and 4-5 sub-stations for Kurnool district. 
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State Legislation 
Both Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh reformed legislation relating to creation of local 
organisations, which made it easier for local groups to form and develop management 
or entrepreneurial activities6. However, proposed legislation to manage groundwater 
still could not get onto the statute book. The Central government first prepared a Draft 
Model Bill to regulate and control groundwater in 1970, which was revised and re- 
circulated to all states in 1997 (Ministry of Water Resources, 1992; Knegt, 2001). In 
2002, the Andhra Pradesh government brought in a new Act -- the Water, Land and 
Trees Act, in 2002. This proposed creating a Water, Land and Trees Authority to 
regulate the exploitation of surface and groundwater? in the state, among other tasks, 
but associated with the Ministry of the Panchayat Raj, Rural Development and 
Drinking Water, rather than APSGWB, with the Authority calling technical experts as 
needed (Andhra Pradesh Gazette, April 2002). The model under discussion was for a 
Mandal Revenue Office in which SGWD staff would have a role (for some 6 people 
per district). The shift back to a administrative unit away from an expert unit was partly 
related to the planning discourses of the time, such a local agency was also seen as 
more able to integrate also these local programmes, for example all the local watershed 
committees that had emerged. However, this also built on local Collectorate meetings 
to discuss water availability and production that took place seasonally in many Districts 
6 In Andhra Pradesh, Borewell User Associations could be registered under the AP Societies Registration 
Act, or the more recent AP Mutually Aided Cooperative Societies Act (MACCS), which reduce 
government control and allowed groups to make profits. For the MACCS societies there is no 
government involvement after their registration, and they organise their own elections, decide over share 
capital and membership fees. Banks could loan up to five times the share capital of a MACs. The 
activities of MACCS associated with borewells groups have included buying supplies of fertilisers and 
seeds to undercut retailers. They mould also store harvested crops for a better price. Wellgroups were 
encouraged to form associations because of the many problems they can face in organisation - to help 
give controls against illegal connections, respond to breakdowns, and ensure rotations. NGO's could 
register under the Societies Act. 
7 Existing wells were to be registered (cost 10 rupees) and permission sought for new wells (for which 
prior agreement of electricity connection is required). Registration was done through the Collectorate and 
the DRDA. 
9 SOPPECOM is the Society for People's Participation in Ecosystem Management 
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(meeting attended in Kurnool Collectorate, September 1983). Some however were 
sceptical about placing work under the collector or administrative staff as there were no 
resources for the programme (Interview with Special Commissioner, Rural 
Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh, November 2002). 
5.2.3 Alternative paradigms and programmes on water access: 
The impacts of water development and agricultural intensification technologies on 
vulnerability and water access in the DPA generated criticisms and a search for 
alternatives. By the mid-1980's (and the 7FYP) there were demands for research and 
intervention that ensured equitable access to resources, more integrated study of both 
livelihood and water systems, and more conservation of inputs (especially water). 
These demands were hardly answered in the government agencies, but were pursued 
seriously by many NGO's. I distinguish three approaches that have sought to achieve 
ecological and equity aims rather than only productivity goals. 
Community assets and access by need 
Rehabilitation of village water sources - through wider watershed conservation works - 
but with reconfiguration of access rights to water is one of the older alternative 
paradigms, for example the Pani Panchayat model first promoted in Maharashtra 
(Pangare and Lokur, 1996). In 2002 this was seen as central to 'Peoples Action and 
Rural Technology (and the Council for it, CAPART), in promoting infrastructure for 
people built by the people, that will also revitalise a village. Creation of a collective 
social identity and responsibility, with locally generated tacit knowledge, seemed the 
more important cognitive factor than actual scientific and technical norms of water 
development. 
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Cost effective and locally promoted water harvesting and conservation technologies 
NGO's like SOPPECOM9 had also developed low cost designs using local materials 
that challenged the standardised and easily defrauded financial norms of many agencies 
(Datye et al, 2000). These designs were available for small dams and for simple drip 
technology. Water harvesting technologies were often profiled as India's indigenous 
technological tradition: water conservation works got new emphasis under the special 
programme of the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh - Neeru Meeru -a programme to 
improve on water availability, and wider water conditions (Anon, 2002). However, 
NGOs continued to campaign against the standardised high-cost and often poorly 
implemented watershed programmes implemented under public agencies, putting more 
information for simple designs and integrated conservation works on the internet (see 
Centre for Science and the Environment website). In Gujarat, locally developed water 
harvesting techniques, constructed by wells for recharge, had spread through promotion 
within spiritual and religious movements (Shah, 1997; Kumar et al, 1999). 
However, some warnings came against uncritical adoption of watershed 
development programmes. The DFID-funded KAWAD programme (Karnataka 
Watershed Development Programme) in Karnataka (see DFID, 2001) and Water Audit 
in Andhra Pradesh (Batchelor, 2002) questioned the continued uptake of watershed 
conservation work with checkdams and other structures, if runoff from watersheds was 
already very low. Problems included: that certain groups could capture water resources; 
there remained an emphasis on building structures to development water resources; 
they could threaten resource supply in downstream villages; new local institutions 
outside government were often vulnerable; and propaganda suggested quick fixes that 
were often misleading (Batchelor et al, 2003). 
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Biomass banking 
Activist scientists and engineers like Datye and Paranjape (2000) had also driven the 
biomass framework into public consciousness. With the SOPPECOM NGO in 
Maharashtra, they promoted a development framework that encouraged production 
options that maximised biomass production under the natural cycles in an ecosystem, 
with a view to maximising also the employment in that habitat, rather only looking at 
most profitable output. It was one of the few alternative paradigms for droughtproofing 
couched realistically and deliberately in scientific terms. The concepts worked in the 
villages supported by the NGO. However, the model assumed cooperation and 
egalitarian employment structures hardly found in many villages. Like the other 
paradigms, it was dependent on an organisation to consistently support and reaffirm it. 
NGO borewell programmes: SPYReddy Wells and MERIBA In Andhra Pradesh 
Fieldwork in Andhra Pradesh uncovered two additional NGO programmes for borcwcll 
development. One programme was funded by an industrialist, politician and 
philanthropist SPYReddy, based in Nandyal in eastern Kurnool district, who owned a 
PVC pipe factory. 
The intervention framework of this programme tackled head on some of the 
problems faced by APSIDC. As long as water potential was approved by SGWD, any 
farmer or group could apply, with a minimum holding of 8-10 acres: some 90-95% of 
wells were group wells. The programme estimated 100000 rupees as working capital 
for a well, but aimed to get 70-80% back. The repayment system was distinctive, 
related to expected build-up of crop income. Farmers paid nothing for the first two 
years: then paid 20% of crop income in the third year and 50% in the fourth year. 
Farmers were given a year free of payment, if they faced a wedding or other heavy 
expenditure. It was left with the farmer or group to get the borcwcll energised, which 
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was a problem in some sites visited - although some farmers had transferred their 
pumps and connections from failing borewells (Interviews with farmers during RRA 
exercises November 2002, see section 5.4. 
Another smaller programme was supported by MERIBA, an NGO working in 
Kurnool District that was a `sister organisation' of a larger NGO PROGRESS. 
MERIBA developed a programme 1991-1993 under which 10 villages were identified, 
borewells drilled and distribution pipes laid: 8 borewells were successfully 
commissioned. PROGRESS introduced alternative development models for 
technology transfer in land and water in different parts of Andhra Pradesh. One model 
was called `Sharing of resources', also partly funded by CAPART of the Government 
of India, where landholders and landless share available resources. People were 
organised to form a sangam (group) who were provided with a borewell. Landowners 
paid 20% of income into the village sangam, and the money was shared between the 
sangam and wider village institutions. The model aimed to benefit landless people 
through sharecropping. (Interviews with APWELL staff previously working with 
PROGRESS, Kurnool District, November 2002). 
5.2.4 Donor programmes: from expert knowledge to local cognition 
Over this period, donor programmes also shifted radically. At the start of the 1990's, 
donors were still involved with funding larger scale technology development and expert 
systems. For example, in that period the UK Department of International Development 
(DFID) still considered funding some large infrastructure projects for drinking water in 
the DPAM, and funding the India-wide 'Hydrology Programme' -a major initiative in 
improvement equipment installation for agrometeorology, hydrology and groundwater 
assessment (see Groundwater department, 1999). In the end DFID funded neither, and 
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moved more specifically into local livelihood programmes, in which water 
management was a special focus (Andhra Pradesh Rural Livelihoods Programme, 
2002; Tucker, 2003). The Dutch government contributed to the large Hydrology 
Programme1° 1990-1995 more generally funded by the World Bank. However, the 
Dutch also went ahead with supporting the APWELL project, which largely merged 
with APSIDC (APWELL, 1994). This was first designed in the 1980s as a programme 
for the installation of wells. Later, with scarcity problems so marked, and development 
discourses so changed, the programme widened to include arrange of social and 
livelihood components, including the development of borewcll associations and 
participatory hydrological monitoring (APWELL, 1999). 
The Water Resources Audit and local water planning financed by DFID 
By 2002, the UK Government had initiated the Andhra Pradesh Rural Livelihood 
Programme (APRLP), focused around self-help groups. The APRLP included local 
monitoring initiatives to see how user groups managed their water, and whether a 
village mold plan its water development. Related with this programme, a Water 
Resources Audit was organised in two mandals - Kalyandurg in Anantapur district and 
Dhone mandal in Kurnool district. A specific objective of the Audit included capacity 
building for mandal-level water management, to promote integration of different 
watershed-related management and monitoring initiatives, eventually to be scaled up 
across the district (Tucker, 2003). 
The audit consolidated and analysed all existing wells, water resources and soils 
data using a GIS system and an integrative hydrological modcL It also undertook 
10 This provided groundwater monitoring sites with automatic level recorders and wider computerisation 
of data records and gave a major fillip to the APSGWD in the late 1990s, see website 
http: //wrmin. nic. inrnvestmentihydrology. (Background knowledge through my own Groundwater 
Mission Consultancy in 1995, for a training programme which became subsumed into the Hydrology 
project, see Appraisal Mission, 1996). 
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surveys in villages in the selected mandals on the numbers and conditions of wells 
tanks and conservation structures, as well as involving knowledge from experts. The 
audit helped to identify patterns of wells that failed in drought years, and those that did 
not - which was not that clearly related with geology except possibly in some granites 
(Batchelor et al, 2003; Batchelor, 2002). Confirming Chapter 4 in this thesis, they 
found no correlation between survey figures and the records of the APSGWD, or well 
development guidelines. They found well densities of up to 51 per hectare in one 
village in Kalyandurg in Anantapur, and also areas where working dug wells still 
outnumbered borewells, in the crystalline rock areas. I compare these findings further 
with my own in section 5.4. However, a core question in the initiative was whether 
resource auditing like this could work for better 'routine' resource planning at local 
level, with better interaction between local state agency sections. 
Participatory Hydrological Monitoring under APWELL" 
The APWELL programme was funded by the Dutch government, and operated within 
the APSIDC introduced in Chapter 4, to promote, technical, social and environmental 
sustainability in groundwater development 12. Under the APWELL programme, pilot 
studies on participatory hydrological monitoring (PHM) developed from 1998 
(APWELL, 1999), as part of a programme also assisting new group borewell 
development. These group borewells typically had 2-8 irrigators sharing. The PHM 
aimed to raise understanding among local irrigators of both local groundwater 
behaviour and the safe yield of local aquifers, and was offered to committees developed 
11 APWELL was the Andhra Pradesh Ground Water Bore Well Irrigation Scheme project. 12 Technical - focused on well-spacing, design, yield and water quality; Socio-economic - focused on 
increasing income of target group, poverty alleviation and increasing opportunities for women; 
Environmental - focused on promoting recharge through watershed development and water quality 
control and water management through control of irrigation efficiency, crop choice and water demand. 
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for the watershed where wells are drilled under the programme13. While monitoring, 
initial training and support was done only for project borewclls, meetings to discuss 
groundwater conditions were open to all water users. Volunteers did the monitoring. 
Studies were undertaken to find which measuring devices were easiest to use and what 
measurements best facilitated local discussions of water conditions (Knegt, 2001). The 
results of the monthly measurements - of rainfall, and static and pumping groundwater 
levels - were publicly displayed on a board in the village. The project also trained the 
groups on borewell operation, and hoped to prevent motor burnout by prohibiting 
automatic starters14 (discussions during field visits, November 2002). 
Some groups also measured pump discharges in addition to the other 
measurements. This data allowed key PIIM staff to discuss water use, extraction 
patterns and seasonal groundwater dynamics with villagers, often using simple 
examples that stayed with the listener. For example, in one seasonal meeting, a PUM 
worker emphasised how paddy rice required five times as much water as irrigated dry 
crops: thus a farmer could cultivate 5 hectares of dry crops under irrigation with the 
same water as a crop of paddy, which could also be more remunerative (Participation in 
a local PHM workshop, Kurnool District, November 2002). Farmers said as a result of 
interactive discussions in meetings, they could now understand how rainfall was a 
factor in groundwater recharge, and pumping affected groundwater levels. By seeing 
the difference registered between static levels and levels after pumping, across the 
season, farmers increasingly understood that groundwater was finite and not always 
fully recharged by rainfall. APWELL tried to hand over responsibilities for the PIIM to 
13 This PHM was part of a wider programme on soil and water conservation, capacity building in local 
organisations, and agricultural extension, through 'social organisers' and agricultural advisors. 14 The project also installed capacitors, circuit breakers and single-phase prcvcntcrs in panel boards, and 
negotiated appropriate size of pumps for the group borewclls, with this aim. APWELL created 34 ßUAs, 
some 20 with MACCS for borcwcll clusters. From each borcwcll clusters they took 1-2 farmers and 
trained them for. identification of faults and pump parts; starter repairs; and checking water levels as part 
of PHM. 
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the District Panchayat Raj (PR) offices, but lack of financial resources and incentives 
left PR representatives disinterested in the work. 
5.3 CHANGING COGNITION AND CHANGING NORMS IN PUBLIC AGENCIES 
Given these widespread criticisms of public agencies, and many new local initiatives by 
NGO's and international agencies focusing m public interaction rather than public 
delivery, what actually happened in the agencies studied in detail in Chapters 3 and 4? 
5.3.1 The Andhra Pradesh State Irrigation Development Corporation (APSIDC) 
As Chapter 4 described, APSIDC started in 1974, but only gained wider regional 
capacity to assist borewell development from the early 1980's. It began to face 
financial problems through both its own failures to collect water rates, and in 
combining its own internal funds with subsidies and bank loans. It also faced delays to 
get borewells energised and operational in reasonable time periods. Its first financial 
crisis came in 1991/1992, when central refinance was needed and NABARD stopped 
its operation to require an audit and change of procedures. NABARD stopped the 
levying of establishment charges, and said all income had to come from capital works. 
By 1994/5 its total losses were 26.24 crore rupees. The Chief Minister also acted, not 
only because of these debts, but also flouting of regulatory procedures on well siting 
and development, and the growing groundwater crisis affecting drinking water sources. 
He put controls on APSIDC and the state electricity company, so borewell development 
slowed substantially. In 1995 APSIDC still had 2600 staff, but were forced to cut this 
to 850 by 1997. The state government wanted to reduce personnel to 400 people, but 
the union took the government to court (Business Line, The Hindu Newspaper, October 
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2001). From 1994 APSIDC had to turn over borcwells b local user committees for 
their operation. (Interview with Chief Engineer APSIDC, 2000). Whcn I met APSIDC 
staff in 2000, they put on a brave face to visitors on their financial and political 
viability, while in fact both were under question, as the state government saw 
decreasing reasons to keep public agencies for developing borcwclls. 
Technically, APSIDC did change some of its operational norms between 1980, 
through changing resource conditions as well as the influence of APWELL. Changes 
included: 
- An increase in drilling depth from 40-50 metres, now up to 100 or cvcn 120 metres; 
-a change from pumps of 4-5hp to 7-10 hp to cope with increasing depth; 
- guidelines and actions to get electricity clearance and proper electrical installation; 
- all borewells were handed over to borewell user groups immediately; 
- all pumps were previously sent to Hyderabad for repair but now done locally; 
- they worked with an accepted ISI list of pumps that farmers could choose from; 
- they no longer did pumping tests. They registered a preliminary test at drilling with 
the compressor development yield, then did a simple yield test with borewell 
energisation. 
- the criteria for a successful well was decreased from 2000gph to 1500gph. 
(Compiled from interviews with the Chief Engineer APSIDC in Hyderabad, 2001 and 
with NABARD staff in Hyderabad, October 2002). 
However, all these changes followed practical or financial requirements perceived 
inside the agency, and rethinking of approaches and assessment came too late with the 
APWELL project, whose fate APSIDC became bound up with. When this project 
terminated in 2003, APSIDC ceased its work in groundwater development. It remained 
in skeletal form, focusing only on lift irrigation projects and some water harvesting. 
FA GINGDROUGHTANDSCARCITY-AGENCIESANDFARMERSINTHEDPAOFINDIA1992-2002 205 
Borewell development models 
Looking across these different approaches to borewell development - APSIDC, 
APWELL, SPYReddy, Meriba - technical staff and farmers gave very different views 
on programme approaches. From APWELL perspectives, APSIDC used to do 
everything individually, and also oversaw everything themselves. They did the 
geophysical surveys, put in the casing, lowered the pump, and chose everything 
including pump options. The borewell users were spectators with very little 
involvement. This was one reason why one person could end up dominating a group 
and intimidating others to leave. However, with the APWELL approach, `beneficiaries' 
were present at all stages in design. They watched the drilling and could see the depth 
at which water was struck and flow changed. Women and men had training, in fields 
from maintenance to agriculture. They even talked about creating a farmers' movement 
rather than just operational capacity. However, other agencies also pointed out the cost 
problems of support to substantial numbers of specialist social organisers for borewell 
development. 
Farmers saw key differences in relation to the higher quality of work and levels of 
training put up by APWELL, and their local assistance - from support to women's self 
help groups to initiatives in PHM. However, APWELL wells only assisted group 
borewells, made up from small and marginal farmers (at least in theory). Thus the 
SPYReddy programme did offer opportunities to a wider range of farmers, and gave 
quite pragmatic assistance, although it could not tackle electricity development 
controls. As APWELL and APSIDC ceased to exist to support borewell management 
after 2002, the SPYReddy model was perhaps the best of the special assistance' 
models remaining. A substantive late flowering of cognition about processes to meet 
local individual and group needs, with interesting participatory dimensions, faced an 
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uncertain future in 2002 - dependent on what banks and NGOs chose to continue. 
(Compiled from discussions with farmers during the RRA November, 2002, and also 
with APWELL staff in Kurnool district and Hyderabad, April 2000 and October 2002). 
5.3.2 The Andhra Pradesh State Groundwater Department (APSGDW) 
In the breadth of work presented and the appearance of its central office in I lyderabad, 
the SGWD seemed to have made extraordinary changes. Certainly the infusion of 
funds, monitoring equipment and computers under the Hydrology project, and a range 
of scientifically-oriented bilateral assistance programmes greatly increased its profile 
and sense of purpose and identity. Wider changes in legislation and the growing 
emphasis on water conservation also helped to increase its profile and involvement in 
state politics. By mid-2003 it aimed to have information in a GIS system down to 
mandal level to give maps of groundwater levels and conditions (Interviews with 
SGWD Director, October 2002). By 2001 the SGWD had its own wcbsite, and by 2003 
had district maps of groundwater conditions readable on line. Additionally, the political 
style of the Chief Minister permeated down to at least some of the Directors of the 
SGWD, who began videoconferencing with their district staff (I attended one such 
video conference with a SGWD Director and his staff in Hyderabad in April, 2000). 
However, actual conditions in the district offices were often far less good. All had a 
computer, but sometimes only one. Conditions for storing maps and computerised 
information were still poor, and the budgetary stresses of annual operation still showed 
through. (Interviews with local district officers in October and November 2002). The 
quality and reliability of the information being put into the maps was also still a cause 
for concern. 
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The APSGWB still did a survey of groundwater development every two years, and 
submitted the information to NABARD: the declaration of development levels was 
even stricter in determining where banks could loan for wells. A new well census was 
done in 2001 in Andhra Pradesh to confirm the electricity connection, well-type, engine 
type and whether in use of abandoned. For the APSGWD, the task of groundwater 
assessment had become an important part of its social institutionalisation as an agency. 
However, to a substantial extent, it was externalnflow of scientific knowledge and 
funding of equipment that allowed this furthering of legitimacy: science helping 
science. The new participatory forms of communication - through internet, through 
video conferencing, and new roles in mandal-level committees, may have helped 
reinforce the visibility and existence of the department, but its data was still not very 
reliable. In 1997, a new methodology for groundwater estimation was in place from the 
Central Groundwater Board (see Groundwater Department, 1999). Table 5.2 
summarises the critical changes made. 
Estimated total groundwater resources had increased, as a result of this new 
assessment procedures, and new local reconnaissance methods. Although recharge 
estimation changed, the unit draft allowances for dugwells and borewells remained 
unchanged from the Central de'eloped norms of 1993, of 0.65 and 1.3 ha. m 
respectively. Borewell spacing recommendations were still 250m. In the new 
procedures, estimates of seepage recharge of 50-60% (including small dams and 
watershed) were high. Perhaps the most startling figure however, was that a 'safe' 
condition for groundwater was a condition of 70-90% developed, and was only semi- 
critical when there was already a falling trend in pre- or post monsoon conditions. 
'Over-exploited' was only used as a condition when more than 100% ofknown reserves 
were exploited and both levels showed a declining trend. 
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Table 5.2 Changes in the Groundwater Estimation Methodology 1997 
" Continuation of a `catchment-based assessment, but at a smaller areal level of 100-300 
sq. km, but with assessments also related to administrative levels (the mandal in AP) 
" Recharge assessments to be made for both monsoon and nor-monsoon seasons, with a 
different methodology provided to estimate specific yield in the dry season, that was seen 
as particularly relevant to changes in the hardrock areas 
" Improvements in assessment of net groundwater inflow and base flow 
" Norms for return flow under irrigation were changed, to allow for type of irrigation, type 
of crop and depth to water table 
" Longterm groundwater trends in Fe-monsoon and post-monsoon levels are made an 
integral part of groundwater assessment 
" Four categories of exploitation status were created to replace the previous three categories 
based on colour (white/grey/black) 
safe a) - less than 70% developed, no water levels trends falling trends) 
b) 70-90% developed, no trends in seasonal levels 
semi-critical. Resources 70-90% developed, and there is a decline in one of the 
seasonal trends 
critical - resource are 90-100% developed and both season levels show declining trend 
over-exploited - resources are more than 100% developed and both seasonal levels arc 
declining 
" Observation wells were to be increased once an area came into the semi-critical category: 
conservation measures were to be increased when an area was in the critical category,, 
and micro-levels studies carried out for more correct reassessment, in critical and over- 
exploited areas 
" It was recommended to allow 510% of the total annual groundwater potential to be 
assigned for natural discharges in the dry season 
" Allocation for domestic and industrial use was to be made on population density and 
relative load rather than the earlier fixed allocation 
from Groundwater Department, 1998 
That the SGWD reported no overexploited blocks in 2002 in Kurnool distnct was 
no indication there were no problems (overexploited blocks were already reported in 
Anantapur, Cuddapah, and Chittoor by 1993, see Kurie n ct a), 1994). The Groundwater 
Audit in Dhone mandal found many unrecorded wells (personal communication Audit 
staff at a presentation in New Delhi, October 2002). While the framework of analysis 
was broadly scientific, the reliability of the data and setting of problem categories, and 
general cognitive objectives, 'ere all still open to question. The APSGWD was still 
concerned to map groundwater that could be developed - it did not create any new 
tools t) help in management of pumping for irrigation and other uses, nor for new 
allocative control of scarce groundwater resources. There was still no sensitivity to the 
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issue of development in a droughtprone area, nor could they give any recommendations 
to wells affected by natural or manmade drought. 
5.33 MD AND ICAR 
These national agencies with such long histories of cognitive and social 
institutionalisation survived better into the 1990s than many of the state agencies for 
natural resource management and technology dissemination IMD moved more into 
long- and short-term weather forecasting for agriculture, based on regional maps 
generated from their own agro-climatic probability mapping. They also moved more 
into public dissemination via television and radio, but hardly linked with agencies for 
natural resource management, staying with their older research networks with ICAR 
and the agricultural universities (Interviews with Director General of ICAR in New 
Delhi, 2000 and 2002). ICAR research centres continued their localised studies to find 
crop recommendations for the aberrant weather conditions of their areas. As the wider 
world of farming systems research pushed emphasis onto more work with local 
farmers, ICAR had engaged in more direct work with farmers, and looked at various 
water-harvesting methods that can both provide small local water supplies in a drought 
(like farm ponds). However, their scientists hardly engaged in the wider water resource 
management programmes active in the DPA in Maharashtra and Andhra in 2002. 
Andrew Warren (1997) described the lack of interaction of natural scientists with 
operators on the ground as a failure of scientific paradigm - to not engage with study of 
the world as seen by those directly dependent on it. Several bilateral programmes did 
have pilot studies that involved (natural) scientists involved at local level, as in the 
Water Audits and PHM. However, in 2002, one still was left with the sense that 
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agencies for scientific research, natural resource development and local government 
still hardly interacted unless called together by the Collector's. 
5.4 GROUNDWATER REALITIES IN KUJRNOOL DISTRICT, IN THE DPA-AP, 2002 
This section examines the actual changes in groundwater exploitation and production 
output under groundwater irrigation across Kurnool district, as compared with the 
information and norms from public agencies. After an owrvicw of general changes 
compared with conditions noted in Chapter 4, it reports on the experiences of farmers 
in villages in three different geological zones, recorded from Rapid Rural Appraisals 
(RRA) in 2002. As 2002 was a drought year with very low ninfall overall, this 
allowed study of how farmers were adopting to seasonal and contingent groundwater 
drought. Visiting different geological zones allowed examination of the real histories 
of farmers preferences and actions around dugwcll and borewell development in a 
droughtprone area, and how they had interacted with agencies and accepted their norms 
or not. 
5.4.1 An overview of changes in Kurnool district, compared to the 1983 study 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the phenomenal change in groundwater development 1982- 
2002 across the Rayalaseema region. Public records indicated 54572 wells of some 
kind in use in Kurnool in 2002. The electricity board noted some 49973 registered 
connections for pumpsets, but estimated that something like 62800 pumpsets were in 
's From 1978, the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Government of India, had 
requested that coordinating committees be developed for minor irrigation at state level, and a special 
responsibility was minor irrigation was also created in the Collcctorate (see Ministry of Agriculture, 
1979). This official supplied me with a census summary on wells during my 2002 research, which was 
more detailed than information accessible through the SGWD. 
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use - besides pumps still operating with diesel (Interview and data from Chief 
Engineer, APTransco, Kurnool District, November 2002). Thus under-reporting and 
illegal electricity connections were still problems. 
Table 53 Changiniz numbers of registered borewells 
Year 1982/3 1992 2002 
Kurnool 148 12271 18602 
Anantapur 288 14949 
Cuddapah 3047 31437 
Chittoor 1198 9618 
Table 5.4 Changing numbers of registered du¢wells 
Year 1982/3 1992 2002 
Kurnool 14463 36397 35970 
Anantapur 65452 82929 
Cuddapah 62369 44647 
Chittoor 80633 106311 
sources: Agnculturai census; minor irrigation records release from the Collectorate; a summary 
of mandal-level connections from APTransco; and District pamphlets from the SGWB. 
The tables show that dugwells continued to be developed into the 1990s, and 
developed in larger numbers until as late as 1993, after which borewells did really take 
over. This indicates the impact of assistance programmes that still promoted wells into 
the 1990s despite concerns about falling water tables from the 1980s. As the remaining 
section will show, however, the effects of borewells were variable. Dug wells had 
stayed in use in the crystalline rocks. The impacts of borewells on dugwells was worst 
in the areas with higher groundwater yields which also attracted more public and 
private investment in borewells. While, by 2002, the census showed dugwell numbers 
declining, the number still registered was remarkable. 
Numbers of registered borewells jumped enormously between 1982 and 1992, but in 
Kurnool at least slowed thereafter. This probably reflected electricity restrictions and 
funding problems facing both public agencies and farmers. Actually, across the period, 
the costs of borewell development dropped in real terms as the value of the rupee fell 
against the dollar - see Table 5.5 - although on paper official costs increased two-fold. 
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Average drilling costs were still only 150 rupees a metre, although pumps costs had 
increased (branded Shp engines cost 16-20000 rupees, local ones 100000). Estimates of 
the costs of an illegal electricity connection cost varied from 2000 rupees for equipment 
only to around 10000 rupees for the equipment and the bribe. Formal connection costs 
were 30600 rupees if a connection was allowed. 
Table 5.5 Average borewell development costs, Kurnool district (Source: interviews and 
literature survey with APSIDC and the DRDA in 1980 and APWELL in 2002, field data) 
Year 1980 2002 
Civil works 40900 222034 
Mechanical and electrical works 22400 
Charges 15203 24007 
Total 78563 146041 
Costs in real terms US$ 5337.33$ 
1$ was 15r) 
3074.5 $ 
1$ was 47. Sr 
In 2002, information on groundwater development was available only for 1993 - the 
SGWD was still processing data to give the situation for 1997 (i. e. were more than five 
years behind). Nevertheless, the available data was startling. Possible numbers of 
additional wells in 1993 were substantially greater than in 1983, despite an almost 10% 
increase in level of existing development. They were also two times again the number 
of wells the electricity board thought already installed. 
1982 Possible number of 1993 Possible number of 
% status of additional wells and % status of additional wells and 
development um sets development pumpsets 
Kurnool 9.31 61404 18 104116 
(icurnooi aistnct pampniets proaucea Dy bU W L$) 
These remarkable figures from the SGWD were said to rcfcct better methods for 
assessing groundwater availability. In 1993, it still had no blocks designated grey or 
black. In 1998 only 9 of its 54 mandals (sub-blocks) had groundwatcr dcvclopment 
levels registered above 30%. Only in late 2002 were 2 mandals registered as 'black' 
(over 70% developed). None of the villages reported here were reported as even in a 
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semi-critical stage, though some had seen problematic declines in water levels16 and 
yields. A private borewell contractor estimated that the average depth of borewells in 
Kurnool District had increased from approximately 53 metres in the late 1980s to some 
84 metres by 1999. In some areas it was now 100-120 metres (Knegt and Vincent, 
2000; field surveys). 
Another surprise in this study was the stagnation in irrigated incomes under crops 
promoted in the 1980s. Table 5.6 shows that several of the traditional 'irrigated dry 
crops had declined in value in real terms, and that the profit now was more in 
horticulture crops - citrus and mangoes as tree crops, and olaa and chillies as ground 
crops. 
Table 5.6 Gross and net margins of crops per acre under irrigated production 
(rupees) 
Crop Gross income 1982 Gross income 2002 Net incomes (a) 
Groundnut 3000 6000 
Sorghum 2500 3000 
Rag' (Finger millet) 1500 3000 
Vegetables 3000 8000 Okra 5000 (a) 
Fodder 4000 
Grapes -20000 
Citrus 10000 
_Mulberry 
8000 8000 
Finger millet, cereals 3000 
Gram 10000 7000 
Paddy 20000(a) 15000(a) 
Sunflower 7-8000 (a) 
Cotton 10000 
Mango/sweet orange 15000 15000- 50000 
Chillies 12000 Green 9000 
Dry 20000 
Commercial crops 
(average cotton and 
oundnuts 
8000 
source: ru-awl, pur Iyau Gala, ArWLLL for gross 1990 data (a) from tanners m Heia 
research 
16 Reports on the declining water table depths varied. Development agencies had to rely on the wells 
monitored by the Central Groundwater Board. In 1993 these indicated falls of only some 0.6-2.0 metres 
across Kurnool district - although figures showed up to 12 metres in parts of Anantapur (Kurien and 
Dhoolappa, 1995). 
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As before however, the most profitable crops - okra, chilies, and paddy - were also 
crops that needed more working capital for inputs. In 2002 the government was 
subsidising sunflower (60% of seed costs) and fertiliser for groundnuts. APSIDC staff 
estimated that the income from a borewell had increased from 4000 rupees per acre in 
1980 to 6-7000 rupees an acre in 2002 (although APWELL were claiming it could be 
up to 15000 rupees). In real terms, however, this was not a major increase, and in the 
1980's there were no electricity supply problems. IIorewell development was beginning 
to lose some of its attractiveness as a droughtproofing tool for reducing vulnerability, 
unless relatively low groundwater yields could be matched to one of the profitable 
crops like paddy or tree crops. 
The table also shows that few crops could compete with the income available from 
rice production, even if it was `banned' officially in publicly assisted projects. Apart 
from its incomes, rice is the staple food crop, provides fodder after harvest, has lower 
labour requirements than cotton and can withstand high intensity showers much better 
than the irrigated-dry crops' like cotton (Kncgt and Vincent, 2000). 
Although many areas were experiencing groundwater yield decline across the season 
by 2002, farmers in all the sites used a similar rule of thumb. If they cropped in just one 
season they covered their production costs: a second and third season was pure profit. 
Increasingly however, a third season was impossible as groundwater was insufficient. If 
wells were working, they at least gave some assured income. Unreliable power was a 
major concern alongside declining groundwater resources. 
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Table 5.7 synthesises key data on patterns and levels of well and borewell 
development in the three different geological regions now reported on in detail from 
RRAs undertaken November 200217 (the names of the villages are not given, to given 
some anonymity to those who gave time and comments to the exercise). These showed 
considerable variations in actual patterns of over-development and uncertainty, despite 
the prevailing discourses of man-made drought and over-exploitation on the one hand- 
and `non-critical' conditions given by the SGWD on the other. The highest levels of 
well and borewell development had occurred in the regions also considered to have the 
best resources - the Kurnool-Cuddapah system tapping quartzite and limestone - in the 
eastern district. 
In central Kurnool, geological conditions had traditionally given little scope to dug 
well development, except in very favourable limestone water table aquifers in basin 
sites. Here too there was a mixed history of expansion of dug wells and borewells, with 
equally mixed development of new levels of groundwater drought as borewells 
operated increasingly short seasons in some locations. 
In western Kurnool, under the crystalline rocks, traditionally a zone of dug wells, 
open wells had not only expanded in number, but some had survived in use (thus 
confirming the experiences of Batchelor et al, 2002). 
17 These RRAs involved both discussions and the schematic development of maps that showed the locale 
of wells and became the basis for discussion of timelines of well development, and differences in yield in 
space and time, as well as different borewcll assistance programmes. Villages were selected after 
discussions with local NGOs working in the three different regions, and preliminary visits where we 
asked farmers if they would take part, and a time was fixed, and some general information was also 
collected. Evening and day visits were possible, at the convenience of farmers. While some appraisals 
took a day or two, one longer appraisal of one week with field visits and repeat evening discussions was 
set up in central Kurnool district. All borewell users were asked to attend: the number participating 
however, typically 10-20 farmers, usually male. Women sometimes attended evening meetings. 
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5.5 WELLS AND LIVELIHOODS IN EASTERN KURNOOL DISTRICT 
This zone of sedimentary formations - in the Kurnool-Cuddapah' geological series 
with cavernous limestones, quartzites, phyllites and shales - proved to have some of the 
highest groundwater yields and borewell development in the district. Although there 
were dugwells present traditionally, this area was a focus of massive expansion of 
borewell technology, especially also as techniques developed for better assessment and 
development of borewells in these rocks. Yields of 5-7000 gph were common. 
Originally drilling was only to 3 0m but by 2002 farmers drilled to 90-100m. Two visits 
and meetings were carried out in RKP village (including attendance of the PHM 
workshop nearby), that was also studied by Knegt (1999) and reported in Knegt and 
Vincent (2000). 
Knegt (1999) compiled the following history line for well deNelopment. 
Period Dug well numbers 
in use (cumulative) 
Borewells in use 
(Cumulative) 
Depth of drilling 
1950-59 8 0 N/A 
1960-79 58 0 N/A 
1980-89 65 13 23-61 
1990-99 76 110 49-61 
1999 5 130-40 43-76 
Not in use 1999 104 79 
Dug wells expanded from the 1960s as pumps came into use. Borewell development 
expanded heavily after 1990, as special assistance programmes moved into the area. 
The irrigated area was estimated to have increased from 160 hectares in the late 1960s 
to around 400 hectares by 1999 (APWELL, 1999a). The SGWD estimated that annual 
groundwater extraction in the larger area surrounding RKP was less than 70% of annual 
groundwater recharge - based on data from four regional groundwater observation 
wells, the nearest some 6.5 kilometres north of RKP. However, based on local and 
more detailed information, APWELL (1999a) estimated that groundwater exploitation 
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in RKP exceeded 110% of recharge. Since 1999, no new dug wells were constructed, 
and open wells were largely abandoned. Borcwells, however, were still being 
established. On the basis of participatory rural appraisals, APWELL (1999, pp. 11) 
estimated that the average pre-monsoon groundwater table stood at 6 metres below 
natural surface in the 1960s, and at some 15 metres by the late 1990s. Feedback from 
farmers gave anecdotal evidence illustrates a progressive depiction of local 
groundwater resources -sec Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8 Evidence of declining water tables (source:, Kengt, 1999; Knegt and Vincent 2000) 
Farmer E. saw his borewell yield ±cline from 72 m3 per hour to 36 n per hour between 1994 
and 1999. He could be this exact as he occasionally supplied water from his borcwcll to tankers, 
and measures the time of filling. 
Farmer T. explained how he and his brother lowered their pump in stages from an initial 9 metres 
depth to 33.5 metres between 1988 and 1999. 
Farmer R reported that in 1985, a contractor drilled his borcwcll to a depth of some 67 metres. 
Until 1997, he irrigated one hectare of crops such as groundnut, cotton and paddy using a suction 
pump. Then discharge declined, and an upper section of the bore was excavated for some 10 
metres like a well, to install the suction pump at its base. The discharge sufficed until 1998, then 
again declined, so a submersible pump was installed. Since then the pump had been lowered 
several times, and now hung at the bottom of the bore. The borcwcll was now dry 
Knegt (1999) found that irrigated farming gave an annual net return of up to 2,000 
rupees per acre more than rainfcd farming. Irrigated cotton was more profitable than 
paddy (some 6,500 rupees against 3,000 rupees), and than irrigated groundnut or 
sunflower. 
In RKP there were 12 APWELL borcwclls, with yields ranging from 3600-8100 
gph, getting power for agricultural use for 4-5 hours a day - at night. An acre would 
take 1-2 days to irrigate, depending on crop and soil type. Typically a farmer had water 
for two days, and with the small size of group per well usually pt water every seven 
days or so. The borewell user association was rgistcrcd as a MACS. Apart from 
managing the borewell, being a MACS enabled the group to buy inputs wholesale 
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(seeds and fertilizers for local resale. They had also started a self-help group which 
supported members with credit for new activities like milk cattle. 
Before, villages asserted they could get only one crop, and had faced drought 3-4 
times in last 10 years. In 2002, with a borewell, they were confident to get two seasons 
- however in APWELL borewells they could irrigate as little as 0.5 acre under a 
summer crop. In the recent drought years, they had not irrigated in kharif. They 
cropped in rabi (usually an ID crop and sometimes still some paddy) or sowed a late 
gram crop, usually on a smaller area than would go under irrigation in kharif (when 
rainfall might supply some water). 
The eastern zone of Kurnool district had experienced the classic `pumping race' and 
disappearance of open wells as a viable technology. The borewells, where they 
survived, still gave a better and more assured income: however declining profit margins 
and production problems with some irrigated dry crops had changed crop choices and 
indeed made commercial production choices more risky. Villagers had developed their 
own norms to cope with drought - both natural and manmade. They now aimed for two 
seasons of cropping rather than three - an option wiped out by borewell interference. In 
a drought year, they operated the borewell in rabi only, based on pumped yields 
available, and cultivated smaller areas. 
The enforced transfer of borewell management to local groups had worked in this 
case of RKP village as they came under a participatory model by APWELL, to create a 
multi-purpose organization which could oversee operations and maintenance and bring 
in some added attractions in help with supply of inputs, credits and marketing. The 
work of the APSGWB and the GEC had been largely irrelevant, and no local actor saw 
the newly proposed mandal water committees making much difference to their 
operations. (Interviews during field visits to RKP, November 2002). 
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5.6 WELLS AND LIVELIHOODS IN WESTERN KURNOOL 
In the west of the district, with its crystalline rocks of granites and gneisses, 
groundwater carne from a shallow water table aquifer 50-60m thick, with the main 
fracture zone holding water only 35-40m deep. This was a zone that traditionally 
irrigated with dug wells, and its geology give little or no major yield advantages of 
borewells over dugwells: in fact dugwells could provide better supply through their 
reservoir capacity. This subsection reports on one village PT, some 20 kilometres from 
Adoni town in the west of Kurnool district, very close to the border with Karnataka. 
Despite the problems of falling water tables, the field study in 2002 still found dug 
wells and dug-cum borewells in use. 
PT village was still listed as a DPAP village, although its current levels of irrigated 
area took it above the limit for a DPAP village. It was located across a basin, 
surrounded by hills. The physiography gave a difference in recharge patterns and 
groundwater yields, and thus cropping options between wells in the basin floor (where 
the main village is sited) and on the hill slopes. These ecological differences were 
echoed in agrarian differentiation, with the marginal lands on the hillslopes largely 
occupied by Scheduled Caste farmers. Its village area was just over 4000 acres, of 
which some 1500 acres were irrigated - some from a large tank (irrigating some 100 
acres under paddy) and the rest under dugwells and borcwells. Villagers estimated they 
needed three acres of irrigated land to work fulltime in agriculture and support a family. 
Recharge in this basin was influenced by seepage from the tanks and a minor canal 
of the Tungabadhra (Low Level) irrigation system which passed through the village 
area, although no part of the village was irrigated by it 18. Villages thought some 50% of 
open wells in the basin area benefited from tank or canal seepage. They also thought 
's Possible recharge has reduced since the canal was lined. Villagers say water levels in wells dropped 
visible after lining in 1995 - however the poor state of the banks means some seepage must occur. 
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the forests on the western slopes increased the rainfall. Some areas had had checkdams 
built on therr, which villagers thought had made a difference. 
Villagers estimated that in the 1960s there were only some 40 dug wells, tapping a 
depth of 15-35 feet. By the end of the decade 1971-1980, there were some 100 dug 
wells, some 40 of these from the Scheduled Caste Corporation, which then cost 9000- 
17000 rupees per well (the standard norm in Chapter 4). The number of dug wells rose 
again 1981-1990, to 130, and by 2002 there were estimated to be some 300 dug wells. 
Of these 100 had been financed by bank loans 19. Only 4 came under the DRDA 
programme (the million wells scheme), which had a cost of 27,000 rupees. Of the 300 
open wells, 120 were still operated by diesel, and 180 by electricity, typically serving 
5-6 acres: 25 had an inwell-bore now tapping to 60-150 feet: villagers estimated this 
doubled the yield. Also, some 200 wells were `group wells', with an average of 3 
people involved, based on joint families sharing. Wells in the basin area were said to 
fill back within 18 hours. They estimated 2 days to irrigate an acre. People did cite 
costs as the main disincentive to new dug wells - the last finished open well was dug in 
1995. It took 10 labourers two months, and cost around 50000 rupees (930 pounds). 
However, a new well had been started a fortnight before the interviews in 2002, using a 
digger for the first time in the area - they were digging to 20ft, and it cost around 
20000 rupees. A borewell was estimated to cost 15000-25000 rupees for 100 metres, 
apart from the costs of the electricity connection and pump, adding up to about 80- 
90000 rupees (cheaper than APWELL and APSIDC as this involved no other 
establishment charges in laying out pipes etc). 
In 2002 there were some 15 borewells. There was only one farmer with a successful 
borewell before APWELL borewells started in land in the neighbouring mandal (most 
19 from the Rayalaseema Grameen bank and KDCC. For a bank loan, farmers needed to have five acres 
of land, have a bank book, and paid 15% interest. 
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of these APWELL borewell users lived in PT village). Two APWELL borewells drilled 
had been failures. Despite the relatively low borewell numbers, spacing was still less 
than 100m apart and it was common to see neighboring borewclls pumping at the same 
time. Borewells here often had a `storage' tank at ground level (some 758 gallons), not 
only to protect against electricity breakdown but also to provide head for irrigation. 
These tanks were filled at night when there was electricity. They also relied on only 
two seasons of cropping for their livelihoods, with only 0.5 acres cropped in summer as 
a norm Most wells supported `Irrigated Dry' crops or vegetables grown traditionally in 
this area of `less potential groundwater', with paddy grown mainly near the canal area. 
Only with some special support could small farmers move easily into newly profitable 
tree crops like papaya and mango. 
Villagers thought that the area was fully developed for borewells against water 
available in a dry year, although it was not listed as over-developed by the SGWD. 
What has helped preserve such a large number of operational dugwclls? Villagers said 
a big factor was poor electricity supply. Many feared that if farmers dd switch to 
borewells there vould be a major decline in levels and yields, although they were 
interested in borewells. 
Table 5.9a-c gives narratives from different well groups visited, in different sites and 
assisted under different programmes (compiled from RRA in PT village, November 
2002). 
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Table 5.9a Dugwells in the basin - farmer `Ahmed' 
He had a partly lined dugwell, developed from the `million wells scheme' of the DPAP 
(there were four in the village). He got it over other applicants because of the way he 
helped officials and there were political pressures that helped him. The well 
construction took 10 men and eight women 1.5 months to dig. His father was a labour 
organiser, coordinating up to 100 people. An elder ga'e him advice on where to dig. He 
used the well with his two brothers: together they had 7.5 acres in total and he had 5.5 
acres. He grew 0.8 acres of paddy, and otherwise irrigated vegetables. He also grew 
unirrigated cotton. He had had this open well for 13 years, and he could pump it for 
some four hours - he estimated there was usually about 8 feet depth of water. The 
pumping depth was 25 ft. He employed a teenage labourer (16 years old) who he paid 
30 rupees a day and also supplied food and clothing. 
Table 5.9b APWELL borewell cluster (close by PT village) 
While men have been the main applicants, wives can be co-applicants and women 
could apply in their own right if they owned land. In this borewell cluster there was one 
woman with three acres under her own name as an only daughter who inherited land, 
but her husband worked the land. Water was rotated every two days per person, and the 
rotation continued regardless of whether the person bok water at their turn. These 
farmers grew groundnut, cotton, sunflower and chilies, and also some had papaya and 
mango trees. Before the borewells they only cultivated one crop: now they could often 
crop through to the summer, although they only cultivated 0.5 acres each in summer. 
Participants stressed how it had changed their lives and created wider employment. 
One borewell user had three acres planted under papaya, which she currently 
intercropped with chilies and had employed up to eight people for weeding. 
Agricultural wages were still 20-25 rupees per day. 
In farmer numbers, these APWELL group borewells had 3-5 members. 
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Table 5.9c Scheduled caste dug wells on the hill slopes (literally beyond the (rail) 
tracks) 
To reach these wells, one traveled up the hillsides, across sandy wastcground some 5 
km from the village centre, onto much poorer soil on the slopes of granite hillocks, 
which were exposed, with a drying wind blowing much of the time. None of these 
wells were lined. Of the 100 acres in the area, some 30-40 was irrigated. Of the wells 
dug, several have failed. Farmers said these wells began to fail 10 years ago, aller only 
working two years or so. Some farmers said they paid off the loan but kept their motors 
in hope. Some wells continued to work but only supported a small area e. g. just one 
acre of chilies, because the yield is so low. 
Farmer `Narsimha' 
Narsirnha was a fan, and his well was 22 years old. IIe had seen water levels 
decline since about 4 years ago - it had dropped by 4 ft - and he thought this was due 
to lack of rain. His site was selected with a resistivity survey. The well was 20 mx 20 
m, was 20 deep in grey weathered rocks, with about SR of standing water in it. The 
well was sanctioned for 5 farmers, but he was now the only actual farmer (his father 
was alive but old). He took a loan for a motor costing 16000r overall but because of 
subsidies he paid only 1800 rupees. This Shp Subima motor was still working, although 
he'd had it repaired 4 times - this cost about 2000-2500r each time in Adoni. Some 
other farmers had to take full loans. At that time there were no restrictions on electricity 
and he got a free connection. He now got electricity for six hours a day. As his well 
seemed to be failing, he wanted another (borc)wcll. Ile was irrigating 3 acres, and 
growing sunflowers and chilies - but thought there was really only enough water for 1.5 
acres to be irrigated properly. He laid out his fields with bullocks and cid not use 
tractors. He s)ld the chilies he grew in Karnataka, grouping together with 45 other 
farmers. He had 16 acres of land overall, but recently sold four acres of dryland to buy 
medicine for his sick son. Ile sold this land to another Backward Class farmer - some 
60 acres of the area had been sold to the Walmiki Backward Castes. lie had six 
children and had to spend on their marriages. His family worked fulltime in farming. 
Farmer `Busamma': 
His well was also 22 years old. It took 15 people forty days to dig. The two sons of 
Busamma operated it: it had to support eight family members. When the well was first 
dug they could irrigate 4 acres, now yields were declining and they could only irrigate 
one acre - they had 0.75acre of chilies at that time. They had hoped for a 0.75 plot of 
paddy but they a)uld no longer irrigate this. They had four acres total, they were 
growing (unirrigated) kharif cotton, getting 8-9000r/a/yr. They also had livestock. They 
thought the problem of falling water levels might be due partly to decline in rainfall but 
was also due to siltation of the well. They did not desilt as they saw it as too expensive 
- around 1000 rupees cost. They said they got no subsidies for development, and saw 
no help from officials who they found rude and dismissive. They were in a self-help 
group supported by the DRDA, they thought the watershed work was OK, and saw its 
value when it rains. 
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In contrast to the experiences from the central and western zones, open wells and ID 
crops had survived in this `less potential' zone. The wells developed under 
programmes of the DPA - in group wells under DPAP and SCST assistance, and 
individual wells under IRDP - were all still working. However, there were also many 
of the problems highlighted from the last chapter. Most group wells were in fact family 
wells, and community irrigation wells were on private lands. While many of the 
farmers cited costs for wells equivalent to the norms of the last chapter, it seemed that 
at least one well owner Busanima did not get the assistance he should have done in 
developing the well. No dug wells had lining or a parapet, (to reduce costs) - one of 
the reasons also for siltation problems. The work of the APSGWB was largely 
irrelevant to the dynamic of changes in well numbers. For borewells, only the 
APWELL programme (and not the older APSIDC) had any influence, perhaps because 
they looked beyond the `norm' that this was not an area appropriate to borewells. Their 
wider support and advisory work also helped some farmers to expand into more costly 
and risky venture like papaya production. Otherwise, farmers in this village of very 
mixed caste and religion actively participated in their own social networks in the search 
for better livelihoods. On the more marginal lands, experiences of dugwells had been 
more variable: some had failed but others survived to support dailies, sunflower and 
cotton production Again, farmers had started to develop their own norms for 
groundwater drought- they aimed for two seasons only, and adjusted their irrigated area 
to the yields they saw from their wells. While they welcomed advice and help with 
cleaning and revitalization of their wells, there were no advisory services for this at the 
moment. For borewells, they had adopted storage tanks as an additional technology 
useful against electricity and yield fluctuations, but again this seemed mainly under 
subsidized borewell programmes. So far, no drip technology was in use. 
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5.7 WELLS, LIVELIHOODS IN CENTRAL KURNOOL DISTRICT 
Central Kurnool is underlain by the sedimentary formations of the Lower Cuddapah 
system: usually quartzites and shales with some layers of limestone, which are overall 
less predictable to develop than in the eastern zone. It has weathered and fractured 
zones that again give some better yields. Its hilly terrain also influences the spatial 
geography of water movement, and some of the worst problems of drying borewells 
were occurring in the foothill zones. At the time of the 2002 RRA in November 2002, 
no agencies had developed any mapping techniques to monitor such spatial interaction 
between village groundwater abstractions. An RRA was performed across in Nannur 
revenue circle, some 20 miles from Kurnool town, to study a transect of villages across 
the hills `uphill' from Nannur -a village seriously affected by drying up of even its 
drinking water borewells in summer. By 2002, the area was dominated by borewells, 
but had seen very different trajectories of dugwell development 1985-1995. The 
proximity of the site to Kurnool, and the nature of the aquifer formations also meant 
that there were several borewell development models to study - old APSIDC borewells 
and SPYReddy wells, alongside borewells drilled privately and by APWELL. Findings 
from four villages are reported here, that were successively higher in the massif - KG, 
UP, UY and KP. This allowed some insight into different and interactive groundwater 
dynamics and the understanding of villagers of them. 
LD Village 
LD village covered a broad fan of land sweeping down from with two arms of hills. 
The slopes, with red soils, were under dryland crops. but otherwise it had black soils. 
Of some 1000 families, 500 still farmed: around 50 farmers had more than 10 acres, 
and about 150 had less than 5 acres. Around 1980 there were only 250 farmers, and I 
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farm was 100 acres (the same family as the current largest one with 30 acres). Of the 
rest, some 400 families were labourers and the others were businessmen or had 
government jobs. LD was less than an hour by bus to Kurnool town, and close to the 
main road also. There were some four families with children in the US, and some 20 
families with children in post-graduate education 
The cultivated area was about 2500 acres, of which 32% was irrigated, taking it 
above new DPAP criteria. Groundwater appeared in two pockets, and some farmers 
had only dryland. In 2002, irrigated land was valued at some 50000 rupees per acre 
whereas dryland was 20-35000 rupees per acre. To rent, irrigated land with a well of its 
own was leased at 5000 rupees an acre: it was 3000 rupees if under a group borewell. 
Dryland was rented at only 1500 rupees per acre. Before the borewells, rainfall was the 
main water source for most farmers. There was a tank, but this breached in 1939: 
although repaired once, it now no longer distributed water (an APWELL borewell was 
close by). There were only 3 large dugwells in the past, that could irrigate up to 7 acres 
each, but they had water throughout the year and were all with large farmers. They 
dried up after borewell pumping started, and had now silted up or collapsed. Unlike 
elsewhere, there was no interim expansion of dug wells here, perhaps because the 
geology was challenging. 
Electricity arrived in the village in 1968, and was first used in agriculture in 197020. 
The first APSIDC borewell came 20 years ago. Four borewells came in the 1980's, and 
one of them could irrigate 20 acres; only two of these were still working. Between 1980 
and 1990, about 30 private borewells came up, then another 120 borewells since 1990, 
giving 150 in 2002 irrigating some 800 acres. The larger farmers could have 2-3 
20 In 2002 farmers got four hours of 3 phase power for agriculture in the night. Opening the outlets and 
switching on the pump was the responsibility of the next person who would be up at 0200 hours in the 
morning. There was no automatic starter allowed here. They paid on the slab system: twice a month they 
paid 354r for 5hp and 500r for 7.5hp engines. Meters were supplied to register for a unit charge (50 paise 
per kw), but they were not connected. The bill came to the registered landowner. 
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borewells in their holdings. APSIDC borewells came in batches, one time five, the next 
time six etc, and there were 16 IDC borewells still operating, as one had collapsed. 
Except for one group well of 7 acres, all other APSIDC wells were registered to groups 
of 9-10 acres. Of these 16 APSIDC wells, four now had water only in kharif. The rest 
still worked - but only three still functiored as group wells. The rest were now all with 
an individual family. APSIDC records showed the borewells drilled into 
weathered/fractured shales and limestone, meeting hard limestone some 60-90m deep, 
after which no water could be found, and farmers knew this geology for commissioning 
new borewells. (Interview with APSIDC stag Kurnool District, November 2002) 
APWELL drilled some 26 borewells of which 17 were successful, electrified since 
1994. These served four families on average and irrigated close to 10 acres per well. 
Some 15-20 farmers had redrilled their borewells since APWELL started drilling. The 
current pumping yields of APWELL borewells were still quite low overall: 
Yield Range gph 
(irrigable area in brackets) 
Pumping yield 
% wells 
(numbers in brackets) 
Drilling yield 
% wells 
(numbers in brackets) 
Failed 34 (9 out of 26) 34 (9 out of 26) 
Less than 2000 23.5 (4) 47.1 (8 of 17) 
2000-4000 52.9 9 47.1 (8 of 17) 
4000-6000 5.8 (1) 0 (0 of 17 
6000- 6600 17.6 (3) 5.8 0 of 17 
(Source: AYWELL borewell drilling records, 2002) 
With a working norm that 3 acres of irrigated dry crops needed 1000gph, there were 
clear stresses coming onto the group wells that had under 2000gph and a potential 
group area of 9-10 acres. These were also yields in the early days of the borewell. 
Villagers admitted there had been problems sharing water, particularly when two or 
more farmers wanted water at the same time, and when individuals sold water to other 
farmers. Private farmers cid sell water to adjacent farmers if they had excess - the 
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charge was 400 rupees for two days. About 60 farmers did this. There were no spacing 
controls on borewells. 
The APWELL borewells did have an 11-member borewell committee (Borewell 
User Association, BUA) that met as necessary. It had representatives from all the 
borewells, and one women representative. They had managed problems of motor 
burnouts on almost all the bores - they gt then rewound/replaced in Kurnool town, at 
a cost of 200 rupees. The BUA was concerned about technical support after the 
APWELL project ended, mentioning the need to flush and clean borewellls 
specifically. In addition to the BUA, the village has several micro-credit groups. 
Farmers recognised that there is variation in well behaviour across the year, also 
across the village area. The largest drop had come in the western area (downslope from 
UP village, which had large-scale well expansion and now had a zone of seasonal 
wells). Here nearly 20 wells were dry by the end of the March. The eastern zone was 
mainly private wells and one there is dry. 
How did farmers cope with what they also saw as Imre uncertainty in a drought 
year? Farmers differentiated on the yields seen. If yields were low, they grew 
sunflower, okra and went for horticulture and vegetables. If better, they went for chilies 
and groundnut. If pumped yields were high, private wells grew paddy. If groundwater 
yields were low continuously, farmers seemed interested to plant mangoes because of 
good prices - farmers gew crops like sorghum for fodder while the trees established 
themselves (value 3-400 rupees per acre as fodder). They stopped cotton two years ago 
because its pests were infecting all crops. They had a crop rotation: 
sunflower/chilies/groundnut and intercropped groundnut and sorghum, and red gram 
and sorghum. If wells still had water in summer, they put only 25% of the area under 
vegetables and left the rest fallow. 
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Irrigators here had seen their groundwater levels declining, and they understood its 
links with rainfall now. If rains were good, all 150 wells muld pump through for a 
summer crop, although they may only be able to irrigate 25-50% of their area in 
summer. If rains were poor then even a rabi crop was not possible on 50% of wells. As 
2002 was a drought year, they were still anxious about the Rabi crop. There was one 
well where a sprinkler system is used on part of the land, assisted under APWELL21. 
How then did the different well programmes compare in their impacts? The next two 
boxes give a brief overview of their different experiences of development under the 
different assistance programmes and technologies. These profiles show that overall, 
this village had benefited from borewell development: older borewells still worked, 
even if the area supported was decreasing. While some borewclls were losing the 
summer crop option, few had dried up, or were only seasonal. However, these 
borewells, that were supposed to be an antidote to agricultural drought, were suffering 
more from seasonal groundwater drought. Comparing LD with concerns of Chapter 4, 
it is clear that many APSIDC wells did go to larger farmers. Also most APSIDC 
borewells, even if they started as group wells, were under one family or owner. The 
only borewell really functioning according to the original equity design was that with a 
group of Scheduled Caste irrigators - members of which were now active in several 
other development initiatives including micro-credit. APWELL borewells survived, but 
not without problems. The KPYReddy well may have lost group members under caste 
politics. 
2! This land is with the expresident of the IIUA, who was helped via APWELL: he is the only farmer 
with such a kit. The overall cost was 12000r and he paid 9000, with 3000r subsidy. 
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Table 5.10a Status in 2002 of APSIDC BOREWELLS drilled in the 1980s 
Bore'ell 1 Five Scheduled Caste farmers got six acres of land ceiling land -they grew paddy, 
groundnut and onion. The small families had stayed with this well. For the first ten years the 
water was excellent - even sufficient in summer but now it dropped back in summer. It was 20 
years old, 8 acres, and had 10 members (although 2 parts were affected by death of cultivators 
whose children are not interested). Each had 0.8 acres. The well had run since it was turned 
over. However the motor had burned out three times, and once the motor fell in the bore. They 
split the cost up in relation to area cultivated. The water level did decline after March so they 
only had two crops. They had no committee as there were no problems that could not be 
solved as they came up. The command area was 3 parts onions, 2 parts sorghum, I part paddy, 
1 part tomato, I part sunflower and 2 parts fallow. They organised turns I day per person, 
although this could be a bit of a problem for the paddy grower. They saw no problem: people 
needed paddy for home consumption and fodder. One of the cultivators worked additionally as 
an agricultural worker (50% on her own plot, 50% off farm): she grew onions to sell in 
Kurnool, She was also a group leader under the UNDG Self Help Group programme - and 
network president. She thought you needed 3-4 acres for irrigation for it to be profitable (it 
would be 20 acres for rainfed crops). 
Borewell 2: This borewell was some 15 years old, and there was only a single farmer from a 
higher caste. He applied under different family (binami) names. He had 16 acres of land. Part 
of the land was under onion and paddy. Across the river was a patch of land once supposed to 
be under this well, where the farmer has since drilled his own well to irrigate 2 acres. 
Informants said the same family had another borewell supporting 14 acres. At that time the 
family lived in Kurnool and leased out the land for 4000-5000 rupees per acre. This was a 
powerful family once considered village elders. 
Borewell 3: This borewell originally had three members irrigating 18 acres. There was now 
only one, who leased out land and water. The family no longer lived in the village. The farmer 
had 6 acres for irrigation, and paid 25000 rupees for this, and leased in 14 acres overall. He 
employed eight people to harvest three acres of onions at the time of interview, and was also 
growing specialised crops like chrysanthemums and curry leaves. He also had a nursery plot 
for aubergines, onions and chilies. 
Borewel 4: This borewell once had three brothers irrigating 10 acres: now there was just one, 
and it had been individually run for 10 years. 
Borewell 5: This borewell had been two brothers only from the start. It originally supported 17 
acres, but now irrigated 10 acres. They were growing one acre of paddy. 
Borevwell 6: This borewell now had only one farmer with 10 acres, who was leasing out 5. He 
bought out the other owners (three acres) by paying them 70-80000 rupees. 
Borewell 7: This borewell was originally 10 acres, originally five members. All others sold to 
one person, for 72000 rupees. 
Borewell 8: This borewell was originally five people, but now only one person. 
Borewe 1 19: This borewell was now seasonal, with only one farmer, but he could irrigate up to 
18 acres in kharif 
Borewell 10: This well was 20 years old: there had been three farmers in one family 
cultivating 25acres. The original borewell had declined, and another had been drilled. 
Borevwell 11: This was a failed well (in an unpromising place). The sites was then under 
paddy (flo g naturally). There were originally two members: both now have other wells. 
232 SCIENCE, TEC LVOLOGYAND AGENCYIN 771E DEVELOPMENT OF DROUGiITPRONE AREAS 
Table 5.10b Status of APWELL AND KRYREDDY BOREWELLS 
APWELL tnrewell by tank: this had 3 farmers, on 7.5 acres. They grew wheat, groundnut, 
chilies and 0.5acres of paddy (flooded area). Actually 2.3 acres could get flooded sometimes. 
They used to rotate water on basis of need but they had now switched to a one day per acre 
rota. They had had conflicts - problems of people being accused of taking too much water, as 
well as members wanting water on the same day. Rotation: 3 acres had five days: for paddy the 
farmers take water when they want. 
South of hills 
There was an APWELL borewell, with 6 families growing chilies, groundnut and sunflower. 
Rotation: I acre per day. 
APWELL Borewell 2: This had 2 acres of paddy. It was allowed as only one farmer %%ould 
cultivate paddy this season (a drought). Other members had sunflower and groundnut so there 
was no problem with water. 
APWELL Borewell 3: There were 4 people - the outlet had started in 2001, on quite steep 
slopes. They were all planting mango, as it would use less water, but it was intercropped - one 
area in sunflower and another with groundnut. The group did discuss crops with each other. 
Well 4: KR Reddy wel - There were four farmers, 20 acres. Three together had 11.5 acres. 
However one previous Backward Class member with 7 acres had now drilled his own well. 
Other villages in the transect 
UP : UP village lay in a basin underlain by limestones. It used to be famous even at 
district level for its number of dug wells. There was also a spring which villages 
recalled irrigated up to 300 acres of paddy. In the 1960s - before energisation - there 
were only some 10 dug wells operated by bullocks. The first diesel was used 1960-67 
then electricity from 1967. In the period 1967-1988 180 dugwclls developed, tapping 
water up to 24 feet - irrigating up to 88 acres of chilies, groundnuts and onions. The 
villages dug all these wells themselves. The spring dried up first, with the impact of the 
dug wells, and was dry by 1988 when the first borewells were drilled. The first 
borewells came from APSIDC in 1988: four were eventually developed (three under 
`normal' programmes and one under special programmes). Private borewells then 
began to proliferate, and some thirty farmers tried for in-well bores in their dugwells. 
By 1995 there were 200 borewells, and a further 100 lad been drilled since then, 
making 300 in total in an area of 1200 acres. By 2002,50% of these were seasonal, and 
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only valuable for kharif crops. (They were dry by the end of January so useless for late 
kharif or rabi crops). The earlier borewells were drilled to 80 feet, the later ones to 200- 
250 feet. Villagers recognised which strata give water and that there was no yield found 
below 200 feet. They estimated that 200 acres were irrigated using leased water - the 
cost was 20% of the crop (water sharecropping), and leasing occurred in both seasons. 
It was happening more than five years ago. Recently SPYReddy Aells had also come 
into this village. Some 70 had been drilled, of which 30 were `successful'. Some 
farmers had transferred their connection from an older seasonal well. As the wells were 
only drilled in March 2002 farmers did not know how they might evolve. 
The villages reckoned they were benefiting in their water supply as they were lower 
than surrounding areas and are a natural collection point. The configuration of water 
development and water problems had left a very particular spatial configuration of 
groundwater availability. There remained a zone without borewells, with a `high 
potential zone' in the south. The zone of seasonal wells was clustered strongly in the 
southwest, some of this close by UY village lands. Farmers admitted that pumping here 
might cause problems to both villages. One the one hand they said that they wanted to 
stop borewell development. On the other hand, they had benefited as a DPAP 
watershed from checkdams and trenches over the neighbouring hills, and were saying 
maybe they could irrigate another 200 acres with the water conserved! 
UY: UY was a `problem' village for water supply prior to the arrival of borewells, 
when the first APSIDC well arrived in 1985. Before that there were no dug wells for 
agriculture. There were no dug wells because of their cost to dig, the depth necessary, 
and the poverty in the village. There were 3 wells for drinking water, dug to about 60ft: 
but they dried up in summer when they had to go to KG for water, They had no local 
spring, although there was one at a temple in another mandal some 2km away. They 
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had a small seasonal tank for their animals (still there). Eventually APSIDC drilled 8 
wells, seven under its normal programme, and one under its small fanner programme. 
Villages said there was now only one group well (with three members cultivating 6 
acres), and the rest were operated individually. Actually only two were working now, 
including the group well. By 1990,100 borewclls were drilled under private 
development, and another 100 developed by 2002. Of these, APWELL brought 12 
borewells, (these also serve &12 acres), pving some 200 wells in total. They only 
cropped in two seasons. However, 50 borewells were now seasonal in the western area, 
operating only until December. The village area was some 3600 acres, of which 600 are 
currently irrigated (16.6%): 1200 acres were irrigated up to 2001 (33%), but only 25% 
of this was irrigated in rabi 2002 because of the drought. Private borewclls had been 
drilled to 150-250 fl, and some fifteen borewells had 7.5 horsepower engines. 
Most APWELL borewells had a water sharing agreement, irrigating 2 days per acre, 
as initially they all had water sharing problems (people wanting to have water on the 
same day). All costs were divided on the basis of area irrigated. Thcrc was a BUA that 
met monthly, but did not yet have MACCS status enabling to organize other services. 
KG: KG was a village of some 2000 acres, 25% (500) acres of which were irrigated. 
Set in hilly terrain, in 2002 it had borewells from all the programmes of intervention It 
had 13 open wells, but only two were still being pumped. It had 4 APSIDC borcwclls, 
15 APWELL borewells, 14 SPYReddy wells, and 34 private borcwclls drilled to 200 
feet, all clustered closely toward a river that winds round the village, where check dams 
had also been built to try and improve water supply. Some zones of the village 
remained without wells. 
Villages knew that one large open well was very old, and once served the whole 
village (and UY and BK) for drinking water some 60 years earlier. It also used to 
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irrigate 3 acres, but had not been pumped for 3 years - this was the effect of the 
borewells. There was now a borewell for drinking water. Another old open well, from 
40-50 years old, used to have 5 feet of water in it and irrigated up to 25acres. In 2002 it 
irrigated only 2 acres in the fields of one person supplying water until the end of 
December (characteristic of open wells in shale there). These wells filled overnight and 
could irrigate 2 acres. Open wells were also being dug until quite recently - there were 
wells only 10 years old: one previously served 10 acres but was now abandoned. The 
farmer had no replacement bore - he tried and failed, and now there was an APWELL 
bore with four families downstream that would interfere with his well if he drilled one. 
However there was at least one dug well that had come back to life after an artificial 
recharge structure was placed by it. It dried up 7 years ago (it was dug 12 years ago). 
The first borewell was a private one, some 18 years ago. Then followed the four 
APSIDC wells. One APSIDC well originally had 3-4 people from the same family, 
originally 20 acres. Now it was only 1 person and 10 acres. Another was still a group 
well with four people but the rest were individual. Only two people with dugwells got 
APWELL borewells. The SPYReddy group wells had 3-5 members, with different 
classes and castes. The BUA for APWELL borewells started three years ago and ran 
extremely efficiently, and wanted to become a MACS to offer other services. The BUA 
had to deal with water sharing problems at the initial stage, especially the problem of 2- 
3 people wanting to irrigate at the same time. They said that a rotation of 1 day per 
acres is all they need. 
In 2002, farmers had multiple concerns over water levels, power supplies and costs, 
and asked for more technical guidance, as many said they still could not read literature 
given to them. The BUA secretary thought there was enough water and they needed to 
mobilise more, it was the problem of luck to find it. There were different opinions of 
water level variations across the year - some said only 30cm - others 3-4 metres - but 
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all agreed that the decline started at the end of December, and from April onwards 
several borewells were almost dry. Under their groundwater drought regime, they only 
irrigated two crops a year - to give the soil a break as well as because of worry about 
risks. They were thinking to move more into horticulture in the future, having seen 
100a of communal lands put under dryland mangoes in a CAPART project locally. 
Thus here, changes in crops seemed the response to growing groundwater drought and 
scarcity, rather than adopting additional water storage or water saving technologies. 
The experiences recorded from these villages at higher elevations in this transect 
showed again that it was locations that once had the best groundwater supply that had 
the biggest negative impact from borewells, with dugwclls drying up and many 
borewells become seasonal, as in LD and UP village. Villagers had interacted with and 
used all the various borewell intervention programmes, and many of the borewells had 
survived. However, only the APWELL and SPYReddy wells seemed to have kept to 
their criteria of either serving only small farmers - or serving all farmers that can 
group to meet the minimum area criteria for borewell assistance. Dug wells had kept 
functioning only in KG in the upper hill zone, although at a much lower level than 
before, partly due to the impact of watershed conservation and artificial recharge 
through ponds and checkdams. Not only had estimates of groundwater potential given 
no guidance in these villages - there was further no real understanding or analysis of 
the wider regional dynamic of groundwater behaviour. 
Villagers had built their own knowledge about water bearing strata, and the 
behaviour of their borewell water supply across the year, They had norms of what to 
expect and do in an average year - usually two seasons only - and in a drought year 
where they reduced area and only considered one crop season Villagers were also 
investigating horticulture as a more reliable option in an increasingly uncertain water 
and power environment. No villagers had adopted any additional water saving or 
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storage technology. These finding echoes those of Chadrakanth and Arun (1997) that 
farmers were only rarely moving into new technology to irrigate with, unless economic 
scarcity is really severe. 
5.8 CONCLUSIONS 
By 2002, there was a new understanding about the scarcity of the Drought Prone Areas 
of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh - that a physical water scarcity with increasing 
problems of insecurity . 
in water access was emerging because of poorly controlled 
water development. There was greater understanding of drought linkages - in how 
rainfall drought manifested itself almost immediately in hydrological drought, giving 
stress on groundwater and surface irrigation, and drinking water sources. However, 
while a number of NGOs experimented with new programmes, and some bilateral 
assistance programmes tried to introduce new knowledge frameworks like Water 
Audits and PHM, many public agencies hardly changed their methods. As definitions 
of droughtprone areas remained unchanged, but the technologies for droughtproofing 
like groundwater development proved less reliable, drought relief became the most 
prominent form of consistent public action (Mathur and Jayal, 1993). While some 
public agencies made their information more user friendly - through use of different 
media like television and internet - few were able to change their actual technical 
practices much The changes that materialised were also shaped heavily by external or 
hierarchical relations of approval. 
The nature of agency institutionalisation in a failed developmental state seemed to 
make change difficult. Mitigating against internal change in agencies were some of the 
problems noted in Chapter 4- shortages of funding and personnel, corruption, lack of 
continuity in supportive research programmes and the politics of institutional survival. 
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Scientific and technical norms and methods became part of the identity of an agency, 
rather than any new vision of resource and technology management. The technologies 
transferred did not need much science for their dissemination I lowever, the sciences of 
agrometeorology and geohydrology also made little effort either to study 
interconnection across the water cycle, nor to develop criteria that could show the 
particular vulnerabilities of different water cycle elements under drought. Debates 
highlighting physical scarcity and competition for water came to transcend those about 
the nature of drought and water cycle behaviour. This was partly because these 
explained more the experiences of people on the ground, but also because the science 
portraying drought manifestations and their materialisation in society had remained so 
weak and abstract. Droughtproofing no longer needed dissemination of new 
technologies - it needed new management tools and new initiatives to promote 
equitable water access that could emerge from an understanding linking drought 
dynamics with structural water scarcities emergent from agency weaknesses. There had 
been new models and platforms within NGOs, and special bilateral programmes, which 
tried to bring the concepts and analytical routines for monitoring drought and scarcity 
together. Whether these can be made more regular parts of public agency and civil 
society in India in the DPA is a question for the future. 
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This intermezzo acts as a break and a reminder, to set the scene again for studies from 
two very different drought contexts, very different state and agency contexts, and very 
different research contexts. The remaining cases now emphasise a much greater 
concern for participatory processes, and report on the struggle to build these into 
project processes (the Yemen case study) and in representation in water administration 
(the Zimbabwe case study). They also represent a very different level of cognition of 
my own work, and relate with the shadow `political economy' question outlined in 
Chapter 1. 
Both cases look at forms of hydrological drought - groundwater drought and surface 
water drought - and at very different hydrological contexts to the previous four chapters 
- at springs and cistern supply in Yemen and at river flow in Zimbabwe. Both studies 
also show stronger cognition of the need to combine hydrological units of river basins 
and watersheds with administrative and political representation. The two locations also 
have rather different overall drought contexts. Both suffer from marked seasonal 
drought, but very different patterns of uncertainty and vulnerability compared to the 
regions documented in India. Yemen, with its rainfall falling under 500 mm in some 
areas is drier and more `droughtprone' than India - although it had no special agencies 
or programmes to combat this, and many development interventions were directed at 
improvements in water supply for health rather than agriculture. Alongside a long 
seasonal drought, the Raymah region of Yemen also had low overall annual rainfall 
that had created endemic levels of water scarcity, that local indigenous technologies of 
springboxes and cisterns and water rights were historically adapted to. Zimbabwe, on 
the other hand, was less `droughtprone', with a climate and physiography that 
generated runoff whose capture and access became of core concern. Zimbabwe also 
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had no special agencies or programmes around drought, although social exclusion and 
underdevelopment had also given famine concerns early in its history. Rather, the 
RhodesianiZimbabwean state put water resources under Ministerial brief in a 
bureaucracy peopled by a scientific elite from relatively early in its history. The 
Manicaland region of Zimbabwe had higher rainfall, but scarcity problems emerged in 
the poor soils and runoff regions made into tribal trust lands. 
Neither of these countries had the historical and geographical scale of famine to 
shape early public action that occurred in India: nevertheless access to water was also a 
fundamental control of economic opportunity which was factored into social and 
political relations of the countries and institutions for water management. Neither 
country, however, had either the traditions of planning documented in India, nor the 
democratic legitimacy of central and state government. The following two case studies 
rather offer examples of planning and cognition emerging respectively under highly 
local water management in Yemer; and highly coercive central governments in 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe using scientific elites to first serve its commercial farming regions 
rather than poorer quality lands set aside for black smallholder farmers. Rhodesia under 
its colonial government could pursue coercive and racist strategies of land and water 
allocation, within which science and technology also operated alongside legal apparatus 
while also active in wider scientific networks regionally and internationally. 
Zimbabwe, perhaps as a result of this, had a good emergent hydrometric network for 
the study of rainfall and river runoff by the 1970s - although these networks were 
highly skewed in their density in relation to commercial areas and tribal trust lands. 
Alone among the case studies, it pursued a systematic development of its water 
legislation, that slowly but surely brought most water sources under monitoring and 
analysis - but under very particular cognitive and technical norms. Yemen on the other 
hand had almost no history of any state influence in the analysis and development of 
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local water resources. Its local knowledge and cognition was hardly even expressed in 
scientific terms - rather it was shown in certain critical dimensions of water rights. 
Both these case studies, however, show what problems and opportunities emerge when 
traditional political power collapses, and new opportunities for allocation and redress of 
historic injustice in water rights occur. In both cases, as in India, technologies become a 
major tool in social and hydrological control, but also the point at which change in 
water availability can be addressed - but with uncertain impacts on water rights unless 
these are investigated first. 
These case studies show again the usefulness of the concept of `technology as 
legislation' - as a tool for understanding why people favour certain technological 
systems over others, and as a value around which ideas, interests and institutions are 
marshaled, diffused and restricted. The Indian studies have shown the significance of 
local elites in agencies in shaping technology choices, and in institutionalising certain 
cognitive norms. In the following case studies, we see how local government and 
informal civil society had this power in Yemen, defending cisterns and springs and 
associated rights against new technical ideas. In Rhodesia and Zimbabwe, however, 
powerful central techno-scientific agencies held stronger controls over analysis almost 
universally directed to studying options for dam creation. Water rights were used as a 
means of control in water scarce conditions, rather than pursuit of new technology or a 
trust in the market that seems emerging in India. However, one weakness common to 
all case studies is the collapsing ability to allocate water in water scarce contexts 
without strong local legitimacy in water governance, and rules in use of technology. 
Technology choices by government can show meanings and ideas - but it is local 
control of water access that shows where real power lies. Ironically, in all these case 
studies, the issues of local power has become more obvious as our scientific and 
technological capacity to study the water cycle has increased, but the determination to 
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administer equitable governance of water has not been backed by relevant judicial and 
technological powers of control. 
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CHAPTER 6 
GROUNDWATER SCARCITY IN THE YEMEN REPUBLIC 
`Raymah people are whimsical people: we work with them as if we are walking on eggs 
Director, ironmonger/hardware supplier, Hodeidah 
Tacitly understood traditions of technological knowledge co-evolve with technological 
paradigms but evolve themselves outside the realm of science.... Scientific patterns cannot be 
perfectly extrapolated for complex, non-trivial technologies and .... technical change is dependent on learnt conceptions of similarity that cannot be reduced to information 
processing. Nightingale, 1998. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the years 1985-1987 1 worked as a water specialist in a Water Unit funded by Oxfam 
supporting drinking water development in the Raymah sub-governorate (in the Sana'a 
governorate), in what was then the Yemen Arab Republic' (YR). This mountainous area 
with low and often uncertain rainfall in the range 400-650mm, nevertheless had an 
agricultural system and stable water management technologies, at that time under a 
rapidly changing tribal system of local management. Water supplies were very limited, 
and critical sources were small spring seepages or spring- fed streams, or cisterns that 
stored runoff and seepage water. 
These unique traditional water storage systems, uncertain water supplies and rapidly 
changing local-centre politics, created a very different kind of droughtprone area, 
development arena and cognitive space, with many more locally-based institutionalised 
actors. Available water was almost fully allocated, and access was managed under 
customary law. This was designed to mediate access to scarce water resources via 
technologies that supplied finite but largely known quantities of water despite seasonal 
fluctuations. These local adaptations and customary laws with embedded tacit 
knowledge about technologies represented cognitive norms quite distinct from those of 
The Yemen Arab Republic was united with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in May 1990 
to form the Yemen Republic. 
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western science outlined in previous chapters. Scarcity was recognised as a condition to 
adapt to, rather than a consciousness of risk and vulnerability under drought. This case 
study thus gives a very different insight into the relations of science, technology and 
agency - of dynamics where technological awareness becomes far more critical than 
scientific knowledge. It also gives insight into the dynamics of agency in the processes 
to resolve struggle and disputes to access water, and the synthesis of differential 
knowledge and visions about possible change. As well as describing these norms and 
practices, the chapter ends with a summary of a water conflict that encapsulated these 
differences, with a view to learning more about frameworks for collective action that 
can openly allow for disputes. The chapter draws on other published papers (Vincent, 
1991,1990,1986). 
Section 6.2 summarises key features of the environment of Raymah, and political 
changes that set the stage for the water struggles documented here. This is followed by 
sections giving more details on Islamic water law, the reality of local water 
management and planning and wider effect of new technology on water mobilisation, 
none of which had been described to the project before this work began. Section 6.5 
documents the successes and failures in work with a local plan for water improvements 
in domestic water supply. This section also summarises details of a summary of a 
conflict over renovation of a spring supplying irrigation water that led to the end of the 
Water project in Raymah. Section 6.6 gives conclusions to this case study. Contrary to 
several framing discourses, it was neither type of sources nor artefacts that precipitated 
water disputes, but rather a particular configuration of interests that allowed for 
opportunism in claiming access to water. The most difficult areas to develop for 
communal drinking water sources were tribal 'boundary' areas, and 'communal' and 
'unoccupied' lands. These were often stretches of mountain or unsettled wadis, which 
carried groundwater, but where jurisdiction and rights were uncertain. Tribal groups 
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were concerned to preserve their traditional rights to water in their territories, such that 
they would dispute new proposals for use, or any change in status to pragmatic access 
they may have granted to other groups. 
This case study shows a situation where it is technology that reshapes science, and 
that western science is largely unable to characterise or parametise such complex 
artefacts. Also that tacit knowledge does not get exposed easily - local surveys and 
discussions did show local indigenous knowledge (science) on resources, but not even 
longer interviews and discussions revealed all the intricate possibilities for its 
transformation Sometimes these only emerged as physical intervention in a water 
system began. I realised that, to become a competent scientist and practitioner, I had to 
understand and interact in politics. 
6.1.1 The project structure 
The Oxfam Water Unit was based in Al Jabin village and uzla: the Unit staff consisted 
of myself and a Yemeni counterpart, and groups of workers hired in as necessary for 
construction. I lived in the village, and these counterparts and workers were local 
people. The empirical data for this study comes from almost three years of work that 
involved rapid rural appraisal of resources, more detailed field surveys, discussions as 
we stayed over night in villages during planning and construction, participatory design 
methods, documentation from council meetings and interviews with key actors 
including state officials, council representatives, PHC workers and water users. We did 
surveys of water use and water sources in 11 villages which were potential system 
development sites. However, only 3 of these sites were approved by all partners as 
technically, politically and financially feasible, and only 2 water projects were 
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completed (an improved village water point in Ilowrah and a piped gravity system in 
Gotto), before attempts to construct a third in Matlas village paralysed the programme. 
By virtue of its distance and inaccessibility, Raymah sub-govcmorate had received 
only limited attention from central schemes in eater supply. Raymah had, however, 
been a focus of OXFAM aid with a Primary I Icalth Care (Pi IC) Programme for some 
time. Village water supplies were seen as a natural focus for extending the effects of 
the health programme and making health impacts more visible (Oxfam office notes, 
Sana'a, 1983; Merabet, 1984). Oxfam had another water project in Yemen and I had 
visited both areas when part of a short evaluation mission in 1983. Through this local 
contact and through local project work elsewhere in the YR, OXFAM was aware of the 
responsibility of local councils in improving water supply, and the keen interest of 
villagers in improving their water supply. Thus a programme was developed with twin 
aims: technical assistance which could improve planning and implementation capacity 
within the local council, and water source improvements to strengthen P1 IC work. 
This aid initiative combined financial and technical assistance from OXFAM with 
financial and administrative assistance from local councils, and financial and labour 
inputs from villagers, with central administrative assistance from the Confederation of 
Local Councils for Cooperative Development (CLCCD). The approach was to design 
water projects for villages with a PIIC centre, which also figured in the local council 
budget for water projects. The focus on villages with health centres concentrated the 
work of the project, and enabled exclusion of general demands for assistance from 
other villages. (Oxfam office notes and minutes, Sana'a and Oxford, 1983). The P1IC 
worker of the area could also provide additional information on water sources and 
liaison for project development, although there was no reason to suppose that such 
advice would be impartial. Disputes and delays in assisting PIIC villages led us to try 
to assist other villages in the local council budget. We also became involved in villages 
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with PHC centres, where water improvements had not been costed into local council 
budgets, because representatives had considered supplies to be adequate. It was hoped 
that this project could provide a model for work with local councils, under the guidance 
of central Ministries, since most of the funds available within the country for rural 
water supply lay with the local councils in the 1980s. 
6.1.2 Tacit knowledge and framing objects in the DPA of YR 
The expectations and approaches of Oxfam and myself were already influenced by 
several debates discourses and learned experiences of the donor community, which 
later proved rather unhelpful. These included: 
1) a conviction to work with water as a health issue rather than a resource or justice 
issue, as basic needs were one of the core reasons to justify work in Yemen. We 
had to relearn the possibilities to survive on very small water supplied in our 
designs, and even ignore conventional standards of supply' if we were to reach any 
point of contact with villagers. In fact our entry point also had to be a resource 
access problem, absolutely involved with concerns of local rights and justice, if we 
were to convince villagers to work with us. We had access to several good survey 
reports on domestic water use (Ansell, 1981; Tutwiler et al. 1980; Yacoob, 1983). 
However, I was given no summary of customary law (nor were these available for 
any technical workers), and largely compiled my own record which is summarised 
in section 6.3; 
2 The convention was that a standpipe supply should provide at least 40 litres per capita per day, but this 
often had to be relayed below this where water was limited. (Laredo, 1986). Health benefits came from 
quality improvement (especially reduction of faecal contamination and reduction of bilharzia risks) and 
reduced collection problems, and some increments in amount of water used. Typically, a household used 
around 100-120 litres per day (5-6 twenty-litre jerry cans) or 20-25 litres/per day/per capita. This per 
capita consumption could be about the same or less as that also organised for livestock. (Tutwiler et at, 
1980; observations in Al Jabin district, 1985). 
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2) donor wisdom that borewells were the preferred source (although not without 
problems), and that springs, cisterns and water tanker supplies were all unreliable 
sources for water improvements because of possble conflicts, health risks, and the 
high operating costs of tankers which also faced 'turnover problems' (UNDP- 
UNCDF Project Evaluations, 1980-1983) We had to realise that actually no source 
was impossible to redevelop - it was the social space of the technology, and not the 
artefact itself, that was in fact the issue. These issues arc covered more in sections 
6.4 and 6.5; 
3) a lack of differentiation in the dimensions of scarcity behind limited water supplies. 
Many tended to highlight the depletion of resources (as in Chapter 5), where 
farmers and communities were largely characterised by helplessness, because there 
were no rules to encompass the technology, and the new technology itself required 
no social interaction for its development and installation. However, the conflicts in 
Raymah were more often over misappropriation of water, and institutions had to 
encompass adjudication, often after physical violence and destruction. Little was 
written by 1984 about the different roles and relations of agencies for these 
different conflict fields in water, 
4) Institutional arrangements proposed for water projects were often rather normative 
in the formation of associations. However, these failed to differentiate whether 
water management problems came from unclear institutional arrangements for use 
(including property rights and access to water) or absence of an authority system to 
give meaning to these arrangements (Bromley and Ccmea, 1989). We started 
thinking that the `problem' was institutional arrangements within systems, but the 
real issue was authority. In fact it was this absence of authority, and the confusion 
and opportunism that emerged as authority was shifting from local to state- 
appointed actors that fuelled possibilities for conflict in this project. Also, the 
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property' arrangements - private, state, common property, open access - varied, so 
too did the authority system and rules called in to deal with them. Another of our 
early mistakes was to look to only one section of the local administration to answer 
all questions about water allocation, management and use; 
5) Disputes were seen as a problem and a sign of trouble, that good participatory 
dialogue must try to prevent or diffuse. I learned that it was disputes between 
groups and not within groups that were a more critical issue, for which no PRA 
skills and few `platform' studies could prepare you for the ways these moved in 
space. I had to recognise that I was working in a society where disputes were a 
normal form of social interaction, through which individuals and groups constantly 
tested their position and opportunities in a changing world. Working with disputes, 
even if its seemed like a constant degree of fire-fighting, was actually an important 
source of personal validation to others, and really the only viable source of 
information for the realities of water management. Rather, it was conflict and 
related violence that was the danger, in the way this could shatter people and their 
reputations, and could bring loss to individuals and communities (Parnell, 1988). 
Disputed claims on natural resources between groups could only be addressed 
further after one group had agreed and taken a public debate and decision. I have 
come to agree with Hunt (1990, p. 145) that... " conflict arises when disagreement 
becomes a public issue", which in Al Jabin came when disputes could no longer be 
dealt with within a community, such that a local group has to turn to a supra- 
community group to deal with `supra-community' problems. Many impasses arise 
in water programmes because governments or donors rarely reflect on whether and 
3 Bromley and Cernea (1989) defined property as a right to a benefit stream that is only as secure as the 
duty of others to respect the conditions that protect the stream 
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how to strengthen the supra-group or whether to strengthen the community so that it 
does not have to turn to supra-groups so oficn. 
6.2 AGRO-ECOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN RAYMAII 
6.2.1 A mountain region in transformation 
In 1983, the Sana'a governorate covered diverse but important areas of the Highlands 
(1000-3000 metres) and straddled an important political divide between the Zaidi tribes 
of the north and Shafites of the south. Raymah consisted of 5 districts. Al Jabin was the 
largest of these, covering an area of 600 square kilometres, with a population of around 
80,000 people at the 1981 census. The average population density was then over 130 
people per square kilometre - quite high for a dryland area. Actual settlements 
depended on water supply and local climate, and population densities were lowest in 
some of the foothill valleys. Each district was subdivided into uzlas. An uzla was the 
smallest administrative unit and its boundaries usually reflected older territorial rights 
of families in the area, drawn in relation to geographical features like mountain valleys 
(wadis) and rock outcrops. 
Some limited rainfall records existed for Al Jabin, but not in detail for the whole of 
Raymah. I estimated that the annual rainfall was around 650 mm on the western slopes, 
falling to around 400mm or less in the cast. Rainfall was highly seasonal, concentrated 
mainly in the months of March-May. There was also no data on rainfall reliability and 
drought frequency, but the cropping system was regarded as a stable one, reproducible in 
most years. Oral reports added that the area was subject to lower and more variable 
rainfall since the late 1960's, with the worst effects in the eastern parts of the mountains. 
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Fig 6.1 Sketchmap of Al Jabin district 
Agriculture in these mountains was predominantly rainfed: irrigation water was at a 
premium. Most available sources of water were used both for domestic water supply and 
irrigation. The increased demand implicit in improving domestic water supply meant 
fitting a further demand for water into an intensively used water system, and the 
technology involved could raise many challenges in the field of existing law. 
On a mountain, the 'losses' of one area supplied water for other users down mountain: 
villagers faced complex questions on whether to opt for improvement of existing sources 
or whether to exploit 'new' sources of water, any of which might cause consequences to 
topographical neighbours. The advent of technology that allowed the incorporation and 
movement of 'unutilised' water at a point in space, like pumps and pipes, could create a 
spatial reallocation problem outside the scope of existing customary legal controls. Thus 
villagers could justifiably fear the impact of projects on their water rights, and in reverse, 
new technologies and pressures night be exploited by local interests to gain greater 
252 SCIENCL TECNNOLOGYAIYD AGENCYIN T/HE DEVEWPM T OFDROUGItZFRONEAREAS 
control or access to available water supplies. There was a serious dilemma for villagers 
between, on the one hand, wanting an improvement and risking new technologies, while 
on the other hand judging the ability of local legal forums and foreigners to protect their 
interests. Learning to discuss and understand this strategic cognition of villagers, in 
addition to just technical details of resources availability, was the hardest shift for me, 
and I thinks still rarely appreciated by many technicians helping with development 
projects - even though misjudgements can have disastrous consequences for communal 
entitlements. This issue was particularly crucial when local villagers were asked to 
accept a technology that they cannot visualise, so that they have no full grasp of how it 
could affect their environment. 
It was thus important in this work to understand the difference between the physical 
location of water and its social appropriation. Regardless of whcthcr we could physically 
find new resources or reorganise existing ones, all water was theoretically allocated over 
a social landscape that mixed private and communal land, and communal and private 
rights to use water. these controls were still very strong. As we discovered, just because 
a village had a right to use a water source, or identified a previously under-utilised 
source, this did not mean that it had a right to develop it. 
Local interests in the mountains of Raymah were complex. At that time, in many 
respects there was still a tribal organisation operating through the extended family, with 
many communal customary entitlements in control of water and access to land for fuel 
wood and fodder. This customary law was still largely applied through representatives 
selected for traditional management roles. Alongside this, however, operated extensive 
private interests in land and water. Landholdings were frequently large, with 
considerable sharecropping of production from both rainfcd and irrigated land. This 
tribal system had been under pressure in parts of Raymah for many years. Early 
influences included the impact of the Turkish occupation on the western slopes of the 
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mountain, and more recently the effects of out-migration, which both weakened 
sharecropping arrangements and the scope of agreements over water use. However, a 
hallmark of the inhabitants of the area was an intense loyalty to their land, which led 
migrants to return and attempt to invest their savings in the area despite its scarce 
resources. Such attachments to the land perpetuated an involvement with customary 
rules on resource use, which were tribal in origin, even if allegiances and ties between 
families and representatives were under stress (village level discussions, 1985). 
Land was extensively terraced on all but the steepest slopes. In Al Jabin, 
sorghum/bean intercropping was the main rainfed land use, but other pulses such as 
lentils and fenugreek were produced, while grass collected from fallow terraces was 
important for livestock and draught animals. The main crop irrigated on the mountain 
was coffee, especially on the western slopes, with some production of vegetables and 
qat elsewhere, and some irrigated sorghum in wadi areas. Where coffee -was 
traditionally cultivated in Al Jabin, it continued despite competition from other 
irrigated crops. This was partly because of the isolated nature of many of the mountain 
slopes, and partly because coffee had low water requirements, and low labour 
requirements in husbandry and marketing, relative to other crops, while still having a 
good market value (Field observations, 1985-1987). 
6.2.2 First assessments of the water cycle 
This terracing and cultivation pattern had considerable influence on the nature and 
volume of the available groundwater. In Raymah, the geology was largely metamorphic 
and volcanic, with groundwater only available in fissures, faults and bedding planes, so 
that seepage under the terraces was an important part of groundwater resources. In 
some valleys in Raymah there was sufficient infill of unconsolidated materials to 
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conduct water, but even in these wadis subsurface flow appeared to follow sub-surface 
drainage lines, so that its development could be unpredictable. These groundwater 
resources supported seepage points, springs and a number of perennial streams, 
although their point of emission and discharge fluctuated seasonally. 
Classifying the hydrological nature of groundwater sources was very difficult, and I 
found it much easier to identify types of water sources by the technology by which they 
can be mobilised, which also reflected rights to ownership. Price (1985) defined 
seepage as the diffuse flow from an aquifer at the surface, and a spring as localised 
flow such as would result along a fault or fissure. In Raymah, they could be difficult to 
distinguish. I use the term seepage point to mean very small discharges under 0.001 I/s 
(mainly found across the hills and terraces), and springs for larger flows. Most seepage 
points and springs were small, and water was pondcd in small springboxcs or cisterns 
before it could be used. Larger springs were either left to flow as streams, or were 
piped to irrigated terraces depending on the spring and its owner. I use the term 
'groundwater streams' to distinguish the springs which support larger, perennial flows 
or water (over 101/s) and which were left to flow naturally. 
There were seasonal floods in some sites, but flows were flashy, and there was no 
spate irrigation, such as is found in lowland valleys (sec Makin, 1977 and Varisco, 
1983). We did, however, come across isolated examples of flood offtakes for terrace 
inundation, and oral references to defunct water harvesting systems for irrigation. 
Settlement was in a mixture of villages, hamlets and isolated homesteads. In Al 
Jabin, the typical size of a village was 200 people, but ranged from 50 to 1500. This 
diffuse settlement pattern was one of the first challenges to an appropriate rural water 
development plan. Across these mountains were a variety of water sources used for 
irrigation and water supply. Some rainwater was harvested in cisterns for general 
domestic use (washing, watering animals etc), but most drinking and irrigation water 
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was mobilised from springs or streams supported by groundwater flow (see also section 
6.5). At this time, hand-dug wells existed to tap the unconsolidated materials found in 
mountain valleys (wadis) and the foothills. Borewells were starting to proliferate in the 
mountains, because of construction technologies available, and because they offered 
the opportunity of private development of water supplies (surveys Wadi Ibrahim and 
Meswar, 1985 and 1986). 
The main changes affecting these resources were: 
a) increased domestic pressure with population increase and greater consumption; 
b) the abandonment of more remote terraces to fallow through the effects of war 
and migration; 
c) increased markets for irrigated crops; 
d) drought, deforestation and road building combining to have unpredictable 
effects on groundwater flow; 
e) new technologies for mobilising water. 
Thus not only was there increasing competition for water between uses, but also 
quite a lot of hydrological uncertainty, as both natural and economic changes affected 
the local hydrological cycle. While other economic opportunities remained limited, 
other social forces thus tended to increase the tenacity with which rights were held, and 
increase the search for opportunities to circumvent them. In such an environment, few 
interventions could be neutral, and negotiation became crucial. My three years here 
taught me how hard that was. 
Where there were few opportunities to find new sources of water, the only other 
current option for local people to expand their domestic water use was reallocation, 
which tended to happen through opportunism rather than negotiation. For feasible 
interventions, we had to understand: (1) what 'new' (unutilised) resources we could 
bring into a location (2) what reallocation in uses could take place at a source or 
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spatially between sources, and (3) what reallocation could take place between users, 
either at one source or spatially between several sources. My own hydrological training 
had given no exposure to questions like this - yet failure to understand this was the 
most rapid way for a donor to become `used' in the reallocation process. For all these 
questions, it became absolutely essential to understand not only the presence of water 
on communal versus private land, but also the private and communal interests of 
villagers using the particular water source. This was tacit knowledge that took time to 
understand and assimilate, and was only made clear from getting involved in the 
mobilisation of sources and construction of systems. 
The option of massive water imports to some parts of the mountain was dreamt 
about by some local representatives, but had been avoided by government and aid 
donors who feared the implementation and operational costs, and political challenges, 
in serving a mountain with a diffuse settlement pattern and tribal loyalties. 
I had no detailed information on the water balance of Al Jabin, and thus began work 
with my own conceptions of losses' and 'surpluses' of water that could be developed for 
water supply4. We had a feasibility period of three months that enabled us to obtain a 
feel for the type and scale of water sources present over a landscape for which we had 
limited maps giving physical contour information but no data on villages and water 
sources. Heinous though it might seem to some that we started work with so little 
information, our feeling was that going operational was to some degree essential to 
show commitment and gain more insights about the locality of water and its control. 
What caused most problems eventually was not so much limited data on water 
resources. The problem was limited understanding of these tacit ownership claims - 
4This situation is not uncommon for water developments in the YR (or elsewhere in the developing 
world), because of government emphasis on funds being used for implementation rather than feasibility 
studies. 
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how villagers and local representatives controlled access to water, how villagers 
conceptualised their rights, and how new interventions challenged these rights. 
Our starting conceptions were that there was some outflow from the montane 
hydrological system to the west and north into the Tihama groundwater system (see Fig 
6.1). This outflow occurred though flash floods after heavy rainfall, poorly utilised 
groundwater streams and also evaporation losses in streams and irrigation channels. We 
recognised that the flood runoff gave soil recharge to the lowland production system, 
although often damaging to field crops and unpredictable in its location: so 
recommendations on source development and rainwater harvesting would have to take 
this into account. However, we felt that some options did still remain, in excavation of 
some new spring points, renovation of springboxes, lining of irrigation channels, and 
better allocation of flow in certain poorly utilised groundwater streams. (The Tihama 
groundwater resources in the zone neighbouring the mountain was also at that time 
relatively undeveloped for irrigation). There was also potential for borewell 
development in some foothill sites, which could compensate for any decline in water 
levels in shallow wells if multi-village projects could be developed, although yields 
were liable to be low. In this respect, the most vulnerable villages were at the head of 
the foothill zone in the relief range 800-1500 metres, because of all the water claims 
around them (village surveys, 1985-1987). 
Almost from the outset, we realised that developments on the mountaintop and to 
the east were far more restricted in potential, although unfortunately these were also 
locations with highly enthusiastic and politically active PHC workers and officials. A 
few possibilities did present themselves for source renovation, without immediate 
downstream effects, but for some villages we saw no possibility of augmenting supplies 
without conflict, as improvement could only involve come from the transfer of water 
from another source to a village territorially contested by others. Also, as sources were 
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small and dispersed, this meant financing projects with high per capita costs and 
sometimes very low per capita consumption levels. These initially provided severe 
challenges to design procedures and decisions, as Oxfam itself and other central 
agencies had to convince themselves that interventions still brought benefits and were 
`good' development. Several of our project designs would supply under 40 litres per 
capita a day, thus assuming that other sources might still need to be used (like cisterns) 
for drinking water supply to be sufficient for a whole village. All of our designs also 
worked with collective spring points, or standpipe systems, and never with house 
connections, mainly to keep consumption low - although in one case a village later 
adapted the system configuration to give more house connections. 
6.2.3 Changing governance 
The republican framework of government in the YR began in 1962, when a military 
revolt overthrew the. religious autarky of the Imam and proclaimed a republic. This 
revolt was followed by a protracted civil war, which exiled in 1969. A new Constitution 
came into force in 1970 (Caponera, 1973). Concerted development effort began in the 
YR with a Three year Plan 1973/4-1975/6. There had been three five year plans (FYP) 
by 1984, which had developed both central and local expenditure programmes. 
Constraints on central government funds meant, however, that finance for drinking 
water improvements were raised either from aid donors or from local sources. 
The Constitution stipulated that Islam was the state religion, and Islamic law 
(Shari'ah) constituted the basis of all legislation. Nevertheless, much of the Highlands 
of the YAR was characterised by a tribal political organisation with its own customary 
law. While this often derived from Koranic guidelines, there were customs that 
predated Islam, which were recognised providing that they did not conflict with 
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Shari'ah rulings. The tribe itself could take responsibility for law and order separate 
from other courts, and this was particularly common in water conflicts. 
Thus one of the key political issues had always been the coordination of local 
representatives with the central government. The derivations of forums and procedures 
inevitably reflected both tradition and new political ventures. Both of these could 
involve religion in an Islamic country. The Tihama and southern areas of YAR became 
Shafite in doctrine (a Sunni sect) in the early years of Islam. The population of the 
Highlands became Zaidis, (a Shiite sect), following Zaid, who was connected by 
marriage to the family of the Prophet Mohammed. In Raymah both groups were 
present, including sheikhly families claiming dynastic links to the Prophet Mohammed. 
The western slopes of Raymah also experienced Turkish administration in first part of 
this century. Al Jabin district was thus a particularly complex mixture of old and new 
families, powerful elites and poor villagers (including ex slaves), and old republican 
and rehabilitated ex royalist fighters. It proved a particularly difficult environment in 
which to assess the reality of tribal traditions in water management and the scope of 
new civil structures in encouraging water development. 
Although the advent of the Republic did not change the scope of existing laws, it did 
change their administration. Traditionally, disputes had moved through a series of local 
representatives, depending on the scale or nature of the problem. Many local leaders 
had derived their wealth from fees for settling disputes which had moved beyond the 
scope of the traditional local representatives (see section 6.5). However, by 1985, many 
districts had a centrally appointed, legally trained district officer (nudiir-al-nahiyya), 
available as a judicial alternative, or who participated in adjudication alongside local 
leaders (he was also there to ensure security). This availability of `central' justice 
meant a loss of power for some local leaders, and also represented new opportunities to 
present claims in water disputes. Although we did not understand this fully initially, it 
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was inevitable that pressures from economic and technical change, together with these 
legal changes, would bring a clash between these systems in adjudicating claims on key 
resources - like water. 
Islam had also been used to shape and fund local administration at this time. Prior to 
the revolution there was no standard local administration, and the new central 
government needed a structure to link the provinces with the centre. They used the 
Islamic principle of welfare groups, originally called Local Development Associations 
(LDA's), but these were not an indigenous local structure. These associations grew 
from 29 in 1973 to 203 by the end of the first FYP. With the shortage of educated 
manpower in the rural areas, many of the posts on these councils had been occupied by 
influential landowners and religious representatives, especially early in the history of 
the LDA's. In Al Jabin, PHC workers were often related to local council 
representatives, or become representatives themselves, and were almost always part of 
families with substantial agricultural interests. There was no reason to expect them not 
to promote their local and personal interests within political support for improved water 
supplies. 
These associations had their roots in Islamic principles of charity, particularly the 
'zakat' donations required from all Moslems. Religious guidelines on zakat did restrict 
the access by central government. 'Zakat' is a portion of personal wealth to be set aside 
for the needy and the poor, and is recognised as the second most important activity of 
Islam after worship. Guidelines exist for all forms of wealth in agricultural production, 
merchandise and personal wealth. The use of zakat should be organised, and only be 
distributed individually if there is no local communal organisation. Other rulings 
include: that the zakat of every locality should be spent in that locality, and that it is not 
good to send zakat from one locality to another except in cases of calamity. Finally, a 
share of the zakat can be paid to those that collect it. 
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Until 1985, LDA's had considerable autonomy in the collection of local taxes (there 
was a local annual 'head tax' in addition to zakat), and their subsequent use. The most 
popular targets of funds had always been schools, health clinics, water projects and 
roads. The collection of taxes was overseen by the Confederation of Yemeni 
Development Associations, who returned 75% of funds collected, but who themselves 
had little budget or manpower for monitoring either the collection of zakat or the 
efficiency of expenditure. In 1985, the structure of local councils was revised. Local 
councils were renamed Local Councils for Cooperative Development (LCCD's), who 
coordinated representatives from the smallest administrative unit, the uzla, into a local 
district council, which were then linked to subgovernorate and governorate 
administrative councils. (These arrangements and councils no longer exists. ) Zakat 
taxes were collected by the Ministry of Finance, and were given back b the local 
councils as an agreed budget, not simply a fixed percentage. This budget was drawn up 
at the district level. By 1987, the Central Ministry had begun audits of LCCD and 
closed several for financial mismanagement. In the water project work, we found 
working with these budgets involved problematic is sues of the exercise of power. 
Proposals reflected what representatives wanted to happen, for personal interest and 
apparent constituency support. Nevertheless, it was in these budgets that our 
reputations and options had to be developed, if there were to be any prospects for 
improving rural water supply. (Interviews with CLCCD and LCCD leaders, 1985- 
1986). 
Thus in Al Jabin we had subtle but critical distinctions between institutional actors 
involved in (1) local traditional representation of customary law, (2) those concerned to 
promote new uses of water, and (3) those administering disputes. Failure to understand 
s In 2000, a new Local Authority Law was approved by Parliament, which mandated elected local 
councils, which also had a new range of decentralised financial and administrative powers for 
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them and to access the right people meant failure to promote an appropriate forum to 
gain information on the physical availability of water and the social space for debate. In 
the programme discussed here, tensions between old and new legal representatives, and 
elected representatives and villagers, all came to be reflected in struggles to obtain 
water projects. However, when I began work, I still looked to conventional elites - 
village sheikhs, PHC workers and teachers - for most information. 
63 TRIBALISM, ISLAM AND CUSTOMARY LAW IN WATER MANAGEMENT 
The existence of an extensive body of Islamic law for all aspccts of socicty, and the 
central importance of water in many Islamic societies, has misled donors into thinking 
that there is be a cooperative spirit in the dcvclopmcnt of water projects, and that there 
can be a forum in which management solutions are easily hammered out. This was far 
from the case in reality, for several reasons. 
The first reason was the ongoing rccognition of customary law in %%itcr 
management, which was actually very complex because of the practical day-to-day 
concessions that often underlay the ideal principles. Secondly, while the importance of 
'brotherhood' and coexistence in a tribe mean that disputes vould be settled within 
customary law where possible (Mahdi, 1986), this did not prevent disputes which were 
often opportunistic and irrational, and sometimes very bitter. Most disputes went to 
wider courts only in desperation because of cost, unless these new courts provided a 
specific opportunity to make a claim. Thirdly, religious guidelines could only be used 
for problems discussed in the Koran or subsequently derived bodies of law. New 
technologies, especially pumps, borcwclls and pipelines, provided huge challenges to 
dcvclopmcnt and management of services under a governorate administration. The first elections were 
held in April 2001: the term for local councillors was five years in 2004. 
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customary and religious law which many enterprising farmers had no qualms about 
making in the 1980s. 
Another reason was the distinction between which aspects of water management 
were collective and what could be privately controlled. Even though the 'Law of Thirst' 
insisted that all individuals must be allowed to drink water, the nature of access could 
become very different between water sources and as competition for water developed. 
In Al Jabin, no one was ever refused a drink of water, but the controllers of a water 
source could and did refuse the right of individuals to fill containers, or charged them 
for this activity. The opportunities for drinking water development offered by the Law 
of Thirst were also made more complex by an additional guideline that water should 
never be wasted, and that any surplus water should be always made available for 
irrigation. These `tacit' guidelines caused some specific design attributes of water 
points, although at first I saw these as just poor construction. 
One key to understanding these guidelines on access and appropriation was the rule 
that water cannot be owned or charged for unless it was stored and measured. Thus in 
terms of water as property, water resources management was collective: it was only 
after that it was mobilised and conveyed that it could become private property. Mahdi 
(1986) noted that water rights may be seen as private property, in that they could be 
inherited, sold or rented/sharecropped, but were not actually thus defined. For most 
situations, there was a tension between a natural tendency for individuals to attempt to 
control a water source in its entirety, and the preservation of access by a group. 
Water flowing in small natural streams, irrigation canals, and from springs and wells 
developed jointly, was subject to joint ownership, with upstream users having priority 
over downstream users. However, water contained in receptacles or tanks, or wells and 
springs developed by an individual on their own land, was subject to private 
appropriation. Some Islamic sects recognised the principle of 'harim', whereby no water 
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project could be constructed within a specified distance of another project. In the YAR 
this distance was supposed to be 500m for well developments, but there was no 
evidence of this ruling operating in Al Jabin. Finally, anyone who developed a water 
source on 'unoccupied' land could lay claim to that water (Caponcra, 1973). 1 show in 
section 6.5 that this last guideline was an important cause of disputes in the mountains 
of Raymah. 
There were then relatively few sources of information in Arabic or English on 
customary law for water in the YR (Makin, 1977: Varisco, 1982,1983). The work 
available, however, stressed a division between the organisation of irrigation water 
from flash floods or intermittent streams, and permanent flow supported from 
groundwater. Varisco (1983) distinguished these as 'sayl' and 'ghayl' respectively. 
Varisco (1982) also cited the Islamic jurist Al-Mawardi (1960) as distinguishing three 
types of spring: 
1) natural flow out of the ground, which was free for all to use; 
2) springs opened up on private land; 
3) springs opened up on unowned land, the effort of which conferred private 
ownership but with certain communal obligations. 
Thus 'streams' in particular had a variety of forms of organisation of water rights 
depending on their hydrological origins. In Al Jabin, all streams were supported by 
groundwater flow. Since these streams night result from any one of the three kinds of 
'spring' flow discussed by Al-Mawardi, we had some variety in the organisation of 
water rights for their use. These rights were complicated further by the issue of whether 
there was land by the stream for cultivation, or whether water had to be conveyed. 
Varisco (1982) went on to discuss the importance of understanding exactly what a 
'share' or'right' to water was, especially the need to distinguish between rights of access 
and the physical appropriation of amounts of water. In Al Jabin, conflict or uncertainty 
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did arise over drinking water projects, because installation of piped water to a village 
previously having only rights of access to a water point was seen as a form of physical 
appropriation (see section 6.5). 
Both Mahdi (1986) and Varisco (1983) discussed the way tribal groups developed a 
management strategy in relation to available technology, judicial rules and norms of 
social conduct, and not only to water quantity or source. Malrii (1986) (like Bromley 
and Cernea, 1989) noted how there was a dual challenge in water management: that 
posed by the environment, which the group overcomes by using its technical 
knowledge, and that posed from other groups who compete for water. Given the 
complexity and flux of legal provision at the local level, it became critical to 
differentiate what could be determined within the tribal water management system, and 
what could be directed by the state, and what was not resolvable by either in 1985. 
This legal control affected not only the technical scope of what we could undertake, but 
also the kinds of risks that villagers and representatives would take in claiming and 
intensifying use of water sources. Some aid donors had moved to the idea that it was 
certain types of water sources which are undevelopable, especially springs and cisterns. 
I contend here it is rather the way a particular source offers scope for political 
opportunism which determined the likelihood of water disputes. 
New technologies and new interventions are new opportunities for personal power: 
in this work I found they were not only being used to circumvent rules in order to 
obtain individual control of water. They were also being used (as were the donors with 
them) to renegotiate or stake a claim over resources. Also, disputes were raised and 
taken to new forums as a way of exposing previous legal settlements over which there 
was still tension. Sometimes these disputes were used to settle personal scores. 
Mahdi (1986) pointed out the subtleties of tribal water use that can confuse any 
outsider trying to understand, let alone rationalise, water use, in his study of a Berber 
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community in the High Atlas of Morocco. He made four observations on this 
community which were relevant to Al Jabin district. The first point is that even though 
rules might appear precise and complex, they were actually only theoretical guides, and 
were often corrected and adapted to the difficulties of the moment. Mahdi noted that 
the same Berber who enthusiastically described the delicate communal water sharing 
system that controlled his life would also explain how this system could be 
circumvented. Peaceful coexistence was important, and rigid adherence to the rules 
signified a crisis in the group. 
The second point was consequent to the first. Rules were periodically ignored, so 
that while the system served as a foundation, it was supplemented by improvisation. 
Such adjustments were not part of traditional law, but were derived from local customs 
and relations, so that it could be difficult to understand the real local daily organisation. 
The complications were such that tribesmen preferred to discuss their system in the 
ideal terms of water rights rather than the actual utilisation. Thus oral history on the 
actual permutations of water access, and why it was permitted, was a vital key in the 
operation of the system. We found this also in Al Jabin. 
Mahdi then discusses how this knowledge was held by specialists who distributed 
the water, or notables in the village who took responsibility for water. This point was 
very important, as it emphasises the role of knowledge in the community as well as 
allocative roles. By virtue of being monopolised by a few, this knowledge could be 
manipulated if required. The status of those who used the water, the oral historians, 
those who allocated water and those who legislated, and the balance of power between 
them, were factors that determined how water rights were interpreted and enforced, but 
this balance was always changing. It was this evolving balance which lay at the root of 
many disputes in Al Jabin. 
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The final point from Mahdi's work concerned the way physical and technical 
constraints led to the communal use of water, which in turn prevented other groups 
from using it. He described the existence of groups within the tribe, endowed with 
specific territory. Each group consisted of several villages, each of which was a 
conglomeration of lineages from several extended families. Members of the group 
shared a strong identity in three ways - of territory, of social origins and of mutual 
defence. This group appropriated the resources of its territory, including jurisdiction 
over water, with rights to defend against the ambitions of neighbours and protect its 
members. However, rights of use did change with conquest and land ownership. Mahdi 
made the important distinction of two models of communal ownership - property of the 
group and property of the village. Thus rights could actually change their form between 
smaller and larger social goups, with rights distinguished between smaller and larger 
social groups, and between groups, villages, lineages and extended families. 
Allegiances altered depending on the location of the threat. 
Such patterns of allegiances also appeared to exist in Al Jabin, and possibly 
explained why certain projects could be developed without difficulties, whereas 
elsewhere projects proved impossible. However, in Al Jabin, the picture was greatly 
complicated by land ownership, and particularly by the large and diffuse landholdings 
of certain families. Thus local group interests could be profoundly affected by the 
aspirations of individual landowners resident elsewhere, with different group 
affiliations. 
Varisco (1983) made an overview of studies of the link between type of water 
source and tribal organisation within a study of small-scale irrigation management in 
the yAR. In his case study of a Highland spring system, Varisco demonstrated that 
there was little need for day-to-day supervisory activities as the irrigator was capable of 
handling the entire sequence of activities involved in irrigation by himself. Thus 
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although there was an elected official, the wakil (called - 'agil in other areas) 
responsible for the solution of disputes, he had no decision. making responsibilities in 
the distribution process or production system. He was more the keeper of knowledge 
and history of rights. The lack of an authoritative role or position with major economic 
rewards for the wakil was a function of the viability of local tribal customary law for 
regulating water and land. He materialised when there was a conflict, and did not even 
necessarily live permanently in an area. 
I found a similar pattern in Al Jabin. What is of interest is that I was never 
introduced to a wakfl as part of our initial discussion of the suitability of a water 
project. Our facilitator was the local government representative, or the PIIC worker, 
who may or may not have been providing accurate information about the water source. 
My counterpart was also involved in the discussion of projects, and thus passed on 
information that he could get from others, but then had to present the information in a 
way that was appropriate to the debate, and in a way that foreigners could understand. 
It was to our disadvantage that we failed to make distinctions on the location of 
knowledge until bad disputes showed us their importance. They were not hidden from 
us, but we just never asked to meet them. It was our bias on styles of contact and 
information flow that stopped us from asking the right questions from the right people. 
Because we initially failed to understand the types of local representation, we could not 
initially participate in a forum that reflected the changing politics in water management. 
Both Varisco (1983) and Mahdi (1986) showed that, while local groups did maintain 
allocative roles for coexistence, they turned to a 'supra-group' for 'supra-community' 
problems. If the problems were infrequent, this procedure for settling disputes night 
actually preserve cohesion. However, frequent and/or violent conflict rendered the tribe 
unfeasible. Varisco (1983) noted the work of Wilkinson (1977) and Fcrnea (1970) who 
agreed that tribal political organisation was unlikely to be able to cope with problems 
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of cross-group communal organisation and upstream- downstream water conflict. Some 
of these problems could come from new technology, and others night be the normal 
opportunism that did characterise tribal society in the YR. The problem for Al Jabin in 
the mid- 1980's was the change and uncertainty in the provision of this 'supra- 
community' legal role, between the new centrally appointed mudiir-al nahiyya and 
traditional adjudication from religious and sheikhly elites. A critical question for us 
thus became which projects would provoke this'supra- community' conflict. I came to 
understand that springs and other water systems were not inherently fraught with 
disputes, only those which provoked'supra- community' tensions. 
6.4. CHANGING TECHNOLOGIES IN WATER USE IN RAYMAH 
Water was a scarce commodity over most areas of Jabal Raymah, and most of the 
sources were in use for irrigation. Irrigated crop options depended heavily on local 
microclimate, as well as availability of irrigation water, sharecropping controls and 
access to labour and markets This section is compiled from field observations and 
village surveys, 1985-1987. 
In the 1980s the most important innovations in water technology in the YR were 
pumps, pipes (rubber and galvanised iron), and the expansion of well construction 
technology. Most crops were irrigated through flooding of bunded plots, or by bunds 
around individual trees. There had been no experimentation with sprinkler or drip 
techniques. Drip technology was marketed locally, but was expensive, with 
polyethylene pipe commanding almost the same price as galvanised iron pipe of the 
same diameter. Roads and vehicles had also led to substantial transportation of water, 
both for domestic water supply and to maintain high value irrigated crops like qat 
(village surveys, 1985-1986). There was also innovation in ideas - the acceptance of the 
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idea that water could be transferred by pipe rather than carried by women and donkeys 
was new and still controversial for some leaders. 
Small-scale expansion of irrigation through excavation of new springs and seepage 
points was found on the upper slopes, expanding coffee, qat, fruit and vegetable 
production. On the hotter, lower slopes, small petrol or diesel pumps were used to lift 
water from wells or groundwater streams to irrigate fruit, vegetables and sorghum. 
Although borewells received much attention by aid donors, these were rare in 
mountainous areas like Raymah, for reasons of both access and geology. Three 
borewells had been drilled in the foothills on the western mountain slopes where access 
was reasonable. One was developed, although it only gave a low yield of 10 litres per 
second: one was dry, and one was still capped, more than six years since it was drilled 
(apparently because of uncertainty about which agency would corrplete it, and 
confusion about which settlements it would serve). 
More important for Al Jabin was new dug well construction: in recent years there 
had been both limited horizontal tunnelling6 and better construction of vertical wells. 
Better construction of vertical wells included lining of hand-dug wells (previously 
unlined in Al Jabin), using stone for large diameter wells tapping poor groundwater 
flow, or reinforced concrete ring linings in sites of better groundwater and reasonable 
road access. In the past, hand-dug wells were only an occasional feature of the upper 
mountain slopes, but were expanding: usually they tapped throughflow under the 
terraces, or colluvial deposits, in wells typically 10-30m deep. They were more 
common in wadis, where they ranged 5-30m in depth. This trend of well expansion 
offered private access to water on privately owned land. In both wadis and on mountain 
6 Deep horizontal tunnelling for infiltration galleries was not relevant in the hydrogeology and opography 
of Al Jabin. 
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slopes, expansion of hand-dug wells may bring greater competition into available 
resources, and influence existing spring and stream flow, long before borewells arrived. 
In Raymah in 1985, however, so far pumped wells had only expanded in one wadi, 
Wadi Al Ariade, which ran into Wadi Sirhan (village surveys, 1985). The proliferation 
of dug wells in this area, with no regard to spacing, had already caused drawdowns in 
the groundwater, affecting all irrigation farmers in the wadi, and the traditional 
domestic water sources. Water level depths were already typically 20-30 metres deep in 
the upper part of the wadi, and 4-20 metres in the lower wadi. Some irrigators had sunk 
ringwells and operated diesel pumps, but small farmers using petrol pumps operated 
these from within hand dug wells, and faced ongoing excavation and operation 
problems as water levels changed, just as in India from the mid-1980s. Irrigation 
farmers nearest the traditional drinking water wells had overcome problems of falling 
water levels by constructing storage tanks near their pumped wells, from which 
villagers could take domestic water. In this wadi we were offered sites on private land 
for the development of wells for drinking water development, with the suggestion that 
the owner could continue to use some of the water for irrigation (field surveys, 1985). 
However, elsewhere such wells had occasionally been reappropriated by the owner and 
used for irrigation only, and this fear was voiced in Al Jabin. We did not preclude the 
joint development of wells for irrigation and water supply, but would only consider this 
in areas where agreements could be properly executed and maintained - and we were 
never able to get such an agreement. 
Pumps require power, and projects involving pumps were popular since a generator 
could also be used as a source of electricity for villagers. In 1985 there was no grid 
development of electricity in the YAR: in Al Jabin over 75% settlements had their own 
electricity generators, with connections maintained only on regular payment of a 
monthly rate. Individual households could operate a small motor if there was no village 
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system. Thus the integration of a generator into a water project was of great interest to 
villagers, especially those currently without electricity or those who disliked the tariff 
levied by a private operator. The presence of a generator within a water project could 
also make collection of funds for maintenance easier, since charges for electricity and 
water maintenance could be collected together. 
Pumps also enabled the lifting of water back up a hillside, from cisterns or streams, 
thus enabling individuals or groups to utilise water that may previously have been 
unutilisable. However, they were expensive, and people did not like leaving them in 
situ in parts of the mountain some distance from settlements for fear of theft or damage. 
By 1985, pump lifting of water for irrigation had only expanded on one perennial 
stream rising and flowing through what appeared to be a boundary zone between uzlas. 
Small petrol pumps were in use, with farmers resident in the locality. 
There were a number of perennial streams, supported by groundwater, on the lower 
slopes and valleys in Al Jabin, and their utilisation was highly individual, depending on 
their hydrology, local settlement density, land tenure, and whether cultivable land 
existed by the stream or some distance from it. My first differentiation vas between 
streams that use and disappeared within relatively short distances, and those which 
flowed continuously through several 'territories'. In the first case, offtakes were 
permitted, and had either gravity offtake canals or an irrigation rotation in situ, 
depending on local topography. The potential for such water sources to be renovated 
and used within a drinking water project would depend on the relationship between the 
irrigators and the village(s) to be served. In some sites, streams had been developed 
into a piped irrigation system supporting coffee irrigation. All such situations could 
arise from classes 2 and 3 of Al-Mawardi's classification. Streams which flowed 
through several villages were utilised only for domestic water supply and associated 
micro- irrigation, except where all the villages benefiting from the streams were also 
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involved in irrigation. Such streams could fall under category 1 of Al-Mawardi's 
classification. We did not anticipate very large expansion of piping or pump lift 
schemes for domestic use on such streams, because of such complex traditional rights 
to their usage. The wide variety of agricultural and settlement conditions influencing 
streams, made them a difficult water source for which to state general principles of use, 
even within one district. 
Piping probably had the biggest impact on water use on the mountains of Raymah, 
especially cheap rubber piping, which was used to carry small amounts of water 
considerable distances. While homesteads near streams drew small amounts of water 
from the flow, the main expansion had been in the excavation and use of small seepage 
points. The usual technique was to construct a small cistern by the seepage point, with a 
pipe leading from the cistern which was opened as required. The main impact of this 
activity was to decrease the total volume of seepage down the mountain. Water levels 
in some wadis had fallen, and it seemed that subsurface drainage lines were changing, 
leading certain wells in lower wadis to dry up. While road construction, drought and 
deforestation were all affecting the groundwater resources of the lower mountain 
slopes, the private expansion of irrigation up mountain has also had an important 
impact. 
Clearly, there was considerable innovation and generation of new customary 
practices in water use, and some very subtle interpretations of guidelines taking place 
to enable this expansion. These changes were not simply a predictable response to 
market opportunities, rather they were possible because of the influence of local 
decisions given the scope of customary law. Many of these developments lay within an 
areal configuration allowing issues to be decided by villagers and their local 
representatives. However, I also suspected the influence of certain landownership 
patterns, where innovations were allowed on a day-to-day basis because that land was 
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farmed by powerful families, either directly or sharecropped. Thus the negotiation that 
could take place for individual smaliscale irrigation development was much more 
flexible than that which could take place for collective domestic water supply 
improvements. 
I also found that considerable private water markets existed in the YR. They existed 
in situ, for example where expansion of water for irrigation by pumping has supported 
separation of cultivators, water owners and pump owners, with complex sharecropping 
arrangements (see Makin, 1977). They also existed spatially through the transport of 
water, both for irrigation and domestic supply, and it was these transport markets which 
were strongest in Al Jabin. 
6.5. PLANS AND INTERVENTIONS FOR DOMESTIC WATER SUPPLV 
6.5.1 The visions of the LCCD 
The plans for domestic water supply improvements generated by the LCCD are shown 
in Tables 6.1-6.3: they focused overwhelmingly on rainwater harvesting and spring 
development, with potential borewell developments rating surprisingly low. This 
limited conceptualisation of the potential role of borewells was, I think, partly due to 
appreciation of their limited potential until more roads were built, and partly to the low 
yields seen to date from borewells developed in the western foothills: costs may also 
have been be a factor. 
As far as we a)uld ascertain from sites known, perennial streams fed by springs 
were referred to as springs in the plans, in keeping with Al-Mawardi's classification 
given in section 6.3. Hand-dug wells did not figure in the plans at all, although they 
were in use for domestic water supply in most of the wadis. This is presumably because 
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of the unreliability or paucity of yield in all traditional wells known to date, so that 
borewells were specified in preference. Throughout our work, we had to move between 
source development perceived as possible in this budget, and those perceived by 
ourselves and other government officials. We found that the local budget focused on 
cisterns and springs that were mainly seepage points rather than streams. 
TABLE 6.1 Percentage of projects proposed for development from different water 
sources, (source LCCD budget plan 1985) 
Water sources % projects 
Rainwater harvesting 48 
Springs 50 
Groundwater borewells 1 
Water trucking (I project) 
Total number of projects 192 
TABLE 6.2 Percentage of villages in plan served by proposed sources, LCCD 
budget plan 1987-1991 
Water sources % villages 
Rainwater harvesting 42 
Springs 47 
Groundwater borewells 11 
Total number of settlements 428 
TABLE 6.3 Range in settlement numbers in proposed projects, LCCD budget 
plan 1987-1991 
% projects with a certain number of settlements 
Number of settlements in project Rainwater harvesting Springs 
1 56 44 
2 16 24 
3 19 15 
4 7 1 
5 3 2 
Greater than 5 5 5 
Maximum number in a project 10 10 
liorewell projects mciuaea between I and 6 settlements, with 3 as the modal size 
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The tanker to transport water is worth highlighting as it later became a means for 
some representatives to criticise Oxfam as people took sides during a serious conflict 
that broke out. Purchase of a water tanker for Al Jabin was actively promoted by the 
PHC Hospital director (and powerful local sheikh and LCCD member), and this may 
actually have been one of the incentives to let the Water Unit start up. During a field 
visit by the UK Oxfam Director, this sheikh tried cleverly and strategically to put 
public questions to him about buying a water tanker, which he later also asserted was 
an agreement by Oxfam and the Unit, as another example of our unreliability. 
However, myself and others thought it was an untenable operating cost to shift onto the 
LCCD, and feared it could end up in private hands after the end of the project, apart 
from being uncertain where it could transport water from on a daily basis. With 
hindsight, I came to wonder if we should have supported this, although it offended all 
my own cognitive norms of locally managed water projects. 
Rainwater harvesting projects accounted for 48% of the projects listed, and 
encompassed 42% of villages to be benefited in the plan. Over 50% of these cisterns 
were for one settlement only, but surprisingly, the remaining 44% were supposed to 
assist more than one village. We were never asked to help with technical assistance or 
funding for cistern projects, so we had very little information about how several 
settlements could share such small amounts of water. I presumed this was only possible 
where the 'settlements' were extremely small, in fact almost individual family units. 
Also, it was rare in Al Jabin for a village to be totally dependent on cisterns, except in 
certain mountain locations within a restricted or poor groundwater catchment. Usually 
drinking water was collected from a spring, even if this was several miles away. With 
the advent of roads, drinking water was often trucked up to villages. Cisterns were 
more commonly used for watering animals and washing clothes. Thus the expansion of 
cistern projects was probably seen to expand the amount of water locally in general, 
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especially on a seasonal basis. Cisterns had been improved with relative ease, albeit a 
lot of expense, elsewhere in Yemen under Oxfam assistance (Merabet, 1985). They 
were rarely sites of dispute, but were disliked by agencies because they provided 
limited or unreliable water supplies, and often had major quality problems from faecal 
and animal contamination, could have bilharzia risks and suffered from siltation. 
However, sometimes they were the only option. 
The prospect of small dams across valleys was raised by some representatives. 
However, the most suitable sites in Al Jabin usually had considerable agricultural hnd 
at the site, and the cost of purchase would make such projects unworkable. 
Most of the Water Unit work was therefore proposed for springs, which were the 
water source preferred for domestic supply. In the planning documents, 49% of projects 
listed also required pump lifting of water. Gravity based projects were proposed more 
commonly on the western slope of the mountain, whereas pumped projects were more 
typical of the eastern part of the mountain. While there were influences of political 
representation and technical understanding present in these plans, they gave an 
indication of the ambitions and concerns to be faced from the side of local 
representatives. 
6.5.2 Visions on the possible from the Oxfam Water Unit 
As Unit staff, we visited the villalp first without per se accepting the technical choices 
listed for water supply improvement. Our approach as outsiders with different technical 
conditioning, vas to look also at options on all streams, and for more hand-dug wells 
and dams, as well as systems included on the list. Through this survey work and 
discussions with water users, we also came to understand more about which water 
sources would trigger disputes if they were proposed for further development, and also 
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which had what we at first considered insufficient water to justify investment (less than 
40 litres per capita per day - although villagers were often sure the investment would be 
worth it). 
We thus hit problems of lack of visible activity in the first year and a half, and none 
of the bigger projects in the LCCD plans gained approval Through surveys we did find 
springs that could support improved supply through smaller improvements, which were 
often easy to recommend. However, as these improvements were often quite cheap to 
do, we did not da them - villages could do these themselves. Such recommendations 
were a task we felt we could and should do, but they did not enhance project visibility. 
In the upper part of the mountain, where springs were usually small, most springs 
had been developed to provide a small collection chamber for domestic water. The 
quantities of water involved were very small, from 0.1 litres per second to less than 
0.01 litres per second, with many springs in this lower range (field surveys, 1985). At 
some springs, water was conveyed by pipe to a collection chamber near the village, 
with an open pipe for the outlet of water. If any surplus seepage was seen as adequate 
for irrigation, it was collected in a small cistern for irrigation. 
As a spring flowed continuously, most collection sites were muddy and dirty. Many 
villages had taken some steps to improve their spring sources. The simplest were 
improvement of the collection chamber, and concreting the area around the spring. If 
water and space were adequate, there could be attempts to provide a place for washing 
facilities (Howrah and Gotto surveys, 1984). In some cases water was piped from the 
spring into houses. These improvements had originally been financed entirely by the 
villagers. 
Our proposals was thus for two kinds: improvement, and construction of new 
sources. In several cases we were asked to improve the design and operation of existing 
springs. The commonest design faults were: 
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1) inefficient construction of the springbox so available water escaped; 
2) pipes of too narrow diameter, so that friction losses were too great for the 
scheme to function properly; 
3) zig-zag pipe laying, increasing friction losses and increasing the risk of air 
blocks; 
4) uncovered intakes so that water was easily polluted; 
5) inadequate filter at intakes so that pipes became blocked; 
6) poor drainage facilities around the supply point; 
7) limited storage so that collection was time consuming. 
All such improvements on springs were easily undertaken as long as all regular 
collectors of water could be supplied by the scheme. Negotiation was required if there 
was a loss of irrigation water through the renovation, or of land to the project, and this 
depended on the relationship between the irrigator and the villagers. With small water 
supplies, the irrigation income loss was small, especially if the irrigated production was 
sharecropped. Compensation could be arranged in money, land or water elsewhere. 
Commonly, however, villagers looked for additional sources of water to increase 
the quantity of water available to their village. This became mire problematic when it 
involved liaising with other irrigation interests, or claiming rights on finding a new 
source of water. Typically, villagers looked first for a new water source on unoccupied 
land that lay within the territory of the village. Sometimes sites were deliberately 
excavated to search for water, but several had been exposed through road construction. 
Again, we found no problems providing the excavation took place on unoccupied 
communal land within village territory. The problems always broke out in the boundary 
areas. 
On the lower slopes of the mountain, the springs were relatively larger, and were 
more commonly ponded directly into cisterns for communal irrigation, based on a 
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rotation system. These springs yielded in the range 0.2 -2 litres per second (villages 
surveys, 1985). Domestic supply was taken either directly from the cistern, or from the 
spring seepage above (for example, Matlas survey, 1987). We thought, from our 
western technological training, that these cistern supplies could be augmented by: 
concentrating spring flow; lining the cistern and canal; and increasing storage to utilise 
all night flow. The water could then be piped or pumped to village, as the terrain 
required. It was these projects which proved most troublesome to develop, however, 
because of the complex interests and numbers of people involved with them. however, 
disputes were often not associated with water access and water rights per se: they could 
often be opportunistic. 
For example, occasionally members of villages some distance away might have land 
irrigated within a system, and insist on benefiting from any associated new drinking 
water project (Merabet, 1985). Proposed changes were also an opportunity to challenge 
the village representative and continue old feuds. They were also an opportunity for 
groups or individuals to lay a claim to the entire resource, or challenge an older legal 
judgement that some villagers felt improper. Thus the problems with irrigation springs 
were not that their rights made them inherently unworkable for the introduction of 
piped drinking water: it was rather that particular conflicts could crystallise within such 
projects. 
In fact, I came across two instances of irrigation and domestic water supply working 
quite well together (Gotto and Howrah village surveys, 1985), and we suspected there 
were more examples in the district. These were both situations where considerable 
flows from large springs were piped around coffee terraces, and where differential 
domestic uses were permitted, depending on the relationship that the spring developer 
had with the villagers. In all cases, villagers were either allowed regular daily access to 
the irrigation pipes, or weekly access to use flows on Friday, the day of prayer. For 
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example, in one system women from certain villages were allowed to wash clothes 
using water from the system, but not to collect household water daily, although they 
were allowed use of the water for all purposes on a Friday. Other villages or 
households were allowed to use the system for all domestic uses every day, but at 
certain times. 
In another case whole villages were allowed to take drinking water from the spring 
system. In one case, we constructed a tank for a village that stored eater from its 
spring, with regular topping up from a local irrigation pipe network (Gotto village 
system plan and construction 1986), and from a local stream used for irrigation by 
villages downstream. All water in this case came from within one uzla. While there 
were regular arguments between families and villages, we thought that differences were 
reconcilable because all fell in one tribal territory7. It seemed feasible that a spring 
developer night allow the combined use of water for domestic and irrigated use if he 
had some economic leverage over villages through the operation of the system. 
However, where a group used a source for irrigation, and source improvements might 
benefit people now in another village, combining domestic and irrigation uses in one 
source was much more difficult, and a private developer might avoid it. 
The groundwater streams in Al Jabin seemed an obvious source of projects, and we 
were asked to consider them by several representatives. Streams on the eastern slopes 
tapped the major part of the groundwater catchment, and surface flow ranged from as 
little as 0.5 litres per second to 50 litres per second on the lower wadis draining towards 
Wadi Rime. We had no data on seasonality of flow. None of the streams were regulated 
or dammed. However, we met resistance to development for all groundwater streams, 
except for those with very localised flow and limited irrigation development As soon 
7 However, there may have been private commercial contracts and financial exchanges not known to us, 
since this fieldwork was action-based rather than observational. 
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as we examined streams in use for irrigation for potential piped domestic systems - 
whether there were complex rotational arrangements within a village, or a sequence of 
irrigators along a stream - we met with resistance, even though we argued that there 
was surplus in the scheme. Large pump lift projects (lifting water several hundred 
metres through a sequence of pipes) were particularly controversial, as they were seen 
to help villages that had no family links with wadi dwellers. (Meswar and `Oden village 
surveys, 1985). 
We had similar experiences of disagreements around wells. Although the council 
plan always specified borewell development, we persuaded them to consider renovating 
hand-dug wells in some sites, as this land was sometimes the only communal point in 
the otherwise privately owned terrain. The only well sites we visited that were not 
immediately controversial were in wadi sites where terrain made agriculture unviable: 
where they lay clearly within an uzla or related group of villages: and where the village 
sites were near the wadi, and thus usually incorporated the wadi within their territory 
(Wadi Ibrahim village survey, 1985). 
6.53 The struggles of territoriality on communal, unoccupied and boundary land 
I came to the conclusion that virtually all types of sources could be worked with in 
Jabal Raymah, for irrigation or very small cDnsumption of domestic water because 
local customary practice was actually very flexible. This was particularly true for 
small-scale irrigation offtakes, which could be developed easily within village territory, 
through family negotiation or private land ownership. New uses were being introduced 
on private land, and projects were implemented on clearly defined village lands. The 
main source of discord and delays in projects was resource management opportunism, 
where an individual or group made a claim to a source which was disputed or to which 
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they had no historic right. Sometimes the dispute concerned only one source, but a 
dispute could also be developed as a protest against the actual private appropriation by 
an individual or group of other water users nearby. However, the most serious disputes 
blew up over the question of rights to water development in 'communal' 'unoccupied' 
land. Also, it seemed that while most technologies could be used to develop most 
sources on private land, flexibility reduced greatly once we were dealing with 
communities. Territoriality was the key issue of how water sources could be used, with 
jealous protection of rights to water usage. 
This raised the difficult issue of what constituted 'unoccupied' and 'communal' land 
on a mountain, on which we needed more research. Uzlas on the mountain had clear 
boundaries, which often ran along wadis. These wadis, however, were often conveyors 
of considerable amounts of water. Frequently these communal lands were steep 
sections of mountain lying between the village and the boundary, often at some 
distance from the villages. It was common for an uzla to have springs and groundwater 
streams rising on communal land which the villages of the uzla did not use because of 
the distance of the spring or stream down the mountain. Often one upstream uzla 
allowed access by downstream uzlas on a practical basis, but still claimed the right in 
theory to dispose of those sources as they wish. This was a pragmatic solution, as a 
downstream uzla or village might lay violent claim to the water source if access cannot 
be negotiated and `allowed'. 
Communal land was usually uncultivable land, by virtue of its steepness, 
inaccessibility or shallow soil. Such minor problems, however, rarely defeated a skilled 
climber and terrace builder. It was possible for terraces to be thrown up in a short 
period of time and defended as a private claim to communal/unoccupied land, and this 
seemed fairly common practice in Al Jabin where water is involved. (Field 
observations, 1985). 
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Until recently, such tensions were resolved practically, in the way that Mahdi (1986) 
suggested. However, the pressure on supplies, and the new opportunities offered by 
pumps and pipes put these disputes back on the agenda. The issue was whether the 
access permitted pragmatically by another uzla or landowner had a force of law over 
the theoretical rights to disposal and use held by the traditional controllers. There had 
been several such disputes being resolved by 'supra- community' representatives in 
favour of the irrigators who had been permitted pragmatic access, and not with the 
customary tribal rights of control. These proved contentious because of family or 
commercial ties between the supra-representative and the irrigators, and also because of 
poor circulation of information among illiterate villagers on what was been allowed in 
these new rights of access. The following sub-section gives a summary of a water 
dispute that escalated into a conflict, that came to encapsulate all these pressures of 
change, and in which the different cognitive world, expectations and strategies of 
different groups burst out into full public politics. 
6.6 MATLAS: THE GENEALOGY OF A WATER CONFLICT 
On May 10 1987, shots rang out, fired into the air over the spring at Matlas. Within 10 
minutes, much of the spring box had been pulled apart. Within half an hour, the path to 
the spring had also been pulled down. No one was hurt, but there was an organised 
show of aggression that made everyone leave the site at this point. Within 24 hours, a 
well-known sheikh and director of the hospital was put in jail for his association with 
the conflict (some say this was as representative of the perpetrators of the violent 
measures, others because he was a party to it and did not stop it). 
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The Water Unit first became involved in Matlas in November 1986, when the 
President of the LCCD asked the Unit counterpart `Mohammed' (pseudonym) to do a 
first design and estimate to improve supplies in the village of Matlas, at a time when I 
was away. He duly did this, for a project costing about 120000 rials8. The LCCD 
president announced publicly that the LCCD would help Matlas and proposed to split 
funding costs 50: 50 with the villagers. Everyone was so confident that they advertised 
for a contractor in the newspaper. 
Matlas village met many of the criteria for support from Oxfam. It had about 300 
inhabitants settled in two hamlets, whose main water supply was a spring about 1.5 km 
from one village and 2 kilometres from the other. Because of distance and terrain 
between villages, the lower village had a cistern used for washing and watering 
animals. Apart from distance, a critical problem was the steep terrain near the spring, 
and the narrow path that skirted the edge of a chasm to get to it: two women were said 
to have fallen to their deaths trying to carry water here. The spring was excellent in 
terms of quality and relatively acceptable on quantity, yielding about 15 litres a minute. 
The village wanted a pipeline supply from the spring to the village. Several meetings 
were held in the village to discuss the project: following project procedures all families 
and village representatives signed their agreement (Matlas village survey, 1986). 
There were technical challenges that made the project expensive. One concern was 
over a lot of suspended pipe work necessary and the other that a small pump might be 
necessary to lift water near the spring. Off-road transportation costs were high, but 
these had already been covered by money collected by the villagers who had already 
deposited 50000 rials with the LCCD. We submitted the project to Oxfam in February 
8 The exchange rate at this time was 10 Yemeni rials to the pound. 
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1987, who became involved partly because no contractor had appeared and the rial 
began to lose value, so that the LCCD budget was insufficient. 
However, the spring lay in an uzla boundary area, and the struggle to claim water 
from the spring soon revealed itself. Almost immediately after the project was 
announced, men from the villages below Matlas protested that the spring development 
might affect their irrigation. Seepage and overflow from the spring fed into a stream 
in the uzla of Bani Bil Hood, where it was used to irrigate coffee. Then it materialised 
that the land around the spring did not belong to Matlas village: it belonged to a 
settlement in Al Jabin uzla above it. This group said they were willing for Matlas to 
use the water providing that Matlas wrote a letter guaranteeing their land rights. The 
dispute went to the new mudiir-al-nahiyya, the new state appointee, who in February 
ruled in favour of the Matlas project continuing. One man involved in the dispute 
from Bani Bil Hood was also imprisoned in the local lock-up for a month for trouble- 
making. 
I had seen the possibilities and problems purely % water supply issue, from 
physical perspectives. The stream collected water from a fairly wide stretch of 
mountainside. I argued that proper lining of the springbox and use of pipes for water 
distribution would stop diffuse seepage and increase flow, and we also offered to 
consider lining some of the local irrigation canals. However, the issue was not the 
quantity of water; it was about who had access, and might claim a share of the 
source if new entitlements were given. It was during these field visits that I met the 
wakil for the first time, who materialised to advise in the conflict, and also later in 
Sana'a. 
Two critical actors were brothers in a sheikhly family who owned land in Bani 
Bil Hood, and who were also the representative sheikhs for Matlas village and 
villages downstream in Bani Bil Hood uzla, referred to here as Abdu and Saeed Al- 
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B (pseudonyms). Both were members of the LCCD, although neither was Chairman 
in 1985. One was also director of the hospital in Al Jabin linked with its primary 
health care work, also supported by Oxfam. Whatever these brothers felt about the 
project, the representative for Matlas could not deny the interests of the village he 
represented in public. Possibly they thought they could control outcomes if any 
dispute went to the old adjudication forum they could influence. However, the 
dispute was also becoming a struggle between the old and new political systems. 
By early March 1987, the conflict had moved to another forum. Representatives 
of all villages and uzlas, and ourselves, were in the capital Sana'a, trying to contact 
both the national president of the LCCD, and members of the governors' office. 
After realising this, everyone convened in the house of the LCCD Chairman for the 
Sana'a governorate. Then an older story materialised. It seemed that some 3 years 
before, there had been a separate dispute about the spring between the villagers of 
Bani Bil Hood and Matlas. Abdu and Saeed Al-B were asked to settle the dispute, 
and took 40000 rials from the villagers of Baru Bil Hood as a fee. They wrote a 
paper saying that the land around the spring was the property of Bani Bil Hood 
(although it was seen by many to belong to Al Jabin). Many villagers did not know 
the contents of the paper because they could not read. Several did know, but were 
too scared to be identified as ringleaders until the dispute of 1985 started to escalate. 
Although the villagers of Bani Bil Hood at first resisted the water project, they 
then said they would agree if Matlas village paid 50000 rials for a right to use the 
spring, as a kind of compensation. Abdu Al-B had been in the Governor's office 
making the case for Matlas to pay this money earlier that day. Matlas villages said 
they would not pay. Abdu Al-B attacked Oxfam further at this meeting: it appeared 
he had not realised that Oxfam was moving so quickly to help the project and had 
thought he could delay it within LCCD budget politics. He argued that the project 
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could not be approved because LCCD funds could not be released yet. We had not 
heard that yet (and he was right), but argued that if the scheme was approved in 
principle, surveys could begin with a view to the project starting. We also later 
found out that one reason for delay was investigations into financial mismanagement 
of local councils by their national council. January 1987 had been their first visit to 
Al Jabin and they had found financial irregularities under the previous LDA of 
which Abdu AI-B had been treasurer. In a long public diatribe, the project was 
attacked for not doing enough and failing to back proposals from the LCCD. 
(Project notes, 1987). 
At the end of the evening, the Unit counterpart was challenged by Ab du Al-B, on 
whether he was working for the LCCD or working for Oxfam: he replied that he just 
wanted to get on with working. The following day the Matlas villagers were given 
the go-ahead for the project from the CLCCD administration They estimated that 
lobbying had cost them some 20000 rials. They were given a letter saying that the 
project could go ahead unless the villagers of Bani Bil Hood could prove 
conclusively that the land around the spring was theirs. Oxfam supported 
continuation of the work, because they had been requested by the LCCD and 
CLCCD to begin implementation, and on that basis we began work. We purchased 
the pipes (gaining the warning from the Hodeidah supplier given at the start of the 
chapter) and had them transported to the roadhead. Villagers moved all materials 
down into Matlas virtually overnight in the hope to start work. 
On the morning when I showed up to start the work (having sent my counterpart 
to finish other work elsewhere as I did think there might be a protest), the violence 
at the spring broke out. Abdu Al B was put in jail for two days. Al Jabin town went 
on alert with concerns over further violence, but things quieted after his iclease. He 
claimed later this was done to him as sheikh of Beni Bil Hood, until the instigators 
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turned themselves in. The story on the market was that he just wanted 50000 rials 
for the project to go ahead - which some local people saw sheikhs doing often as a 
fee claim in negotiation, and in the end was not `so major' (although Matlas people 
remained angry). I was advised to stay in Hodeidah for a while, although I did return 
to finish my contract and the two other projects. Matlas villagers were left to 
reconstruct their spring, although they kept all the pipes we had bought in for the 
project. The Water project stopped in 1987, and one year later, its counterpart had 
still not been employed by the LCCD. If we had known at the beginning what we 
understood by the end the project might have worked. To this day, I do not really 
know if all the positive support stated in public only came because no-one believed 
we would start the project given our earlier slow record, as well as the belief the two 
sheikhs could control any background negotiation through their traditional power 
base. 
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Mountains are not only physiographic landscapes with complex hydrology, they are 
part of a social landscape, for which it is essential to understand property rights and 
institutional actors as well as the social structure of village life. land ownership and 
rights of access. The development arena of Raymah, with its extraordinary contexts 
of change, forced me into a new understanding of what non-government agency and 
key institutional actors could be, and that I needed a whole set of 'non-elitist" and 
non-scientific skills of seeing, listening and negotiating that I had never learned in 
my previous cognitive or scientific development. 
I also had to learn to work with non-scientific elites and tacit knowledge, to 
work almost without science as I had known it. Switching to a perspective of 
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scarcity (what people could access through available social means) rather than 
drought (as particular forms of shortage and lack) also brought technology into a 
new profile. I could see technologies were complex to introduce or reform, not only 
because of their intrinsic material dimensions and properties or amoral non-neutral 
impacts, but because of the tacit knowledge involved to keep them functional in a 
world of scarcity dominated by a desire to get water. The supra-authority was not 
vested in any technical rules like well spacing - which were so obviously 
unenforceable - but in the social structures themselves. The social rules to keep 
water within an uzla acted to protect `social catchments' to ensure water access- 
within which they felt their water use choices were up to them. I learnt also that 
exchanging cognitive frameworks takes time, and must often also involve action, 
that forces real knowledge and strategies into the open. These skills went beyond 
what beyond what my formal technical training and participatory methodologies had 
taught me so far. 
One could see too, how it was the rules around technology and information from 
its use that had driven the creation of scientific knowledge about the ecology and 
technology of the area, as Brook's classification suggested could happen. The 
testing of the water rights categories of Al-Mawardi against adaptations around 
hydrology in Al Jabin vindicated them as cognitive tools for interpreting water 
management practices, and in studying water project options in Yemen 
The problem was not that there is no water management in the YR- there is a 
lot of customary law. The problems lay in the conflicts that economic, technical and 
political circumstances were creating in certain sites. This did not mean that no 
water projects could be developed. It became a question of distinguishing which 
projects lay in a likely conflict zone. This affected both springs and well 
developments. Understanding the relationships between villages involved in a 
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scheme was also critical, as was understanding the relationships between villages in 
the locality of the water source and those villages actually being served by the 
project. Thus the nature of potential opportunism needed to be considered in the 
early stages of a project and legal advice sought. Properly drawn up agreements at 
the investigation, design and implementation stages, involving all villagers and all 
local representatives were time-consuming but aDuld prevent such opportunism. 
Such evaluation can also help limit the damage to the enthusiasm of villagers, and 
the reputation of individuals, that will be caused by a stream of potential projects 
which never materialise. The causes of escalating disputes can be studied, and 
solutions developed if an appropriate forum for local water politics is facilitated. 
Otherwise, in a situation of scarce resources, the donors themselves will be used as a 
resource. So much of the rhetoric of development before the 1990's was about 
transforming technologies and institutions in a normative direction. So little has 
been written about trying to work with people to transform technologies when 
wider politics are also changing. 
The struggles of the project showed not only the physical water scarcity but 
emergent structural water scarcity in the actions of elites to determine water access 
for their own groups. The material in this chapter echo some of the findings of 
Turton and Warner (2002), whose frameworks were recently tested by others in 
Yemen - Lichtenthaler (2003) described a sheikh who stopped all groundwater 
development in his village. There was the first order scarcity challenge in the 
availability of 'hater, and a second order scarcity challenge of social resources and 
adaptive capacity in their management. However in this study, the struggles around 
physical scarcity were already showing structural scarcity dynamics of the kind 
described by Homer-Dixon (1995), making second order changes in management 
very conflict prone. Within these changes lay a challenge not only to negotiate the 
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physical structures for resources use in a droughtprone area, but also the ability to 
redesign address equity and justice as it is seen locally. Choices of what new norms 
can work can only be evolved by a society given its developmental state, in which 
transformations in local and supra- local authority and capability are critical issues. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SURFACE WATER DROUGHT AND STRUCTURAL WATER 
SCARCITY IN THE LOWER ODZI WATERSHED, ZIMBABWE 
Neither the frugality of nature nor shortages of resources define scarcity... shortages due to 
poor harvests are not the same as scarcity, because it is the relationships between people that 
define scarcity... In traditional societies... shortages only equal scarcity when they became an 
issue of rivalry. Scarcity in the economic sense is related to the struggle for goods, which are 
scarce because they are an issue to fight over. This becomes the case in modern society, where 
desires are no longer restrained but freely expanded. Times, 1998, p. 84 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Zimbabwe is the third and last of the droughtprone areas to be studied in this thesis: 
this case study focuses on the Lower Odzi watershed, part of the Save river basin 
crossing Manicaland Province in eastern Zimbabwe. The variable rainfall of this 
watershed, from over 800mm in the highlands to below 500mm in the hotter drier 
lowland valleys, came to be echoed in segregated settlement patterns and land 
allocation in the colonial period. This rainfall regime, in combination with 
physiographic features, generated a river network that was perennial in good years 
albeit with a strong seasonal regime. However, the same social mechanisms that 
segregated land access also restricted access to river water for irrigation, creating a 
structural water scarcity that limited access to water more generally, and not only in a 
year of surface water drought with low or zero flows. How such drought problems were 
conceptualised and acted against, and how hydrological analysis reflected these 
frameworks and ignored analysis of structural water scarcity - and how all this related 
with the wider structure of the state in Zimbabwe - is the subject of this chapter. 
The state of Zimbabwe, and its colonial predecessor Rhodesia, has shown an 
extraordinary continuity in problem identification and technical norms in water 
development, across a country almost entirely under a seasonal rainfall regime, and 
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with areas prone to more erratic rainfall and drought that faced famine at certain times 
(Zawe, 2000). These norms evolved for the primary focus of land settlement zoning 
and profitable agriculture in segregated (white) commercial farming areas, 
accompanied by changing and variable concerns for smallholder agriculture largely 
segregated in communal areas (originally called native reserves and later tribal trust 
lands). Rainfall availability and soils were primary criteria in this zoning, while runoff 
data estimated from this data became a core technical parameter in water right 
allocation, and dam design. 
The history of the state has moved from settler colony gaining separate identity from 
South Africa, to the British colony of Rhodesia marked by segregated land access, 
through a liberation war and independence in 1980 that led to the so-named socialist 
independent state of Zimbabwe. However, many of the earlier water agencies and 
norms simply continued despite these political changes until the major legal changes of 
1998. Only then did a radical shake-up begin of biased and privileged water legislation, 
that underneath quite sound data collection frameworks, nevertheless gave very 
unequal water access to white and black farmers. Then a new Water Act emerged in 
1998 to change strategic planning agencies, revised representation of users within a 
river basin framework and transformed historical water rights into licences. 
Information for this study was collected between 1997-20001, at a time when water 
management was in transition under the new Water Act and Zimbabwe National Water 
Authority (ZINWA) Act. The research was completed before the advent of land 
occupations and laws supporting resettlement of commercial farms were enacted. By 
1 The study was undertaken within a longer-term collaboration programme between the University of 
Zimbabwe and the Wageningcn University, known as the Zimbabwe Women, Extension, Sociology and 
Irrigation Project (Zimwesi) because of the departments involved. The programme supported MSc and 
PhD research - some by individuals employed in state agencies - as well as research by collaborating 
staff. Access to information and data was thus relatively straightforward and open, and local farmers 
were actively involved in the field research, while the programme itself was well resourced for research. 
also with vehicles, and computers. Virtually all research developed from actor-oriented perspectives. 
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2000, over 95% of white-owned farms in Zimbabwe were in the process of being 
acquired for land redistribution, but not all farms were broken up into smallholdings. 
However, there was still a commercial sector present and the so-called indigenisation of 
the agricultural sector will not make the problems discussed in this chapter disappear. 
Rather the new political pressures highlight the importance of promoting a 
`smallholder' hydrology perspective' in future water resource management. 
Information sources for this chapter included: the register of water rights for the 
Lower Odzi watershed; literature in the National Archives of Zimbabwe; computerized 
daily and monthly river flow records held by the Department of Water Resources 
(DWD) in the Ministry of Rural Resources and Water Development (MRRWD); and 
computerised monthly rainfall data available from the Ministry of Lands and 
Agriculture (MLA). The network of rainfall and runoff data expanded in Rhodesia from 
the 1970's particularly, but was fractured by the liberation war. In a number of cases, 
data collection did not resume thereafter. However, same of these older data series 
were used, when there was no other available representative data for that locality. It 
also draws on the work of associated PhD research under the Zimwesi programme 
(Bolding, 2004; Chidenga, 2003; Manzungu, 1999), MSc research (Zawe, 2000) and 
special research assistance (Smits, 2001). 
Section 7.2 gives a brief overview of the Lower Odzi watershed. Section 7.3 
examines the historical development of water legislation and agency development. This 
shaped the data that came to be collected in the public domain, and its relation with key 
cognitive institutionalisation about the nature of water problems and tasks of water 
legislation and agencies. This demonstrates how norms such as the prioritisation 
sequence of water rights and classification of water within public and private domains 
echoed the broader political focus on commercial agriculture as it became ever more 
significant in the economy. Section 7.4 then introduces one of the critical technical 
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norms adopted to study water availability - mean annual runoff. Technical norms 
tended to focus around the generation of averages that helped in certain kinds of 
agricultural planning, but looked less at problems of variability of water supply and 
risks of drought and crop failure for small farmers. Section 7.5 returns to look at the 
historical evolution of settlement and water right patterns, their implications in water 
use within the Lower Odzi watershed, and how this created key actors and brokers in 
contemporary water management. In this watershed there had been a complex 
abandonment and re-scheduling of water rights, through the lapse of older farm rights 
in the liberation war and the development of many smaller `informal' off-takes in more 
recent decades. There were also a number of relatively old smallholder irrigation 
systems in the lower river reaches, which came in conflict with these more recent 
upstream smallholder irrigators a times of low flow. Section 7.6 studies the actual 
water availability and patterns of low flow and scarcity for water rights in the 
watershed, through what are quite conventional hydrological techniques previously 
unused by agencies responsible for water management. 
The study concludes in section 7.7, that there has been a shift in cognitive norms, 
especially recognition of the problem of smallholder farmers in registering water rights, 
and of the stresses now emerging at low flow on many rivers, through over allocation- 
and illegal use of water. However, there has been little change in basic technical norms 
that remain institutionalised within agencies, even while these agencies were 
transforming in administrative scope after independence. Hydrometric design (data 
collection networks) and data compilation methods still need changes if they are to 
address smallholder needs. There were various emergent problems for the 1998 law and 
the new organisations in this watershed when this field research ended in 2000. These 
may not only maintain stresses between commercial and smallholder farmers, but also 
leave dilemmas and tensions between smallholders and their representatives active in 
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new catchment management structures - for example between large and small permit 
holders and even between smallholders in different irrigation schemes. While the new 
Water Act gave a new platform for local agencies, the political and financial problems 
of the now underdeveloped and patrimonial Zimbabwean state have left little scope for 
new analytical study - except where external funding supported some of the new 
Catchment Councils. The challenge remains to find both resource monitoring methods 
and technologies that can develop more just and more reliable allocation and regulation 
in a complex river system, especially for smallholder irrigators. 
My own cognition had already transformed by the time of this research, and changed 
further during its process. For the first time I was involved in research concerned more 
to understand evolution of strategy within public agency. This was very different to all 
my earlier work that was largely involved with looking at development objectives of 
agency and relevant performance. Working in a country with such relatively strong and 
centrally directed resource management agencies, with a strong history of legislation 
and legal and jural institutions in water, gave me very different research possibilities - 
both to explore conventional hydrological approaches, and also the whole concept of 
'technology as legislation', not possible in the Indian case studies. Working with a 
critical mass of researchers, also many of them doing in-depth PhD research and often 
highly placed, also gave an extraordinary framework on which to reflect on these ideas, 
free of the institutional and academic politics that dogged often earlier research. Much 
of the work in the study presented here has also been written up as a book chapter 
(Vincent and Manzungu, 2004), as most published work this programme aspired to be 
co-authored2. 
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7.2 THE LOWER ODZI WATERSHED 
The Lower Odzi watershed encompasses the eastern tributaries of the Odzi river (see 
Figure 7.1): the Umvumvumvu and Nyanyadzi rivers were particularly important rivers 
in this watershed and are the main focus of study in this chapter. The terminology to 
demarcate hydrological zones changed with the new legislation of 1998, during the 
course of this research. The Odzi river is a major tributary (since 1998 called sub- 
catchment, previously hydrological sub-zone) of the Save river (since 1998 called 
catchment, previously hydrological zone). For planning purposes the Odzi river was 
previously divided into three hydrological units - the Upper, Middle and Lower Odzi. 
In the past, a 'hydrological unit' was the lowest level hydrological planning unit for 
water resources planning. The study area is actually now a `sub-sub-catchment' -a 
hydrological planning unit below the level where firmal representation present in the 
five new Catchment Councils. Under the Save Catchment Council created since 1998 
there is formal representation for the Odzi sub-hydrological zone or sub-catchment. 
The sub-sub-catchments or the old hydrological units, remain as areas only with 
managers or bailiffs that report to the catchment manager. From now on this `sub-sub- 
catchment' is referred to as the Lower Odzi watershed. 
The watershed covers some 2426 square kilometers, and includes several `Natural 
Resource Regions' - the landuse planning approach of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe based on 
annual rainfall and soils (like India). In its eastern highlands, this watershed has Region 
II land originally scheduled for intensive farming under commercial (white) fauns 
(rainfall 700-1050mm per year mainly confined to summer): this is the zone where all 
2 Most of the data analysis and archival surveys for this study were my own. Other researchers and 
assistants helped with compilation and computerisation of rainfall and runoff data and water rights, and a 
study of correlations between flows in tributary and main river systcros. 
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the eastern tributaries of the Save rise. In the western and southern parts, the watershed 
has Region N and V land scheduled for extensive farming - largely under communal 
lands (earlier called tribal trust lands, reserved for smallholder black farmers). Zone N 
has annual average rainfall in the range 450-600mm year and is subject to frequent 
seasonal drought, while zone V has less than 500mm average rainfall per year that is 
also erratic and unreliable. These areas face uncertainty in addition to seasonal drought 
phenomena: irrigation has thus been important for sustaining and intensifying crop 
production, and smallholder irrigation was encouraged, initially also as a protection 
again famine as in India (Roder, 1965). The hydrological diversity across these areas 
can be seen in the rainfall figures of Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Rainfall variation across the Lower Odzi hydrological unit 
Raingauge site Mean annual Catchment location 
rainfall mm 
Nyamabewa (') 745.4 Umvumvumvu river, old commercial farming area, hills 
Umvumvumvu 504.2 Mid-Umvumvumvu, old commercial and smallholder 
Cashel) (") areas 
Mhakwe("') 474.5 Nyanyadzi, communal area 
Calculated from daily rainfall records (i) 1945-1970/71; (ii) 1952/3-1994/5; (iii) 1963/64-1978/79 
Source: Ministry of Lands and Agriculture 
The site of Mhakwe in the communal areas had an annual rainfall as least as low as 
parts of India formally recognised as droughtprone. However, a few miles to the east, 
highland sites like Nyamabewa had higher rainfall, which in combination with cooler 
temperatures made production options quite favourable. Rainfall varies considerably 
from year to year and there may be cyclic patterns present. Figure 7.2 shows the annual 
rainfall recorded at Cashel Road raingauge in the Umvumvumvu catchment. Runs of 
years with lower rainfall are visible. The cyclone of March 2000 ended a decade of 
drier years, bit also washed out or damaged river gauging stations along the river. 
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These facts had a significant impact on the settlement patterns and Land 
Apportionment programmes implemented during the colonial period. The wetter cooler 
zones had the earliest white settlement and registration of water rights: the earliest 
water right in the watershed is from 1916, along the Umvumvumvu (Water Rights 
Register). The Umvumvumvu, with it more perennial flow and better rainfall was 
exploited by white settlers much earlier than the Nyanyadzi, although Bolding et al 
(1996) showed a longer historical use of small furrows by local people that was never 
registered in water rights. The drier, hotter zones were scheduled as native reserves 
(later renamed tribal trust lands and finally communal areas, see Zawe, 2000), creating 
an ethnic and agrarian polarisation along rivers that became particularly strong along 
the Umvumvumvu and Nyanyadzi rivers. The rivers were a source for irrigation. 
As well as extraction rights for commercial farmers, collective smallholder irrigation 
schemes were developed for groups of farmers along these tributary streams, and many 
small informal furrows were developed by local smallholder farmers, that were not 
registered for water rights (Bolding et al, 1996; Bolding, 2004). Seasonal and longer- 
term dry periods in rainfall created a seasonal regime in rivers, with periods of low 
flows. Surface-water drought became a reality not just from this seasonal flow regime, 
but also with eventual over-allocation of water rights and over-exploitation of resources 
relative to these low flow periods, resulting in competition for water. The historical 
date of grant of water rights prioritised rights to water at low flows- nearly always 
advantaging commercial farmers, and left fights and struggles between small black 
farmers in different parts of the watersheds (Bolding, 2004). At such times, 
downstream irrigators with formal rights in group irrigation schemes traveled upstream 
to close down the informal furrows of irrigators without rights (Bolding, 1997). 
The Odzi river receives tributaries from the western and eastern parts of its 
watershed (see Fig. 7.1). However, prior to 2002, all water rights for agriculture lay 
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along the eastern tributaries - the Whitewater, Wengesi, Umvumvumvu, Murare and 
Nyanyadzi rivers (Water Rights Register, Harare). The Umvumvumvu and the 
Nyanyadzi have been the most important river systems feeding into the Odzi in terms 
of numbers of water rights and stakeholders. All these rivers consist of a complex 
network of tributary streams with the drainage network strongly affected by the hilly 
topography. Both the Umvumvumvu and Nyanyadzi rivers have highly seasonal flow 
regimes and suffer from periods of low flows. However, plots of now over time 
suggest that flows are declining. Figure 7.3 shows the plots of monthly flow volumes 
for the Umvumvumvu river. 
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There has been a change in both the availability of base flow and perennial flow and 
in the level of peak flows since 1980/81. River flow is also sometimes subject to a drop 
in flows in the months of December, January or February in some years as a result of 
rainfall patterns, and this drop has fallen to lower levels as flows have become more 
erratic, On the one hand, this change was influenced by the more variable rainfall 
regime that has characterised this decade. However, it was also undoubtedly being 
affected by the increased abstraction of flows and changing land use in the catchment. 
These changes were the result of the resumption of agricultural activities in the 1980's 
after the liberation struggle, a subsequent redistribution of land, population increase and 
a more intensified development of irrigation to support livelihoods in the area. 
A similar picture of changing base flow emerges for the Nyanyadzi river (Fig. 
7.4). Comparing the 1990's with the 1970's shows an even clearer decrease in peak 
flows. 
Fig. 7.4 Nyanyadzi River, monthly flows, 000 cubic metres, E121 gauging station, October 
1966-October 1998 (source: DWR flow gauging records) 
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These hydrological fluctuations and uncertainties were the backdrop against which 
to study cognitive and technical norms portraying levels of drought and scarcity in the 
Lower Odzi watershed. 
In data collection, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe deserves some praise for its past efforts to 
create hydrometric networks and studies to assist water planning. Much effort was put 
into installing river gauging stations and rain gauge networks after the 1960's, although 
this network was heavily concentrated in the commercial farming areas. Zimbabwean 
hydrologists and meteorologists tried to use the latest techniques to study rainfall- 
runoff relationships to assist spatial predictions about water flows where flow gauging 
or rainfall gauging was difficult or non-existent (Kabell, 1962,1972; Lineham, 1972; 
Mitchell, 1963,1967,1982). However, the database available for studying rainfall- 
runoff relationships in order to forecast and assess the possible effects of land use 
change was extremely limited. By 1998 the rainfall records in this sub-catchment were 
often fragmented and out-of-date. Raingauge coverage was biased to commercial areas, 
with the exception of gauges linked to some smallholder irrigation systems: large tracts 
of old communal territories still had no raingauge. There was a real need to re-design a 
hydrometric network that can be used to study rainfall and runoff patterns over the 
watershed in relation to different land use practices. 
7.3 WATER LAW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR HYDROLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS 
The state of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia had separate Ministries for water resources, 
agriculture and rural development administration from as early as the 1950s (although 
names have changed, see Chidenga, 2003; Zawe 2000), and the fate of smallholder 
agriculture and irrigation has frequently been moved between agriculture and rural 
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development agencies. In fact, smallholder irrigation first became part of government 
action in the name of famine relief, under the Ministry of African Affairs (Zawe, 2000). 
Alongside these Ministries with development responsibilities, a Water Court eventually 
developed to deal with water rights issues. Almost from its inception the Ministry of 
Water and Natural Resources3 took responsibility for developing and monitoring 
networks of raingauges and rivergauging stations (hydrometric networks). The 
development of these networks start first in the older settlement and commercial 
farming areas. They began to develop more widely not only in relation to new scientific 
debates and norms for hydro-meteorological monitoring (Kohler and Linsley, 1970), 
but also in relation to how legislation slowly took more and more water sources into 
public control, out of private responsibility. While this growing public control indicated 
changes in cognitive norms on hydrology for development (which also echoed growing 
strength in government agency), technical norms of measurement and prioritisation 
have changed less. 
Water law has evolved through a number of Acts and Regulations, and only the 
most significant are summarised here (drawing from Havilland, 1950; McIlwain, 1936; 
Natural Resources Board, 1984). The fast European settlers, encouraged by the British 
South Africa Company (BSA Company), brought with them the Roman Dutch Law 
that had evolved in South Africa. From 1911 the white settlers agitated for 
independence from the BSA Company and this was finally granted in 1923. The Union 
Irrigation Act gave way in 1913 to the Water Ordinance and in 1920 further legislation 
was introduced. These ordinances established the lines of development for 
Zimbabwean catchments, notably through definitions of `public' and `private' streams, 
and the differentiation of types of use. The local promulgation of specific laws 
3 This Ministry has moved through several changes ofname. In this study the names of sections in 2000 
are used: Department of Water Resources in the Ministry of Rural Resources and Water Development. 
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provided the basis for the establishment of a water court to support this settler 
agriculture. 
A `public stream' was originally described as a stream within banks, with a flow that 
can be applied to riparian lands. Other runoff - that might be captured by ephemeral 
runoff across a vlei (depression or wetland) for example - was considered private. Uses 
were differentiated into `primary purposes' for human and farm livestock use and 
`secondary purposes' for irrigation or the watering of stock other than farm stock. 
`Tertiary purposes' included the needs of the mines and railways. The 1920 Water 
Ordinance stated that: `if a farmer has land well suited for irrigation and there was a 
stream that could be economically utilised, he could acquire the right to use the whole 
of the water for irrigation even though it left others without water except for primary 
purposes'. 
The ordinances of 1913 and 1920 set in motion a set of entitlements to take water for 
irrigation that would have profound later consequences. Of course, at this time the 
population of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe was barely 1 million and there was little visionary 
thought of what would happen as population grew and agriculture - especially as 
practised by smallholder `native' farmers - changed and developed. Prior to the 
enactment of the new Water Act in 1998, there were three Water Acts that shaped 
water monitoring and planning in Zimbabwe, the Water Act of 1927, the Water 
Amendment Act (1947,1948) and the Water Act of 1976. However, these never really 
transformed the way water allocation - and its hydrological analysis - took place. 
Rather, they refined and clarified procedures and brought in rules for allocation in dry 
years. These Acts actually tied in with important periods of settlement and changing 
political control, as well as changing pressures on the catchments. The changes in these 
laws have to be seen in this light, and there have been winners and losers in the process. 
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Under the 1927 Water Act, a Water Court and Water registrar was created that could 
issue and adjudicate on water rights. Also rights were identified as firmly attached to 
land. When land apportionment legislation created the Communal Areas (earlier Tribal 
Trust Lands), rights in these lands were registered with these bodies and not with 
individuals. Water rights could be not be `reserved for some indefinite use' in the 
future: they were to be within use within a specified period and failure to use rights for 
a similar period could lead to rights being revoked (Mcllwain, 1936): three years was a 
first norm. There was provision for appointment of representatives for the `native 
interests' in Irrigation Boards and in the Water Courts. Dams could be built without 
having to be registered if they were for `primary use'. It also empowered appointment 
of officers for hydrographic surveys, if necessary to resolve water issues (Mcllwain, 
1936). 
The Water Court fixed the conditions for which use of water was allowed. 
Application for a right for irrigation had to be publicized so that opposition could also 
be registered: provisional rights followed if there was no opposition or opposition was 
considered unfounded. Applicants had to specify the activity, and allowances for 
irrigation were fixed per acre per crop, for different times of the year. Before a 
permanent right was awarded, a permanent intake structure had to be built, and a 
certificate registered from an engineer that works had been carried out. Few individual 
smallholders using small water intakes entered into this process until after 
independence, however intakes for smallholder irrigation systems like Mutambara and 
Nyanyadzi did get registered through these processes, albeit sometimes later than their 
original actual startup date, and not without struggles. 
The one provisional right revoked in 1997 from a private farmer along the 
Umvumvumvu river was said to have happened because of irregularities found in the 
intake and use water as specified (personal communication, DWR representative). 
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Bolding (2004) documented several experiences in the Nyanyadzi river. For the oldest 
MuNyanyadzi furrow, the Water Court did insist on cement lining of the furrow and 
measurement of water losses during conveyance before granting a final water right un 
1936. Despite an effort in 1936 to gain a water permit for at least 1000 acres for the big 
new Nyanyadzi smallholder irrigation system, the judge limited the amount and the 
territorial boundaries that this flow could serve. This did keep options open for 
European settler farmers in the upper part of the catchment, but was said to be done to 
ensure that water allocated did get used by African and settler farmers before any larger 
amount was allocated in the Native Reserves. Limited staffing for the cks allowed both 
European and African farmers to abstract water quite informally. However, periods of 
low flows, or the incidental travel of officials in an area did bring `illegal' irrigation to 
light quite often Thiss shown in archived correspondence noted by Bolding (2004), 
who also described how, in 1947, Native Commissioners and representatives 
complained to the Water Court about illegal and wasteful irrigation by European 
settlers in the upper Umvumvumvu that threatened downstream smallholder systems 
like Chakowa and Mutambara (although proper applications were then solicited from 
these farmers rather than foreclosed). 
In 1948, there was also a protest against a new application from a European farmer 
on the Shinja river that might affect flows to the Nyanyadzi smallholder irrigation 
system, and there were further objections in 1951 through the Provincial Native 
Commissioner to the issuance of more rights to European settlers upstream of the 
smallholder irrigation project. A hydrological investigation was undertaken 1951-52 
which exposed more illegal African furrows upstream also, and led to proposals for 
dams and better registration (Bolding, 2004). The problematic issue of how to allocate 
rights and set priority access such that irrigation development was possible in many 
years with higher flows, while limiting stresses in years of low flows, entered into the 
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domain of the government departments responsible for hydrological assessment and 
planning after the 1947 Act. This chapter returns to this dilemma and different 
approaches to assessment in sections 7.4 and 7.6 
This 1927 Bill also clarified both acquisition procedures for water rights and also the 
priority right system to be applied during droughts, thus initiating rules that underpin 
many of the stresses found in the catchment in this study. Manzungu (1999) documents 
how the downstream Mutambara smallholder irrigation scheme tried legal action to the 
High Court in 1996 to stop abstraction upstream by a cooperative with a more recently 
granted right. However, the district administrator intervened to get the matter settled 
out of court, and it was still left to local irrigation staff to travel upstream and try and 
resolve the system unsuccessfully. Bolding (2004) also documented how the Nyanyadzi 
system had a `lower priority' relative to the rights to water at low flows of farms with 
final rights registered before that of the scheme. Hydrologically, it gave a framework 
for better studies of water in the catchments, but still maintained the public/private 
dichotomy that kept some water sources outside hydrological study. 
The Water Amendment Act 1947 (Havilland, 1950) brought this topic of the 
public/private dichotomy in water registration further under scrutiny. It noted that 
private water vas `that which naturally rises, falls or drains on to any land, provided 
such water is not naturally capable of entering any water course of natural origins'. 
This virtually confined private water to lakes, springs and vleis that did not have any 
effect, direct or indirect, on the flow of any stream. Proving this `hydrological 
disconnection' was, of course, a negotiated rather than absolute outcome, dependent on 
hydrological understanding and legal relations in a point in time. The Act, in 
redefinition of allowances for primary use, still left considerable powers for riparian 4 
4 It defined primary use as that for human and animals, defining the limit as 50 gallons per person per 
day, regardless of colour or race that could be used in gardens for sewerage, or anything else. 
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landowners to take water without reference to other water users. Through its loose 
allowances for primary use - especially for `gardens' and riparian users generally - it 
created scope for the development of unregistered small off-takes, the scale of which 
still remains unknown today. This might help explain the claims to rights by the many 
small water users who started to settle along the banks of streams after independence in 
1980. Dams could be built without having to be registered if they were for `primary 
use'. Under a white settler government (and a lower population) priorities of rights 
were perhaps never in doubt, and were enforceable. As the government changed, 
however, so too did the potential for control of water abstraction. 
While the 1947 Act tried to redefine private water in ways that might open more 
water sources to hydrological scrutiny, it also defined a zone that began to stay outside 
public study and management. These were the vleis (dambos or wetlands in 
depressions), springs and streams beyond public streams that were being used by both 
smallholder farmers and commercial farmers. It may have helped to fuel the further use 
of vleis, intermittent flows and lakes. This might also help to account for the declining 
base flow and peak flow of rivers. Finally, the Act recognised new uses in the 
catchment such as fish fauns and conservation activities that were the result of new 
commercial interests. 
According to the Natural Resources Board (1984), the 1976 Water Act was seen as 
an `amending Act'. It contained provisions that made it possible for the Minister to 
reserve water for future use and declare water control areas in regions where the limits 
of exploitation had been reached. It also required the better registration and technical 
survey of new dams to ensure dam safety. During the 1950's both irrigation and dam 
technology had become more sophisticated and much information and experience had 
come from the USA. The Act allowed for outline plans to be prepared for the 
development and use of surface water and for public involvement in planning purposes. 
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The 1976 Water Act also clarified and created regulations for permits for groundwater 
use for the first time - by this time settlement schemes were being planned based 
around development of borewells. The Act also brought in some hydrological 
definitions to help planning. It introduced the idea of `normal flow' as the criteria for 
planning purposes. This was `public water' not directly occasioned or caused by floods 
due to rainfall. By the early 1960's, hydrologists had started to investigate base flow 
patterns and rainfall runoff relations in the major Rhodesian/Zimbabwean rivers 
(Kabell, 1962,1972), but such analysis was never bought down to local river level (see 
section 7.4). The 1976 Act also provided for some stakeholder participation in such 
institutions as the River Boards (but which were never really established widely). This 
was a reaction to water management realities on the ground, where local arrangements 
were needed to deal with water scarcity. However, participation was restricted to water 
right holders. Then the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and ensuing 
liberation war stopped further hydrological refinement, modeling and local planning 
development until the 1980's. 
The 1998 Water Act (Chapter 20: 24) made sweeping changes in the institutions of 
administration and law. Water was no longer private property, and access to water was 
to be given through a permit system. Catchment councils were created with 
responsibilities for monitoring, the issuing of permits and the production and 
monitoring of plans. They could also appoint sub-catchment councils to help with all 
activities except the issuing of permits. The `priority right' allocation procedure for low 
flows was terminated, leaving responsibility with the Catchment Councils to propose 
controls as they saw fit during periods of low flow. They were also empowered to 
declare water shortage areas, if darns and stream flows dropped below minimum level, 
and able to reduce permit allowances where considered necessary. A new National 
Water Authority (ZINWA) was created to develop water management plans and 
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oversee apportionments between different sectors and public/private users, manage 
hydrological stations, and ensure the Catchment Councils and local authorities 
discharged their duties as far as water planning and potable water provision and 
disposal were concerned. The powers and responsibilities of ZINWA vºcre defined in 
the accompanying Zimbabwe National Water Authority Act (Chapter 20: 25). However, 
the Minister also held powers that made it possible for him or her to intervene and 
change the decisions taken by both the ZNWA and the Catchment Councils. Issues- 
related to water supply in the Communal Lands were mentioned specifically, and the 
appropriate Minister had the right to nominate an appropriate person to represent these 
interests (as discussed later, the Save Council included a communal leader from 
Mutambara Communal Lands). 
In terms of hydrological planning, the 1998 Water Act gave new recognition to 
hydrological issues. It encouraged localised, catchment-focused planning and 
management with stakeholder representation, promoted integrated water resources 
management, introduced pollution monitoring, and introduced a requirement to meet 
the needs of aquatic and associated ecosystems. Finally it gave a stronger definition of 
a `public stream'- "a watercourse of natural origin whether or not it is dry during part 
of the year or changed by artificial means" - which was to come under a Catchment 
Council. 
The DWR also continued to monitor and compile hydrometric data but how 
analytical work would be funded remained unclear. There was no strong commitment 
to improving hydrometric networks in the Act, and the acquisition of resources to do 
new monitoring and data compilation was left largely undefined. During this research, 
external donors did start to assist different catchment councils in their new monitoring 
work. However, no changes emerged in the Save catchment, where interviews also 
suggested that most available funds went on salaries and attendance allowances. Also 
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the issue of water use in gardens was not specifically referred to and the right to use 
water from `private streams' remained vague. Small dams could still be built without a 
permit. The new Act of 1998 gave a stronger integrated focus to water management and 
ecology issues. It specified (Water Act, Chapter 20: 24. Part iv section 67) that due 
consideration should be given to the protection, conservation and sustenance of the 
environment. While fresh attention to water quality and aquatic ecosystems was 
welcome, it introduced potential new stresses into the water allocation debate. 
7.4 WATER AVAILABII. ITY OR WATER SCARCITY? TECHNICAL NORMS AT 
WORK 
The way that water availability is described is influenced by the way it is seen to 
provide benefits and challenges to society, and how planners think they can control and 
develop it. Sections 7.1-7.3 have shown the emergence of several norms shaping 
agricultural and water planning: 
- the definition of Natural Regions in agricultural planning, in which rainfall and its 
seasonality was a critical element; 
- the concept of the `public stream' and its `normal flow' on which water rights could 
be allocated. In Zimbabwe, water availability was primarily studied in terms of 
potential dam yield if this flow as regulated, and the safe yield from such dams 
(based on flows exceeded - i. e. available - 90% of the time, or a 10% failure level). 
Planning studies also estimated the present level of dam regulation and yield and the 
`potential' remaining if more dams were built. Flow yield was classified as three kinds: 
Type A was the base flow of a river available throughout the year. Type B was yield 
from rivers at a selected risk factor, in this case with draw off equivalent to annual 
runoff exceeded 90% time, from small dams with annual storage. Type C yield was the 
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maximum yield that could be obtained from dams with overyear storage, with a 10% 
risk of failure (Ministry of Water Resources and Development, 1985. (For details see 
footnotes to Table 7.2). 
-a system of definition of primary use, related with priority dates in water right 
acquisition, that determined who got water at times of low flow; 
-a growing interest in dams as a crucial technology to store water against seasonal 
droughts; 
-a planning framework where central monitoring and consolidation of data that 
stopped at the hydrological unit of sub-hydrological zone level. In fact it was these 
major tributaries that were first the target of government efforts at major dams for 
regulation. Potential smaller dam sites were identified on the Nyanyadzi and 
Umvumvumvu rivers but never developed. 
These norms all helped to shape the evolution and reinforce use of another critical 
technical norm that became applied to all rivers subjected to flow gauging - the mean 
annual runoffs (MAR) expressed as a depth in millimetres. This parameter was seen 
as the most useful to represent the available water supply for development. The 
`scientific' approach was that MAR could be compared with rainfall for water balance 
studies, and also be related to increased potential runoff from an area after flow was 
captured by dam construction. 
This section investigates the different understanding of problems that emerged when 
this parameter was applied to local streams, to see the stresses `looking up from the 
field' - as opposed to understanding when it was just averaged for the Odzi zone - as 
central planners of the time did. By 1985, a set of calculations were in place that gave 
s Mean annual runoff expressed as a depth gives a parameter that can be compared with other climatic 
data expressed as a depth, such as rainfall and evapotranspiration. Typically it is calculated from runoff 
formulae which may include coefficients for relief, landuse etc. Estimation of runoff from rainfall has 
been a common practice where runoff records are inadequate for further study. 
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indications of what levels of yield could be supplied from dams, either from annual 
storage or overyear storage. However, while these `regionalised' water parameters 
could help in planning allocation and development in relation to total annual flow, they 
could not help in assessment of allocation of actual flows, which are studied fu ther in 
section 7.6. 
Table 7.2 first shows average mean annual runoff of 110mm for the watershed. This 
expresses long-term average river 
discharge as a depth over the catchment drained by 
the river (some older reports give this as 102 mm). This of course is much less than 
the average rainfall and reflects losses through evapotranspiration and seepage. As 
Water Resource Planning publications (Kabell, 1972) noted, this figure `is primarily 
dependent on rainfall.. . to a 
lesser extent it is dependent on catchment characteristics 
such as soil type, vegetation and cover, 
land use and topographical features'. The 
planning figure was in fact largely estimated 
from rainfall. This table begins to show 
what could be available for use in an `average year'- 
if all water were captured and 
stored: calculation procedures for yields possible with different 
levels of storage and 
risk are shown in footnotes with the table. 
Table 7.2 shows the Lower Odzi watershed as one where the reliable flow from 
potential dams sites is under-exploited, although the resultant safe yield from all 
possible storage is still very much less than mean annual runoff. This low `safe yield' 
potential of only 58 mm reflects the dry climate and problems in regulating rivers with 
such extreme flows. The calculation of yields from different levels of dam storage 
were all done for a 10% risk, i. e. that a failure of 1 year in 10 was a practical level for 
farmers of that time. 
In fact, by 1985 there were discussions of whether this risk could be raised to 20% 
once there was adequate potential for storage. By this time, more was understood about 
the water stresses that plants could withstand. Kabell wrote (in Ministry of Water 
316 SCIENCL 7EC71 OLOGYA%DAG&VCYLY711EDE; ELOPMENTOFDROUGif1TROAEAREAS 
Resources and Development, 1985) that farmers growing annual crops could adapt 
their farm plans to known levels of water storage. Farmers growing perennials could 
also estimate what levels of yield reduction could be withstood by lower levels of water 
application. In this context, the 1927 Water Act had allowed the formation of 
`combined irrigation systems' and Water Boards, shareholders in which would have 
water rights alongside responsibilities in payments of water rates and development 
capital (Mcllwain, 1936). Such combined schemes to supply private commercial 
farmers did gain rights in the Lower Odzi (for example the Pcnkridgc scheme along the 
Umvumvumvu) and elsewhere (Zaag and Roling, 1996, document the problems and 
actions of farmers in the Nyachowa system). Where they were linked with dam 
construction, shareholder farmers might even trade or defer rights in relation to oflllkes 
in a dry year. However, in unregulated rivers the priority rights rule was the only 
principle by which to allocate water rights in low flow years. Initial attempts to give 
smallholder farmers individual titles failed, and representation of their rights to water 
could only be claimed via the Native Commissioners (see Bolding, 2004). 
However, in 2000 the Umvumvumvu river still had no dams regulating the river 
overall, although some farms rights for small water storage. It was thus still largely 
what was characterized as a Type A river, where reliable base flow was still seen as the 
main guide to allocation. As section 7.5 shows, serious action to control rights and 
revoke the burgeoning number of licences really began in the 1980s as a new ardor 
began after independence. Most of the revoked licences were along the Nyanyadzi and 
Odzi rivers. However, while only one licence was revoked along the Umvumvumvu, 
the problems faced in the smallholder irrigation systems there also showed that 
allocation was probably going above reliable base flow levels. 
The Chakowa smallholder irrigation system (90 ha), located in the downstream zone 
of the Umvumvumvu quite close to its confluence with the Odzi, had its first block 
SURFACE WATER DROUGHTAND STRUCTURAL WATER SC. ARCITYIN THE LOWER ODZI WATERSHED 317 
developed in 1934 with a water right of 6011s: this was later increased to enable four 
further blocks to be developed, with a right of 112 Vs when water was available. In 
1970, despite construction of night storage reservoirs, plans for the last of these blocks 
were shelved as water supply was inadequate (Chidenga, 2003). Water stress was 
visible also in the current scheme, where tail end blocks grew less water demanding 
crops and had poorer irrigation frequencies and performance (see Chidenga, 2003). 
Manzungu (1999) documented the problems in Mutambara smallholder irrigation 
system upstream of Chakowa, also to get adequate water for all its farmers: Mutambara 
also had a two level water right depending on the flow available. Thus, for this study, 
two levels of development were considered, to represent what might be a representative 
level of allocation for low flows without serious conflicts. The first was the MAR level 
of 4.2mm, the consumptive use level monitored in 1970 (see Kabell, 1970). The second 
was the consumptive use level of 5.0mm measured against `available storage' of 
0.4mm in 1983, by which time the problems of Chakowa suggested allocation was 
already beyond what was feasible in years of low flow given actual storage levels. No 
full grants for water rights involving storage were issued between 1985 and 1998 
(Water rights register). By 1998, allocation had increased to the equivalent of 5.3 mm. 
A figure of 4.2 mm is thus used in table 7.7 to represent allocable base flow with 
minimal storage (less than 0.5mm). 
From figures, it looks as if the Lower Odzi watershed has an `underdeveloped' 
status, where there was quite some room for manoeuvre even if there were a few 
problems. However, when looking into detailed records and problems along rivers, 
indications are clear of the actual pressure arising from the levels of water right 
allocation in the face of a high variability of flow. Fig 7.1 shows the river systems of 
the Lower Odzi watershed now discussed in more detail. 
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Table 7.2. Lower Odzi Watershed, Mean Annual Runoff and Yield, from planning 
publications (Ministry of water Resources 19S) and Water Fights Register 
LOWER ODZI MEAN ANNUAL YIELD (mm) 
WATERSHED RUNOFF 
KM2 (mm) 
With annual storage(") 17.61 
2426 110 With over-year storage 69.34 
10% 'safe yield' with 58.00 
over-year storage (iv) 
Level of utilisation 
1970"' 4.2 
1983("') (0.4mm in storage) 5.0 
1998 (") 5.3 
(0.5 mm granted for storage) 
Derivation of figures (Source: Kabcll, 1972; Ministry of Water Resources and Development, 1985; 
Mitchell, 1963; Water Rights Register). 
i) The Mean Annual Runoff (MAR). This is long-term average runoff, seen to represent the total input to 
surface water potential. It is estimated from precipitation measurements (amount, intensity and 
distribution), with coefficients also for soil type, vegetation and cover, land use and topographical data. 
River Flow: Potential yields of rivers were originally classified as of three kinds: 
Type A: Yield was expressed as the base flow of the river available throughout the year and every year. 
Estimates were derived in relation to the baseflow of annual hydrograph drawn for (low) flows 
received in 10% years (i. e. exceeded 90% of the time). Even in 1985 it was noted that... 'thc volume of 
water in this classification is small and in most catchments in Zimbabwe it is already utilised' (Ministry 
of Water Resources and Development (1985) .. p. I 
(ii) Annual storage was derived as a Type B yield. This was the 'potential annual yield' possible from 
storage that balanced varied monthly flows, where dams were thus also quite small. Yield was estimated 
as 80% of an estimated storage capacity (this allowed for losses from evaporation). This storage capacity 
was calculated from a graphical relation, that related the total annual runoff with 10% chance of 
occurrence (estimated from the Gamma distribution) and Coefficient of Variation (CV). For the Lower 
Odzi the CV was 80%, thus storage capacity was 0.2 of the MAR of 100mm, or 22mm. Potential yield 
with annual storage was 80% of this 22mm, to allow for losses i. e. 17.6 mm. 
(iii) Overyear storage was derived as a Type C yield. This was the 'potential catchment yield' - that 
which could be obtained at a given risk factor over an indefinite span of years, using reservoirs that have 
overyear storage, that balanced out variability of flows between years as well as across a year. As it 
was dependent on larger structures, there was greater loss from evaporation and water is more expensive. 
In analyses, storage capacity was expressed as a ratio of MAR While twice the MAR was a working 
norm as a general practical limit, actual estimates were also related to the CV of annual runoff. For the 
Lower Odzi, the optimal storage potential in 000ni was taken as 1.3 MAR (expressed a volume). The 
CV was 80%, and the ratio of MAR taken for estimating 'potential catchment yield' was 0.63, giving a 
figure 0.63 (110) or 69.3 mm. 
(iv) This potential yield with overyear storage was further adjusted to build in a safety factor that allowed 
for risk of failure. The risk levels taken were 10% for agricultural uses, and 4% J )r urban use, thus 
planning estimates also cited respectively 90% of potential yield (yield at 10% risk with overyear 
storage) and 96% of potential yield (yield at 4% risk with overycar storage). These different general 
yields were estimated for larger dams for the subzone, by a procedure known as a Transitional 
Probability Matrix (TPM) that integrated likely reservoir characteristics (relationship of capacity and 
surface area that would affect losses), draw-off patterns and further statistical analysis. The figures cited 
here for yield from overyear storage at 10% risk were taken from Ministry of Water Resources and 
Development, 1985. Information on the TPM procedure is given in Mitchell (1967). 
(v) Calculated from Water Rights Register storage level is not assessed because of difficulties in 
knowing when and if some rights were increased from original oldest rights 
(vi) from Ministry of Water Resources and Development (1985) 
(vii) sum of all applications for rights summed from the Water Rights Register. 
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Tables 7.3 -7.6 show the mean annual runoff and the actual range of runoff for the 
various river systems within the Lower Odzi watershed as calculated in this study. This 
gives quite a different picture. The main river systems show a much lower mean annual 
runoff than the overall sub-catchment average of 110 mm, especially in their lower 
reaches, and the wide range of flows annually is immediately apparent. While this can 
be due to different rainfall-runoff characteristics especially in the drier hotter 
communal areas, it will also reflect the level of abstraction along these streams. Finally 
Table 7.7 shows the current level of water rights allocated, expressed as mm depth. 
These rights appear to be only a fraction of the mean annual runoff - yet they are 
already above the lower range of mean annual runoff. This indicates the high level of 
flow variation against which rights must be allocated. Thus a legal rights structure must 
be present that really can manage prioritisation or reallocation of water at low flows. 
Tables 7.3-7.6 also show that most rivers experienced a decline in average annual 
runoff along their course. The data in these tables is from computerized monthly 
records with the DWR: figures in brackets give runs of years used. In some rivers, 
upper tributaries/gauging stations have much higher rainfall, and often very high peak 
flows. They may maintain the same or greater base flow across the year than lower 
reaches of the same river, indicating the importance of these upper reaches in supplying 
base flow for downstream needs. These phenomena are also very important for 
planning the spatial allocation of water rights. 
Table 7.3. Mean Annual Runoff and Range Of Runoff, Lower Odzi, expressed 
from monthly flow data (years of 2aueinQ records used liven in brackets) 
ODZI RIVER SYSTEM MEAN ANNUAL RANGE OF MAR (mm) 
RUNOFF (mm) 
Odzi-Maranke gauge (1961/62-1999/2000) 113.7 5.9-336.2 
(upstream of Lower Odzi catchment 
boundary) 
Odzi Hot Springs gauge (1949-1974/75) 94.8 5.4 - 260 
Odzi Gorge gauge (1983/ 84-1999/2000) 77.2 1.0 - 402 
(downstream gauge before confluence 
with the Save) 
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In the main Odzi river, the wet season flow measured upstream of this watershed at 
Maranke Weir was 60-75% of the outflow from the watershed measured at Odzi Gorge, 
showing contributions from in- flowing tributaries. However, in the dry season, the flow 
measured upstream was twice as high as that measured at the outflow (Odzi Gorge) 
(Smits, 2001). This indicates both a limited contribution from any tributary streams and 
the effect of water abstraction, seepage and evaporation losses. These seasonal and 
spatial differences may also be affected by the policies for release from the Osborne 
dam. No new permanent water rights had been granted in this stretch of the Odzi since 
1991. 
Table 7.4 Northern Tributaries, Mean Annual Runoff and Range Of Runoff, 
derived from monthly flow data (years of gauging records used given in brackets) 
NORTHERN TRIBUTARIES MEAN ANNUAL RUNOFF RANGE OF MAR 
(mm) (mm) 
Whitewaters gauge 22.2 0-58 
(1968/69-1997/98) 
Wengezi gauge (1982/83-1996/97) 303.8 10.8 - 1300 
The upper rivers gauged in this hydrological unit show highly variable flows, with 
the intermittent Whitewaters stream well below the mean annual runoff of the whole 
watershed. The larger Wengesi river has a higher mean annual runoff with its ligher 
flood flows shaped by rainfall over the eastern mountains. 
Table 7.5. Umvumvumvu River, Mean Annual Runoff and Range Of Runoff, 
derived from monthly flow data (years of gauging records used given in brackets) 
RIVER SYSTEM MEAN ANNUAL RANGE OF MAR 
RUNOFF mm (mm) 
Umvumvumvu Cashel gauge 125 116.6 1.9 - 261 
1970/1971- 1997/98) 
Tandai gauge (1956/57-1997/98) 128.8 3.3-335.3 
Table 7.6 shows that the mean annual runoff depth in the Tandai catchment, an 
upper tributary, was substantially higher than the average for the whole Umvumvumvu 
system, with its lower rainfall zone downstream. In the Umvumvumvu system, the 
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upstream flow in the Umvumvumvu at the upper `Ostend' gauge near the Tandai river 
was some 40% of flows received by the downstream gauge in the wet season (Smits, 
2001). This indicated an inflow from other downstream tributaries like the Ruwaka and 
Nyambewa as well as flows triggered by rainfall along the river zone itself. However, 
in the dry season this upper river flow gauge showed similar or greater flow than the 
downstream gauge at Cashel Road bridge. This also indicated that there was little 
contribution then from other tributaries in the dry season, and even a reduction due to 
abstraction (such as by the Mutambara irigation system) or losses from seepage and 
evaporation. The Tandai tributary of the Umvumvumvu was, on average, equivalent to 
some 18% of flows in the wet season and 40% in the dry season of flows measured at 
the `downstream' Cashel Road Bridge Gauge (Smits, 2001). Thus any re-development 
of water allocation on the Tandai needs serious consideration because of its 
significance to dry-season flow given downstream commitments. The Tandai river and 
the McAndrews - Ostend zone of the Umvumvumvu river, both of which maintain 
base flow in most years, were the first main zones of European settlement. The gauges 
monitoring these flows were also the oldest in the whole Lower Odzi sub-catchment 
(operating since 1956): this shows the economic priorities in the original development 
of the gauging network. 
In the Nyanyadzi system, water stresses were especially apparent. Table 7.6 
indicates that several rivers showed runoff well below the potential MAR, and that the 
runoff equivalents decreased between upstream and downstream gauges, probably 
reflecting the larger drier areas in the lower catchment, as well as abstractions along the 
river. These relationships need further study. However, the flow gauges of some 
tributaries were no longer operating and had gaps in their records, so flows were not 
averaged over similar time periods. 
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Table 7.6. Nyanyadzi River, Mean Annual Runoff And Range Of Runoff, &rived 
from monthly flow data (years of gauging records used given in brackets) 
NYANYADZI RIVER 
SYSTEM 
MEAN ANNUAL 
RUNOFF (mm) 
RANGE OF MAR 
(mm) 
Nyanyadzi gauge 121 (1968/69-1995/96) 
(upstream of main tributaries) 
93 2.5 - 234 
Nyanyadzi gauge 119 (1968/69- 1997/98) 
(downstream of major tributaries, 
upstream of Nyanyadzi irrigation scheme) 
90.5 2.8-508.9 
Moosgwe gauge (1955/56 - 1997-98) 13.8 0.3-144.9 
Shinja gauge (1970/71-1999/2000) 43.9 2.6 - 124 
Mhakwe gauge (1969/70 -1976 /77) 124.9 19.6-226.5 
Biriwiri gauge (1968/69 - 1997/98) 113.3 2.4 - 614 
Tributary streams like the Moosgwe and Shinja were strongly below the mean 
annual runoff of the Lower Odzi watershed. This was partly due to lower rainfall and 
their more ephemeral nature, but also to their development: Table 7.8 reflects these 
struggles through the numbers of rights revoked in the area. (The Shinja communal 
area covers the Shinja stream and also abuts onto the Nyanyadzi river). In the 
Nyanyadzi river system, flows in the Biriwiri tributary (also a zone of early settlement) 
are some 30-40% on average of the lowest gauge in the Nyanyadzi river. Any major 
new developments in the Biriwiri river will, therefore, also have implications for 
downstream flows of the Nyanyadzi and the security of water access there. 
The contested Shinja river contributed flows of about 10-20% to the downstream 
flow, peaking at 30% in November around the early part of the rainy season. This local 
significance of the Shinja flows explained some of the conflicts documented by 
Bolding (1997,2004) where officials and irrigators from the Nyanyadzi irrigation 
system traveled upstream to destroy offtakes upstream on the Nyanyadzi and Shinja 
rivers. 
Finally, Table 7.8 gives an estimate of the current water right situation, also 
expressed as a water depth. So far, the water allocation in rights appears low - only 
around 5 mm or approximately 5% of mean annual runoff. 
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Table 7.7 Allocated water rights in the Lower Odzi Watershed, expressed as mm 
depth by 1998 
Water rights, Lower Odzi Watershed, 1998 - 5.3 
Mean annual runoff, Lower Odzi Watershed - 110.0 
- 10% safe yield with over-year storage - 58.0 
- Estimated allocable baseflow with available storage (less than 0.5 mm) - 4.2 
However, stress was already present at such a development level, as the water rights 
issued for the watershed were still more than the estimated allocable baseflow 
expressed as MAR with available registered storage. In fact, these water right figures 
are probably an under-estimate of use because of illegal abstraction and the problems of 
revoking provisional water rights in reality. Nevertheless, the figure serves to show the 
dilemmas in the watershed. The table shows what might be possible with more dams: 
however it is unlikely that finance be available for their construction in the near future. 
The MAR parameter was a strongly embedded technical norm in water planning in 
Zimbabwe: its use was strongly related with a wider interest in dam design 
development found both in government agencies but also with commercial farmers. 
The parameter was relevant for showing some of the inherent variability and levels of 
scarcity found in small tributary streams. However, it had not been applied before to 
show either this variability in flow across years, or the spatial conditions of variability 
along smaller tributary streams. The structure of institutional responsibilities in water 
administration had kept its application to larger catchment areas and to its use as an 
average figure, consistent also with a water development policy strongly focused into 
dam construction. The next two sections look further into the history of watershed 
development, and the struggles for smallholder irrigators with this variability and 
uncertainty. 
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7.5 WATER RIGHTS AND KEY ACTORS IN THE WATERSHED 
The water rights in the Lower Odzi have been strongly shaped by white settlement in 
the upper catchment streams, as well as by rights allocated for smallholder irrigation to 
communal lands for both irrigation schemes and individual use. Commercial tourism 
development along the Odzi also played a role. Table 7.8 shows this growth over time. 
In the Umvumvuvmvu system, settlement began in 1917, but key periods of expansion 
were 1930-1940, and 1945-1955. Registration since 1975 was very limited, and in fact 
many white settlers left their farms during the liberation war. Some new smallholder 
cooperatives had registered for rights, but there was also unregistered use in the form of 
small furrows. There were no new registrations since 1989. Along the Nyanyadzi river, 
there were fewer commercial settlers and most of them came in the period 1950-55. 
Since 1981 there were many more requests for small water rights in the old communal 
areas. 
In the past, water rights were first granted as a right to extract a flow. It was possible 
for an abstraction right to be limited to a period, or periods when river flow was greater 
than a certain level. It was also possible for a farm to hold a right for use throughout a 
year and an additional right for a certain period, such as during the dry season. These 
`double rights' were found on some Umvumvumvu commercial farms. Group rights 
were also given to irrigation companies and cooperatives as well as to smallholder 
irrigation systems registered under the communal authority. A critical issue in 2000 
was whether and how individual rights and responsibilities would be given to 
individuals. As explained earlier, water rights were granted first as provisional rights. 
The grant was confirmed once the necessary and required headwork development has 
been done, and if there were no complaints. 
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Table 7.8 Date of water rights issued, Lower Odzi watershed 
Figures show total volume of rights per year in OOOm3. The numbers of rights issued is given in 
brackets (rights nendin2 not included)6 
PERIOD UM NYANYADZI WENGEZI, ODZI RIVER 
RIVER SYSTEM RIVER SYSTEM MURARE & 
WHITE WATERS 
RIVERS 
1916-19 616.7(l) - - - 
1920-29 424.3(4) - - - 
1930-39 2592.5 (12) 1062 (4)* 
1940-49 1536.3 (28) 242(2) 258.7 (7) - 
1950-59 1480.1 (12) 312.3 (11) 132.5(5) 2427.9_(5)* 
1960-69 460.8 (18) 205(6) 241 (4) 98.7 (1) 
1970-79 176.4(5) 66 (3) 
1980-89 73.5(4) 783 (43) 6(l) 193(2)- 
REVOKED REVOKED 
240(18) 193(2) 
1990-98 - 192 (7) - 108 (2) 
REVOKED REVOKED 
152.4 (1) 192(7) 
TOTAL 7206.2 2430.3 638.2 2634.6 
NET 
* for the Nyanyadzi i rogation system, me current ngnts list a surnace aosuacuon from tae 
Nyanyadzi river and a lift abstraction from the Odzi river which together are still too small for 
the current irrigated area. However, the stress in the scheme for surface supplies is created 
when pumps are not used because of breakdowns and operational preferences 
During the 1990's a number of provisional rights were revoked, notably in the 
Nyanyadzi catchment, but also along the Odzi. During the late 1980's, the irrigation 
system manager and irrigators from Nyanyadzi traveled upstream at times of low now 
and burned any gardens irrigated from illegal `informal' furrows. A lot of applications 
for water rights were then applied for, but these were not supported and many, 
6 The data compiled was taken from a record list of 1998, when rights were still being requested and 
issued and totals both permanent and provisional rights listed. It compiles the volumes allowed for 
abstraction per year, for both a full right and those operating only part of the year. Several entries had to 
be checked for compilation errors where flows and volumes listed were not consistent. The dates used 
relate to the first date of issue of rights, even though some rights have been broken up and reassigned, for 
example with the Penkridge rights: reassigned rights are not re-entered into the total. Thus the figures in 
this tables should be treated as approximate, but rounding up was not done to avoid over-exaggeration of 
allocation. 
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therefore, remained provisional or were revoked. This explains the high level of 
revoked rights visible in Table 7.8. 
There is a significant difference in types of right seen. The communal lands show 
both large allowances for communal smallholder irrigation schemes, but also ! lows 
based on units of I Vscc to irrigate one hectare (Water Rights Register). 'These 
`communal area' rights accounted for many of the rights issued for the communal 
lands crossing the Nyanyadzi river system. These rights arc visible from the 1950's and 
are especially evident after 1980. They probably represent rights allowed to individual 
farmers after the Native Land Husbandry Act, and later the resettlement of lands after 
independence in 1980. Since 1990, provisional rights have been increasingly requested 
on small tributary streams - where perhaps `riparian rights' arc easier to assert because 
there are relatively few other riparian close by to protest. On smaller watercourses 
with temporary flow it may also be possible to claim the land as a Ocl. 
The amount of water requested within these 'communal area' rights has also started 
to increase. In 2000, several provisional rights were registered for rights of 60 Vs 'for 
stock watering' along tributary streams of the Nyanyadzi - although this flow is the 
same as supplied to small-scale irrigation systems of some 90 hectares. 
Among commercial farms and other non communal users there was been a range of 
size of water allowances - large and small. Typically, ii the upper Umvumvumvu and 
Nyanyadzi rivers, individual farm estates told several rights - at different places and 
even over different streams. The effect of this 'spatial hold' over streams and the water 
resources in the upper area needs further study. 
In the Umvumvumvv, there were some small dams linked to individual farms and an 
old Irrigation Board on the upper streams, but no regulation of the main Umvumvumvu 
river. Although there were over 90 rights allocated, many actors had more than one 
right in their property, whether commercial enterprises or communal lands. Most rights 
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granted were `full grants' - only one provisional licence was revoked in this catchment 
- from a notkommunal owner. Maps showing the location of intakes suggest, however, 
that there were other sites, where rights were once considered. 
The Nyanyadzi river had less water allocated in rights than the Umvumvumvu, but 
had a greater struggle for water. There were regular scarcity problems where 
downstream users took action to stop `illegal' use upstream of the Nyanyadzi irrigation 
system In addition, its seasonal flow and water level meant that access was much more 
contested. In the Nyanyadzi river, over 70 water rights were allocated - with 
smallholder rights in different communal lands and wards. During the 1990's around 
20% of water rights granted provisionally were revoked, notably along the Shinja and 
Mhakwe rivers. All the revoked licenses were within communal lands and wards. No 
private licenses were ever revoked. Table 7.9 now tries to show the balance between 
these actors. 
The Umvumvumvu was the river with the greatest number and volume of rights 
granted, followed by the Nyanyadzi. But there were also major questions of power 
embedded in the access shown. This power balance was not simply an issue between 
commercial farmers and smallholder irrigators, although this is clear from the table and 
a vital issue. As can be seen, organized private or cooperative enterprises took 55 % of 
the water overall, and 74% of water in the Umvumvumvu river. 
328 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGYANDAGENCYINTHEDEVELOPMENTOFDROUGFITPRONEAREAS 
Table 7.9 Water rights allocated to different classes of rigliholder in the Lower 
Odzi Watershed by 1998 (M3 are 000m3) (Source: Water Rights Register, 
Harare) 
Rightholder Umvumvumvu Nyanyadzi Odzi river Wengesi Murare % of total 
type/ river river & volume of 
Registration Whitewaters rights in 
point Lower Odzi 
watershed 
Private farms, 76 rights 21 rights 3 rights 16 rights 
coops and other excluding 1 excluding 2 
non-communal revoked revoked 
holders * 55.3 
5317.3 M3 887.2 M3 306.6 M3 632.2(99%) 
(74%) (36.5%) (11.6%) 
inc roads)* 4 rights 5 rights 2 rights 
Mutambara 8 rights 6 rights 1 right - 
Communal excluding 
Land one 
revoked 
16 
1889.1 M3 99.0 M3 72.0 M3 
(26%) (4.1%) (2.7%) 
Nyanyadzi I right - - 
Communal excluding 
Land one 0 
revoked 
Muwushi 23 rights 1 right - 
Communal excluding 9 
Land revoked 
27.6 
1348.1 M3 2220 M3 
(55.5%) (84%) 
Muromo 1 right I right 
Communal 0.3 
Land 36 M3 6 M3 (1%) 
(1.4%) 
Shinja 19 rights - - 
Resettlement excluding 
and wards 11 revoked 0.7 
96 M3 
(4.0%) 
Chimanimani 1 right 0 
excluding 1 
revoked 
TOTAL 7206.2 M 2430.3 M 2634.6 M 638.2M" 12909.5 M 
% TOTAL 
ALLOCATION 
IN 55.8% 18.8% 20.4% 4.9% 
LOWER ODZI 
*small rights are allowed for use for road building/repairs 
Revoked' indicates the cancellation of a provisional right. 
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Power was also an issue in the relationship between different users in the communal 
lands and their representatives. This chapter has already shown the stresses downstream 
in the Umvumvumvu, especially between the smallholder irrigation systems of 
Chakowa and Mutambara to get their water. Yet both systems were registered under the 
same communal land, which also his registered water rights further upstream. All ill 
under the adjudication of the local communal representative - in 2002 the Chief of 
Mutambara. There put real stresses on such local representatives, like the Chief of 
Mutambara, who had different interests in different schemes across the catchment: 
those of the Mutambara scheme versus others like Chakowa downstream. In the 
Nyanyadzi, local councils and groups with people from five communal areas also had 
different interests as stakeholders in the struggle for water along the river system. 
Thus the table also shows how the `power broker' for the communal lands was 
Mutambara, holding rights on the Umvumvumvu and Nyanyadzi rivers, the two most 
important tributaries in the Lower Odzi watershed. Along the Nyanyadzi river, 
although the Muwushi Communal Lands held more water in registered rights than 
Mutambara, it had also seen many of its rights revoked as smallholders have tried to 
register small rights. The Chief of Mutambara was the representative for the communal 
areas on the sub-catchment council in 2000. Table 7.9 helps to show why there had 
been such struggles between some smallholder users - along the Nyanyadzi river 
(fuelled by the spatial geography of those holding rights), and between Mutambara 
irrigation system and other rightholders along the Umvumvumvu. 
This section ends with an overview of the range in size of water rights registered in 
September 2001 (at this time still awaiting conversion to permits), shown in Table 7.10. 
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Table 7.10 Range of size of agricultural water right In operation November 2000 
UMVUMVUMVU RIVER SYSTEM 
SIZE OF 
RIGHT( US 
COMMUNAL AREAS PRIVATE TOTAL 
Granted 
(revoked) 
Provisional Granted 
(revoked) 
Provisional Granted Net 
<1 2 12 14 
1-1.9 3 9 12 
2-4.9 1 1 25 1 28 
5-9.9 13 13 
10-19.9 10 1 10 
20-39.9 6 
1 
6 
40-79.9 1 1 2 
>80 1 1 2 
91 90 
NYANYADZI SYSTEM 
SIZE OF 
RIGHT( US) 
COMMUNAL AREA PRIVATE TOTAL 
Issued 
(revoked) 
Provision 
al 
Granted 
(revoked) 
Provisional Gross Net 
<1 17(2) 2 19 17 
1-1.9 23(21) 1 24 3 
2-4.9 14(l) 4 7 25 24 
5-9.9 - 8 8 8 
10-19.9 1(1) 1 1 3 1 
20-39.9 
40-79.9 - 4 3 7 7 
>80 1 1 
88 63 
In the Nyanyadzi system some 58 % of rights (including those revoked) were for 
less than 2 litres/second, a very low flow for which to create a hcadworks and measure. 
In both rivers systems, there were both private and communal offtakcs with rights of 
over 50 Us, but the majority of water rights in communal lands were under 5 Us. The 
current Act gives greater powers to request the measurement of water abstractions, but 
this will be challenging for the small flow rights panted in this watershed. Unregulated 
rivers like the Umvumvumvu and Nyanyadzi arc more prone to floods and these can 
damage offtakes and make sustained offlake management difficult: cyclone Cline in 
2002 washed out many small registered intakes. Govcrnmcit priority will always go to 
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larger works after such emergencies. Commercial farmers have tended to be upstream 
in the catchment in higher rainfall areas where they face fewer extreme events, and also 
have access to more labour to rebuild any offlakes that may be washed away. 
This section shoved how study of the historical evolution of rights, and also the 
spatial spread of users, demonstrated many of the emergent pressures on local water 
management. It shows what fu ther information on water scarcity can be elicited when 
hydrological research studies the nature of rights and users in the field and on a map, 
and not just calculates the quantity of water allocated inside a computer. 
7.6 UNDERSTANDING THE COMPETITION FOR WATER 
What then are the actual risks for smallholders along the different `local' tributaries of 
the Lower Odzi watershed? This section tries to answer this question, through the use 
of very common hydrological techniques, that were also not formerly applied in 
Zimbabwe given the other technical norms in use. It proved quite difficult to collate 
and cross-check flow gauging stations, especially for the Nyanyadzi system, because 
data records were fractured by the liberation war. However, a study from the Cashel 
gauging station on the Umvumvumvu is now used to show the stress in the catchment 
and the need to develop more sensitivity to the local problems for smallholders. 
At Cashel, the main downstream water rights lie with the Mutambara Communal 
Lands and there is only one other `non-communal' user. Mutambara rights include the 
Chakowa irrigation system (a right that dates from 1935), a private right at 
Mhandharume as well as a few smaller rights registered to Mutambara that will irrigate 
1-3 three hectares. Chakowa had a right to take up to 1121/s when water was available, 
but otherwise 601/s. These equated with a total downstream demand of about 120 Us. 
However, the Chakowa system had not registered an intake above 64 1/s since the' end 
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of the 1980's7. A key practical problem was also that such low flows in a wide river 
bed creates difficulties for an irrigation intake as low flows pool, meander, and move 
within the river bed, and so require training and sandbagging to obtain water. In fact to 
allow for channel seepage and losses and informal extraction, a flow of 2001/s at the 
Cashel gauge might be better to guarantee downstream flow at Chakowa. 
The Water Act of 1998 specified that due attention should be given to the 
protection, conservation and sustenance of the environment. HRWallingford/DFID 
(2003) gave a review of methods that could be used to estimate allowances for 
environmental water demand and use, that could also be expressed as a minimum flow 
requirement. The one most consistent with available data was the aquatic base flow 
method. This is based on the assumption that the median flow for the lowest flow 
month is adequate through the year (HRWallingford/DFID, 2003 p. 25). From the study 
of the Umvumvumvu monthly flow records, the lowest flow months are September and 
October, whose median flows expressed in 1/s are 435 Us and 379 Us respectively. 
Using the lower figure, and adding the preferred water allowances for downstream of 
120 Us, provision for aquatic ecosystems, might require a downstream flow of some 
500 Us from this gauging station to ensure for all rights granted. In the meandering low 
flow streams that occur in these wider river beds, such a flow would also be easier to 
train such that the irrigation scheme could abstract its water right. Of course, provision 
of flows for aquatic preservation that are twice that allowed for the irrigation system 
could be controversial. However, the incidence of these flows can be studied further to 
demonstrate the stresses emergent in the river system. 
7 The Chakowa system has dropped a planned irrigated area because of water shortage, and even a night 
storage dam has not relieved water shortages that account for differences in head-tail crop patterns and 
timings, with head end areas particularly growing tomatoes. The records in the 1980's have not indicated 
any variation in intake since 1989, but this may be due to recording procedures as manpower has 
declined, rather than systematic full use of available water (see Chidenga, 2003). 
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As discussed in Table 7.2, water planners had taken a conservative estimate of water 
available for allocation. For unregulated flows, allocation could be estimated against 
the baseflow of the annual hydrograph at 10% risk (Ministry of water Resources and 
Development, 1985). In fact, there was discussion at one time of shifting this to 20% 
years, where there was greater storage. 
However, the critical issue was availability of storage that could bring greater 
security about decision making. For rivers without much available storage, such as the 
Umvumvumvu, planners had instead either to plan from lower probabilities, or rely on 
controls of abstraction so it was adjusted to available flow. Thus, as well as a priority 
rights system, many irrigation offtakes had a sliding right, where farmers could only 
abstract a higher flow when a given level of water was available in the river. 
As this chapter has already suggested, sliding rights with use related to available 
water supply did not work well. Where farmers were coordinated with specific legal 
rights, they could perhaps negotiate with each other on the sharing of flows in a dry 
year against compensation in another. Around the world, many large irrigation schemes 
have rules and procedures in place for restriction and sharing of water across systems 
when flows are low, under central direction (Wahaj, 2001). However, smallholder 
black irrigators in communal systems had no individual rights to negotiate from. The 
authoritarian management of farmers within irrigation systems and relatively recent 
evolution of these systems meant few internal sharing and enforcement mechanisms 
were in place when droughts hit (Chidenga, 2003; Manzungu, 1999). 
Manzungu (1999) described how farmers in irrigated blocks in Mutambara with 
contracts on crop production tried to negotiate with other farmers within the system to 
get water to save their crops (as well as police their water supply), in a drought year 
although this did not work successfully. Chidenga (2003) described how farmers from 
tail end block in Chakowa sometimes found employment in blocks with better water 
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supply as a kind of compensation for the disadvantage that head end blocks caused by 
taking available water. Also, farmers in the upper catchment would not always 
voluntarily reduce irrigated areas if flows were low (or were forecast to continue low). 
If too many rights were issued upstream, there was a chance that the tailend of 
vulnerable systems (like Chakowa) would get inadequate water very frequently. 
Section 7.3 showed that, even with strong rules that illegal of(takes could be destroyed 
and overuse of water could be prosecuted, and manpower to enforce this, there were 
regular problems of supply for downstream systems that fuelled struggles and 
disagreements over water between smallholder and commercial irrigators, and between 
their respective administrators (Bolding, 2004; Chidenga, 2001; Manzungu, 1999; Zu, ag 
and Roling, 1996). However, there were also struggles within irrigation systems about 
the areas that could and should be irrigated if water supplies were inadequate. 
One way round this problem could have been some compensation arrangements for 
land not irrigated by those who took larger amounts of water and who could still 
irrigate in a dry year, or a combination of other employment and livelihood assistance. 
This, however, would require substantial organisation and a high degree of trust and 
negotiating capability to deal with estimations for compensation and losses of cropping 
investments undertaken. From the 1960s onwards some government officials were 
skeptical about smallholder irrigation development as a viable and profitable 
development strategy (sec Manzungu, 1999 and Chidcnba, 2003). This would also 
have limited government action to help formulate relevant financial and investment 
sharing mechanisms. 
Also, many small producers relied on irrigated areas for their subsistence crops, and 
any compensation or insurance would need to assure these needs. They would still 
struggle to grow these with available water. Growth of additional crops for sale would 
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be additional to this, and subsistence cropping only abandoned if income was sufficient 
to purchase food needs and their availability was secure. 
One standard hydrological technique that can be used to study over-allocation is a 
flow frequency curve. For the reasons just described, the different possible minimum 
flows discussed above are plotted against the flows received 95% , 90%, and 75% of 
the time in Fig 7.5, for the Cashel Road gauging station in mid-reach of the 
Umvumvumvu river - downstream of which are a number of offtakes 
for irrigation, for 
three levels of low flow. 
Fig 7.5. Flow frequencies and downstream water requirements, Umvumvumvu 
River, Old Cashel Road Gauge 
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A comparison of these plotted lines shows how risk levels shape the potential 
cropping season length and thus what crops might be grown. The 5% flow frequency 
shows that in one year in twenty, flows will be inadequate almost throughout the year 
for the registered water rights. In such conditions, December-January were the reliable 
months to crop, with risks to receive inadequate flow for the Chakowa irrigation system 
even in late January. The months of December-January, there, are when most 
subsistence farmers will focus their subsistence crop. Farmers in the disadvantaged 
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tailend blocks only irrigated thin in Chakowa in 1998/1999, and irrigated maize only. 
They did not risk sowing any other crops for irrigation at that time. The opportunities 
for more lucrative horticultural crops that could be grown March-October is indicated 
by the frequency curves for higher risks. At a risk level of one year in 10 the low flow 
period runs between late-April and November. In 1999, the headend irrigators grew 
more lucrative crops of tomatoes, onions and beans in March-May 1999, able to rely on 
taking more water but also having more links into market production to sell these crops. 
The tailend blocks only sowed some beans from April-July 1999. Looking at the flows 
received 25% time in comparison with allocated rights, only mid-August through to 
end-October appears as a dry period, and in fact this was anticipated ii commercial 
irrigated farming system design by large and small famrers. Headend smallholder 
irrigators cash-cropped a lucrative okra crop, and groundnuts and maize in the period 
July-September 1998, and beans, tomatoes and onions March-July 1999, when there 
was water. Tailend blocks cropped beans between April and July 1999 only as water 
was available. The possibilities for cropping in July-October in the dry (and cool) 
season were fairly clear from flow and recession characteristics, so did not have risks of 
losses of sown crops. Smallholders were not risk averse as such, but the 5% criteria did 
demarcate the more secure period when farmers still grew a subsistence crop. Their 
production choices on other crops were shaped by their understanding of the security of 
water supply. (Crop information from Chidenga, 2003). 
The graph of 25% probability against water right comes close to the approach of 
mapping the dependable moisture availability as it was developed by Hargreaves 
(1967). No graphs were made for ligher levels of risk, such as the 50% value used for 
assured rainfall in India (see Chapter 3). This would suggest that water was available 
across the year at this risk level, but give no indication of the incidence of particular 
problem points in the cropping season or runs of years with low flow. Also, the 
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institutional stress of dealing with disputes on average every other year, if all farmers 
tried to plan to use more water, would be too great to handle. While some irrigation 
systems have often differentiated areas with seasonal and permanent rights to irrigation 
(as in Pakistan, see Wahaj, 2001), this would have been hard to formalize or enforce in 
the smallholder politics of Zimbabwe. 
Considering the situation with an allowance for aquatic ecosystems, with a 
downstream requirement of 500 l/s, then actually there could be problems April- 
November, and in January, at a frequency of one year in four. Its enforcement could 
jeopardise several of the lucrative crops that smallholders tried to crop at these times, 
and it would be unlikely that such a flow would remain unchallenged or unused as it 
flowed past a scheme with considerable internal water stress. 
From, the perspective of the risks a commercial farmer might manage relative to 
their dry season (winter) crop choices, the Umvumvumvu was not extensively over- 
developed. However, from the viewpoint of smallholders, the river was already 
developed to a level where the frequency of longer dry spells brought limitations into 
the irrigated cropping options of many downstream irrigators. Also, the differentiation 
was coming between smallholders and not just between smallholders and commercial 
farmers. 
A second common analytical technique - on lengths of periods of low flows - bears 
out this probability analysis, and also shows the utility of looking inside general risk 
data to see the actual problems. Table 7.11 shows the length of spells with flows under 
200 Us. Years with serious dry spells often follow each other in a 2-3 year run. These 
occured at least once in a decade, when there was also a dry year in which flows could 
be inadequate from January. Years with dry spells starting in May appeared to have 
become more frequent, and these years often followed each other, interspersed by runs 
of wetter years. In the 1990's, low flow spells tended to run increasingly into 
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November and December and thus had a much stronger effect on production scheduled 
in October-November. 
Table 7.11 Numbers of days in spells with flow below 200 Us, Umvumvumvu river, 
Gauge E125 (Date is start of spell, followed by number of days (d) of low flow) 
YEAR DRY SPELLS FLOW < 0.2 d 1s (spells with less than 5 days higher flow) 
1971 Aug 3: 106d Doc 6: 6d 
1972 Nov 17: 7d Dec 28: 4d 
1973 Jan 1: 31d Feb 8: 8d Mar 3: 269d 
1974 - 
1975 - 
1976 - 
1977 Missing 
1978 Missing 
1979 Missing 
1980 - 
1981 - 
1982 - 
1983 Apr 19: 223 d Doc 28: 4d 
1984 Jan 1: 78d May 8: 185d 
1985 - 
1986 - 
1987 Mar 23: 249 days 
1988 
1989 Broken record 
1990 
1991 May 23: 223d 
1992 Dry throughout year 
1993 May 8: 199d 
1994 May 9: 174d Nov 7: 39d 
1995 Jan 28: 314d 
1996 Sept 12: 65d 
1997 - 
1998 Part missing 
1999 Part missing 
2000 Cyclone Eline destroys gauge 
(Source: IJaily ilow records, l)W K) 
I end this section with a restatement of the problematic for the Lower Odzi 
watershed in 1998. 
WATER RESOURCES PLANNING DATA 
" mean annual runoff (estimated) 
10% `safe yield' if all storage built 
STUDY DATA, YEAR 1999 
" reliable runoff 
" water rights allocated and supposed in use 
" unregistered garden and riparian use 
000m3 
235600 
134300 
12910 
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Superficially there seemed little problem in the watershed when viewed from the 'sub- 
catchment' perspective. This study of local realities showed otherwise. 
7.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The colonial history of Rhodesia gave shape to longstanding Ministries for Water and 
Natural Resources that has allowed for cognitive and technical norms to become 
embedded, shaped by scientific networks and links with international scientific 
communities encouraged under post-war colonial administration and academia. The 
water agencies and legal developments of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe show particular 
systematized approaches, very related to more normative models of hydrological 
analysis and hydro-meteorological networks evolved for `developing countries'. While 
independence helped to redefine the `purposes to be served' by science and technology 
and Ministries give more attention to smallholder agriculture and irrigation, no new 
technical norms were defined. Rather, the ministries continued the scientific tasks of 
the hydrologist set many years earlier. The new Catchment Councils generated new 
hope and enthusiasm but later faced troubles to develop new procedures in the face of 
financial and political difficulties. 
Looking back at Kohler's model of what hydrologists do given in Chapter 2, 
Zimbabwe simply continued with technical norms relevant to particular tasks the state 
thought should be served - for agriculture. For planning and design, it focused on 
studying available water supply in average conditions. For operational dimensions, it 
looked to dam operation and scheduling of diversions and distribution for irrigation in 
the short term, and for agricultural planning in the seasonal and longer term. 
Information relevant to allocation and equity concerns - including on the variability of 
flows relative to allocated rights - and risks to smallholders - were never considered. 
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Returning to my own framework, in the older state agencies, historically both cognitive 
and technical norms were strongly controlled by scientific and political elites. The new 
Water Act has given more attention to local representation, and cognition outside these 
technical and scientific elites. However, so far, only `formal' representatives of civil 
society are present, and in very small numbers - as tribal representatives for the 
communal areas. 
Finally, returning to other concepts and models discussed in Chapter 2, the 
knowledWability and capability of agencies seemed mainly related to land zoning and 
allocation and encouragement of more intensified commercial farming in agriculture, 
and regulation of larger rivers in water development. According to Roling's models, 
agent-context-ecosystem associations gave quite consistent cognition for commercial 
farmers, and there was coherence and correspondence in knowledge and institutional 
design for commercial agriculture and larger-scale river basin management. The 
`capabilities' for working with small black farmers were present in agriculture, but 
variable in strength and usually very authoritarian. This chapter shows that this interest 
in smallholders was only partially present in the planning of water resources, despite 
the recognition of communal representation in the evolving water laws. There is now 
an urgent need to develop new coherence and correspondence between knowledge and 
institutions for contemporary water management that gives more attention to local 
rivers and smallholder users. Currently there is still `multiple cognition' in cognition on 
surface water drought in Zimbabwe, and much work is still necessary to develop 
collective cognition. For myself, this study taught me yet more about the diversity of 
cognition that can exist between stakeholders, and just how politically created this can 
be. Also that building process for change s one of the most significant and difficult 
elements in building new collective cognition. 
SURFACE WATER DROUGHTAND STRUCTURAL WATER SC, ARCITYINTHELOWER ODZI WATERSIIFI) 341 
In 2000, the understanding of Zimbabwean rivers was still drawing on data 
information networks developed in the 1970's, without reference to any population, 
land use and climatic changes that may be affecting water flows. Contemporary 
calculation methods for the analysis of surface water supply at catchment and sub- 
catchment level paid little attention to the quantity and variability of flows in individual 
streams, although the reliability of water entitlements for small-scale irrigators 
depended on this. Upstream and downstream users were differentially affected by this 
variability especially at times of low flow. 
The new Water Law will solve some old injustices, but it may not remove some 
inherent confusions still entrenched in the law. I hope it does not set anallholder 
against smallholder, nor smallholder against commercial farmers. In the same way, 
hydrological analyses currently used may not help answer questions related to 
reallocation. The reallocation of water rights has to be studied against the spatial 
hydrology of the main rivers, their major tributaries at key points, and their behaviour 
at high and low flows. The 1998 Law created a means to confront the structural water 
scarcity present in the watershed, in its removal of the prior rights systems and 
licensing approach, However, it has not yet address the differential risks of lack of 
access to water at low flows between smallholder farmers, as well as small and large 
farmers. This chapter thus also shows the difficulties in addressing the second-order 
scarcity issues related to management when there is structural scarcity- and that new 
technical guidelines and norms are needed, and not only new representation and 
institutions. 
Most hydrologists believe that their first responsibility is to collect the best possible 
data and develop the most accurate scientific analysis of water resources. But 
hydrologists are part of society and, therefore, should ask the question what purposes 
do their analyses serve. This chapter shoved that in Zimbabwe, hydrological analysis 
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had been done largely for land settlement and segregated agricultural development 
purposes, with a major emphasis on dam development relevant to capitalised 
commercial farming enterprises. While it was clear that dams could ensure more secure 
water supply in the Lower Odzi watershed, there was still a need for better analysis of 
flow variability to help design new allocation principles and guide a new allocation of 
water permits - the new operational needs. 
Looking at the way collected data has been analysed and used, some strong biases 
and gaps seemed to emerge. First, hydrological analysis had focused on data analysis 
and equations expressing average runoff per area and equations useful for small dam 
construction. Here analysis was about seeing `available water potential' in relation to 
very specific regulating technology with a clear and verifiable volumetric dimension 
that can be monitored and charged. This technology, like water rights, was vested in 
commercial landholders. However, this did not reflect the reality of smallholder water 
use still registered under communal lands either through smallholder irrigation systems 
or very small offtakes of 1 Us or less which were very hard to monitor. The unclear 
situation of gardens in primary rights, a key area of smallholder water use, was another 
complication. 
Second, population and water use had changed. New needs in forecasting to guide 
allocation in low flows suggested not only a need to study the relationship between 
rainfall and runoff better, but also to understand the relationship between water 
resources and land use in a catchment. In this way better support services aDuld be 
provided to both smallholders and commercial water users. The analytical methods 
were not specifically designed to analyse characteristics of surface water drought level 
of risk, but were more for general planning. They failed on the critical issues of 
allocation and operational decision-making related to short-term forecasts. They thus 
really were not useful tools in relation to the stresses of reallocation arising by 1998. 
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New initiatives that could help include more analysis of flow variability to find new 
allocation principles for low flow, and more studies on rainfall and runoff to facilitate 
forecasting and increase understanding on how water regimes might be changing with 
population increase and changing agricultural patterns. However the relations between 
irrigators within systems and along a river also new attention to start new thinking 
about risk and local action when there is competition for water. Irrigation 
development, while a key framing elements in cognitive norms, was no panacea against 
surface water drought, while there was no sound appreciation of the risks in its water 
supply. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
Viewing (drought) as a visitation of nature only diverts attention from a whole range of social 
activities that intense or mitigate its effects... What is required is to highlight drought as the 
central problem of development .... If this is not 
done, it will continue to be treated the way it is 
with a few long-term projects, little investment and inadequate efforts to search for scientific 
and technological solutions to it problems. Agricultural development requires an entirely 
different perspective and policy effort... has to be reviewed to keep drought as a central focus. 
Mather andJamaL 1993, p. 118-125 
Where meaningful interactions are suffocated by unconscious collective images or pre- 
understandings that demand articulation, reflection and critique, there is a legitimate task for 
critical science. Empirical analysis of data, ski fl interpretation of socially constructed 
meanings and social critique are equally important elements of an enlarged concept of 
scientific rationality.. .. Rationality as openness to 
learning further presupposes the 
embeddedness of the scientist in a durable context of dialogue and action Hoppe 1999, p. 203 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study set out to understand why, despite more than 100 years of public concern, 
planned intervention and investigative science in droughtprone areas, the water 
resources in such regions are overallocated and have unequal access, and significant 
inequalities and vulnerabilities remain for farmers. It tested two related hypotheses to 
explain this. The first was that scientific, technological and political elites built their 
profiles, or struggled to remain prominent actors, through the technical and cognitive 
norms that they built. Development of these profiles was often promoted with 
assumptions that it would bring social legitimacy as well as both outcome and social 
power, but often did not. Secondly, that a cognitive framework linking scarcity and 
drought - rather than drought or scarcity alone - can transform options to discuss water 
resources, their allocation and their monitoring. 
Through case studies in different droughtprone and water scarce areas in different 
states, dependent on different water sources, this thesis has studied how different states 
of development shaped the occurrence and relative power of public agencies to manage 
a water cycle prone to fluctuations and deficits. These elites took different forms in 
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shaping access to water: technoscientific agencies and technoeconomic networks as in 
the Indian case studies: civil society elites and communities as in the Yemen study: and 
technoscientific and legal agencies within the state apparatus of Ministries and Water 
Courts as in the Zimbabwe study. They also had different cognitive and technical 
norms in looking at drought and scarcity contexts, and within this a different emphasis 
on scientific and popular knowledge, and different levels of commitment to cognisance 
and conscientisation. Key differences and opportunities emerging from this analysis are 
given in Table 8.1. 
These conclusions first summarise key findings across the case studies relative to 
these hypotheses, by revisiting the research sub-questions. It then looks further into the 
societal challenge for states in (re)organising water knowledge and management. 
Finally, it revisits the three objectives of the thesis to show the usefulness of a cognitive 
framework: in improving reflection on water resources planning in droughtprone and 
scarcity areas; in planning of participation and negotiation around drought and scarcity 
problems; and in recognising potential for transformation in public action within the 
resource-technology-society nexus in water-scarce areas. 
Regarding the profile-building of agencies, those with established scientific 
orientation and resources for actual field verification in data collection have continued 
to stay in existence and retain recognition, even if they also still attract criticism of their 
approaches. Once resources and credentials begin to slip (or are never established), 
then their data becomes of uncertain relevance. Any power to make a valid contribution 
collapses (along with continued funding to do it), but so too does the power over 
actions as rules and procedures that permit water access become flouted. I hope that 
future work and contacts in all these states will help reflection on scientific and 
cognitive norms that will address contemporary problems, to move beyond the defence 
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of norms repeated in the interests of routine operations and necessary demonstration of 
task performance for agency survival 
Discussion of the different case studies emphasised that drought does have different 
dimensions and manifestations, of which continued and improved understanding is 
needed. Cognitive frameworks on drought have nude attempts to understand effects of 
lack of rainfall on different elements in the water cycle - soil moisture, groundwater 
and surface water drought, but largely in relation to defined risks of water deficits and 
perceived options for technologies to increase access and production opportunities. 
While wider calls have come to recognise the range of social relations and activities 
that exacerbate or mitigate drought effects, few scientists in national agencies have 
widened their work to study such processes. Frameworks of scarcity - more related 
with access to and use and management of water - have changed in their emphasis and 
specificity over time - from a focus on the lack of security and economic opportunity 
shaped by lack of water availability and the sociotechnical design of water control that 
mediates water shortage, to specific attention also to structural scarcity where 
vulnerability and marginalisationis created by social relations of exclusion and second- 
order scarcity created by inadequate management capacity. Scarcity perspectives were 
coming to dominate debates about needed public action by 2002 in droughtprone areas, 
because they connected more with the real experiences on the ground. However, they 
have hardly impacted back into the norms of public agencies, to change their routines 
or contact with the public, such that scarcity 
dialogues seem either developed in new 
civil platforms or direct action Thus the various cognitive frameworks for studying 
drought and scarcity have still hardly come together yet to reshape public action, 
although there could be great 
benefit from this. 
This thesis has shown a sad materialisation and domination of largely simple 
mapping and patterning techniques from scientists to assist public agencies in 
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droughtprone areas. Efforts for increased understanding of complex social and 
environmental processes shaping drought dimensions remain rare. Yet this thesis has 
shown that there have always been further analytical and investigative techniques 
possible to give greater attention to the use and the user of the water who is so affected 
by drought. In additioi the study of scarcity in relation to actual water access as 
mediated by technology and institutions also remains quite rare, and this thesis has 
aimed to show the importance of understanding actual water availability and access 
rather than generalised mapped conditions created by certain discourse around scarcity. 
It is communities accepting collective cognition and will in mediating access that have 
showed best capabilities to survive. These have often come from the driest areas and 
most vulnerable communities, if they have built up a political and legal capacity to 
manage their technologies and water cycles, as in Yemen in the past. Ironically, here 
recognition of tacit and popular knowledge rather than expert science has often proved 
more critical in shaping these possibilities - in which space for negotiating disputes, as 
well as space for knowledge exchange were important. Most agencies for science and 
technology have focused into maximising supposed water potential, continuing a 
`supply-side' focus (Sexton, 1990) into with new concerns around productivity of water 
and risk survival, beyond simple water availability. Few have considered new 
approaches to design with reference to actual demand-side realities (where demand is 
politically and technologically mediated and not just exerted by crop choices) or 
realistic local matching of technologies and institutions, emergent from a particular 
society's use and management of resources in economic change. 
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Table 8.1 Working with drought - science and agency in different states 
STATE FAILED WEAK AUTHORITATIANIPATRI 
DEVELOPMENTAL MONIAL/ 
Social UNDERDEVELOPED 
mechanisms 
Agencies technoscientific agencies Turnkey-type agencies Technoscientific government 
administering own bureaucracies 
planning agencies programmes with weak 
central link 
venture agencies 
techno-economic networks 
Civil society NGOs Communities and 
customary law 
Formal and informal elites Formal elites 
Informal elites 
Knowledge Rational science informing Tacit knowledge and Rational science informing 
And formal elites power with customary formal elites 
specialties roles 
Technology often driving Scientism in technology 
scientific questions design and choice 
Key tools in Own data collection sites Embedded in laws of Hydrometric networks 
mapping or generic empirical norms water use evolving in relation to 
water comme rcial activities 
resources Quantitative techniques 
needing new and criteria e. g. (for 
Quantitative techniques and 
consideration rainfall and groundwater) criteria e. g. (for surface 
water) 
Annual rainfall 
Qualitative, cultural 
Optimal Moisture differentiation of sources Mean Annual Runoff 
Availability linked with use 
Runoff yield and risk 
Specific capacity 
Groundwater estimation 
routines 
Possibilities Negotiation around Negotiation around New representation after 
for learning disputes and direct action disputes political reform 
and shifting 
to critical Visioning and action Participatory action Visioning and dialogue 
science and research between users, research and 
development between users, engineers and 
technology engineers and scientists between users, engineers scientists 
for studying and scientists 
drought and Consultation and strategies 
scarcity of 
improved Special assistance 
communication Recognition and programmes 
discussion of how 
Collaborative capacity collective will is imposed 
building 
Rethinking controls on Rethinking representation 
Rethinking local technologies in new and the management and 
management - expert and forums assessment of water 
local knowledge resources 
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8.2 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND AGENCY IN WATER DEVELOPMENT IN 
DROUGHTPRONE AREAS 
8.2.1 Cognitive rather than instrumentalist frameworks in policy-related research 
The need to change from instrumentalist to more interdisciplinary and socially aware 
research questions has been an important theme of this study. All the case studies have 
shown that an instrumentalist perspective, where water availability alone is seen as the 
deciding influence in development, is insufficient to give understanding of how farmers 
and agency workers make choices about how droughtprone regions may transform. 
However, too strong a focus in political economy in action can highlight the power 
struggles between actors within social relations of resource control and technology 
choice, but give insufficient attention to the transformations in resource monitoring and 
assessed, and how technologies can be chosen and (re)designed. 
Approaching a droughtprone area as a cognitive space allowed it to be seen as a 
space in which new knowledge, technologies and related social relations can be 
created, but also as an arena of actor strategies, actor networks and struggles about 
knowledge and control. The approach became, a means to integrate understanding from 
both the political economy of natural resources and also awareness of the social 
construction of knowledge, resource dynamics, social pressures and technology design. 
The case studies have shown that where technoscientific agencies gain control over 
the monitoring and allocation of resources, cognition is restricted heavily into 
dimensions of cognisance. In the agencies studied in this thesis, there is really very 
little conscientization towards either participatory technology development, or 
concerted action to manage resources. This has only changed where external pressures 
and new funding allowed space for new action, and when endorsed by peers. In the 
cases of the positive developments of participatory hydrological modelling and 
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hydrological audits in Andhra Pradesh, these have gained recognition by many, but 
their continuation will depend on institutional reforms and facilities in wider local 
government, as well as within the technoscientific agencies. The science of these 
agencies has often been very structured by what data and analytical processes the 
technoscientific agencies will accept, as shown in both the Indian and Zimbabwean 
case studies. The Yemen case study and the Indian village study of section 5.5 showed 
that local actors can develop institutions and popular norms for development and 
management of their water access technologies without sophisticated science, but this 
does take time. 
Revisiting the typology of Brooks (1994) on the relations of science and technology 
(see section 2.2), to link these with agency, this thesis shows that technology has driven 
development of science in the droughtprone areas far more than vice-versa, even 
though new specialty agencies and their research agendas were justified through the 
need for new knowledge for resource development. It has also been the development 
potential of irrigation and water conservation technologies in droughtprone areas that 
has driven the type of questions asked about water resources in droughtprone areas, and 
justified finance spent on these agencies. Science, in the case studies of agencies here, 
has been largely used as a tool in mapping resource modules to calculate the numbers 
of technical artefacts possible, or statistical analysis to define physical allocation, rather 
than a means to really rethink water management collectively. This also confirms 
Nightingale's (1998) definition of science and his justification for taking wider 
cognitive approaches when looking for innovation possibilities. 
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8.2.2. Changing definitions of drought and changing emphases towards scarcity 
It has proved important to look at drought in relation to different elements of the 
hydrological cycle - rainfall, groundwater and river regimes - this can demonstrate the 
behaviour of the resource in its physical context and how this is related with the 
technologies to extract it, and how water availability shapes its use. The chapters have 
shown the value of looking at the nature of dry periods and perturbation in a water 
source as well as generalised measurements of the water cycle. All these can be better 
related to the technology of access and the differential options of users within water 
systems - sociotechnical systems - that shape and are shaped by the natural water cycle 
and the social relations mediating access to it. In this respect, moving from a focus just 
on meteorological drought to more specific attention to agricultural drought, 
groundwater drought and surface water drought has given some specific reflection on 
the relations of users-technology-resource management. However, a `scarcity' 
perspective is still needed, that can move understanding beyond the narrow physical 
assessment of `human impact' in shaping how rainfall is related with other water 
sources with actual water availability patterns, and any related search for generic tools 
to lessen this impact. What is needed rather is a scarcity reference that opens up the 
understanding of social processes acting across state and locality to open understanding 
of local water access as well as use under local scarcity contexts - and through this the 
different challenges to different groups to find strategies of transformation 
However, attention to drought specificities also helps to ground studies of water 
scarcity, which can also often lose their reference to actual local water environments 
and local strategic choices under larger-scale studies of basins or national economies. 
Transition-type models of water management stresses in river basins and groundwater 
use (Burke and Moench, 2000 and Keller et al, 1997) have their uses to identify future 
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needs in public action especially when they are related to the polity and water 
resources of that location; but the differentiation of access and livelihood strategies 
locally can remain masked. Making water work, from the bottom up - as opposed to 
hypothesising plans of how it might flow, from top-down - requires some new concepts 
for the droughtprone areas. Rather than Tarching for a single indicator, studying a 
drought-scarcity nexus, through a matrix of the kind applied in this study and initiated 
in Table 2.1 can be one new approach. I return to this in section 8.3.3. 
A cognitive framework that focuses only on physical dimensions of drought and 
lack of water as a condition tends to link with a very narrow analytical focus into the 
physical ecology of a locality. A cognitive framework focused from a concept of 
scarcity brings a focus on the economic and societal dynamics playing in the region to 
portray a social landscape of institutions, property rights and social relations rather than 
just the physiographic landscape and hydrometry. However, both can integrate around 
understanding of environmental and social processes linked with 
drought to reshape 
public action more effectively. Such action can then move the common development 
focus from agencies and knowledge to mobilise, increase and secure supply, to a better 
understanding of interactions between societal needs and the 
dynamics of water 
resources -as shaped by natural meclnnisms, technology and people. 
8.2.3. Evolution versus stagnation in the cognitive practices of water elites 
Few of the specialty agencies documented made any shift in their analyses without a 
radical change in political context - perhaps 
because their identities were so bound up 
in a specific domain related to water resource assessment or extraction. The scarcity 
framework that is now coming more into use is often directing change into core local 
socio-spatial organisations - 
like the district collectorate in India who will manage 
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hydrological audits, the local councils in Yemen and the representatives and managers 
of watersheds in Zimbabwe - which experts will advise only. I hope there will be more 
reflection in the future on how this can work better for all groups generating knowledge 
and supporting its use in rural transformation for which this thesis has given insights. 
The case studies have showed that all dites dominating water management do 
develop their own technical and cognitive norms, but there are real differences in how 
these actually become accepted and embedded. Agencies which can control their own 
monitoring and data collection, and are resourced sufficiently to do planned research 
(like IMD and ICAR) did develop their own norms, which also became widely 
accepted within them. However, other agencies simply continued use of Very simple 
empirical norms and equations established out of necessity early on. In this respect, 
deriving accepted and respected norms is much easier when science does try to shape 
technology, and much more difficult when the technology is already on the market. 
All forms of agency could have used a range of information collection and 
analytical methods. Much of the detail in this thesis was to give a demonstration of 
what analyses could show social concerns and risks better in particular drought and 
scarcity contexts. However, their choices of routines were often biased by economic 
priorities and analytical preferences acceptable to the agency. All the agencies studied 
have shown disciplinary/specialty isolation and it has been a struggle to involve them in 
wider perspectives. In this respect, it is important to note the different wider 
frameworks that have begun to influence agencies dealing with different water 
resources/water use contexts. Fanning systems perspectives have been used to broaden 
research in meteorological and agricultural drought studies, while livelihood 
perspectives have been used as a wider framework for groundwater and surface water 
drought. Scarcity is a perspective that enables integrated understanding of different 
water sources as well as social uses, but remains a real challenge for specialty 
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organisations in hydrology and geohydrology, and perhaps this is why it has been 
driven more by external studies rooted in wider local governance entities and NGOs. 
For myself, charting my own history reminded me of the transformations I had to 
make, to be a critical scientist rather than just rational one : 
- from mapping only the physical drought and scarcity in the water resource, to 
including the user of the water resource in different dimensions of the water cycle: 
- studying the processes linking different forms of drought as they are mediated by 
technology; 
- to studying the `guidelines from the resource' in how it shapes artefacts of use, and 
social relations around them, as a means to rethink access options to scarce water; 
- to joining new dialogues and debates around new knowledge, but also 
understanding the limits in individual scarcity `discourses' and solutions they may 
prescribe; 
- to recognising that public action 
in water scarce regions is political and not always 
rational, and that participation in real intervention engages one immediately in real 
water politics. 
8.2.4. Diversity in public agency in droughtprone areas - learning from 
differences 
The case studies have demonstrated the capabilities (and limitations) that can come 
from a range of collectivities striving to work in water development - technoscientific 
agencies, technoeconomic networks (departments and corporations), and village-level 
management and governance institutions. As Chapter 1 cited from Long (2001, p. 16) 
collectivities become agents when they have discernible ways of formulating and 
carrying out decisions, and have 
both knowledgeability and capability. The case studies 
show that these concepts of 
knowledgeability and capability do have to be translated 
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culturally and politically, to see the form they take in different states. Thus there is no 
ideal norm in assessment or management procedures for droughtprone areas. What is 
critical, however, is the way they build in a participatory dimension that allows a 
structured debate, and whether this emerges through consultation, interactive 
communication, dispute or direct action. Table 8.1 shows that I see very different 
locations and activities for such work in the different states. I hope this can become the 
point of change for scientists to move from rational to critical and postnormal science 
as the opening quote from Hoppe (1999) highlights. They will need this to play a 
valuable role in the new decentralised forums for water mamgement - and in that 
respect may still need to learn how to embed themselves in dialogue and not just in 
scientific and institutional politics. Table 8.1 summarises different tools that may yet be 
used by these agencies to make them `learning organisations'. 
It helped to study the practices and actions of agencies in relation to actor 
networks. For the evolution of some technical norms, technoscientific networks did 
evolve in some cases, as between IMD and ICAR to define risks to help design new on- 
farm technologies. However, overall, technoeconomic networks proved much more 
influential on actual resource assessment practices, and selection and siting of water 
technologies - where powers to development and manage technology and resources 
were shaped by financial, social and political links. States with developmental 
aspirations showed the strongest mix of specialty and civil agency - in weak and 
authoritarian states only one of these tended to dominate. Only developmental states 
used agencies like `venture' corporations or relied on markets and the private sector in 
policies for transformation of their droughtprone areas. 
Overall, departmental structures seemed to develop the most embedded and enduring 
norms, and also seemed to survive better both through their own political 
institutionalisatior; also allowing such structures to link well with other funding and 
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scientific networks. The capabilities of organisations like APSGWD to survive, despite 
known problems in their assessments and monitoring, were remarkable. The 
corporation structure - as with the technology dissemination organisations in India - 
proved a problematic one for cognitive development and financial survival. Expediency 
drove early acceptance of very simple norms and procedures for which they later 
became greatly criticised. If APSIDC had developed a coherent institutional 
development programme alongside its technical one, able also to debate financial and 
rights issues, it might have fared better. Only after its virtual financial collapse did it 
open up to more participatory approaches and a concern for institutional development 
brought in by external assistance programmes. Changing governance structures in 
water management can give a chance to debate new cognitive frameworks, as well as 
representation, as seen in Zimbabwe. However this study also showed just how difficult 
it can be to ensure equity and social justice, in that in the new situation small irrigators 
may contest with other small irrigators as much as with large farmers. 
8.2.5. Cognition about water supply technology and the analysis of resources 
This thesis suggests that recognising the way technology shapes both resource use and 
social dependencies may give much more relevant ideas for the assessment of resources 
and design of support programmes in droughtprone areas and scarcity contexts. This is 
a different cognitive framework from hydrological analysis alone, which can develop 
analysis related to how people access and use a resource, rather than just collecting the 
best data and doing the most advanced analyses possible. All the case studies have 
shown that there can be different analyses to give more attention to needs of small 
water users, and the relation of access technology with resources, however limited the 
data. Developing capacities to work with multiple frameworks can help answer 
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questions about what we still need to know to alleviate drought inpacts and manage 
scarcity better. 
8.3 STATES OF DEVELOPMENT AND CHOICES IN MANAGING DROUGHT AND 
SCARCITY 
Looking beyond drought, a scarcity focus can bring attention to the social resources of 
a society and its adaptive capacity in the way transformations in agencies, technologies 
and social relations of use can emerge. This again is why attention to the nature of the 
state is so critical. The case studies have shown a diverse range of states with very 
different development objectives and political purposes, and very different degrees of 
capacity to influence local realities. These in turn shape the elites dominant in water 
management and controlling access, and the institutional structures in place for water 
management. In this respect, there is no ideal model for planning intervention, in 
droughtprone areas. However, this chapter summarise findings from three perspectives: 
- Looking from the state, for directing the mobilisation ofwater for development 
- Looking from the village and the system, for negotiating local water security 
- Struggling in between, negotiating the drought-scarcity nexus in droughtprone areas. 
8.3.1. Looking from the state, for negotiating water development 
There are powerful economic choices and political motivations behind the design of 
data collection and analysis, and droughtprone and scarcity-affected regions generate 
powerful data collection dilemmas. Data generated has often tended to serve economic 
planning needs rather than technology design and local equity. In target-driven 
development planning, as seen in the DPAP and IRDP of India, technology choices 
often got shaped by wider financial and political forces, rather than the real resource 
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situation. There are choices in how regional political or agricultural development 
organisations, rather than hydrological planning institutions, shape water programmes. 
It is the real power of these institutions and their interfaces with villagers, that have 
major influences on village-level experiences and capabilities in resource management 
and technology use. The analytical and statistical approaches used to identify risks to 
production and availability of water by public agencies have largely failed to show the 
dimensions of scarcity as experienced by local people in their individual lives and 
social relations. These also fail to show how diversity of technologies in use is related 
with understanding of scarcity by local people, beyond the dominant forms promoted. 
8.3.2 Looking from the village and the system, for negotiating water security 
None of the case studies indicated much recognition of higher level hydrological 
authority at local level. People struggled and manoeuvred with data designed on more 
scientific lines. Information and guidelines may be better institutionalised within simple 
guidelines, rules and regulations - as documented for local water management in 
Yemen and PHM in India. Both the Yemen case study and the Indian groundwater 
study also showed how village and community politics had to be factored into 
technology choices - technology is never simply handed out or simply accepted. 
Unpacking disputes around technology, and working with them as a social arena rather 
than a social problem, can be a powerful learning tool for individuals and local groups 
(if started before conflict erupts). This thesis has shown, like Mchta (1998) that local 
people do have diverse strategies and knowledge they used in the face of lack of water 
or restricted access. It has also shown how local practice in water rights is a critical 
source of information on how groups allow innovation in water use in spite of scarcities 
and drought risks, while keeping control of their water sources. 
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8.3.3 Struggling in between: negotiating the drought-scarcity nexus in 
droughtprone areas 
This thesis has shown that it both possible and necessary to understand how contexts of 
scarcity inter-relate with different forms of drought if we are to understand the needs 
and strategies of water users. Also that these can manifest themselves particularly 
through the performance of technologies and agencies, which in turn relate with the 
reshaping and new differentiation of livelihoods and agrarian relations. Poorly- 
designed policies of technology development have helped to increase vulnerability to 
drought, and drive owr-exploitation of water resources. However, Chapter 5 showed 
two significant cognitive shifts, in the use of biomass concepts, and in how water use 
can be mediated by analysis of the components of technology, and their redesign to 
transform social relations of water control (as for the control of electricity use). 
In liaising between the state and the village, the district- or local river-level is a 
critical one in the design of water information systems and in building knowledge and 
trust between local people. Local government or system representatives and the front- 
line workers of agencies, are as important (and may actually be more important) than 
new basin level initiatives in representation and management. The nature of the expert 
system is critical, both in how it has developed its own norms, and whether it is 
prepared to accept its own fallibility and be open to both new science and more 
interdisciplinary and action-oriented research findings. 
This thesis confirms some of the fmdings of Mehta (1998), that the value of a focus 
on water scarcity is how it brings attention to relational aspects of water use. However, 
we also need to take care about the biases a particular focus may bring. Mehta's work 
also asks to understand the relations that act across society, and between society and 
resources. We should not only target one context of scarcity and risk a mechanistic 
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portrayal of the experiences, strategies and knowledge of local people in getting water 
in relation to physical shortages which can have diverse origins. 
The case studies in is thesis have shown that rarely was only one `form' of scarcity 
in place but rather several came together. Rather it has shown that economic, structural 
and designed water scarcities can be better seen as sets of relations than broker access 
and performance, often through particular technical and institutional norms, networks 
and power relations. Thus rather than producing another new term to claim a more 
specific focus or integrative representation for water scarcity, an effective way to better 
understanding could be to explicitly focus on the social relations emergent through 
integrative study of forces in economic, structural and designed water scarcity. This 
helps understanding of the mechanisms and flows of power and resources that link 
them and thus shape action around an experienced water shortage. Returning to Figure 
2.1, policies related to scarcity could also give better integrated attention to the focus 
public action - adaptive capacity, renegotiated governance, allocation and system 
design; and conflict resolution - rather than just focusing on one of these, as can happen 
if one discourse becomes dominant. 
The diverse conceptions of scarcity in use -- economic scarcity (where shortages 
and exclusion are seen in economic conditions and related with the key institutions 
mediating water policics and water systems for economic change: Government of 
Maharashtra, 1973; Sexton, 1990,1992), structural scarcity (resource capture by elites: 
Homer-Dixon, 1995); orders and spirals of scarcity (emphasising first the physical 
dimension of scarcity then the second order scarcity related to lack of skills and 
adaptive capacity in public management institutions: Turton and Ohlsson, 1999, Turton 
and Warner, 2002); and system-embedded `designed scarcities' (reflecting water 
allocation choices and relations acting through technology at scheme and basin level 
and shaping local action for water delivery; Wade, 1988, Uphoff et al., 1990; Vincent, 
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1991; Mollinga, 1998; Oorthuizen, 2003; Vincent and Manzungu, 2005) - all interact 
through the public domain and in public action around water scarcity in a state. The 
cognitive norms and their places of institutionalisation and practice in these domains of 
water control also reflect the priorities and relations of control acting across states, and 
can become a means to understand the actor networks, political mechanisms and new 
technology options involved. 
The lesson from the cognitive history of this thesis is that more research and critical 
science is needed, to understand how these scarcity dynamics interact to shape agrarian 
as well as national economic transformatiorr and in turn reshape water cycles and 
drought events. For example, focusing on structural scarcity alongside designed 
scarcities shows the challenge to breaking economic scarcities present through the 
financial and political powers of elites - that might otherwise continue to subvert 
equitable water access to water resources, shape conflicts and limit creation of 
meaningful new scientific and technical norms in water allocation and operations. 
Attention to `second-order scarcity' has also helped to bring special attention to the 
reform of public agencies and new platforms of social action related with scarcity of 
access and other injustices. However attention to this alone has a weakness in the way 
it can focus just on the ideals of new action and new structures, rather than the realities 
of local struggle in transformation in water use. It can still fail to address a to `third 
order scarcity' for this kind of typology, that becomes clear with greater attention to 
designed water scarcities. Thiss the existence of differential risks, uncertainties, and 
injustice in access to water between users and differing ecological instabilities for them 
resulting from science, technology and agencies in control - that may still materialise 
even under transforming water management institutions. 
Thus such a nexus and linkage approach enables a view beyond one dominant 
discourse, to see how the norms and claims within them still need to be debated and 
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contested. It thus also addresses difficulties in engaging explicitly in critical science 
and engineering to develop more inclusive and socially-conscious scientific and 
technical norms for facing water scarcity. Such a conceptual framework can start the 
more integrated study of drought and scarcity that many authors have called for. 
Combined attention is possible to the physical shortage, hydrological linkages and 
social mechanisms shaping access to and use of different water, sources in water-scarce 
regions, so we better understand people's coping strategies around drought dynamics 
versus exclusion from water, and where agencies might reform However, I think we 
still need more work to understand the transformation of operational and design 
capabilities for limited water supply when recognising these scarcity domains, together 
with creation of new social mechanisms and platforms and direct action that struggle 
for greater equity and justice. This also links with the new scientific `rationality as 
openness' referred to by Hoppe in the opening quotes. 
8.4 MEETING NEW OBJECTIVES IN SCARCITY MANAGEMENT THROUGH A 
COGNITIVE APPROACH 
8.4.1 Breaking narrow approaches to water planning , 
A cognitive framework can help a scientist and engineer in the critical study of thcir 
own knowledge and its relation with action and outcome. In this thesis, I have 
documented the following areas of critical reflection for cognition that could transform 
individual and collective agency, including: 
- the basic understanding of consciousness and processes of knowledge growth 
and belief; 
- the development of critical science 
to reshape the work of scientific specialities 
and agencies; 
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- the content of knowledge used in understanding, and how this is rclatcd to 
inclusion of different scts and forms of knowlcdgc, different forms of 
representation, and different methodologies of research and knowledge generation; 
- changing associative theories used to ascribe outcomes to certain relations and 
processes and cause with effect; 
- cognisance allowed to determine utility or truth and propose action: and thus 
how certain knowledge scts, artefacts and Was bccomcs instruments of public 
option, action and new knowlcdgc generation; 
- consclentisation on the relations structuring knowlcdgc, power and control; 
- cognition used In design and operation of technology and gcncration of 
knowledge around this. 
When applied into the study of drought and scarcity these can give a better 
understanding of how knowledge relates with action and outcomes, and the spaces for 
change in institutions involved in development policy, implementing change and 
intervening locally. I iowcver, there has to be focus with water users for critical analysis 
of norms in place, to show the hydrological, technological and social realities in water 
use, and the interplay ofcollcctivitics, social arcrus and public action around scarcity. 
8.4.2 Understanding participation as struggle and negotiation as a process 
In all the studies, despite different cognitive and technical norms in each type of 
agency, each also had a'hibitus', and it was usually external actors that tried to reshape 
these. However this reshaping can rarely be influenced by an individual, as my 
documented attempts show. Rather reshaping comes from concerted action in a broader 
social arena, as shown with the new water management institutions in Zimbabwe. 
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Neither the building of participatory approaches nor the creation of platforms for 
negotiation is straightforward, as especially the Yemen case study showed. The 
difficulties to appreciate and work with struggles and conflict, which emerge in any 
move towards concerted action, do need more attention. Either these may not be 
expressed well, or groups may use their own cognitive and technical norms as framing 
discourses that ensure their role in a debate but also protect their interests (even though 
these norms may be widely flouted in everyday life). Following Gigerenzer and Todd 
(1999) one tool is to look at the coherence (cognitive consistency) and correspondence 
(structural coupling of actors, social context of ideas and their domain of existence). 
This can help to see the realism of what people argue and say they may do, and the 
failures in coherent cognition that also includes a social dimension. Also a cognitive 
space (and development arena) like a droughtprone area can be studied for the diversity 
of cognition among agents within it. The study of sociotechnical processes around 
technology, and the actor networks that move water, are an important focus in this 
space (Mollinga, 1998). The differentiation of Roling (2002) between collective, 
distributive and multiple cognition is also helpful here. Better water management under 
scarcity at a local level comes where there is a collective cognition where rules can be 
enforced (is in Yemen in the past). However, the rapid social and environmental 
change in droughtprone areas has meant that such collective cognition has not had time 
to build. Instead there is distributed (or partial) cognition or multiple cognition that has 
led to the problematic programmes of research and development seen in the India 
cases, %%ith their dialogues of the deaf between agencies, NGOs and farmers, and the 
invisibility of small farmers in hydrometric analysis seen in the Zimbabwe. 
366 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGYANDAGENCYINTHEDEVELOPMENTOFDROUGIITPRONE AREAS 
8.4.3 Determining that change can happen 
The advantage of writing a history, that has also encompassed political and cultural 
diversity of governance, is that it can show how certain cognitive and technical norms 
evolve and how quickly they become embedded. However, the studies show that, if 
these norms do not change, agencies lose their reputation if not their existence. 
Changes in social order - whether in new structure of representation as in Yemen, or in 
new state policies as in India and Zimbabwe - do create times and spaces for change. In 
these case studies, no agencies have changed strongly from within - but new policies, 
new development frameworks and public opinion have helped create new frameworks 
for resource study, as shown with the hydrological audits and participatory 
hydrological monitoring in India, and new river management institutions in Zimbabwe. 
8.5 EPILOGUE 
I hope writing a study in this way helps to show the hydrologist and engineer the 
weight of social action to consider in their work. Taking time to track a cognitive 
history of the practices of their field and that are used in their region of work, to be 
aware of cognitive differences of those they strive to work with, and work with both 
critical and post-normal science and engineering in their agencies, may yet help build 
the equitable access, environmentally sound technologies and sustainable water 
development that people seek for the droughtprone areas of this world. Focusing on a 
third level of water scarcity, and the dynamics of social processes around water 
availability and norms to manage equity around it, can show scientists and engineers 
the need for dialogue and renegotiation around the norms used in drought and scarcity 
analysis. This includes an ability to recognise, address and adjudicate inequity and 
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injustice emerging in contexts of water scarcity also shaped by natural drought 
mechanisms, and to aim for negotiation rather than imposition of new institutions to 
resolve them 
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APPENDIX 2 DRY SPELL ANALYSIS 
Analysis of dryspells has developed both to analysis simple frequencies of dryspells of time 
periods 1,2j .... r, and the nature of persistence of 
dryness between one period and the 
subsequent period. The incidence of particular lengths of dryspell has often been of interest in 
planning, both in days in a dryspell that affect actual crop growth, but also time periods of dry 
years. Historical analysis to portray such risks helps in understanding of conditions of 
vulnerability and related policies of transformation. Analysis of persistence has been 
particularly important in weather forecasting and monitoring of drought conditions, and is 
important in understanding and designing coping strategies (for mitigation and damage 
rtstitution). In both cases there usually a close understanding developed of relations of dry 
conditions with the weather phenomena causing them, again helping with forecasting and 
choices of action. 
For studying dryspells, or runs of dry periods,, it is useful to distinguish two sets of frequency 
information: - 
i) frequencies of spells of exactly 1,2,3,... n days 
FhFZ, F3 ..... F. Let the sum of series F1+F2+F3+ ... +Fo -Q 
While such a frequency study will show a general decline in frequencies, it will not be a 
smooth progression, and may show several minor peaks. This makes the sequence more 
difficult to model. 
ii) frequencies of spells of at least 1,2,3 ... n days 
Tk, TZ, T3 ... T.. where 
Ti'. Q, T= " Q. F, T3 -Q (F1+F=)..... 
Let the sum of series T1+T2+T3+ ... +T. =S 
This frequency series is easier to analyse. 
For understanding persistence, the statistical analysis of the frequency of runs of dry days is 
determined by assumptions on the nature of 'persistence' of dryness between one day and the 
subsequent day. One can identify three conditions 
of persistence: - 
t) 'zero pcrsistcnce' or'constant probability', where the chances of a further day remain the same 
no matter how long the dry spell 
ii) 'positive persistence', where the chance of a further dry spell increases as the length of dry 
spell increases 
iii) 'negative persistence' or'antipersistence', where the chance of a further dry day decreases as 
the length of dry spell increases. 
«teile one pattern of persistence may prevail throughout the range of lengths of run, it is more 
likely that 'persistence' will vary as the length of run increases, as this is influenced by the life 
cycle of meteorological phenomena causing dry spells. Thus Belasco (1948), in a study of 
anticyclonic spells at Kew, found positive persistence in the range 3-20 day spells, but strong 
anti-pcrsistence thereafter. Lawrence (1957) in a study of south England noted up to 5 
persistence trends across longer dry spells, with positive persistence in spells 3-10 days, and in 
spells 20-25 days. IIc commented that a study of persistence over dry spells of varying lengths 
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gives a useful variable in differentiating 'weather areas', and in medium and long-range 
forecasting at a site. 
Simple frequency studies 
Data from (i) can be used to study average length of dryspell (1) from the formula 
laverage ° In-fn where 1 is dryspell length and f is frequency of spell of this length 
Ufn 
However, the higher incidence of small spells of days (1,2.3.4), often occurring several times 
in a month, hampers understanding of frequencies of longer dryspells, unless the study 
demarcates a minimum specific length for a dryspell and confines the study to frequencies of 
spells longer than this. Ratnam et al (1975) applied simple studies of this kind in Dharwar in 
India. 
Alternatives using (ii) can be to 
i) from frequency data, assess the average number of times a dryspell event of at least ... r days occurs in a given month over a set of years. If a dryspell event S of at least ... t days occurs 
on average once in two years or 50% of the time, it could be labelled S50. 
ii) rank to maximum dryspell event of at least ... t days occurring each year in a given month. This can related to recurrence interval (return period) and thence the probability of such a 
magnitude of a size of event occurring in that month in a given year. 
The earliest studies of probabilities in the dry areas of India developed to study the probability 
of spells of at least r days (r days or more). These were estimated by calculating actual number 
of spells of at least r days in a given month over a set of years, as a percentage of the total 
number of spells in that month in the years under analysis (Ratnam et al, 1975). However, this 
is a complex calculation for longer spells that run over one month or across months. 
Some workers (Buishand 1978) have fitted discrete probability distributions to dry spell 
frequencies. The most appropriate is the Negative Binomial Distribution (NBD) developed 
from the Binomial Distribution (see Haan 1977). In practice, however, there were very few 
advantages of distribution fitting over the use of series, the technique involving at least equal 
amounts of computation. Furthermore, the values generated by the NBD are similar to those 
generated by a logarithmic series. The NBD also made the assumption that p, the chance of a 
dry day, was constant throughout the dry spell. For these reasons, probability distributions are 
not fitted in this report. 
Studies to assist weather study and forecasting 
Dry spells form a series of discontinuous, independent events. A study of the frequencies of 
spells of 1,2,3 ... n days is thus suited to analysis by mathematical series. 
Appropriate Mathematical Series 
i) to generate frequencies of at least n days, there have been two approaches 
a) the geometric series 
of the form .... N, NP2, NP3, ... NP "'I """ provides the simplest solution. 
There is great similarity between this and the binomial distribution. 
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N= number of spells of at least 1 day 
P= constant probability that the dry spell will last at least one more day 
P is easily solved, since the sum of this geometric progression, which is also the sum of 
frequency series S is 
S=Ni. e. P =1-N 
S I- P 
Lawrence has shown that this simple series can give a reasonable forecast of frequencies, 
although a more appropriate value for P emerged if the study commenced from a 3day dry 
spell i. e. N= frequency of spells of at least 3 days, NP= frequency of spells of at least 4 days 
etc. 
The disadvantage of this series is use of a constant P value, which is unrealistic in most 
climatological conditions. 
b) the 'natural persistence series' 
In this series the frequency of runs lasting at least 2,3 ... t days can be represented by 
N, NP2P3, NP2P3P4...., Np2133 ... Po 
where pp = number of spells lasting at least t days 
number of spells lasting at least (t-I) days 
where n>l 
N= number of spells lasting at least I day 
P, = number of dry days 
total number of days 
This series, although it involves more computation, is still easy to generate, and has the 
advantage of providing a set of 'persistence possibilities' which vary as the spell grows longer. 
These can be used for spatial comparison and forecasting in the way suggested by Lawrence 
(1957). Lawrence also found that this series gave the best results in generating frequencies. 
The persistence probability Pn that a dry day will persist as a dryspell for at least 2,3,4.., 
days can be represented by 
Pet P2P3. P2P3P4 ..... , P2P3P4 ..... Pa 
The natural persistence series has been used to analyse dry spell frequencies and scrics in this 
study. It is considered that this series takes the most realistic attitude to persistence, and it is 
also an easy series to compute once the frequency study has been made. 
ii) to generate frequencies for spells of exactly 12 3 ... n days 
c) The logarithmic series has been most commonly applied. The components of a histogram 
of this frequency series could be represented by an equation of the form 
a+ act x +ac2x2: + aC3X3 + ..... +ac,, 
e4 
where c and x combine to give a probability which can change over the period. 
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The logarithmic series 
" (x+ x2 + x3 +.... x'.. ) 23n 
can be used as an approximation. This can be developed for dry spell wies as 
Qaa+ar+a? +ar3 +... a? *' C 
234n 
The summation for (x + x2 + x' +.... x") is log, (,., ) 
23n 
Thus for a set of dry spell frequencies modelled by equation (1) 
Qa -a-log. (1-r) 
r 
The effect of the logarithmic series is to imply positive persistence, i. e. the longer the dry spell, 
the more likely that another day will be dry, but the persistence effect is still controlled. In 
equation (i) a and r are both site specific. (Lawrence (1957) proposed a graphical solution but it 
makes the series difficult to compute. 
Where dry spells in a month are studied, one must consider spells which last over the end of the 
month. Two conventions have been used in the literature: 
i) Buishand (1977) allocated all spells commencing in month m to month m 
ii) Lawrence (1957) allocated a spell which ran over the month to the month which experienced 
the greater portion of the spell. If a spell was divided equally between months then half the 
spell was allocated to each month concerned. 
The second convention has been used in this analysis as it is more appropriate to the pattern of 
monsoon rainfall. The first convention would reduce the illustration of the driest month, as, for 
example, longer spells covering much of August but starting at the end of July would be 
allocated to July. 
After compilation of maps using the persistence probability criteria, the following Rave the best 
spatial distinction within the DPAM - 
(i) for June, (P, o). 
(u) for July, also (P10), also provided useful distinctions and provided more information that a 
map of (Pu). The map of the 50 per cent dry spell So also provided some interesting 
contrasts; 
('iii) for August the map of (P u) provided a very good spatial contrast, Nmv%tr, the maps of 
(P23) and (Sso) distinguish core areas of long dry spells more clearly, and arc et= in 
Chapter 3; 
(iv) for September, none of the criteria reflected very clear contrasts, perhaps because this 
month is often one of showers and dry spells across the entire state. (Pis) gave the clearest 
distinctions. 
(v) in October (Pis) provided the greatest spatial information. 
More details of the analysis by month arc given in Vincent (1978). 
The following frequency tables show runs of at least N days, from analysis of rainfall roeonis 
1901-1976 for selected stations in the DPAM 
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MOISTURE AVAILABILITY INDICES: THE STUDY OF RUNS OF YEARS 
WITH DEPRESSED YIELDS 
A computer programme was designed to print out the ratio of actual monthly rainfall to 
average monthly PET for all months 1901-1976. Humid and moist months (ratio >05) 
were distinguished from moderately dry and dry months (ratio <0.5). A number of criteria 
were then developed to monitor different kinds of kharif and rabi risks, and thus to 
establish the overall level of drought risks and spells of drought years. 
The specific meteorological events which result in crop failure are: - 
(i) late onset of the monsoon rains (after mid July) or complete failure of the 
monsoons. The criteria to test for this were (a) no humid or moist month before 
August, and (b) no humid or moist month until September. 
(ii) Low rainfall or dry spells after onset. The criteria to test for these was a 
moderately dry or dry month ( or months) after a moist or humid month marking 
onset. This criteria also enables a study of the changes of 1,2,3... months of good 
rainfall for kharif production. 
(iii) Moderately dry or dry September. This could indicate delayed planting of rabi 
crops, although this is not an automatic source of low crop yields. 
(iv) Inadequate rainfall for rabi crops. Rabi risks must be considered in relation to soil 
depth and moisture storage. Section 2.3 suggested that deep soils over 90cm can 
support a rabi crop without further showers, after good rains in September. 
Medium soils in the range 50-90cm., however, need further showers in 
October/November to support a reasonable crop. Thus two criteria were 
established: 
(a) no moist or humid month in either September or October. This leads to 
crop failure on all rabi soils, deep and medium. 
(b) Only one moist or humid month in September or October. This will 
seriously depress yields from rabi crops on all but very deep soils. 
Criteria (i) and (ii) combine to give 'kharif risks', criteria (iv) gives 'rabi risks' and 
from these the sequences of years of poor kharif and rabi crops can be established. 
Chapter three has pointed out, however, that it is not enough to consider the 
frequency of bad years, one must consider the incidence of very good years which 
would generate surplus for investment, as well as sequences of bad years. Thus 
one can also distinguish: 
(v) Years of 3,4,5 consecutive humid or moist months after onset, to provide good 
kharif crops. 
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(i) in kharif, 'total failure' will result from either failure of onset, late onset of the 
monsoon in August or if there are two or more dry or moderately dry months in 
succession. General depressed yields will result if there is one dry or moderately 
dry month 
(ii) in rabi, 'total rabi failure' will result if there is no moisture or humid month in 
September or October. 'General depressed yields' arc likely if only one moist 
or humid month is received, especially on the medium deep soils. The risks 
from a dry September, because they depend on other features such as 
temperature, are not included in the study. 
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GEOLOGY AND WELL DEVELOPMENT IN RAYALASEEMA 
Unclassified crystalline L 
and Archean rocks 
Pre-cambrian - Paleozoic 
granites 
Quartzites and shales of 
lower Cuddapah system 
C4ddapah-Kurnool system 
t.:: sedimentary rocks 
Carboniferous-Triessic-Jurassic 
'=, rocks of 'Gondwana' system 
00o Deccan trap rocks 
'' Coastal tertiary deposits 
Pleistocene and recent 
sand and alluvium 
Fault and extoiiation trends in metamorphic rocks 
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Fig. A4.1 Annual rainfall and geology of Andhra Pradesh 
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Table A 4.1 Standard costs in well requiring blasting 
Depth Dcscription ýý 
(m) 
& Cost (rs) 
2 Excavation of work 22 x 22 2205 
area in loamy & 
clayey soils 
2 
Ilud gravels and soft 8x8 463 
2 disintegrated rock 
removable by pickaxe 
2 and crowbar 
2 Hard disintegrate! 1529 
rock removable by 8x8 
pickaxe and crowbar 
I land disintegrated 8x8 3978 
rock requiring partial 
blasting 
Ilard rocks and 
14277 
boulders more than 3 
8x8 
cubic metres in size 
requiring partial 23152 
blasting 
Other costs 
explosives 
Uning 
uW 
4400 
pump 5000 
land 500 
development 
TOTAL 35252 
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Table A. 41 Standard costs in well not requiring blasting, 1983/84 
Depth Description d gth 
(m) 
& Cost (rs) 
2 Excavation of work 22 x 22 2905 
area in loamy & stiff 
clay 
2 8x8 553 
2 Mamis 1-4 8x8 1105 
All in soft 
2 disintegrated rock 8x8 2210 
removable by pickaxe 
2 and crowbar 8x9 3715 
10038 
Other costs 
lining 
8000 
PUMP 5000 
land 500 development 
TOTAL 22932 
393 
One matte is 2 metres 
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Table A43 Excavation cost of CI well at Cherlokothur, Dhone block, 
Kurnool district (1983/84 costs) 
Matto (2m) Description Length & width 
m 
Cost (rs) 
1 Loamy & stiff clay lox 10 518 
Gravel & soß 
2 disintegrated rock 10 x 10 1057 
3 Soft disintegrated rock 
removable by pickaxe 
and crowbar lox 10 2047 
4) 1 lard disintegrated rock 
removable by pickaxe 10 x 10 4655 
5) and crowbar 
11381 
Other costs 1 
Dry stone masonry, 
2530 
including cost, 
conveyance and 
labour (top 2% 
mattu only) 
2155 
baling out charges 
TOTAL 16066 
1. Curies comment "baling and lining adjusted to kccp within total" (150000 R). 
Sourcc: Panchayat Samiti records, Dhonc Bock, Kurnool District. 
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Table A4A. Actual excavation cost of CI well at Venkataraymipalli, Dhone block, Kurnool 
district (1983/84 prices) 
Matsu Description Length & Width 
(m) 
Cost (Rs) 
I Loamy & stiff clay 10 x 10 519 
Soft disintegrated rock 
2 removed by pickaxe 10 x 10 1410 
and crowbar 
3 Hard disintegrated rock 7.5 x 7.5 2217 
removed by pickaxe 
and crowbar 
4 Hard disintegrated rock 7.5 x 7.5 4035 
requiring partial 
blasting 
8181 
Other costs 
Dry stone masonry, 3725 including cost, conveyance 
and labour (all matt us 
claimed) 
Baling charge, 30 days at 
70R per day 2100 
Subtotal 
14006 
P. S. charges 
994 
TOTAL 15000 
Source: DRDA Records, Kurnool. 
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Table A4.5. Actual excavation cost of well at M. Thimmapuram, Nandval block, 
Kurnool district (1983/84 prices) 
Mattu Description Length & width 
(m) 
Cost 
I Black cotton soils & 401 
hard g avclly soils 
2 Hard soils & son 871 
disintegrated rock 
3 Hard rock soils 2392 
requiring partial 
4 blasting 4227 
8236 
Other costs 
Baling out charges 2302 
Blasting materials 1354 
11892 
No details of lining. 
Source: DRDA Records, Kurnool. 
